In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0206

In re the Marriage of:

Tristan Joseph Trainer, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Ashley Dominique Nichole Goodlander,
Appellant.

Filed September 16, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-FA-17-1927

Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Ashley Goodlander, Lake Crystal, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, J udge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Ashley Dominique Nichole Goodlander challenges the d istrict court’s
denial of her motion to reopen dissolution proceedings, contending that the district court’s
decision to allow service by publication was improper. Because we conclude that the
district court erroneously permitted service by publication res ulting in ineffective service
of process, and therefore a lack of personal jurisdiction, we reverse and remand.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant Ashley Dominique Nic hole Goodlander and respondent T ristan Joseph
Trainer separated in October 2016. Goodlander moved to Florida with the parties’ child in
February 2017, and Trainer filed for divorce about three months later. Along with his
petition for dissolution of the marriage, Trainer submitted an application for service by
alternate means, which the district court granted. Trainer pub lished notice in the Waseca
County News once a week for three weeks. Goodlander never responded to the summons,
and in a default judgment, the district court dissolved the marriage and granted sole legal
and physical custody of the parties’ child to Trainer. Goodlan der later filed a motion to
reopen the dissolution proceedings, arguing in part that it was improper for the district court
to permit service by publication, which the district court denied.
District courts have discretion to determine whether to reopen a dissolution
judgment. Clark v. Clark , 642 N.W.2d 459, 465 (Minn. App. 2002). But we review
de novo “[w]hether service of pr ocess was effective, and person al jurisdiction therefore
exists.” Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008).

3
In marital-dissolution proceeding s, Minnesota Statutes section 518.11 (2018)
governs service of process and requests for service by alternat e means, including service
by publication.1 Generally, unless a proceeding is brought by both parties, personal service
of the summons and petition is required. Minn. Stat. § 518.11(a). If the petitioner cannot
achieve personal service, the district court may allow service by alternate means.2 Id. (c).
But before the district court may order service by alternate me ans, the petitioner must
submit an application including statutorily required informatio n, including: the
respondent’s last-known location, petitioner’s most recent cont acts with the respondent,
the names and locations of immediate family members and others likely to know the
respondent’s location, the loca tion of respondent’s last-known employment, and a
description of any efforts made to locate those with informatio n about respondent’s
whereabouts. Id.
Here, Trainer’s attorney submitted an affidavit to the district court seeking service
by publication. That affidavit stated that Trainer informed his attorney that Goodlander’s
last-known location was at her parents’ home in Waseca, but that Trainer did not know the
address. According to Trainer, Goodlander’s current location was unknown. The affidavit

1 Because custody of the child was at issue in the dissolution proceeding, the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) applies. Minn. Stat. §§ 518D.101-
.317 (2018). The notice provision in the UCCJEA provides that when a person is outside
a state, notice “may be given in a manner prescribed by the law of this state for service of
process or by the law of the state in which the service is made.” Minn. Stat. § 518D.108(a)
(2018). Therefore, we focus our analysis on requirements under relevant Minnesota law.
2 Trainer does not contest that service by alternate means inclu des service by publication,
arguing that “[s]ervice by [a]lternate means may be done by ordering the party to serve the
documents by mail or through a publication.”

4
also described Trainer’s contact with Goodlander, explaining th at his last contact with
Goodlander occurred on February 8, 2017 when he messaged her an d she responded but
did not provide her address or p hone number. Trainer allegedly attempted to message
Goodlander through Facebook and PlayStation and noted that his last attempt to contact
Goodlander was around February 21, 2017. And according to the affidavit, Trainer would
not learn Goodlander’s location, and there was “a reasonable possibility that mail will not
be forwarded.”
We conclude that the submitted a ffidavit did not comply with th e statutory
requirements.3 The affidavit did not include any names or contact information for
immediate family members or others likely to know Goodlander’s location.4 And because
the affidavit did not list any of these individuals, it also di d not include a description of
Trainer’s attempts to contact them. Additionally, the affidavi t did not disclose
Goodlander’s last-known employment. Because the statute is clear that “[t]he application
for alternate service must include” the listed information—and Trainer’s submitted
affidavit did not—the submitted affidavit did not meet the stat utory requirements.

3 W e n o t e t h a t T r a i n e r ’ s a t t o r n e y , r a t h e r t h a n T r a i n e r h i m s e l f , submitted the affidavit
seeking service by alternate m eans, raising questions about whe ther the affidavit is
supported by personal knowledge. See State ex rel. Sime v. Pennebaker , 9 N.W.2d 257,
259 (Minn. 1943) (holding that attorney’s affidavit attesting t o facts known by client was
hearsay and did not have evidentiary value absent client’s affidavit). But because this issue
was not raised, we do not address it.
4 Trainer contacted police in Feb ruary 2017 to seek assistance l ocating Goodlander,
providing police with the name of Goodlander’s father. Police contacted Goodlander’s
father, who told them that she moved to Florida. This informat ion indicates that at
minimum, Trainer could have submitted the name of Goodlander’s father in his affidavit
to the district court. And we note that the record does not in dicate that Trainer himself
attempted to contact Goodlander’s father.

5
Minn. Stat. § 518.11(c); see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15a (2018) (stating that “‘[m]ust’”
is mandatory”).
In addition to the requirements for requesting service by alternate means, the statute
also provides criteria that the district court “shall” consider , including “the length of time
the respondent’s location has been unknown, the likelihood that the respondent’s location
will become known, the nature of the relief sought, and the nature of efforts made to locate
the respondent.” Minn. Stat. § 518.11(c). After considering these factors, the district court
may order service by publication, “but only if it might reasonably succeed in notifying the
respondent of the proceeding.” Id.
In granting Trainer’s request for service by alternate means, t he district court
checked a box on a form indicating that publication in the Wase ca County News “might
reasonably succeed in notifying [G oodlander] of this proceeding .” But the district court
did not check the boxes indicating that personal service could not be made on Goodlander
or that Goodlander was not likely to receive notice mailed to her last-known address. Nor
did the district court order Trainer to attempt service by mailing the summons and petition
to Goodlander’s last-known address. Nothing in the record suggests that the district court
considered any of the statutorily required factors. This absen ce of statutorily required
considerations by the district c ourt—apparently driven by an in adequate affidavit—leads
us to conclude that the grant of service by publication was erroneous.5

5 When denying Goodlander’s motion to reopen, the district court reiterated that Minnesota
law permits service by publicati on and that Trainer’s applicati on for service by alternate
means “included the required information.” But as noted above, Trainer’s application did
not include all of the required information. Additionally, the district court appeared to rely

6
Because the district court erroneously granted service by publi cation, we conclude
that service of process was ineffective and personal jurisdiction was therefore lacking. See
Shamrock, 754 N.W.2d at 382. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretio n for the district
court to deny Goodlander’s motion to reopen the dissolution pro ceeding, and we reverse
and remand for reopening of the dissolution proceeding.6
Reversed and remanded.

on rule 4.04(a)(3) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, w hich provides for service
by publication in a marriage-dissolution proceeding when “the c ourt has ordered service
by published notice.” But we note that before ordering service by publication, the district
court must follow the requirements outlined in Minnesota Statutes section 518.11.
6 Because we reverse and remand based on ineffective service of process, we do not address
the balance of Goodlander’s arguments.