In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. L. R. and E. T.-P., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0185

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A. L. R. and E. T.-P., Parents.

Filed August 19, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-JV-17-4506, 27-JV-18-302, 27-JV-18-1453

Marisela E. Cantu, Cantu Law Firm, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant father)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services)

Thomas J. Nolan, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Nancy Appelbaum)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cleary, C hief Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant-father A.L.R. appeals the district court’s order term inating his parental
rights to his four children, arguing that the district court ma de clearly erroneous findings
and abused its discretion in det ermining that a statutory basis for terminating his parental
rights exists and that termination of his parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

2
Because the record supports the district court’s findings, and because the district court did
not abuse its discretion in terminating A.L.R.’s parental rights, we affirm.
FACTS
A.L.R. (father) is the biological father of Child 1 (born in April 2013), Child 2 (born
in March 2016), and twins Child 3 and Child 4 (born in September 2017). All four children
were born to E.T.-P. (mother). M other is also the mother of R. G.T., the children’s older
half-brother.
Father’s Relationship With Mother
F a t h e r a n d m o t h e r a r e n o t m a r r i e d a n d d o n o t l i v e t o g e t h e r . M other has made
multiple allegations that father has threatened violence against her and also alleged that all
four of their children were conceived by rape. She has obtaine d multiple orders for
protection (OFPs) against father. She obtained one OFP that was active from June 2014 to
July 2016. She obtained another OFP in March 2017.
Child-Protection History
Father and mother have each bee n working with the Hennepin Cou nty Human
Services and Public Health Depar tment (the department) since 20 15. The department
became involved because mother was leaving Child 1 and R.G.T. i n the care of S.G.R.—
R.G.T.’s biological father, who suffered from health problems t hat rendered him unfit to
supervise children. The department filed a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)
petition alleging that mother lef t Child 1 and R.G.T. in S.G.R. ’s care and that S.G.R.
sometimes did not know where the children were, threatened to k ill the children, and on
one occasion locked R.G.T. in a car on a hot day and refused to let him out.

3
The district court ordered that R.G.T. and Child 1 remain in m other’s care under
protective supervision. But mother continued to leave the chil dren in S.G.R.’s care. She
also allowed S.G.R. to drive her children, even though S.G.R.’s medical team advised him
not to drive. In November 2015, t he district court ordered R.G .T. and Child 1 into
out-of-home placement. Child 1 was placed with father and R.G. T. was placed in foster
care. The district court eventua lly adjudicated the children t o be in need of protection or
services.
In March 2016, mother gave birt h to Child 2. Mother admitted that Child 2 was in
need of protection and services. R.G.T., Child 1, and Child 2 were eventually returned to
mother at various times in 2016 under trial home visits that we re conditioned on, among
other conditions, mother not allowing S.G.R. to drive with the children in the car.
In January 2017, S.G.R. had a car accident while Child 1 and m other were in the
car. In February 2017, following the accident, Child 1 and Child 2 were placed in father’s
care under protective supervision because mother failed to comp ly with the requirement
that she not allow S.G.R. to drive her children. In April 2017 , the department filed a
petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to R.G.T.
In August 2017, mother agreed to transfer legal and physical custody of Child 1 and
Child 2 to father. At that time, father had completed enough of his case plan, provided by
the department, that the department supported transfer of custo dy. The transfer of legal
custody order (TLC order) gave mother the right to supervised v isitation time at a neutral
facility. At the time the district court issued the TLC order, mother had an OFP in place

