Quality Companies, LLC, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0154

Quality Companies, LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Corey Lee Albertson, individually and d/b/a/ American Towing,
Appellant.

Filed August 19, 2019
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-17084

Erik F. Hansen, Kirk A. Tisher, Burns Hansen, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Matthew J. Bialick, Johnson Bialick Law Firm, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this appeal following a bench trial, appellant, an impound-lot operator, challenges
a district court decision requiring appellant to return a vehicle to respondent, a commercial-
vehicle-leasing company . Because the district court did not err by determining that
appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of Minnes ota Statutes section
168B.06 (2018), we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review
This case arises on appeal following a bench trial in which the district court found
in favor of respondent Quality Companies, LLC, which holds power of attorney to engage
in various activities related to the truck at issue in this case, and against impound -lot
operator, appellant Corey Lee Albertson. In an appeal from a bench trial, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Findings of fact are
clearly erroneous if they are not reasonably supported b y the evidence and the reviewing
court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Gjovik
v. Strope, 401 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. 1987). On appea l, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the district court’s factual findings and defer to the district court’s
opportunity to assess witness credibility. Prahl v. Prahl , 627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn.
App. 2001). But we review de novo a dis trict court’s conclusions of law, including the

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interpretation of statutes. Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord ’s, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 364
(Minn. 2009); Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003).
II. Legal and Statutory Framework
The is sue presented on appeal is whether appellant provided adequate statutory
notice to respondent under Minnesota Statutes chapter 168B. This chapter regulates the
treatment of abandoned motor vehicles and articulates the rights and responsibilities
afforded to impound -lot operators who engage in impounding or storing abandoned
vehicles. See Minn. Stat. §§ 168B.01 to .16 ( 2018). An “impound -lot operator” is “a
person who engages in impounding or storing, usually temporarily, unauthorized or
abandoned vehicles.” Minn. Stat. § 168B.011, subd. 8.
After impound ment, the operator “must inform the registered owner within five
days that the vehicle has been taken and may be reclaimed by paying all towing and storage
fees.” Everything Etched, Inc. v. Shakopee Towing, Inc., 634 N.W.2d 450, 453-54 (Minn.
App. 2001) (citing Minn. Stat. §§ 168B.06, subd. 1, .07, subd. 1). The notice must set forth
the date and place of the taking, provide identifying information for the vehicle, inform the
vehicle owner of the right to reclaim the vehicle upon paying the associated fees, advise
the owner that failure to reclaim the vehicle may constitute waiver, and state that the owner
has the right to retrieve personal property from the vehicle without charge. Minn. Stat.
§ 168B.06, subd. 1(b). The notice “shall be sent by mail to the registered owner . . . of an
impounded vehicle .” Id., subd. 2. “If it is impossib le to determine with reasonable
certainty the identity and address of the registered owner . . . the notice shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the area where the motor vehicle was towed

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from or abandoned.” Id. If the owner f ails to respond to the notice within 45 days, an
impound-lot operator may dispose of the vehicle and its contents. Minn. Stat. §§ 168B.051,
subd. 2 (providing that a vehicle impounded at a private impound lot is eligible for disposal
or sale under section 168B.08, 45 days after notice to the owner), 168B.08, subd. 1(a) (“If
an abandoned or unauthorized vehicle taken into custody by . . . any impound lot is not
reclaimed under section 168B.07, subdivision 1, it may be disposed of or sold at auction
or sale when eligible pursuant to sections 168B.06 and 168B.07.”).
III. Appellant’s Failure to Comply with Minn. Stat. § 168B.06
In May 2017, appellant towed an abandoned truck to an impound lot. The truck
carried Indiana license plates and featured respondent’s name, address, phone number, and
business description on its mud flaps . Respondent held power of attorney to service the
truck and was responsible for handling all matters related to the truck. Appellant searched
the State of Minnesota Department of Public Sa fety database (the DPS) in an effort to
identify the truck’s owner. When the DPS search revealed that the truck was not titled in
Minnesota, appellant published notice of impoundment in June 2017, in a paper of general
circulation in the area. Appellant did not attempt to locate the owner through the Indiana
Bureau of Motor Vehicles or provide notice to respondent. In August 2017, appellant
purported to transfer ownership of the truck to himself , and submitted a title application
for the truck to the DPS. Respondent filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that
appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of chapter 168B. Following a
bench trial, the district court determined that resp ondent was entitled to possession of the
truck and that appellant had no interest in, or right to possession of, the truck.

