State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0222

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Derrick Lee Riddle,
Appellant.

Filed February 18, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-9060

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A Ramsey County jury found Derrick Lee Riddle guilty of stalking and domestic
assault. On appeal, Riddle argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy
trial and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. We conclude that Riddle’s right to a
speedy trial was not violated and that the prosecutor’s conduct does not warrant a new trial.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Riddle and G.F. were in a turbulent romantic relationship between 1997 and 1999.
They reunited in 2007 and had a child together. In June 2017, G.F. obtained an order for
protection (OFP) that prohibited Riddle from having any contact with her, directly or
through other persons, for two years.
On August 17, 2017, Riddle confronted G.F. in a parking lot. Riddle struck G.F.
and threatened that he would have someone kill her. Shortly after the incident, Riddle sent
threatening text messages to G.F.’s nephew, which were addressed to both the nephew and
G.F. Riddle sent text messages directly to G.F. on October 14, 2017, and indirectly through
G.F.’s daughter on November 7, 2017.
In December 2017, the state charged Riddle with one count of a pattern of stalking
conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) (2016); two counts of a third or
subsequent violation of the stalking statute , in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd.
4(b) (2016); and one count of felony domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 4 (2016). The complaint alleged that Riddle violated the OFP between

3
February 1, 2017, and November 10, 2017, and that Riddle assaulted G.F. on August 17,
2017.
Riddle was arrested on February 28, 2018. At his initial court appearance the next
day, he requested and was granted a public defe nder. On March 13, 2018, Riddle was
released from custody after posting bail. At a March 26, 2018 om nibus hearing, Riddle
pleaded not guilty and demanded a speedy trial. A pre-trial conference was scheduled for
April 26, 2018, and trial was scheduled for May 21, 2018.
At the April 26, 2018 pre-trial conference, Riddle’s public defender informed the
district court that there was no plea agreement and that the case would proceed to trial. On
May 21, 2018, the day on which trial was scheduled to begin, a newly assigned public
defender appeared with Riddle, informed the district court that he would be unavailable for
the remainder of the month , and requested that the trial be continued. The district court
noted that Riddle had made a speedy-trial demand and rescheduled the trial for the weeks
of June 4 and June 11 , 2018. The district court also noted that the rescheduled trial dates
were beyond the 60-day speedy-trial deadline but found that the reasons stated by Riddle’s
public defender provided good cause to continue the trial for two or three weeks.
The parties appeared for trial on June 4, 2018. Jury selection began that day and
continued into the following day. After a jury had been selected, Riddle addressed the
district court and stated that he wished to proceed pro se with his public defender serving
as advisory counsel. Riddle explained that he had met his new public defender only two
weeks earlier, had not communicate d with him since then , and had given his public
defender evidence that the public defender apparently was not planning to use at trial .

4
Riddle also stated his belief that public defenders have a conflict of interest because they
are employed by the state. The district court asked Riddle whether he was prepared to
proceed with trial, and he answered in the affirmative. The district court accepted Riddle’s
waiver of his right to counsel and granted Riddle’s request to proceed pro se. But, on its
own initiative, the district court reconsidered the matter and declined to appoint the public
defender as advisory counsel in light of the concerns Riddle had expressed and the
possibility that the public defender might be asked to assume full representation of Riddle.
The district court stated that it would appoint an attorney who is unaffiliated with the public
defender’s office to serve as advisory counsel and that, to accommodate that appointment,
the trial would need to be continued to the week of July 30, 2018. The district court found
that the need to appoint new advisory counsel provided good cause to further continue the
trial for an additional six weeks despite Riddle ’s speedy-trial demand. Riddle expressed
his agreement with the court’s decision to continue the trial.
On Friday, July 27, 2018, a private attorney was appointed advisory counsel. When
the case was called for trial on Tuesday, July 31, 2018, the state requested a continuance
until the next trial block, which was in September 2018, on the ground that the trial likely
would run into the following week, when several of its witnesses were unavailable. Riddle
objected to the state’s request. The prosecutor noted that all of its witnesses were available
in June, when a jury was selected. The district court granted the state’s request. The district
court reasoned that Riddle’s speedy-trial rights were not violated because the reason for
the delay was attrib utable to him because the state was prepared for trial in June but the