4
against father. The TLC order provided that if the OFP was res cinded, mother would be
allowed unsupervised visitation conditioned on her sobriety and mental health.
Mother gave birth to twins, Child 3 and Child 4, in September 2 017. They were
immediately placed in foster car e. Shortly thereafter, the dep artment filed a petition to
terminate mother’s parental rights to the twins. Genetic testi ng, completed in
November 2017, proved that father was the twins’ biological fat her. The district court
consolidated mother’s termination of parental rights file (TPR petition) regarding R.G.T.
with the TPR petition regarding the twins for trial.
After the twins were born but before father had a formal case plan for the twins, the
department offered to facilitate unsupervised visitation betwee n father and the twins.
Father did not take advantage of the department’s efforts, refu sing multiple proposals by
the department to have visitation with the twins. At one point, father stated that he wanted
the department to send the twins to him when they were about a year old. Father did not
start visitation with the twins until April 2018.
In January 2018, the department filed a CHIPS petition relating t o C h i l d 1 a n d
Child 2, who were in father’s custody, alleging that father and the two children had an
unsupervised visit with mother at mother’s apartment in violation of the TLC order and the
OFP. On March 21, 2018, the department filed an amended CHIPS petition relating to
Child 1 and Child 2, alleging that the department found photogr aphs, apparently taken as
late as March 2018, on R.G.T.’s new cell phone that showed mother in father’s apartment.
One of the photographs included Child 2. According to the amended petition, mother and
father denied violating the OFP, and mother continued to report that she needed an OFP

5
against father to ensure her safety. On March 22, 2018, one da y after it filed the CHIPS
petition, the department filed a TPR petition regarding father’s and mother’s parental rights
to Child 1 and Child 2.
After evidentiary hearings in Ap ril 2018 on the CHIPS petition, the district court
found that father violated the OFP and the TLC order and conclu ded that the violations
posed safety concerns to the children. The district court ordered that Child 1 and Child 2
be removed from father’s care and placed into out-of-home placement. Child 1 and Child 2
were placed with the same foster provider as the twins and R.G.T.
After the district court ordered Child 1 and Child 2 into out-o f-home placement in
April, the department offered father a new case plan. This case plan was very similar to an
earlier case plan provided to father on March 21, 2018, regarding the twins. The new case
plan required father to, inter a lia, (1) participate in individ ual therapy, (2) participate in
parenting education classes, (3) participate in anger-management programming, (4) engage
in supervised visitation with all four children, (5) abide by t he OFP that was in place,
(6) maintain contact with the department, (7) allow the department access to his residence,
and (8) complete a psychological assessment and all recommendat ions of the assessment.
This plan required a full psychological assessment of father’s mental health and parenting
capacities rather than just the diagnostic assessment that the March 21 case plan required.
The department provided the April case plan to address its concern that father continued to
leave Child 1 and Child 2 with mother, an inappropriate caregiv er, and violate the OFP.
The department provided father with a copy of the new case plan and explained to father
why it was necessary.

6
After the case plan was provided to father, mother requested th a t t h e O F P b e
vacated. On May 7, 2018, the district court vacated the OFP.
On May 14, the department filed an amended TPR petition to add father as a party
to the TPR case regarding the twins, as the previously filed TPR petition listed only mother
as a party to the case.
Ultimately, two separate trials t ook place that are relevant to the appeal: a trial
regarding mother’s parental righ ts to R.G.T. and the twins, and a trial regarding father’s
parental rights to his four children and mother’s parental rights to Child 1 and Child 2.
Trial Regarding Mother’s Parental Rights to R.G.T. and the Twins
The trial on the TPR petitions relating to mother’s parental rights to R.G.T., Child 3,
and Child 4 occurred on various dates from October 2, 2017, to May 16, 2018. Following
trial, the district court made extensive findings, ultimately ordering that mother’s parental
rights to R.G.T., Child 3, and Child 4 be terminated.
The district court concluded that mother was unable to parent a ny of her children.
It found that mother repeatedly left her children in S.G.R.’s c are in violation of the
children’s safety plan and repeat edly allowed S.G.R. to drive t he children. It noted that
mother’s request that the most recent OFP be dismissed was evid ence that she places her
own needs above the safety of he r children, considering her con sistent and repeated
allegations against father throughout the case. The district c ourt reasoned that mother’s
decisions to allow S.G.R. to drive the children and to vacate the OFP show that the services
provided to her did not engender meaningful change in her paren ting abilities and
demonstrate that mother has ongoing issues with decision-making and lack of insight. The

7
district court also found that mother’s mental-health issues negatively impact her ability to
safely and appropriately parent her children.
The district court ultimately determined that two statutory bases existed to terminate
mother’s parental rights to R.G. T. and the twins—(1) palpable u nfitness to parent under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( b)(4) (2018), and (2) that reas onable efforts by the
department had failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( b)(5) (2018). The district cou rt concluded that it was in
the best interests of R.G.T. and the twins that mother’s parental rights be terminated. This
court later affirmed the district court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights to R.G.T.,
Child 3, and Child 4. In re Welfare of the Children of E. T.-P. , No. A18-1075, 2019 WL
114449, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 7, 2019).
Trial Regarding Father’s Parental Rights to all Children and Mother’s Rights to Child 1
and Child 2

