Sokkhan Ka, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0156

Sokkhan Ka,
Appellant,

vs.

Mai Yia Vang,
Respondent.

Filed September 23, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-17-2304

Sokkhan Ka, Shoreview, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Janell M. Stanton, Wagner, Falconer & Judd, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
In this c ustody dispute, appellant argues that the district court clearly erred by
implicitly: (1) denying his motion to amend its finding that he agreed to the guardian ad
litem’s (G AL) custody recommendation ; and (2) declining to make additional findings
regarding his child -support obligation, and domestic -abuse and chemical -dependency
programming. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In September 2017, appellant-father Sokkhan Ka petitioned for parenting time and
joint legal and joint physical custody of his son , P.K., who was residing with his mother,
respondent Mai Yia Vang. Mother counter-petitioned seeking sole legal and sole physical
custody of P.K., the appointment of a GAL, an order allowing father supervised parenting
time only, and an order establishing child support.
Following a hearing, the district court appointed a GAL and allowed father
supervised parenting time . The district court also granted mo ther’s motion for child
support, awarding her $382 per month, effective July 6, 2018.
The district court held a review hearing on December 3, 2018, to receive the GAL’s
testimony and accompanying report. Prior to the hearing, father filed his objections to the
GAL’s report, including an objection to the GAL’s recommendation that mother be granted
sole physical and sole legal custody of P.K. Fat her also testified at the hearing that he
“would like to be able to make decisions for [P.K.] too, . . . Like medical stuff, school,

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anything that has to do with him.” The district court later asked father: “Do you agree with
the [GAL]’s recommendations?” to which father replied: “Yes.”
On December 31, 2018, the district court filed an order finding that “[t]he parties
agree with the recommendations made by the [GAL]” with the sole exception of a
modification to t he telephone-contact schedule. T he district court awarded mother sole
physical and sole legal custody of P.K. as recommended by the GAL. Father moved for
amended findings, asserting, among other things, that he did not agree with the GAL’s
custody recommendation. The district court did not issue a written order in response to
father’s motion to amend, but instead i ssued an amended order on January 24, 2019, t hat
corrected only clerical errors. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
GAL’s custody recommendation
Father argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to amend the finding
of fact that he assented to the GAL’s custody recom mendation. This court will “set aside
a district court’s findings of fact only if clearly erroneous, giving deference to the district
court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
where an appellate court is left with th e definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation and
citations omitted).
Following the GAL’s testimony at the December 3, 2018 hearing, the district court
found that “[t]he parties agree with the recommendations made by the [GAL], ” with the
exception of the telephone-call schedule. The district court did not amend this finding in

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its amended order, or otherwise address fath er’s motion. “ [G]enerally, a district court’s
failure to specifically address . . . a motion constitutes a denial of that motion.” Anderson
v. Anderson, 897 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. App. 2017) , review granted (Minn. Aug. 22,
2017) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Jan. 30, 2018).
Presumably, the district court based its finding on the following testimony:
The Court: Anything else you want to tell me on the
[GAL]’s recommendations?
Father: No.
The Court: All right . Do you agree with the [GAL] ’s
recommendations?
Father: Yes.
Viewed in isolation, this exchange supports the district court’s finding that father agreed
to the GAL’s custody recommendation, but put in context of the entire review hearing, the
finding is clearly erroneous.
As an initial matter, father’s indication that he agreed with the GAL’s
recommendations followed lengthy discussions of the GAL’s recommendations unrelated
to custody. Prior to father’s indication of assent, the district court questioned father
regarding his assertion that the outpatient program he planned to attend should satisfy the
GAL’s recommendation to attend anger management and regarding the apportionment of
the costs of recommended dr ug testing. The district court then concluded with the
following statement, which immediately preceded father’s assent to the GAL’s
recommendation:
So, you understand that you’ve got at least six months
to . . . go through and work every day to figure out how, for
your own sake, as well as your son’s, how you can so rt of get
your act together and deal with either mental health issues or

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chemical dependency issues or any issues you might have with
anger that perhaps in the past has led to domestic abuse
allegations. All right?