5
trial was continued to accommodate Riddle’s request for self-representation and advisory
counsel.
The trial began on September 26, 2018. At the outset of trial, t he state voluntarily
dismissed counts 2 and 3 of the complaint and proceeded on count 1, which alleged a
pattern of stalking conduct, and count 4, which alleged domestic assault. The state called
ten witnesses, including G.F., G.F.’s nephew, G.F.’s sister, and a woman who had seen
G.F. and a man in the parking lot on the date that Riddle allegedly assaulted her there. The
state also called multiple police officers who respo nded to G.F.’s complaints. A police
sergeant testified that he spoke with Riddle on October 18, 2017, and informed him of the
OFP. The sergeant also described the process of serving an OFP by publication. Riddle
did not testify and did not call any other witnesses.
The jury found Riddle guilty on both counts. At a hearing in October 2018, the
district court considered various post -trial motions filed by Riddle, including a motion to
vacate the judgment on the ground that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. The district
court concluded that there was no speedy-trial violation. The district court reasoned that
“the delay was due in part to the court’s congested calendar and in part to the consequences
of Mr. Riddle ’s decisions,” particularly Riddle’s decision to discharge his second public
defender, and that the delay did not prejudice Riddle because he was not detained before
trial and because his defense was not compromised. During the district court’s oral ruling,
Riddle expressed his desire to withdraw his motions. The district court noted that it was
making a record regardless and reiterated that there was no speedy -trial violation . In

6
November 2018, the district court imposed a sentence of 48 months of imprisonment on
count 1. Riddle appeals.
D E C I S I O N

Riddle’s appellate attorney makes tw o arguments on his behalf for reversal . In
addition, Riddle has filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he makes five additional
arguments for reversal. We will consider each argument in turn.
I. Right to Speedy Trial
Riddle first argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The
United States and Minnesota constitutions provide that, in all criminal prosecutions, “the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also
Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In determining whether a delay has deprived a defendant of the
right to a speedy trial, Minnesota courts generally apply the four -part balancing test
outlined in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972). See State v. Taylor ,
869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015); State v. Windish , 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999).
The four factors are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the
defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the
defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 -33, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 -93. The four factors must be
considered together in light of the relevant circumstances, and no one factor is dispositive
or necessary to a finding that a defendant has be en deprived of the right to a speedy trial.
Id. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193; Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315. If a defendant has been deprived
of the right to a speedy trial, the appropriate remedy is dismissal of the case. State v.
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017).

7
A. Length of Delay
“The delay in speedy-trial cases is calculated from . . . when a person is arrested and
held to answer a criminal charge.” State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986). In
this case, Riddle’s trial began on September 26, 2018, almost seven months after he was
arrested. A “delay of seven months is long enough to trigger the consideration of the other
Barker factors.” Id. Thus, th is factor weighs in f avor of a finding of a speedy -trial
violation.
B. Reason for Delay
Riddle argues that the delay between his arrest and the trial was attributable to the
district court and the state. He contends that there was not good cause to continue the trial
on July 31, 2018, on the ground that the state was not diligent in securing the appearance
of its witnesses. He further contends that , because he was prepared to try the case on
June 5, and because his public defender was prepared to act as advisory counsel, the district
court should have allowed the trial to go forward on that date.
In response, the state argues that delays caused by a court ’s congest ed calendar
weigh only slightly against the state and that the delays were primarily attributable to
Riddle. The state notes that the first delay, fr om May 21 to June 4, 2018, was due to the
assignment of the second public defender, and that the second delay, from June 5 to July
31, 2018, was due to Riddle’s decision to discharge his second public defender and proceed
pro se with advisory counsel. The state contends that the district court declined to appoint
Riddle’s second public defender to be advisory counsel because the district court wished
to accommodate Riddle’s expressed mistrust of the public defender’s office. The state also