The trial at issue in this appeal concerning father’s parental rights to his four children
(and mother’s parental rights to Child 1 and Child 2) began on October 9, 2018, and took
place on various dates before c oncluding on Decem ber 12, 2018. The department
presented the testimony of father and the child-protection soci al worker assigned to the
case. Mother testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of her therapist. The
guardian ad litem (GAL) also testified.
A. Father’s Complianc e with the Case Plan
The social worker testified that the department provided father with a case plan and
services that were designed to address the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement

8
of the children. By the time of trial, father had completed or was engaged in all aspects of
his case plan. Father had estab lished visitation and engaged i n parenting classes and
anger-management programming, but his compliance with other parts of his case plan was
untimely. Specifically, father w as delayed in participating in individual therapy,
completing a psychological assessm ent, and participating in a f amily group conference.
By the time of trial, the department concluded that, even despi t e f a t h e r ’ s d e l a y e d
compliance, there were no additional services that it could provide that would assist father
in addressing the department’s parenting concerns.
1. Individual Therapy
Father significantly delayed in complying with the individual t herapy required by
his case plan. When his case p lan began in April 2018, he init ially asserted that he could
not attend individual therapy because of his busy schedule. He eventually scheduled an
intake appointment in July 2018. Father did not begin regular, monthly therapy
appointments until September, just before the trial in this matter began. The social worker
testified that the department had been asking father to complete individual therapy since at
least January 2018, even before the formal start of his most recent case plan.
Both the social worker and the GAL spoke with father’s therapis t regarding his
progress in therapy. Father’s therapist reported that father was not being fully honest. The
therapist told the GAL that father was difficult to work with because of his dishonesty and
because he was not able to acknowledge the gravity of the situation with the children. The
social worker testified that even with therapy, father had not developed insight into his
behaviors that led to the out-of-home placement of his children. She also opined that father

9
would not be able to develop ins ight into these behaviors in th e reasonably foreseeable
future.
2. Psychological Assessment
Father’s compliance with the psy chological assessment was also delayed. The
department referred father to complete a psychological assessment in mid-April 2018, but
father did not schedule his first appointment until late July. By October 10, the day after
trial began, father had still not completed the assessment. His final evaluation appointment
was on October 12. Though the parties anticipated that the assessment would be completed
before the final trial date in D ecember, the assessment was not completed until after trial
concluded. The district court left the record open and received the assessment as an exhibit
two days after trial concluded.
The psychological assessment i ndicated that father understood a child’s need for
guidance, personal care, and attention. The evaluator noted, however, that father may have
had limited emotional attachment or urgency to develop a bond with his youngest children,
as evidenced by his failure to timely establish visitation with the twins. The evaluator made
recommendations that were already being facilitated through father’s case plan.
3. Family Group Conference
The case plan required father to participate in a family group conference with the
foster parent for the children. After the twins were born, but before his case plan for the
twins became effective, the department asked father to voluntar ily participate in a family
group conference. Father was unable to provide dates when he was available for a family
group conference. Even after th e case plan relating to the twi ns became effective in

10
March 2018, father did not participate in a family group confer ence until late September.
Father insisted that mother be p resent at the conference, even though the conference was
aimed at improving his own relationship with the foster parent.
4. Concerns Raised Durin g Father’s Visitation
In addition to its concerns regarding delayed implementation of the case plan, the
department also had concerns ab out father’s understanding of th e twins’ needs. When
father established visitation in April 2018, he initially had d ifficulty distinguishing the
twins. This was problematic becau se the twins had allergies to different foods. By the
time trial began, father was able to distinguish between the twins. But the department was
still concerned that father did not understand the severity of his children’s allergies because
father continued to bring outside food to visits and request th at visits occur at fast-food
restaurants. Father continued to demonstrate a misunderstanding of his children’s allergies
during trial—evidence was introduced that, in November 2018, fa ther told the twins’
registered nurse that Child 3 did not have allergies, and at on e point father inaccurately
testified that Child 4 did not have food issues.
In reviewing father’s engagement in the case plan and his limited progress under the
plan, the social worker testified that in her view father had s till not corrected—and was
unable to correct—the conditions t hat led to his children’s out -of-home placement. The
social worker testified that she did not believe that father ha d developed insight into the
behaviors that led to his children’s out-of-home placement.

