State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0204

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sophia Wang Navas,
Appellant.

Filed March 23, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-17-1287

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges her sentence s for racketeering and sex trafficking on three
grounds. First, appellant argues that the district court relied on a legally invalid basis for

2
departing upward. Second, appellant challenges her sentence as excessive given the
conduct and sentences of her codef endants. Third, appellant challenges her sentence for
sex trafficking because she believes that it was improperly Hernandized.1 Appellant also
filed a pro se supplemental brief challenging her convictions. We affirm the district court’s
upward departure for appellant’s racketeering offense, but we reverse her sentence for sex
trafficking because that offense was improperly Hernandized, and we remand for
resentencing of the sex-trafficking offense.
FACTS
Appellant Sophia Wang Navas pleaded guilty to racketeering and aiding and
abetting the sex trafficking of an individual. As part of her plea agreement with respondent
State of Minnesota, Wang Navas waived her right to a Blakely2 trial and admitted the facts
regarding an aggravating factor: the presence of multiple victims. In exchange for her
guilty plea, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and agreed not to seek a
sentence above 150 months. Both parties retained the righ t to file departure motions at
sentencing.
At the pl ea hearing, Wang Navas admitted that, in approximately July 2016, she
began a business relationship with Hong Jing and Dongzhou Jiang. Jing’s daughter,
Fangyao “Michelle” Wu, also played a limited role, concealing the proceeds derived from

1 In State v. Hernandez, the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth a process for district courts
to follow when sentencing a defendant on the same day for multiple convictions . 311
N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981).
2 Individuals have a right to a jury trial to dete rmine whether aggravating factors exist to
support an upward sentencing departure, but they can waive their jury trial right. Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-05 (2004).

3
the sex-trafficking operation. Ultimately, Jing, Jiang, and Wu all pleaded guilty for their
roles in the charged offenses. As part of her business with Jing, Ji ang, and Wu, Wang
Navas admitted that she posted thousands of advertisements on Backpage.com containing
sexually suggestive photos of Asian women for the purpose of engaging in sex trafficking.
Wang Navas further admitted that she set up appointment s for at least two individuals to
perform sex acts in Plymouth, St. Louis Park, St. Paul, and Oakdale, and that she made
money for her role in the sex-trafficking scheme. Specifically, Wang Navas admitted that
she “communicated with commercial sex customers” and “gave them the location and the
price” for sex. Wang Navas also admitted that she knew that some of the women who were
being trafficked were also robbed.
Prior to sentencing, Wang Navas moved for “both downward dispositional and
durational departures from the presumptive prison sentenc e.” Conversely, the state
requested a 150 -month sentence , which is an upward departure from the presumptive
guidelines sentence for racketeering . The parties also disagreed about the appropriate
severity level to be assigned to Wang Navas’s racketeering offense; the state argued that
the offense should be ranked at level nine, while Wang Navas argued that the offense
should be ranked at level eight. The state argued at sentencing that the number of ads
posted by Wang Navas were “almost double” the amount posted by Jing. In addition,
unlike Jing and Jiang, Wang Navas admitted to aiding in the trafficking of multiple victims.
Finally, the s tate argued that Wang Navas’s post-offense conduct contrasted with that of
both Jing a nd Jiang, who agreed to cooperate “very early on in the proceedings.” Ji ang
even agreed to testify on behalf of the state at Wang Navas’s trial.

4
The district court ranked the racketeering offense at a severity -level nine based on
many factors, including t hat Wang Navas’s conduct “occurred in multiple counties,”
“involved multiple acts,” “consumed the better part of a year,” constituted a “sustained
level of activity,” and took advantage of vulnerable adults. The district court also
considered that it woul d be illogical to rank the racketeering offense at the same level as
the underlying offense of sex trafficking because the legislature views the offense of
racketeering to be “a very serious crime punishable by up to . . . 30 years.” The district
court also denied Wang Navas’s motion for a downward departure and granted the state’s
motion for an upward departure. The district court cited the “heinousness of the offense as
measured in the number of victims who were involved” as the “substantial and compelling
reasons” warranting the departure. The district court imposed an executed sentence of 150
months in prison for the racketeering offense, and, after Hernandizing Wang Navas’s sex-
trafficking offense, imposed a concurrent 76 -month sentence for that offense. Jing
received a 102-month, executed sentence for racketeering and a concurrent sentence for
aiding and abetting sex trafficking of an individual . Jiang received a 53-month, executed
sentence for racketeering and a concurrent sentence for aiding and abetting sex trafficking
of an individual. Wu received a stayed sentence for racketeering and was ordered to
complete twenty years of probation for racketeering.3

3 The record does not contain information regarding the length of the sentenc es imposed
for Jing’s sex-trafficking conviction, Jiang’s sex -trafficking conviction, or Wu’s
racketeering conviction.