8
contends that the district court correctly recognized that there was good cause to continue
the trial on July 31, 2018, because the state was prepared for trial on June 4.
Delays that are attributable to a defendant do not support the defendant’s argument
that his right to a speedy trial was violated. See State v. Mahr, 701 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.
App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2005). “Mere court congestion is insufficient”
to justify delays, McIntosh v. Davis, 441 N.W.2d 115, 120 (Minn. 1989), but administrative
delays, by themselves, are “generally insufficient to violate a defendant’s speedy-trial right
in the absence of a deliberate attempt to delay trial ,” State v. Hahn , 799 N.W.2d 25 , 32
(Minn. App. 2011).
The state is correct that the first delay, on May 21, 2018, i s attributable to Riddle
because his second public defender requested a continuance to accommodate his schedule.
The state also is correct that the second delay, on June 5, 2018, is attributable to Riddle
because he wished to proceed pro se and had expressed mistrust of the public defender’s
office.1 But the third delay is fairly attributed to the state. Nonetheless, most of the delay

1A criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to advisory counsel. State
v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460, 466 (Minn. 2006). Rather, the assistance of advisory counsel
is available pursuant to a rule of court: “The court may appoint advisory counsel to assist
a defendant who voluntarily and intelligently waives the right to counsel.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 5.04, subd. 2. T he appointment of advisory counsel is committed to the discretion of
the district court. Dobbins v. State, 845 N.W.2d 148, 155 (Minn. 2013); Clark, 722 N.W.2d
at 467. In this case , the district court likely c ould have exercised its discretion by not
appointing advisory counsel. The district court also could have appointed Riddle’s second
public defender (rather than a private attorney) to serve as advisory counsel . See Clark,
722 N.W.2d at 466; Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.02, subd. 4; cf. Minn. Stat. § 611.17(b)(4) (2018).
Regardless, it is clear that , as it happened, the district court continued the trial on June 5,
2018, because of Riddle’s stated concerns about the public defender ’s office. Because
Riddle caused the district court to appoint a new attorney as advisory counsel , Riddle

9
between Riddle’s arrest and his trial is attributable to him. Thus, this factor does not weigh
in favor of a finding of a speedy-trial violation.
C. Whether Riddle Asserted Right
Riddle demanded a speedy trial at his March 26, 2018 omnibus hearing ,
approximately one month after he was arrested . He never withdrew that demand. The
district court repeatedly acknowledged that Riddle had demanded a speedy trial. But
Riddle consented to continuing the trial at the May 21, 2018 hearing to accommodate the
schedule of his newly appointed second public defender. He also consented to continuing
trial on June 5, 2018, when the district court agreed to appoint a private attorney to se rve
as advisory counsel. Riddle did not object to any delay until July 31, 2018, when the state
requested a continuance because of the unavailability of its witnesses. A “delay occasioned
by the defendant himself often is deemed a temporary waiver of his speedy trial demand,
which can only be revived wh en the defendant reasserts his speedy trial right .” State v.
Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1993). Thus, this factor weighs only slightly in favor
of a finding of a speedy-trial violation.
D. Whether Delay Prejudiced Riddle
Riddle argues that the del ays prejudiced him because he was required to spend
months anticipating trial, make multiple court appearances, and suffer from the anxiety
induced by his prosecution. In his pro se brief, Riddle adds that the delay made it difficult
for him to arrange fo r witnesses to testify on his behalf , and he suggests that the delays

cannot now argue on appeal that he is not responsible for the delay resulting from that
appointment.