11
B. The Best Interests of the Children
Both the social worker and the GAL testified that termination o f father’s parental
rights to all four children is in the best interests of the children. In their trial testimony, the
social worker and the GAL both identified father’s poor decisio n-making as a major
concern, specifically father’s d ecision to allow mother to supe rvise the children and
participate in parenting given mother’s own history of poor dec ision-making. Father had
a history of relying on mother for childcare when he was at work. The GAL testified that
when Child 1 was placed with father in 2016, father allowed Chi ld 1 to “basically reside”
with mother because of the hours and location of his job. The social worker testified that,
before the TLC order, the department had concerns about father’ s long work hours. For
that reason, the department aske d father to identify a “backup” who could help provide
care for the children. The backup was father’s neighbor. But in early 2018, father
continued to have contact with mother and allow mother to have unsupervised contact with
himself, Child 1, and Child 2—despite the TLC order and OFP preventing him from doing
so. At the time of trial, father had the same job as he did in 2016. Consequently, the GAL
expressed continuing concern about father’s long work hours and who would be providing
backup care for the children.
The GAL testified extensively about the children’s best interests. She testified that
the twins have a strong bond to their foster parent because they had been in foster care for
their entire lives. She testified that the older children have a strong bond with father and
that father has “sufficient parenting skills” to parent them. The GAL, however, was
concerned with father’s ability t o keep Child 1 and Child 2 saf e, based on his history of

12
allowing mother to have contact w ith the children in or out of his presence. The GAL
believed that father would continue to involve mother in parent ing even though she has a
history of unsafe decision-making. Moreover, the GAL testified that it would be against
the sibling’s best interests to be separated from each other an d from R.G.T. Ultimately,
the GAL opined that the district court should terminate father’s parental rights to his four
children because father does not have the ability to make appropriate decisions for them to
keep them safe. The social worker provided similar testimony r egarding the children’s
best interests.
The GAL testified that the services offered to father were reas onable and were
offered in a timely manner. She did not believe additional ser vices could or should be
provided to father in order to support reunification. The GAL testified that there is nothing
father could do to convince her that he would not allow mother to have contact with the
children.
C. Evidence Presented by Father and Mother
Father testified, but the distric t court largely did not credit his testimony. Father
testified that he did not want t he children returned to mother, that he did not intend to
co-parent with mother if the children were returned to him, that he would not allow mother
to care for his children, and t hat he understood the importance of not allowing mother to
have contact with the children. Father testified that he did n ot violate the OFP, but later
claimed that he did not remember whether he violated the OFP—testimony that the district
court noted in determining that father’s testimony was not cred ible. Father also testified
that he understood the twins’ allergies after attending a medic al appointment and that he

13
learned how to use a device used to treat emergency allergy symptoms. In addition, father
testified that his parenting skills had improved after particip ating in parenting education
classes and anger-management programming, and that he was learn ing in therapy how to
be a good father.
Mother also testified, but the d istrict court did not credit he r testimony either.
Mother testified that her paren ting skills had improved through the services provided by
the department. She testified that she did not have contact with father and that she did not
intend to have a relationship with him.
The district court also heard testimony from mother’s therapist , who the district
court found to be credible. Mother’s therapist testified that she was showing progress in
individual therapy. Mother’s the rapist also testified that mot her had indicated that she
wanted to vacate the OFP to reunite with father, and that she probably had a better chance
of getting the children back if th ey reunited. Mother’s therap ist, who was not aware that
mother in fact dismissed the OFP, testified that he would be co ncerned if he learned that
mother dismissed the OFP.
The District Court’s Decision
The district court issued a very detailed order terminating fat her’s parental rights.
The district court determined that clear and convincing evidenc e supported two statutory
bases to terminate father’s parental rights to all four children: that father was palpably unfit
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), and that father failed to correct the conditions
leading to the children’s out-of-home placement despite reasona ble efforts by the

