Dean Aaron Anderson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0208

Dean Aaron Anderson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 12, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-10-308

Bradford Colbert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Dean Aaron Anderson appeals the denial of hi s petition for
postconviction relief. Anderson was convicted of third-degree controlled-substance crime,

2
after having been acquitted in an earlier trial on another charge of controlled -substance
crime. In his petition for postconviction relief, Anderson argued that he was subjected to
serialized prosecution. The postconviction court denied relief, concluding that his claim is
procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). We affirm.
FACTS
This case began with law enforcement arranging for an informant to execute three
controlled buys of prescription drugs containing oxycodone from Anderson in the summer
of 2010. The informant bought 150 pills from Anderson at each buy. Based on the details
of the controlled buys, law enforcement obt ained and executed a search warrant at
Anderson’s house. They found and seized four small plastic bags of white pills in a
nightstand drawer. The pills in the bags appeared to be consistent with the pills bought at
the controlled buys. Anderson had, however, obtained these pills through a prescription.
The state charged Anderson in four separate complaints. It charged him with first -
degree sale of a controlled substance in connection with the evidence seized with the
warrant and three separate second-degree sales of a controlled substance in connection with
each controlled buy. The charge in this case was originally one of the second -degree sale
charges.
The parties proceeded to trial with respect to the first -degree sale charge. At this
first trial, the district court permitted the state to introduce evidence of the three controlled
buys; according to Anderson, the district court admitted this evidence “given the nature of
the common motive, intent, knowledge, and scheme or purpose.” The jury acquitted
Anderson.

3
After the first trial, the state filed an amended complaint in this case, combining all
three of the controlled buys made in the summer of 2010 into a single charge of first-degree
sale. The state dismissed the two remaining complaints.
The parties proceeded to a second trial. At that trial, the district court permitted the
state to introduce evidence of the drugs obtained with the search warrant, which the state
argued was evidence of a common scheme or plan. The jury found Anderson guilty of first-
degree sale of a controlled substance. Anderson appealed. This court reversed the
conviction, reducing it to a third -degree sale of a controlled substance. State v. Anderson,
865 N.W.2d 712, 721 (Minn. App. 2015). It did so on the grounds that the relevant statute
did not apply to pills containing oxycodone. Id. at 720. It then remanded the case for
resentencing. Id. at 722.
At his resentencing hearing, Anderson argued that the case against him should be
dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the motion, stating that
resentencing was proper based on this court’s reversal and reduction of his conviction and
remand for resentencing. The district court then sentenced Anderson to a 21-month prison
sentence and stayed execution. The district court indicated that Anderson was to be placed
on probation for 20 years and then, since Anderson had 493 days of custody credit,
immediately discharged him from probation.
Almost two years later, Anderson filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking
to have his conviction vacated. He argued that his conviction after his pr evious acquittal
violated Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2008), which prohibits serialized prosecution for offenses
making up a unitary course o f conduct. The postconviction court rejected Anderson’s

4
petition, concluding that his claim is barred under Knaffla “as a claim that he knew or
should have known about on his direct appeal.”
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Anderson asserts that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition for
relief on the basis that his serialized-prosecution claim is Knaffla barred.
The standard of review for the denial of postconviction relief is for an abuse of
discretion. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). L egal issues are reviewed
de novo, but review of factual issues “is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in
the record to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.” Vance v. State, 752 N.W.2d 509,
512 (Minn. 2008). Appellate courts will not reverse an order “unless the postconviction
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Reed v. State, 793
N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
Under the Knaffla rule, “once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in the
direct appeal and all claims that were known or should have been known but were not
raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626
(Minn. 2015) (emphasis omitted). There are two exceptions to the Knaffla bar. Zornes v.
State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 421 (Minn. 2017). First, “a defendant’s failure to raise a claim may
be excused when the claim is so novel that the legal basis was not available in the earlier
proceeding.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, “[u]nder the interests-of-justice exception to
the Knaffla rule, the court may review a claim as fairness requires when the claim has

5
substantive merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the
issue in the direct appeal or a previous postconviction petition.” Colbert, 870 N.W.2d at
626.
Anderson claims that the state violated Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2008), which
states:
[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under
the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one
of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them
is a bar to prosecution for any other of them. All the offenses,
if prosecuted, shall be included in one prosecution which shall
be stated in separate counts.
Section 609.035 bars multiple, or serialized, prosecutions arising from a single behavioral
incident. State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 876 (Minn. 2000).
Anderson argues that the state violated section 609.035 when it tried him in this case
after the jury acquitted him in the first trial. He claims that the state conceded that the two
cases were one incident when it argued in the first case that evidence of the controlled buys
should be admitted because the events were “all intertwined” and were “part of the same
case.” He argues that his postconviction petition is not barred by Knaffla because he raised
the argument at his resentencing and, alternatively, that his argument falls under Knaffla’s
two exceptions, specifically the fairness exception.
The postconviction court denied Anderson’s petition, concluding that it is Knaffla
barred. It stated that Anderson “knew or should have known about [the claim] on his direct
appeal” and yet he did not raise it. It also noted that neither exception to Knaffla applied:
(1) the language of section 609.035 dated back to at least 1997 and thus would not qualify