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On appeal, a ppellant argues that he is the lawful owner of the truck because he
published notice of impoundment under Minn. Stat. § 168B.06, and respondent failed to
reclaim the truck. This argument presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we
review de novo. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud , 853 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Minn. 2014). The
object of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018); see also Linn v. BCBSM, Inc., 905 N.W.2d 497,
501 (Minn. 2018). We apply the plain meaning of a statutory provision if the legislative
intent “is clear from the unambiguous language of the statute.” Staab, 853 N.W.2d at 716-
17. We also “give effect to all of the statute’s provisions,” and “no word, phrase, or
sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Allan v. R.D. Offutt Co .,
869 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “We construe nontechnical words
and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings ” and “look to dictionary
definitions to determine the plain meanings of words. ” Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co .,
855 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2014).
Here, the relevant statute provides that:
When an impounded vehicle is taken into custody, the
. . . impound lot operator taking it into custody shall give
written notice of the taking within five days . . . to the registered
vehicle owner and any lienholders.
. . .
The notice shall be sent by mail to the registered owner,
if any, of an impounded vehicle and to all readily identifiable
lienholders of record. The department shall make this
information available to impound lot operators for notification
purposes. If it is impossible to determine with reasonable
certainty the identity and address of the registered owner and

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all lienholders, the notice shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the area where the m otor
vehicle was towed from or abandoned.
Minn. Stat. § 168B.06, subds. 1(a), 2.
Appellant urges this court to adopt a bright -line rule that it is statutorily
“impossible” to determine the identity of a vehicle owner with reasonable certainty where
the owner cannot be identified through the DPS database. The plain language of the statute
does not support appellant’s interpretation. The statute allows for notice by publication
only “[i]f it is impossible to determine with reasonable certainty the identity and address
of the registered owner and all lienholders.” Id., subd. 2. The statute does not state that it
is impossible to identify an owner when the owner is not listed in the DPS, and we reject
appellant’s attempt to modify the plain language of the statute by reading in a reference to
the DPS where it does not exist. Such an interpretation would add language to the statute
that the legislature either intentionally or inadvertently omitted. See Rohmiller v. Hart, 811
N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012) (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were
intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”). The plain language of the statute does not compel
a conclusion that the legislature intended the DPS to be the only avenue to identify an
owner with reasonable certainty. Had they so intended, the legislature could have drafted
subdivision 2 to reflect that understanding. As this court does not add language to a statute
that the legislature omitted, we determine, under our de novo review, that an impound-lot
operator’s inability to find a vehicle owner through the DPS does not render the task per
se impossible.

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Instead, the statute creates a factual inquiry into whether it was possible for
appellant to determine the vehicle owner with reasonable certainty. The Minnesota
Supreme Court recognizes that:
the sufficiency of the notification remains for resolution by the
factfinder—usually the jury. Evidence of actions relative to
that determination include the nature and extent of the efforts
of the possessor to locate and provide personal notification to
the owner; and, failing i n such efforts to provide personal
notification, the nature, extent, and reasonableness of the
possessor’s efforts to provide the owner notification of his
rights by publication.
Kampsen v. County of Kandiyohi, 441 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. 1989).
Under Kampsen, it is within the province of the f act-finder to determine whether
appellant could have identified the truck owner with reasonable certainty. Id. “In an appeal
from a bench trial, we do not reconcile conflicting evidence.” Porch v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. June
26, 2002). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s factual
findings and defer to the district court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of the
witnesses. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 702.
Here, the district court found that it was not impossible for appellant to identify the
truck owner. The district court found that appellant did not attempt to contact respondent
directly, even though the company’s name, phone number, and address were “prominently
displayed on the mud flaps.” Instead, appellant ran a search through the DPS database,
which only searches for vehicles registered in Minnesota. The DPS search revealed that
the truck was not titled or plated in Minnesota. Appellant was not surprised by this result,

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given that the truck carried Indiana plates and was unlikely to be identified through the
DPS. Appellant did not attempt to contact the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles to identify
the truck’s owner. Based on these facts, the district court determined that appellant did not
satisfy his statutory obligation to identify the vehicle owner and provide notice of
impoundment. The district court’s factual findings are reasonably supported by the record
evidence and are not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.