Ramsey County Thissen, J.

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-0240

Ramsey County Thissen, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,
vs. Filed May 6, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
Matthew Michael Garland,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Ramsey County
Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. Assuming without deciding that the district court erred by not holding a
hearing on appellant’s motion to exclude expert testimony regarding DNA evidence, any
such error was harmless.

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2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert opinion
testimony regarding the State’s DNA evidence because the opinion was foundationally
reliable and helpful to the trier of fact and the scientific technique used in the GlobalFiler
test kit is not novel.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the probative
value of the DNA evidence outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice to appellant.
4. The prosecutor ’s unobje cted-to conduct during the video replay that was
requested by the deliberating jury and held in open court was not structural error and did
not affect appellant’s substantial rights.
5. The district court erred by adjudicating appellant guilty of both first -degree
murder and second-degree murder.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
A jury found appellant Matthew Michael Garland guilty of first-degree murder and
second-degree murder for the shooting death of Ronde ll Dunn and the district court
adjudicated him guilty on both counts. Garland challenges both convictions. First, Garland
argues that the district court erred by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on the
admissibility of the DNA evidence. Second, he argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his pretrial motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony regarding
DNA evidence. He contends that the evidence should have been excluded because the
expert’s opinion lacked foundational reliability, was unhelpful to the trier of fact, and should

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have been evaluated under the Frye-Mack standard because it involved a novel scientific
technique. He also contends that the DNA evidence was inadmissible because it was more
prejudicial than probative. Finally, Garland contends that the prosecutor ’s unobjected-to
responses to three fact questions posed by the jury in open court with the judge and defense
counsel present after the jury had begun deliberations constituted structural error.
We hold that any error the district court may have made by declining to hold an
evidentiary hearing regarding the DNA evidence was harmless. We also hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Garland’s motion to exclude the DNA evidence.
We further hold that even if the prosecutor’s conduct was plain error—an issue we do not
reach—it is not reasonably likely that the jury would have reached a different result had the
prosecutor not answered the three jury questions. Consequently, Garland was not prejudiced
by the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, we hold that the district court erred by
entering a formal adjudication on both first-degree murder and second-degree murder. We
remand to the district court to correct that error. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand.
FACTS
Just after 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 2017, Rondell Dunn was shot at the corner of Saint
Albans Street and Fuller Avenue in Saint Paul. A police investigation led to the a rrest of
Garland and his friend, S.L. Garland was charged with first -degree murder, first-degree
murder committed for the benefit of a gang, second -degree murder, and second -degree
murder committed for the benefit of a gang. S.L. was charged with aiding and abetting

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second-degree murder. S.L. ultimately pled guilty to aiding an offender and testified against
Garland.
After the district court conducted several pretrial hearings, Garland filed an additional
pretrial motion to exclude DNA evidence and related expert testimony that the State sought
to introduce against him. He also requested an omnibus hearing on the motion. In his
motion, he argued that the expert opinion lacked foundational reliability under Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 702, the DNA evidence was inadmissible under the Frye-Mack standard,
and the evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Min nesota Rule of Evidence
403. The district court denied Garland’s motion to exclude the evidence without holding an
evidentiary hearing.
Garland petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals. He argued that
the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
State’s expert testimony met the requirements of Rule 702 and the Frye-Mack standard. He
asked the court of appeals to direct the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
admissibility of the evidence and expert opinion testimony. The court of app eals denied
Garland’s petition and the case proceeded to trial.
At trial, the State established the following facts using witness testimony, crime scene
surveillance videos, scientific test results, and other evidence. Just before 1:00 p.m. on the
day of Dunn’s murder, S.L. picked up Garland in S.L.’s girlfriend’s car, a gold Saturn Vue.
Garland was wearing a red Polo hat, a black True Religion shirt , black pants, and a black
jacket. That was the same outfit Garland was seen wearing in a gas station surveillance video
just one week before the murder.