10
prevented him from obtaining custody of his son. In response, the state argues that Riddle
was not prejudiced by the delay because he was not in pre-trial detention after he asserted
his right to a speedy trial and has made no claim that the delays impaired his defense.
A defendant has three interests in a speedy trial: (1) preventing oppressive pre -trial
detention, (2) minimizing anxiety and concern, and (3) limiting the possibility that the
defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. There is no indication
that any of these three interests were compromised. First, Riddle posted bail in March
2018, approximately two weeks after being arrested, and was at liberty until the conclusion
of trial in October 2018. Second, his claims about anxiety and concern are undermined by
his amenability to the continuances on May 21 and June 5 , 2018 . Third, he has not
identified any witnesses who did not testify because of the delays or any other way in which
his defense was affected by the delay. Thus, this factor does not weigh in favor of a finding
of a speedy-trial violation.
In sum, because only one of the factors weighs more than slightly in favor of a
finding of a speedy-trial violation, and because two factors weigh against such a finding,
we conclude that Riddle’s right to speedy trial was not violated . See Taylor, 869 N.W.2d
at 19-21.
II. Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Riddle also argues that he should be granted a new trial on the ground that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct on several occasions during trial.
The right to due process of law includes the right to a fair trial, and the right to a fair
trial includes the absence of prosecutorial misconduct. Spann v. State , 704 N.W.2d 486,

11
493 (Minn. 2005); State v. Ferguson , 729 N.W.2d 604, 616 (Minn. App. 2007), review
denied (Minn. June 19, 2007). There is no dispute in this case that Riddle did not object to
the conduct that he challenges on appeal. Accordingly, we apply the “modified plain-error
test” to Riddle’s unobjected-to claims of prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Carridine ,
812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012).
To prevail under the modified plain -error test, an appellan t initially must establish
that there is an error and that the error is plain. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302
(Minn. 2006). An error is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.”
Id. If there is a plain error, the burden shifts to the state, which must show that the plain
error did not affect the appellant’s substantial rights, i.e., “that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant
effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If the state fails to demonstrate
that substantial rights were not affected, ‘the appellate court then assesses whether it should
address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.’” State v.
Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740
(Minn. 1998)).
Riddle argues that the prosecutor engaged in four types of misconduct. We analyze
each part of the argument separately.
A. Eliciting Vouching Testimony
Riddle argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited vouchi ng testimony from
G.F.’s sister. This argument is based on a series of questions in which the prosecutor asked
G.F.’s sister whether G.F. “has been honest with you about the abuse that she has suffered

12
from Mr. Riddle ” and whether G.F. “was telling the truth about being abused by Mr.
Riddle.” The state concedes that these questions were improper. We agree. “[O]ne witness
cannot vouch for or against the credibility of another witness. ” State v. Ferguson , 581
N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998) . Accordingly, Riddle has established the first two
requirements of the modified plain-error test, and the burden shifts to the state. See Ramey,
721 N.W.2d at 302.
With respect to the third requirement of the modified plain -error test, the state
contends that the misconduct did not significantly affect the verdict because the prosecutor
did not refer to G.F.’s sister’s vouching testimony in closing argument and, instead, urged
the jury to follow the district court ’s instructions concerning the credibility of witnesses.
The state also contends that the supportive testimony of a victim ’s sister would not have
been surprising and, thus, surely was not a significant factor in the jurors’ decision-making
process. Riddle contends that he was prejudiced because the misconduct touched on G.F.’s
credibility, which was central to the case.
The state’s arguments are more persuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that “there
is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had
a significant effect on the verdict” of the jury. See id. Thus, the prosecutor’s misconduct
in eliciting vouching testimony from a witness does not warrant a new trial.
B. Arguing Facts Not in Evidence
Riddle also argues that, in closing argument, the prosecutor improperly stated facts
that were not in evidence. This argument is based on a portion of the prosecutor’s closing
argument in which she stated as follows:

13
[O]rders for protection aren’t just handed out at the drop of a
dime. What happens is there is a process. So, you have to
petition the court. So you have to provide paper work and
documentation about why you need protection. The party who
is the recipient of the order has the ability to demand a
contested hearing, where that person goes to court and tries to
explain to the judge why the order isn ’t necessary or why the
order isn’t warranted. And then it is the judge who makes the
final determination about whether to grant the order f or
protection. It is not the victim. It is the judge evaluating the
situation and deciding, yes, this person needs protection.