At no point did the district court ques tion father regarding the GAL’s custody
recommendation.
More importantly, father specifically objected to t he GAL’s custody
recommendation both in writing and during the hearing, and never withdrew his
opposition. In the first sentence of his w ritten objections, father stated that he “does not
agree with [the] custody recommendations contained with in the [GAL’s] report.” Father
concluded by asking the district court to “not rule on custody labels or parenting time yet
and instead schedule a review hearing in six . . . months.”
Following the GAL’s testimony at the hearing, the district court asked father if he
would like to question the GAL, and stated “I did note that you filed a memorandum with
the [c]ourt about the report.” However, the distri ct court did not address the merits of
father’s memorandum. Father then testified that “as far as seeing [P.K.], I’m fine with
those decisions, but I would like to be able to make decisions for him too.”
Father unequivocally disagreed with the GAL’s rec ommendation that mother be
granted sole physical and sole legal custody of P.K. The only evidence in the record that
supports the district court’s finding is father’s statement that he agreed with the GAL’s
recommendations regarding domestic-abuse counseling and drug-treatment programming.
At no point did father either indicate that he assented to the GAL’s custody
recommendation, or withdraw his objections to that recommendation . Therefore, the
district court’s finding is clearly erroneous and the issue of custody is remanded to the

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district court to make the required best -interests findings i n accordance with Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1 (2018).
Right to jury trial
Related to his contention that he did not assent to t he GAL’s custody
recommendation, father asserts that he was denied the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. On remand, u nder Minn. Stat. § 518.168(c) (2018) , the district court is to
determine questions of law and fact without a jury. Father does not challenge the
constitutionality of section 518.168(c) or provide any legal support for his contention that
he is entitled to a jury trial in a custody proceeding. Father also cites Minn. R. Civ. P. 39,
without providing a specific subsection of that rule, or authority supporting his contention
that he is entitled to a jury trial in a custody proceeding pursuant to that rule of civil
procedure. An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported
by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.
Schoepke v. Al exander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 ( Minn. 1971).
Therefore, father’s unsupported claim is forfeited.
Child-support modification
Father argues that the district court clearly erred by implicitly denying his moti on
to amend its findings of fact regarding his child-support obligation. In his motion to amend,
father asserted that during the December 3, 2018 hearing, “[t]he parties agreed that support
payments would be suspended starting A ugust 1, 2018. This eliminates [the question of]
are arrearage payments owed by Petitioner.” However, the record does not support father’s
characterization of the parties’ agreement.

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At the hearing, the district court noted that a medical report stated father was unable
to work from August 27 – November 27, 2018. Based upon this evidence, mother agreed
to reduce father’s child-support obligation for the period in which he was unable to work
to the statutory minimum of $50 per month. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 2 (2018).
The parties did not discuss either a complete elimination of fa ther’s child -support
obligation for that period, or a reduction applicable to any other period . The district court
asked father if he understood the modificatio n mother agreed to, and he responded:
“Yes[,]” and “I understand.” The district court also asked father if he had any ad ditional
comments, to which he responded: “No.”
The district court’s order following the review hearing does not address child
support, and the di strict court ruled from the bench that it would modify fa ther’s child-
support obligation for the three months he was unable to work. The district court’s implicit
denial of father’s request for additional findings not contemplated by the part ies’ on-the-
record agreement is not clearly erroneous.
Father also argues that the requirement that he pay the statutory minimum in child
support for the period in which he was medically unable to work violates the Americ ans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) . But father does not provide any authority in support of his
assertion that the ADA provides relief from an o therwise valid child -support obligation.
Therefore, father’s unsupported assertion is forfeited. Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135.
Programming requirements
Father argues that the district court clearly erred by implicitly denying his motion
for amended findings of fact regarding the requi rements of his domestic -abuse and

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chemical-dependency programming. Father asserts that the district court erred by not
amending its findings to include provisions for father’s proposed alternatives to the GAL’s
recommended programming. The record does not support father’s characterizatio n of the
district court’s allowance for alternative programming.
At the December review hearing father asked the district court if an outpatient
program he planned to attend could satisfy the GAL’s recommendation that he complete
an intensive domestic-abuse/anger-management progr am. The district court responded:
“I’m not saying it’s not possible, but I would have to see . . . if your doctors say, this
program contains an anger management program, that’s fine . . . . But . . . you’re going to
need to show me that you’ve fulfilled an anger management program.” Based on this
record, the district court neither granted nor denied father’s request f or alternative
domestic-abuse programming. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by implicitly
denying father’s request to make a specific finding that his alternative programming is
acceptable.
Father also asserts that the district court clear ly erred by implicitly denying his
request for additional findings regarding the specifics of his d rug-testing program. In his
motion for a mended findings, father asserted only that Minnesota Monitoring requires
more specificity regarding the type of screening and number of negative tests. Father does
not allege any asserted error committed by the district court necessitating appellate review,
only that the testing program requires additional clarification from the district court
regarding the terms of its order. Therefore, this is a matter for father to coordinate between
Minnesota Monitoring and the district court, as this court is an error-correcting court only.

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Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 2 10 (Minn. 1988) (“The function of the court of
appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.