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S.L. and Garland drove toward S.L.’s house. As they were driving , they spotted
Dunn. Garland told S.L. to park at a corner nearby. S.L. did so. Garland then told S.L. that
he was going to “blow his ass down,” which S.L. took to mean that Garland was going to
shoot at Dunn. S.L. would not let him do it from the car, so Garland got out and w alked
down the street toward Dunn. He passed Dunn, turned around, and shot Dunn several times
in the back.
After Garland left the car, S.L. immediately drove part of the way around the block
and stopped by an alley. S.L. then saw Garland running through the alley and across a yard.
He drove to the next street and picked up Garland in the middle of the block. Garland told
S.L. that he had shot Dunn. Garland still had his gun, but said that it was empty. He was no
longer wearing his red Polo hat. A different eyewitness confirmed parts of S.L.’s testimony
about these events.
S.L. and Garland sped away from the scene of the shooting but got stuck at a stoplight.
S.L. attempted to get around several cars, hitting one in the process. S.L. drove away from
the scene of that accident and dropped Garland off at another person’s house before picking
his girlfriend up from work.
The woman whose car S.L. hit called 911 to report that she was the victim of a
hit-and-run accident at a stoplight. The license plate number she provided to police was
connected to a gold Saturn Vue that matched the car that surveillance cameras had recorded
driving near the scene of the shooting. Officers determined that the car belonged to S.L.’s
girlfriend and that S.L. had previously been seen driving the car. Police arrested S.L. and
searched the Saturn Vue incident to that arrest. Garland’s black jacket, which he was wearing

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in the gas station surveillance video and on the crime scene surveillance video, was found in
the car. And Garland’s fingerprints were found on the exterior of the car window.
Garland disputed his involvement in the murder, stating that he had been in Chicago
on April 17, 2017. But cell-site location information placed his cell phone in Minneapolis
and Saint Paul on April 16 and 17. And messages from his Facebook account showed that
he was making plans to meet a woman in Saint Paul on the afternoon of April 17.
The State also presented DNA evidence linking Garland to the shooting. At the scene
of the shooting, police recovered a red hat with a Pol o design on it that looked virtually
identical to the one that Garland had been wearing in the gas station surveillance videos .
Police sent the hat to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) for DNA testing. A BCA
forensic scientist used a GlobalFiler test kit to analyze two DNA samples taken from the hat.
Based on her analysis, the scientist opined that a swabbing sample taken from the hat, Item
1-1, contained a mixture of DNA from four or more individuals. She also concluded that a
cutting sample taken from the hat, Item 1-2, contained a mixture of DNA from four or more
individuals.
The BCA scientist then determined whether Garland could be excluded from the
sample by comparing markers in his DNA to markers in the samples. She concluded that
Garland could not be excluded from either sample. She could not —and did not —state
whether Garland’s DNA was part of either sample. Finally, she calculated what percentage
of the population coul d be excluded as contributors to each sample. She concluded that,
based on the DNA markers present, 92 percent of the general population could be excluded
from Item 1-1 and 16.7 percent of the general population could be excluded from Item 1-2.

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After the case was submitted and the jury began deliberations, the jury asked to review
two video exhibits. The jury viewed the videos in open court in the presence of the judge,
the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and Garland . The videos were played from the
prosecutor’s laptop and were projected onto the courtroom wall. During the viewing, the
prosecutor responded to three questions about the videos from the jury. First, the jurors
asked to stop one of the videos at a particular point and “get the time frame . . . [t]he time
stamp.” The prosecutor responded that the time was “14:18:26.” Second, as the video was
stopped at the same point, a juror asked , “This is Central, right?” and the prosecutor
responded, “Yeah.” And third, when viewing the second video, a juror asked, “What is the
time stamp on that?” to which the prosecutor responded, “14:12.” Following the second
question, the district court reminded the jury that the prosecutor “can’t answer questions.”
Defense counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s statements.
The jury found Garland guilty of first-degree murder and second-degree murder and
not guilty of the gang -related charges. Garland received a sentence of life without the
possibility of release.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Garland makes four principal arguments. First, he argues that the district
court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing to assess the admissibility of the State’s
expert opinion regarding the DNA evidence. Second, he contends that the district court
abused its discretion by denying h is motion to exclude the State ’s expert opinion under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702. Specifically, he argues that the State’s expert opinion
involved a novel scientific theory and therefore needed to satisfy the Frye-Mack standard.