5
D E C I S I O N
I. Validity of the Upward Departure for Multiple Victims
Wang Navas first challenges the validity 4 of the stated ground for departure:
multiple victims . Wang Navas argues that the district court could not base an upward
departure on the existence of multiple victims because the elements of both racketeering
and sex trafficking require multiple victims and because the district court already
considered the number of victims when it ranked the racketeering offense as a severity -
level nine. We disagree and conclude that in departing from the presumptive sentence, the
district court properly considered the presence of multiple victims.
The “district court may depart from the presumptive guidelines sentencing range
only if there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to s upport a
sentence outside the range on the grids.” Tucker v. State , 799 N.W.2d 583, 586 ( Minn.
2011) (quotation omitted). The sentencing guidelines provide “ a nonexclusive list of
factors that may be used as reasons for departure.” State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 157
(Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted) . “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those
circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.” State
v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985).

4 Wang Navas does not challenge the factual support for the district court’s departure
decision or argue that the presence of multiple victims was an insufficient reason to depart.
Nor does Wang Navas challenge the extent of the departure (as it relates to multiple
victims). Instead, Wang Navas challenges only the legal validity of the stated reason for
departure. As discussed below, Wang Navas also challenges the reasonableness of her
ultimate sentence and argues that it is unjustifiably disparate from the others involved.

6
The standard of review on appeal depends on the particular error asserted. We apply
a de novo standard of review to questions of law, such as the validity of the stated reason
for departure. State v. Jackson , 749 N.W.2d 353, 357 ( Minn. 2008); see also Dillon v.
State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 596 (Minn. App. 2010) review denied (Minn. May 11, 2010)
(observing that a de novo standard of review applies “when reviewing whether a particular
reason for an upward departure is permissible”).5 Wang Navas raises two challenges to the
validity of the district court’s stated reason for departure.
First, Wang Navas argues that the district court improperly granted an upward
departure because the elements of both racketeering and sex trafficking require multiple
victims. E vidence relied o n to prove an element of the criminal offense cannot also be
relied on to justify an upward departure. State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 840 ( Minn.
2000). Wang Navas is mistaken, however, in her belief that the elements of either
racketeering or the charged sex-trafficking crimes necessarily require multiple victims.

5 We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to other aspects of a district court’s
sentencing decisions. For example, we review the factual support for the stated (and valid)
departure grounds for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 163 (Minn.
2015) (applying abuse of discretion to whether the valid reason was factually supported by
the record). Abuse-of-discretion review also applies to the district court’s decision whether
to depart once it has identified proper grounds. Dillon v. State , 781 N.W.2d 588, 595
(Minn. App. 2010) (“Once we determine as a matter of law that the district court has
identified proper grounds justifying a challenged departure, we review its decision whether
to depart for an abuse of discretion.”) (emphasis in original) review denied (Minn. May 11,
2010). We also review the extent of the departure for an abuse of discretion. Dillon, 781
N.W.2d at 596 (“ We have generally deferred entirely to the district court ’s judgment on
the proper length of departures that result in sentences of up to double the presum ptive
term.”) (citation omitted).