14
department under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). 1 The district court also
determined that the department presented clear and convincing evidence that it was in the
best interests of father’s children that father’s parental rights be terminated.
Father appeals the district court’s order.
D E C I S I O N
Father argues that the district court erred in terminating his parental rights because
the department did not present clear and convincing evidence th at a statutory basis for
termination exists or that termination of his parental rights is in his children’s best interests.
Involuntary termination of paren tal rights is only appropriate if there is clear and
convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists and termination is in the
children’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 137
(Minn. 2014). This court reviews a termination of parental rig hts “to determine whether
the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria an d whether the district court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clea rly erroneous.” In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We are mindful that
“[p]arental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty re asons,” In re Welfare of
M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990), but we give “considerable d eference to the
district court’s decision to terminate parental rights,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We apply
a clear-error standard of review to “the district court’s findi ngs of the underlying or basic

1 The district court also determined that a third statutory basi s supported termination of
father’s parental rights to Child 1 and Child 2—that father neg lected to comply with his
parental duties under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (20 18). This statutory basis
was not applied to Child 3 and Child 4.

15
facts” and an abuse-of-discreti on standard of review to a distr ict court’s ultimate
determination as to “whether a particular statutory basis for i nvoluntarily terminating
parental rights is present.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901
(Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous “if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656,
660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
We first address father’s argument that the district court erred in concluding that a
statutory ground for termination exists. We then turn to his a rgument that clear and
convincing evidence does not support the district court’s determination that termination is
in the best interests of all four children.
I. Statutory Basis
The district court determined that two separate statutory bases exist for terminating
father’s rights to all four child ren—palpable unfitness under M inn. Stat § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4), and failure to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement of
the children under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). We will affirm the district court’s
decision to terminate parental rights if either of these statut ory grounds exists. See In re
Children of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005) (“In reviewing a decision to
terminate parental rights, the appellate court determines wheth er there is clear and
convincing evidence to support at least one statutory ground for termination . . . .”).
Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), a district court m ay involuntarily
terminate a parent’s parental rights if the court finds that “following the child’s placement

16
out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct
the conditions leading to the ch ild’s placement.” Because the record supports the district
court’s determination that father failed to correct the conditi ons leading to his children’s
out-of-home placement despite reasonable efforts by the department, we address only that
basis for termination.
Father contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that the department’s
efforts to reunify were reasonable, arguing that he had insufficient time between the CHIPS
proceedings and the filing of the TPR petitions to complete his case plan. He also argues
that he corrected the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement because the OFP that
he violated was no longer in effect after May 7, 2018. We are not persuaded.
A. The district court did not err in determining that the depar tment’s
efforts to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement were
reasonable.

Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere matters of f o r m s o a s t o
include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150
(Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). In order to
determine whether efforts were reasonable, the district court m ust consider whether the
services offered were: “(1) relevant to the safety and protecti on of the child; (2) adequate
t o m e e t t h e n e e d s o f t h e c h i l d and family; (3) culturally appro priate; (4) available and
accessible; (5) consistent and tim ely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018). The d istrict court must consider “t he length of the time the
county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d
529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).

17
F a t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e d e p a r t m e n t ’ s e f f o r t s w e r e n o t r e a s o n a b l e because the
department did not give him enough time to comply with his case plan before seeking
termination of parental rights. T he department maintains that its efforts were reasonable
considering that father had more than six months to complete his most recent case plan and
that the department has been providing services to assist father since 2015.
The district court made extensive findings regarding the depart ment’s efforts to
reunify father with his children. The district court found tha t the department had worked
with the family since 2015, when it first became involved with Child 1 and R.G.T. Father
successfully engaged in case plans from early 2016 through 2017, and in 2017 became the
sole legal and physical custodian of Child 1 and Child 2. Begi nning in September 2017,
the department again offered father services, primarily including visitation with the twins.
The department also made multipl e attempts to facilitate a fami l y g r o u p c o n f e r e n c e
between father and the foster provider. But father refused the department’s efforts to
establish visitation with the twins until April 2018, and he did not agree to participate in a
family group conference until September 2018.
In April 2018, the department offered father a new case plan af ter Child 1 and
Child 2, the two older children, were removed from his care. T his case plan was very
similar to other case plans offered to father in the past, but required him to complete a more
extensive psychological assessmen t. The district court found t hat, as the social worker
testified, the case plan was modified to address the department’s concerns that father was
leaving the children with an inappropriate, unsafe caregiver (m other) and that he was
violating the OFP. Although fath er engaged in some aspects of the case plan in a timely

