In the Matter of Midway Pro Bowl Relocation Benefits Claim.

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-0237

Court of Appeals Anderson, J.

In the Matter of Midway Pro Bowl
Relocation Benefits Claim.
Filed: January 15, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Jon W. Morphew , Morphew Law Office, P.L.L.C ., Minneapolis, Minnesota , for
respondent Bowl-Rite, Inc.

Peter G. Mikhail, LeVander, Gillen, & Miller, P.A. , South Saint Paul , Minnesota , for
appellant City of Saint Paul.

S Y L L A B U S
To secure judicial review of a decision in a contested case, an aggrieved person must
serve a petition for a writ of certiorari on all parties to the contested case not more than 30
days after receiving the final agency decision, as required by Minn. Stat. § 14.63 (2018),
but this 30-day deadline does not apply to the agency-service requirement in Minn. Stat.
§ 14.64 (2018).
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
Respondent Bowl-Rite, Inc., d/b/a Midway Pro Bowl (Midway) had its lease of a
bowling alley prematurely terminated because of the construction of Allianz Field in Saint

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Paul. Midway sought relocation benefits under the Minnesota Uniform Relocation Act,
Minn. Stat. §§ 117.50 –.56 (2018), but appellant City of Saint Paul (City) denied the
request. The dispute proceeded to a contested -case hearing before an administrative law
judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings . The administrative law judge denied
Midway’s claim.
Midway then sought review of this decision under the judicial review procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act . Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63 –.69 (2018) . Midway filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the court of appeals and served the petition on the City
within 30 days of receiving the decision, as required by Minn. Stat. § 14.63. The City
moved the court of appeals to dis charge the writ and dismiss the appeal , alleging that
Midway failed to serve the petition on the agency, as required by Minn. Stat. § 14.64,
within the 30 -day deadline set forth in section 14.63. The court of appeals held that the
30-day deadline in section 14.63 does not apply to the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 14.64,
and denied the motion to discharge the writ. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
The facts in this appeal are undisputed. Midway sought relocation benefits under
the Minnesota Uniform Relocation Act after Midway’s lease of a bowling alley was
prematurely terminated due to the construction of the Allianz Field soccer stadium and
related infrastructure. The City denied Midway’s claim for relocation benefits , arguing
that a private party, rather than the City, had acquired the property. The Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) conducted a contested-case proceeding. See Minn. Stat.
§ 117.52, subd. 4 (requiring a contested case proceeding under the Administrative

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Procedure Act if the denial of relocation benefits is challenged). In an order issued on
January 18, 2019, an administrative law judge affirmed the City’s denial of Midway’s
claim for relocation benefits. The decision of the administrative law judge was the final
agency decision. See id.
On February 7, 2019, Midway sought judicial review of the decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the court of
appeals. See Minn. Stat. § 14.63. The Clerk of the Appellate Courts issued the writ of
certiorari that same day. As requested in the proposed writ, the writ issued by the court of
appeals was directed to the City. On February 9, 2019, Midway served both the petition
for the writ of certiorari and the issued writ on counsel for the City , by certified mail, and
served the issued writ on the OAH, by first-class mail.
On February 25, 2019, the City moved to discharge the writ of certiorari for lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that Midway had failed to comply with the judicial review procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, the City argued that (1) Midway failed
to serve the petition for the writ of certiorari on the OAH—the agency that issued the final
decision—within the 30-day period in section 14.63 and (2) Midway improperly served the
writ of certiorari on the City rather than the OAH. Midway opposed the motion and, two
days later, on February 27, served the petition for the writ of certiorari on the OAH by
certified mail.
On April 16, 2019, the court of appeals denied the City’s motion to discharge the
writ of certiorari. In re Midway Pro Bowl Relocation Benefits Claim, No. A19-0237, Order
(Minn. App. filed Apr. 16, 2019). The court of appeals held that Midway had invoked the