And then we have notice and service. Service in person is one
way that a person can be notified of an order f or protection.
But under Minnesota law, we also have service by publication.
Now, that may seem unfair to some people that if you are going
to have a document like this, you have got to hand it directly to
that person and they have got to be a ble to directly accept it.
But the reason the law allows for service by publication is
because there are abusers who evade service. If the person
goes there to give them the document, they don ’t answer the
door. Or they don’t make themselves available for service.

In response, the state argues that the prosecutor’s argument is a “fair interpretation” of the
reason for the OFP law and can be “reasonably inferred” from the OFP itself, which was
introduced into evidence as an exhibit, and from the sergeant’s testimony that the OFP
against Riddle was served by publication.
A prosecutor’s closing argument must be based on the evidence introduced at trial
or reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 237 (Minn.
2005); State v. Crane, 766 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Aug.
26, 2009). In this case, the prosecutor’s argument was based on reasonable inferences from
the evidentiary record, which included a copy of the OFP that was served on Riddle and
the testimony of the sergeant about service by publication. To the extent that the prosecutor

14
discussed uncontroversial principles of law concerning the issuance of OFPs , see Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01 (2018), the argument surely did not affect Riddle ’s substantial rights, see
United States v. Sanchez -Godinez, 444 F. 3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2006) . Thus, this part of
the prosecutor’s closing argument was not reversible misconduct.
C. Personally Vouching for the Victim’s Credibility
Riddle also argues that, in closing argument, the prosecutor improperly vouched for
G.F.’s credibility. This argument is based on a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument
in which she stated as follows:
[O]verall, [G.F.] was credible. She came in and she provided
testimony that was consistent with what she had previously
told the police. She provided details on multiple different
incidents that happened over a span of several months. So this
is up to you to decide when you heard her on the witness stand
whether she was credible and believable, and I submit to you
that she was. [G.F.] is credible and [G.F.] is also courageous.

Riddle contends that the prosecutor provided her “ personal opinion” by stating, “I submit
to you that . . . .” In response, the state argues that the prosecutor made an argument based
on evidence that indicated that G.F. was credible. The state further contends that the
prosecutor’s use of “I submit” was not inappropriate because it was used in the context of
an argument about the evidence, not the prosecutor’s personal opinion.
“A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion regarding witness credibility, but
it is not improper for a prosecutor to analyze the evidence and argue that particular
witnesses were or were not credible. ” State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 139 (Minn. App.
2012) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013) . A prosecutor does not
vouch for a witness’s credibility if the prosecutor “offer[s] an interpretation of the evidence

15
rather than a personal opinion as to guilt.” State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn.
2000). In this case, the statements at issue are based on evidence that G.F.’s testimony was
detailed and consistent with prior statements. The phrase “I submit ” is somewhat
customary when lawye rs speak in courtrooms and does not, by itself, indicate a personal
opinion. See id. Thus, this part of the prosecutor’s closing argument was not misconduct.
D. Encouraging Jury to Punish Riddle
Riddle argues that the prosecutor improperly encouraged the jury to hold Riddle
“accountable.” This argument is based on a portion of the prosecutor ’s closing argument
in which she stated as follows:
But I think it is also important to point out that [the victim] had
to come in here and be subject to cross -examination fr om
someone who has assaulted and threatened her dating back
twenty years. And that ’s difficult. These cases need to be
prosecuted because people need to be held accountable , but
when you have an order in place protecting her from this
defendant and she has to be subject to questions and berating
and trying to undermine her credibility makes the trial process
almost abusive. (Emphasis added.)