7
A person commits the crime of racketeering if, in association with an enterprise, she
participates in a pattern of criminal activity, which constitutes at least three criminal acts.
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.903, subd. 1(1), .902, subd. 5 (2016). While the statute requires three
separate predicate crimes, i t d oes not require separate victims for the contemplated
predicate acts. A person can commit a racketeering offense by engaging in three separate
predicate acts against a single victim. In addition, a person can also commit a racketeering
offense by engaging in three separate “victimless” crimes, such as illegal drug transactions.
The elements of racketeering do not preclude a district court from considering the number
of victims as a basis to depart from the presumptive sentence.
Likewise, the predicate act (sex trafficking) charged in this case could involve
multiple victims or it could involve a single individual victim, depending on the particular
statutory provisions at issue. The state charged Wang Navas with sex trafficking in the
second degree, a violation of subdivision 1a (4), without pleading the existence of the
aggravating factors listed for a first -degree violation in subdivision 1 (b). Minn. Stat.
§ 609.322, subds. 1a(4), 1(b) (2016). Second-degree sex trafficking in s ubdivision 1a(4)
prohibits the “sex trafficking of an individual ,” and carries a maximum sentence of 15
years’ imprisonment. Id. (emphasis added). A first-degree violation under s ubdivision
1(b)(4) of the st atute provides for a sentencing enhancement of up to 25 years’
imprisonment if “the offense involved more than one sex trafficking victim.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.322, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016). The complaint not only refers to subdivision 1a(4), it also
uses the following language to label the charge: “Aiding and Abetting Engages in the sex

8
trafficking of an individual.” 6 Because the state did not allege a first-degree sex trafficking
offense under subdivision 1(b), or allege the presence of multiple victims under subdivision
1(b)(4), the district court was not precluded from considering the number of victims as a
basis to depart from the presumptive sentence.
Second, Wang Navas argues that particular circumstances may not be used to assign
a severity level and also to support an upward departure.7 See State v. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d
440, 443 n.3 (Minn. 2000). Wang Navas contends that the “facts cited by the [court] show
that the district court concluded that there were multiple victims when it c onsidered the
rank of the racketeering offense.” Assuming without deciding that Kenard prohibits
district courts from relying on particular conduct to both rank an offense and to depart from
the presumptive guidelines, we conclude that Wang Navas misstate s the basis for the
district court’s ranking decision.
The record reflects that the district court focused on several factors to rank the
racketeering offense , including that Wang Navas’s conduct “occurred in multiple
counties,” “involved multiple acts ,” “consumed the better part of a year ,” constituted a
“sustained level of activity ,” and took advantage of vulnerable adults. The district court
also considered that it would be illogical to rank the racketeering offense at the same level
as the underlying offense of sex trafficking because the legislature views the offense of

6 Wang Navas does not argue that the state was required to charge a first -degree offense
under subdivision 1(b). Instead, Wang Navas argues that, as a matter of law, the elements
of racketeering necessarily involve multiple victims and that the elements of subdivision
1a(4) necessarily involve multiple victims.
7 We note that Wang Navas does not challenge the district court’s decision to rank the
racketeering charges at a level nine.

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racketeering to be “a very serious crime punishable by up to . . . 30 years.” Although the
district court used the plural “victims,” in explaining its reasoning for ranking the offens e
as a level nine, the district court’s focus was not on the number of victims but on the nature
of the victims, such as their vulnerability. The stated reasoning for its ranking decision did
not preclude the district court from considering the number of victims when it enhanced
Wang Navas’s sentence.
II. Reasonableness of the Ultimate Sentence
Wang Navas argues that her sentence was “excessive and must be reversed because
it was not warranted when compared to the conduct and sentences of [her ] codefendants.”
We disagree and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
the length of the sentence imposed.
We review the extent of a departure and an ultimate sentence for an abuse of
discretion. Dillon, 781 N.W.2d a t 596; State v. Spain , 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 ( Minn. 1999)
(“We afford the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and we cannot
simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.”). Nevertheless, appellate courts
have express statutory authority to “review the sentence imposed or stayed to determine
whether the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable,
inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact
issued by the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2018). In doing so, we may
consider the defendant’s sentence in relation to the sentence an accomplice received. State
v. Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d 110, 111-12 (Minn. 1983). We may also compare the sentence to
those imposed on other defendants convicted of the same or similar offenses. Id. at 112.