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court’s jurisdiction by timely filing the petition for the writ of certiorari and timely serving
the petition on the City, in compliance with section 14.63. Id. at 1. But the court of appeals
also concluded that Midway had “incorrectly directed the writ of certiorari” to the City
rather than to the agency. The court of appeals ordered Midway to file “a corrected
proposed writ of certiorari” and, once the Clerk of the Appellate Courts issued a new writ,
to serve the corrected writ on the OAH and the City. Id. at 2. Because the court of appeals
“determined that publication of a special term opinion [would] be beneficial to the bench
and bar,” it announced that a “ forthcoming special term opinion [would] constitute [its]
final ruling on the jurisdictional issues.” Id. The next day, Midway served the corrected
writ on the OAH.
On May 20, 2019, the court of appeals issued a published speci al term opinion,
explaining the reasoning for the decision. In re Midway Pro Bowl Relocation Benefits
Claim, 930 N.W.2d 7 (Minn. App. 2019). The court of appeals held that the Administrative
Procedure Act requires only that the petition for the writ of certiorari be filed with the court
of appeals and served on all parties to the contested case within the 30 -day appeal period
and “does not establish a time limit for service of the petition an d the issued writ on the
agency.” Id. at 10. Therefore, the court of appeals concluded , Midway’s failure to serve
the petition and the issued writ on the OAH within the 30-day appeal period was not a
jurisdictional defect. Id. at 12.
The City sought further review of the court of appeals’ decision. We granted review.

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ANALYSIS
The City argues that Midway forfeited its right to judicial review of the OAH
decision because Midway failed to institute proceedings for review under Minn. Stat.
§ 14.64 within the 30-day deadline set forth in Minn. Stat. § 14.63. We are presented here
with a statutory interpretation issue, which we review do novo. State v. Thompson , 754
N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn. 2008). When interpreting statutes, we attempt to “ascertain and
effectuate the intentio n of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (20 18); see Eischen
Cabinet Co. v. Hildebrandt, 683 N.W. 2d 813, 815 (Minn. 2004). The clear language of a
statute should not be disregarded to pursue the spirit of the law. Minn. Stat. § 645.16.
The court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction over executive branch administrative
decisions “as prescribed by law.” Minn. Const. art. VI, § 2. For administrative decisions,
“[t]he appeal period and the acts required to invoke appellate jurisdiction are governed by
the applicable statute. ” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 115.01. The court of appeals lacks
jurisdiction over an administrative appeal that is not initiated in accordance with the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. In re Risk Level Determination of
J.M.T., 759 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn. 2009).
The Minnesota Uniform Relocation Act expressly incorporates the Administrative
Procedure Act and requires that an administrative law judge determine a contested claim
for relocation bene fits. Minn. Stat. § 117.52, subd. 4 (incorporating by reference Minn.
Stat. §§ 14.57 –.66 (2018)). The right of judicial review of an executive branch agency
decision is invoked by following each of the steps established by the Legislature. See, e.g.,

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Dennis v. Salvation Army, 874 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that “we adhere
strictly to the statutory requirements for appeals from an executive branch agency”).
The City argues that the deadline set forth in Minn. Stat. § 14.63, which requires a
petition for a writ of certiorari to be served on all parties to the contested case not more
than 30 days after the aggrieved person receives the final agency decision, also applies to
the service requirements set forth in Minn. Stat. § 14.64. In particular, the City argues that
Midway was required to serve the petition for the writ of certiorari on the agency, the OAH,
within the same 30-day deadline specified in section 14.63. We disagree.
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine wheth er, on its face, the
language of the statute is ambiguous. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud , 813 N.W.2d 68, 72
(Minn. 2012). We interpret the statute as a whole, considering the provision at issue “in
light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting i nterpretations.” Am. Family Ins.
Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). “A statute is ambiguous only if it is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis,
837 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn. 2013). “When the language of a statute is clear, we apply
the plain language of the statute and decline to explore its spirit or purpose.” Cocchiarella
v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).
Section 14.63 entitles any person aggrieved by a final agency decision in a contested
case to seek judicial review of th at decision. T o invoke the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals, the aggrieved person must (1) file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the court
of appeals, (2) serve the petition on all parties to the contested case , and (3) do so within
30 days of receiving the agency decision. Minn. Stat. § 14.63. Th is language is

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unambiguous, and it is undisputed that Midway complied with the plain language of this
statute.
Section 14.64, on the other hand, describes the requirements to institute proceedings
for judicial review:
Proceedings for review under sections 14.63 to 14.68 shall be
instituted by serving a petition for a writ of certiorari personally or by
certified mail upon the agency and by promptly filing the proof of service in
the Office of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts and the matter shall proceed
in the manner provided by the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