Riddle contends that this statement attempted to dissuade the jury from deciding his
case dispassionately. Riddle correctly notes that “ the jury’s role is not to enforce the law
or teach defendants lessons o r make statements to the public.” State v. Salitros ,
499 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 1993). “A prosecutor must not appeal to the passions of the
jury. When credibility is a central issue, this court pays special attention to statements that
may inflame or prejudice the jury. ” State v. Mayhorn , 720 N.W.2d 776, 786 -87 (Minn.
2006) (quotations omitted) . However, “When reviewing claims of prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument , we consider the argument as a whole, rather than

16
focusing on particular phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue
prominence.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 691 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). In
this case, the particular statement about holding people accountable was a very brief and
small part of a discussion about how difficult it was for G.F. to appear in cou rt and to be
subjected to cross -examination by the person against whom she had obtained an OFP.
Thus, this part of the prosecutor’s closing argument was not misconduct.
In sum, Riddle is not entitled to a new trial for prosecutorial misconduct.
III. Pro Se Arguments
As stated above, Riddle has made five arguments in his pro se supplemental brief.
First, Riddle argues that the district court erred by not allowing him to call witnesses
to testify on his behalf and by not allowing him to call the prosecutor as a witness. As the
state argues in response, Riddle had an opportunity to subpoena witness es but did not do
so. The district court ruled that Riddle had not articulated a proper reason for calling the
prosecutor as a witness. The district court did not err in that ruling. See State v. Fratzke,
325 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1982) ; State v. Mussehl , 396 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. App.
1986), aff’d, 408 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1987).
Second, Riddle argues that G.F. and the police offi cers who testified at trial
committed perjury. Riddle had an opportunity at trial to cross -examine the state’s
witnesses and did so. This court defers to the jury’s credibility determinations and its
resolution of disputed factual issues. See State v. Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn.
1980).

17
Third, Riddle argues that the jury was tainted by the presence of two police officers
in the venire panel , neither of whom were selected to serve as jurors. A juror is not
disqualified from serving on a criminal jury simply because he or she ha s an association
with law enforcement, so long as he or she can be fair and impartial . See State v. Huseth,
375 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 1985); cf. Ries v.
State, 889 N.W.2d 308, 314 -15 (Minn. App. 2016), aff’d, 920 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 2018) .
In any event, the two officers were not selected to serve on the jury.
Fourth, Riddle argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts.
He argues, among other things, that he did not receive notice of the OFP, that the witness
who testified to seeing a man with G.F. did not identify him, that G.F. was not credible,
and that he did not commit domestic assault because he never came into physical contact
with G.F. The state introduced evidence that Riddle was served with the OFP by
publication. Minn. Stat. § 518.01B, subd. 8(c) (2016). As stated above, t he credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony is a matter that is reserved to the
jury. See, e.g., State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). The district court
also correctly instructed the jury that there need not be physical contact for a domestic
assault to have occurred. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subds. 1, 4 (2016). Thus, t he
evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that Riddle is guilty of both a pattern of
stalking conduct and felony domestic assault.
Fifth, Riddle argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of prior
incidents of domestic abuse . We apply an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to a
district court’s decision to admit evidence. State v. Graham, 764 N.W.2d 340, 351 (Minn.

18
2009). Relationship evidence may be admitted if it provides context for the crime charged.
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2016); State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 553 (Minn. 2010); State
v. Loving , 775 N.W.2d 872 , 8 79-80 (Minn. 2009) . Such evidence need not be
corroborated. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 553. The district court allowed the state to
introduce evidence of Riddle ’s p rior abuse of G.F. The district court analyzed the
admissibility of the evidence under both section 634.20 and the caselaw interpreting that
statute. The district court determined that the relationship evidence was more probative
than prejudicial. The district court did not abuse its discretion in that ruling.
Affirmed.