18
manner—namely, anger-management programming and parent educatio n classes—he
failed to timely participate in the mental-health services offered. Father delayed scheduling
the psychological evaluation until late July 2018, and as a res ult, the evaluation was not
complete before trial concluded. Father also delayed in scheduling individual therapy, and
did not start monthly appointments until September 2018, just before the trial in this matter
began. Based on this evidence, t he district court found that t he department offered
mental-health services to father in a “timely manner,” but fath er’s own delay in engaging
in the services “greatly diminis hed” the value of the psycholog ical evaluation and
individual therapy. The district court also found that “despite working with the department
on-and-off for almost three years, [father] has been unable to improve his parenting skills
sufficiently to provide for the da y-to-day care of his children .” Our review of the record
leads to the conclusion that these findings of fact are support ed by clear and convincing
evidence in the record and, therefore, are not clearly erroneous.
Father urges this court to conclude that the district court abu sed its discretion in
determining that the department’s efforts were reasonable by arguing that the district court
should have considered only the department’s efforts from the t ime of the CHIPS
proceedings (in the first quart er of 2018) until the time that the TPR petition regarding
Child 1 and Child 2 was filed in March 2018. He argues that he was given insufficient
time to improve his parenting skills and reunite with his child ren. But father’s argument
is flawed because he was offered services both before the CHIPS petition was filed (from
2015 – 2017) and after the TPR petition was filed. The record shows that the department
continued to offer services to father through the end of the tr ial in December 2018. The

19
record further shows that it was father’s own delay and reluctance to engage in the services
that rendered the case plan ineffective. His own delay, in fact, supports the district court’s
finding that father continues to have problems making good deci sions. By the time trial
concluded, the department had fa cilitated services for father i n his most recent case plan
for approximately eight months a nd had offered services on-and- off for approximately
three years. Given the departmen t’s efforts to work with fathe r since 2015, it was
appropriate for the district cour t to consider the services tha t the department offered to
father prior to the most recent case plan. See In re Welfare of A.H., 402 N.W.2d 598, 604
(Minn. App. 1987) (concluding t hat the county’s reunification e fforts were reasonable
where the formal reunification plan lasted only five months because the appellant had been
receiving help from various county agencies for several years). Under these circumstances,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretio n in concluding that the
department’s efforts were reasonable.
B. The district court did not err in determining that father fa iled to correct
the conditions that led to out-of-home placement.

Father also argues that he corre cted the conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement. He argues that the children were placed out-of-home due to his violations of
the OFP and the TLC order. He emphasizes that the OFP is no lo nger in effect and notes
that, under the TLC order, mother is allowed unsupervised visit ation once the OFP is
rescinded. He maintains that, because he can no longer violate the OFP or the TLC order
by having contact with mother, the conditions leading to the ch ildren’s out-of-home

20
placement no longer exist and that the district court clearly erred in determining that he had
not remedied the conditions.
Father oversimplifies the cond itions leading to the children’s out-of-home
placement. The technical violati on of the OFP and the TLC orde r was not the reason
leading to the children’s out-o f-home placement. Rather, fathe r’s decision to violate the
orders multiple times is an example of a broader problem—his poor decision-making and
lack of insight into the safety of his children. Beyond violat ing the court orders, father’s
behavior demonstrates a lack of i nsight into whether he is prov iding a safe caretaker for
his children.
In the order terminating father’s parental rights, the district court directly addressed
this issue. The district court determined that even though fat her had engaged in his case
plan, father’s behavior had not changed such that the children could be safely returned to
his care. The district court emph asized that father “continues to demonstrate a lack of
insight as to his own behaviors and his inability to safely parent his children.”
The district court’s determination that father failed to correct the conditions leading
to the out-of-home placement is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father relied
on mother to care for Child 1 when Child 1 was in his care, had ongoing contact with
mother despite an OFP prohibiting him from doing so, and as recently as September 2018
continued to demonstrate an inte rest in involving mother in par enting his children by
insisting that she participate in the family group conference. Father failed to prioritize and
fully engage in individual therapy and the psychological evaluation, which were intended,
in part, to help address father’s lack of insight into appropri ate caregivers and