Minn. Stat. § 14.64. This language is also unambiguous. As noted above, the City contends
that Midway did not comply with the requirements of section 14.64 because the petition
for a writ of certiorari was not served on the OAH within the 30-day deadline.
The City urges us to read both statutes together and apply the requirements
conjunctively. It argues that, when read together, the 30-day deadline in section 14.63 must
also apply to the service requirements in section 14.64. In support of this interpretation,
the City argues that the word s “shall be instituted” in section 14.64 refer to the
commencement of the appellate proceeding and that section 14.64 “explicitly incorporates
and applies” the 30-day deadline found in section 14.63. Put another way, the City argues
that the 30-day deadline applies to all of the requirements necessary to institute proceedings
for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
The City cites In re Risk Level Determination of J.M.T. , 759 N.W.2d 406 (Minn.
2009), in support of this argument. In that case, we held that the service requirements in
Minn. Stat. § 14.63 (2008) must be met according to the service methods prescribed in
Minn. Stat. § 14.64 (2008). In re J.M.T., 759 N.W.2d at 408. That decision was based on

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the fact that section 14.63, at the time, required service of the petition on the agency within
30 days and section 14.64, at the time, specified the methods by which the agency was to
be served with the petition. Both statutes addressed the same subject matter: service of the
petition for the writ of certiorari on the agency.
The Legislature amended section 14.63 in 2013, changing the previous requirement
for the petition to be served “on the agency,” to the current requirement that the petition be
served “on all parties to the contested case .” See Act of May 13, 2013, ch. 56, § 1, 2013
Minn. Laws 270. After this amendment, section 14.63 and section 14.64 no longer address
the same subject matter. Now, as amended, section 14.63 addresses service of the petition
on the parties to the contested case, but section 14.64, which was not amended by the 2013
legislation, still addresses service of the petition on the agency. There are no requirements
related to service of the petition on the parties to the contested cas e in section 14.64.
Whatever relevance In re J.M.T. might have held before 2013, it simply does not apply to
the issue here.
Thus, w e decline to import the deadline in section 14.63 into section 14.64. In
enacting and amending these statutes, “the Legislature is presumed to have known and had
in mind all existing laws relating to the subject -matter, and to have enacted them in the
light of such knowledge,” and we thus construe those laws “ so as to harmonize with each
other and give full effect” to all if reasonably possible. Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 77 N.W.2d 425, 428 ( Minn. 1956) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). These statutes serve separate purposes, and each of their parts can be read
in harmony without imputing language from one statute to another.

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Section 14.63 provides that an aggrieved person, here Midway, invokes the court of
appeals’ jurisdiction by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the court and serving
that petition on all parties to the contested case , in this case the City, within the 30 -day
deadline. Section 14.64 speaks to a different event; it provides that a proceeding for
judicial review is instituted by serving a petition for a writ of certiorari on the agency, here
the OAH, which puts the agency on notice that the proceeding has begun and that the
procedural deadlines and requirements of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure now
apply. The City argues that this is not how a proceeding for judicial review should begin
under the Administrative Procedure Act and that the 2013 statutory amendment did not
intend to remove the requirement that the agency be served with the petition for a writ of
certiorari within 30 days. We assume , however, that “when t he Legislature amends a
statute, it intends to change the law. ” Hansen v. Todnem , 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn.
2018).
The plain language of the statutes at issue here provide s a deadline to serve the
parties but no deadline to serve the agency. 1 Specifically, we hold that judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act is invoked by compliance with the provisions of
section 14.63, and we also hold that the 30-day deadline in section 14.63 does not apply to

1 The City also argues that this interpretation leads to a suboptimal result and is not
how the judicial review procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act should operate.
Although the City’s policy arguments may have merit, when interpreting statutes, we “will
not supply that which the legislature purposefully omits or inadvertently overlooks.”
Green Giant Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue , 534 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1995). If the City
wants the agency to be served (or notified or otherwise involved) within 30 days (or by any
other deadline), the City should ask the Legislature to amend the statutes accordingly.

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the service requirement imposed by section 14.64. Midway served the petition for a writ
of certiorari on OAH, as required by section 14.64. More importantly, b ecause Midway
filed and served the petition for the writ of certiorari on the City within the 30-day deadline
in section 14.63, w e conclude that Midway properly invoked the court of appeals’
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.