Evan Andrew Lautigar, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0188

Evan Andrew Lautigar,
Appellant,

vs.

$42,830.00 in U.S. Currency,
Respondent.

Filed December 23, 2019
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge*

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-17-2531

Craig E. Cascarano, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark S. Rubin, St. Lo uis County Attorney, Nora Christie Sandstad, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Peterson, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
This appeal challenges the district court’s determination that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over an administrative -forfeiture proceeding because appellant failed to
properly serve a demand for judicial determination of forfeiture. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 16, 2017, appellant Evan A ndrew Lautigar was pulled over by the
state patrol for a traffic violation in Anoka County and arrested for driving with a canceled
license. During an inventory search of Lautigar’s car, officers discovered $42,830 in cash,
which was sei zed by local law e nforcement. On September 20, 2017, Lautigar received
from the St. Louis County Attorney a notice of seizure and intent to forfeit property, which
stated that the money found in Lautigar’s car during the traffic stop in Anoka County is
subject to forfeiture.
On October 19, 2017, Lautigar electronically filed in St. Louis County District Court
a demand for judicial determination of forfeiture , which alleged that the $42,830 was
unconstitutionally seized and was not derived from or used in any illegal activ ity. On
October 23, 2017, Lautigar mailed to the St. Louis County Attorney a copy of the demand
for judicial determination of forfeiture. On November 19 , 2018, Lautigar moved the
district court to dismiss the administrative forfeiture for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction1
because (1) the money was seized in Anoka County and the action was being pursued in

1 Lautigar’s motion to dismiss appears to be based on the premise that the St. Louis County
Attorney initiated an action by serving a notice of seizure and intent to forfeit property.

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St. Louis County; and (2) the forfeiture was being pursued in bad faith when there were no
controlled substances seized.2
On Nov ember 20, 2018, St. Louis County moved the district court to dismiss
Lautigar’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Lautigar failed to mail a
notice and acknowledgment of servi ce with the demand for judicial determination of
forfeiture. Lautigar did not contest that he failed to mail a notice and acknowledgment of
service but argued that the district court should st ill consider his claim because St. Louis
County had actual knowledge of his filing in the district court.
The district court determined that it lacked subject -matter jurisdiction to consider
Lautigar’s demand for judicial determination because Lautigar failed to comply with the
requirements for effective service. The district court granted the county ’s motion and
dismissed Lautigar’s demand. The district court made no determination on the merits of
Lautigar’s arguments that the forfeiture was improper. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Lautigar appeals the district court’s decision to dismiss his demand for judicial
determination of forfeiture for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We review the question
of whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Strange v. 1997 Jeep
Cherokee, 597 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. App. 1999). We also review the ques tion of

2 Money found in proximity to “forfeitable records of manufacture or distribution of
controlled substances” is presumed to be subject to administrative forfeiture. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.5314, subd. 1(a)(1)(iii) (2016). In the district court, St. Louis County argued that
Lautigar’s funds were seized in proximity to cell phones that contained records of drug
distribution.

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whether service of process was effective de novo. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith , 754
N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008).
Under the statutory administrative-forfeiture procedure, within 60 days from when
property that does not exceed $50,000 in value is seized, all persons known to have an
ownership, possessory, or security interest in the property must be notified of the seizure
and the intent to forfeit the property. Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 2(a) (2016).3 But
service of a notice does not initiate a judicial action.
Instead, within 60 days after service of notice, “a claimant may file a demand for a
judicial determination of the forfeiture.” Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 3(a) (2016). “The
demand must be in the form of a civil complaint and must be filed with the court
administrator in the county in which the seizure occurred, together with proof of service of
a copy of the complaint on the prosecuting authority for that county.” Id. “The claimant
may serve the complaint on the prosecuting authority by any means permitted by court
rules.” Id. A district court’s j urisdiction to hear a demand for judicial determination
attaches when a claimant makes a timely demand that meets statutory requirements .
Kokosh v. $4657.00 U. S. Currency , 898 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Minn. App. 2017) , review
denied (Minn. Aug. 8, 2017) . “Strict compliance is required, and if the owner of the
affected property fails to properly serve the demand for judicial determination, no forfeiture

3 If notice is not sent, “the appropriate agency shall return the property to the person from
whom the property was seized, if known.” Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 2(c) (2016).

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action is commenced, and the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to address the
matter.” Id.
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure permit service of a complaint by:
(1) personal service and (2) publication. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03-04.4 The rules also permit
service by mail. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05. To effectuate service by mail, a party must “mail[]
a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) to the
person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgment conforming
substantially to Form 22 and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.”
Id. If the sender does not receive acknowledgment of service within the time that the
defendant is required to serve an answer, the service by mail is ineffectual. Id.
Because there is no dispute that Lautigar failed to mail an acknowledgment of
service with his demand for judicial determination, his attempted service by mail did not
comply with the requirements of the forfeiture statute and, therefore, did not commence a
forfeiture action . Lautigar argues , however, that, because St. Louis County had actual
knowledge that he filed the demand for judicial determination, the district court erred when
it dismissed his demand for judicial determination. Lautigar contends that this court should
determine that St. Louis County’s actual knowledge of his filing is sufficient to satisfy the
service requirements.

4 The district court applied the former version of Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05, which was recently
amended to be “more straightforward.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 4.05 2018 advisory comm.
cmt. Because the amended rule became effective on July 1, 2018, and was not i n effect
when Lautigar attempted to serve the St. Louis County Attorney , we apply the rule that
was in effect prior to the amendment.

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We are not persuaded. The supreme court has concluded that “[s]ervice of process
in a man ner not authorized by the [Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure] is ineffective
service.” Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997). Because
strict compliance with rule 4.05 is required and Lautig ar’s failure to include an
acknowledgment of service clearly violated the rule, it is irrelevant whether St. Louis
County had actual notice of Lautigar’s demand. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884
N.W.2d 601, 609-11 (Minn. 2016).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err when it dismissed Lautigar’s
demand for judicial determination for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . Because the
district court properly dismissed Lautigar’s demand , we do not address Lautigar’s
remaining arguments.
Affirmed.