6
as novel, and (2) Anderson did not sufficiently explain why his previous failure to raise the
argument on direct appeal was not deliberate and inexcusable.
Failure to Raise Claim on Direct Appeal
Anderson’s brief does not claim that he raised the section 609.035 argument in his
direct appeal. He instead focuses on how he raised the matter at resentencing and points to
State v. Hodges for support. 384 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. App.), aff’d as modified, 386 N.W.2d
709 (Minn. 1986). In Hodges, the appellate court considered the appellant’s arguments
related to section 609.035, even though the appellant had only briefly mentioned the
arguments to the district court in their sentencing memorandum. Id. at 181-82. Hodges is
distinguishable, however, as this court was considering, on direct appeal, arguments that
were briefly made during sentencing. Id. In other words, the case involved timely
arguments that were at least briefly mentioned. While the subject of the arguments in this
case and Hodges overlap, Hodges did not involve untimely arguments or the application of
the Knaffla rule. Anderson offers no authority that indicates that raising an argument at a
resentencing hearing that was not made i n an earlier direct appeal is sufficient to preven t
Knaffla from barring the claim.
Furthermore, Anderson had access to the relevant facts and procedural history
needed to make his serial -prosecution claim, as the claim is based on the two trials he
participated in. Thus, Anderson knew or should have known of the claim at the time of his
direct appeal. Nothing in the record or in Anderson’s briefs contradicts this conclusion. As
such, unless Anderson’s claim falls under one of the exceptions to Knaffla, his claim is
procedurally barred.

7
Novel-Legal-Issue Exception
Anderson claims that this is a novel issue, as no Minnesota appellate court ha s
directly addressed the issue. It may be true that an appellate court has not considered the
specific issue of whether a serial ized-prosecution claim can be established under section
609.035 based on the use of certain types of common -objective evidence. Serial ized-
prosecution arguments, however, have been made for decades. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza,
297 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1980) (holding defendan t waived the issue of serial
prosecution by not raising it at the district court). The Minnesota Supreme Court first held
that section 609.035 prohibits serialized prosecutions over 50 years ago. State v. Johnson,
141 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1966).
Given the lon g history of serial ized-prosecution arguments, the claim was
reasonably available to Anderson at the time of his direct appeal. Thus, the postconviction
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the novelty exception to the Knaffla
does not apply.
Interests-of-Justice Exception
The postconviction court concluded that, because Anderson did not explain why his
failure to raise his serialized-prosecution claim was not deliberate and inexcusable, his
claim does not fall under the interests-of-justice exception to Knaffla. This reasoning is
consistent with Minnesota Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g. , Swaney v. State , 882
N.W.2d 207, 216 (Minn. 2016) (deciding that the interests -of-justice exception did not
apply because the appella nt offered “no argument as to why his failure to raise this issue
in his pro se brief on direct appeal was not deliberate and inexcusable”).

8
Anderson argues that the fact that he raised the issue at resentencing shows that he
did not “deliberately and inexcusably” fail to raise the issue. The rule, however, requires a
party who brings a direct appeal to raise the issue in that appeal, not at resentencing or
some later hearing. Colbert, 870 N.W.2d at 626. At oral argument, Anderson’s counsel
suggested that Anderson’s failure to raise the argument on direct appeal is explained by the
difficulties an individual faces when they wish to raise an argument that their lawyer does
not want to make. But, in his direct appeal, Anderson filed a pro se supplemental brief in
which he raised other arguments not made in his counseled brief . He could have included
there the argument that the state had subjected him to a serialized prosecution , but he did
not do so.
Since Anderson has not shown that he did not “deliberately and inexcusably” fail to
raise the serialized prosecution on his direct appeal, the postconviction court did not abuse
its discretion by concluding the interests-of-justice exception does not apply.
Pro se Arguments
Anderson also raises three arguments in his pro se supplemental brief. He claims
that the third-degree drug charge was “not a fact found by the jury” and thus his conviction
was unlawful. This claim ignores how this court, in reducing Anderson’s conviction from
a first-degree charge to a third -degree charge, determined that a third -degree conviction
was appropriate by relying on facts found by the jury at his trial.
Next, Anderson appears to argue that he did not have sufficient access to the records
of his first trial until now, which he claims goes to the interests-of-justice exception to the
Knaffla rule. Access to these records, however, was not required to at least raise the

9
serialized-prosecution claim, so even if Anderson could not access the records, it does not
excuse his failure to raise the claim in his first appeal.
Anderson concludes by stating he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under due
process. Minn. Stat. §§ 590.01-.11 (2018) describes the postconviction petition process,
including when the postconviction court may determine that an evidentiary hearing is not
necessary, see Minn. Stat. § 590.04. The postconviction court determined that Knaffla bars
Anderson’s claim, so an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. Anderson does not provide
any argument as to why section 590.04 fails to sufficiently protect a petitioner’s due
process rights.
Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err by concluding that Anderson’s
serialized-prosecution claim is Knaffla barred.
Affirmed.