10
This court may “reduce a defendant’s sentence in order to make it more equitable with the
sentence that a similarly situated codefendant received.” State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273,
277 (Minn. 1983).
The record reflects that , in addition to Wang Navas, there were three oth er
individuals convicted for their roles in the offense: Jing, Jiang, and Michelle Wu. Jing
received a 102-month, executed sentence for racketeering and a concurrent sentence 8 for
aiding and abetting sex trafficking of an individual. Jiang received a 53-month, executed
sentence for racketeering and a concurrent sentence9 for aiding and abetting sex trafficking
of an individual. Wu received a stayed sentence 10 and was ordered to complete twenty
years of probation for racketeering. Wang Navas admitted that she posted “thousands” of
ads on Backpage.com , gave interested persons location and price information,
communicated with the victims , and profited from her participation in the sex -trafficking
offense. The state argued at sentencing that the number of ads posted by Wang Navas were
“almost double” the amount posted by Jing. In addition, unlike Jing and Jiang, Wang
Navas admitted to trafficking multiple victims. Also, Wang Navas admitted that she knew
that some of the women who were being trafficked were also robbed. Finally, Wang
Navas’s post-offense conduct also contrasts with that of both Jing and Jiang , who agreed
to cooperate “very early on in the proceedings. ” Jing even agreed to testify on behal f of

8 The record does not contain information regarding the length of the sentence imposed for
this offense.
9 The record does not contain information regarding the length of the sentence imposed for
this offense.
10 The record does not contain information regarding the length of the sentence impose d
for this offense.

11
the state at Wang Navas’s trial. Wu’s stay of execution reflected that she played a limited
role, concealing the proceeds derived from the sex-trafficking operation, but not engaging
in additional criminal conduct.11 The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
a longer sentence for Wang Navas than those received by the other persons involved.
Wang Navas next contends that her sentence was “disproportionately long when
compared to other sentences imposed for racketeering.” But as the state points out, the
data from the Minnesota Sen tencing Guidelines Commission offered by Wang Navas
cannot establish any relevant point of reference . For instance, the data fail to reveal if a
sentence or severity level was agreed upon by the parties or whether the sentencing court
considered or grante d upward or downward departure motions. Most importantly,
predicate crimes for racketeering offenses can vary greatly ( as demonstrated by the facts
and relative culpability of the others involved in this case). Because the data offered cannot
reveal the nature of the predicate offenses, we cannot compare the sentence at issue to any
other racketeering sentences and cannot conclude that the district court imposed a
disproportionately long sentence.
III. Accuracy of the Criminal History Score
Finally, Wang Navas argues that the district court erred by using the Hernandez
method to increase her criminal history score used in relation to the sex -trafficking
conviction. Generally, under State v. Hernandez , a district court sentencing a defendant
on the same day fo r multiple convictions can increase the defendant’s criminal -history

11 Wang Navas does not argue that she was less culpable or involved than Wu.

12
score incrementally as each successive sentence is imposed . 311 N.W.2d 478, 479-81
(Minn. 1981). Racketeering cases, however, do not follow this general rule, and district
courts cannot apply the Hernadez method when sentencing for both racketeering and its
predicate offenses. State v. Longo, 909 N.W.2d 599, 612 (Minn. App. 2018).12
Here, the district court used the Hernandez method to sentence Wang Navas for the
sex-trafficking offense. The state agrees that under Longo, Wang Navas’s “sentence for
sex trafficking should have been based on a criminal history score of zero, like the
racketeering charge.” Accordingly, we reverse Wang Navas’s sentence for sex trafficking
and we remand for resentencing on the sex-trafficking charge.
IV. Waiver of Remaining Arguments
Wang Navas filed a pro se supplement al brief challenging her convictions and
sentence, b ut her brief contain ed no citation to any legal authority. We consider such
arguments waived. See State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 22 ( Minn. 2015) (“We deem
arguments waived on appeal if a pro se supplemental brief contains no argument or citation
to legal authority in support of the allegations” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Yang,
774 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and
not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be

12 As discussed in Longo, the racketeering statute allows district courts to impose multiple
sentences for both racketeering and predicate offenses . 909 N.W.2d at 612 (citing Minn.
Stat. § 609.910, subd. 1 (2014)). However, the Hernandez method cannot be applied unless
multiple sentences are contemplated by the statute addressing multiple sentences generally.
Id. (discussing Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2014)). The court in Longo made this clear: “We
conclude that because sentencing Longo for both racketeering and controlled -substance
offenses was permissible under section 609.910, rather than under section 609.035, the
district court should not have used the Hernandez method.” Id.

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considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection” ) (quotation
omitted). Without reference to legal authority, we do not consider these arguments.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.