21
decision-making. The district court found that father was dish onest about violating the
OFP and that “his own duplicity has limited the effectiveness o f the services offered and
stymied his ability to make the progress and change necessary to have his children returned
safely to his care.” The district court’s factual findings sup port its conclusion that father
failed to “effect substantive change to his behavior such that his children can be safely
returned to his care,” and failed to develop insight regarding safe and appropriate
caregivers. Because the district court’s factual findings are supported by clear and
convincing evidence and demonstrate a statutory basis for termi nation, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that a statutory basis exists
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), to terminate father’s parental rights.
II. Best Interests
Father argues that the district court erred in analyzing the be s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e
children because there was evidence suggesting that the foster parent was abusive and there
was no evidence introduced that the foster parent provided a beneficial environment to the
children.
Involuntary termination is only proper when “at least one statu tory ground for
termination is supported by cl ear and convincing evidence and the termination is in the
child’s best interest.” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. When a statutory basis for terminating
parental rights exists, “the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301. subd. 7 (2018). In determining whether termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best inte rests, “the court must balanc e three factors: (1) the child’s
interest in preserving the paren t-child relationship; (2) the p arent’s interest in preserving

22
the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest o f the child.” J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted ). “Competing interests includ e such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences. ” Id. (quotation omitted).
“Where the interests of the parent and child conflict, the inte r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d a r e
p a r a m o u n t . ” M i n n . S t a t . § 2 6 0 C . 3 0 1 , s u b d . 7 . “ W e r e v i e w a d i strict court’s ultimate
determination that termination is in a child’s best interest fo r an abuse of discretion.”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Father’s argument on appeal misses the relevant issue—the issue to be determined
a t t r i a l w a s w h e t h e r i t w a s i n t h e c h i l d r e n ’ s b e s t i n t e r e s t s t hat his parental rights be
terminated, not whether the foster parent provided the best placement for the children. The
district court properly consider ed the relevant analysis and ba lanced: (1) the children’s
interest in preserving the paren t-child relationship with fathe r ; ( 2 ) f a t h e r ’ s i n t e r e s t i n
preserving the parent-child rela tionship; and (3) the competing interests of the children.
See id.
In considering the children’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the
district court noted that all four children had some interest i n maintaining a relationship
with father because “children ty pically prefer to maintain a re lationship with their
biological parent.” Moreover, the district court considered that Child 1 and Child 2 have a
stronger bond with father than Child 3 and Child 4, who had never been in father’s care.
In considering father’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the
district court noted that father loves all four of his children and wishes to have all of them
returned to his care. The distric t court also found that fathe r shared a stronger bond with

23
Child 1 and Child 2 due to his decision to not establish visitation with Child 3 and Child 4
until April 2018.
The district court, however, determined that the competing interests of the children
weigh strongly in favor of termin ation. The district court not ed that the children all have
an interest in a stable, safe, appropriate, consistent caregiver, which father did not provide
and will continue to be unable to provide into the foreseeable future. The district court also
found that all of the children ha ve an interest in maintaining a sibling relationship with
each other and with R.G.T., which can only be maintained if all of the siblings remain
together in foster care.2
While we recognize that father loves his children and wishes to maintain his parental
rights, we conclude that the dist rict court’s best-interests an alysis is well reasoned. The
district court’s conclusion that termination of father’s parent al rights is in his children’s
best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Consequently,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating father’s parental rights to his
four children.

2 We note that mother testified about alleged abuse by the foster parent. We also observe
that the district court did not credit mother’s testimony and that there is other evidence in
the record that the children were doing well in foster care. Ultimately, however, this matter
concerned only whether it was in the best interests of the chil dren that father’s parental
rights be terminated, not whether the foster care provider that they were currently placed
with was the best option for placement.

24
In sum, because the district cour t properly concluded that a st atutory basis for
termination exists and that term ination is in the best interest s of all of the children, we
affirm.
Affirmed.