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He also argues that the opinion lacked foundational reliability and was unhelpful to the jury.
Third, he contends that the State’s expert opinion was more prejudicial than probative under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403. Finally, he argues that the prosecutor’s exchange with the
jury during the video viewing was reversible error.
I.
Garland sought to prevent the State from introducing expert testimony related to the
DNA testing of the red Polo cap found at the crime scene. In support of his written motion
to exclude the State’s expert opinion, Garland submitted substanti al evidence in the form
of an expert report, affidavit, and the complete transcript of a prior evidentiary hearing on
a DNA challenge involving the same experts. Garland demanded a hearing under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 11.02, along with a request that the district court receive evidence under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 11.03(a), to assess the admissibility of the State’s expert opinion regarding
DNA evidence . See Minn. R. Crim. P. 8.03. A fter reviewing Garland’s written
submissions, but without granting oral argument or holding a n evidentiary hearing , the
district court denied the motion to exclude the expert opinion.
On appeal, Garland argues that the district court committed reversible error by
denying his motion without providing an opportunit y for oral argument or holding an
evidentiary hearing to receive testimony from the expert witnesses. Because the alleged
errors were harmless, we need not decide whether the district court was required to grant

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oral argument on the motion or hold an evidentiary hearing to receive testimony from the
expert witnesses.1
We have previously held that the erroneous failure to hold a hearing on the
admissibility of the State’s evidence is subject to a harmless-error analysis. State v. Roman
Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 2002) (applying a harmless -error analysis to a claim
that the district court improperly denied the defendant a Frye-Mack hearing and therefore
admitted the DNA evidence in error); State v. Burns, 394 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn. 1986)
(“[T]he lac k of an admissibility hearing where one would normally be held does not
automatically entitle a defendant to relief .”); Coralin v. State , 377 N.W.2 d 14, 19–20
(Minn. 1985) (applying a harmless-error analysis to the district court’s erroneous failure to
hold a midtrial hearing on the admissibility of a pretrial photo lineup).
Even if we assume without deciding that the district should have held a hearing, the
improper admission of DNA evidence is harmless if it “did not have a significant impact
on the verdict.” State v. Nielsen , 467 N.W.2d 615, 619 (Minn. 1991); see also State v.
Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Minn. 2006) (explaining that an evidentiary error is
harmless unless it “substantially influences” the jury’s decision) (citation omitted) (internal

1 The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure generally do not provide clear guidance
to courts or lawyers on what type of hearing a district court must hold under Rule 11.02
and when a district court should hold an evidentiary hearing as allowed under Rule 11.03.
To ensure clarity for courts and practitioners, we refer to the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure the task of studying and making
recommendations to this court clarifying (1) the circumstances under which an opportunity
to orally argue omnibus motions is required and (2) when a district court should allow
witnesses to testify subject to cross-examination in connection with such motions.

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quotations marks omitted). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the admission of
the State’s expert opinion testimony did not have a significant impact on the verdict.
Although DNA evidence may be strong and persuasive to a jury, see State v.
Schneider, 597 N.W.2d 889, 896 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., concurring specially), other
substantial and compelling evidence of Garland’s guilt exists here. Garland’s friend, S.L.,
testified that Garland admitted to shooting Dunn. S.L.’s testimony is corroborated by other
evidence, including eyewitnesses and video surveillance . Garland’s primary defense was
that before the incident he boarded a bus from St. Paul to Chicago and was in Chicago at
the time of the shooting. B ut there was n o sign of Garland on the relevant bus station
surveillance footage. Moreover, a phone that the State linked to Garland pinged cell phone
towers in Minne apolis in the days immediately preceding and following the murder.
Garland’s Facebook messages also placed him in the area at the time of the shooting. And
the State did not rely heavily on the DNA evidence. The prosecutor’s closing argument
took more than 30 pages of trial transcript, but the DNA evidence was mentioned on only
four of those pages. On those four occasions, the prosecutor simply reiterated that Garland
could not be excluded from the DNA sample found on the hat. Cf. Roman Nose , 649
N.W.2d at 823 (stating that we “simply [could not] say the jury’s verdict was surely
unattributable to the admission of [the] DNA evidence . . . given the importance t hat was
placed on the evidence”).2

2 We further observe that t he parties submitted extensive evidence for the distric t
court to consider when determining admissibility , including detailed memoranda, expert
reports, and transcripts of prior expert trial testimony by the two experts involved in this
case. Moreover, the district court did not limit the parties’ written sub missions regarding

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Based on the above considerations, we hold that the failure to hold a hearing on
Garland’s motion to exclude the State’s expert testimony regarding the DNA evidence was
harmless.
II.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It
states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The opinion must
have foundational reliability. In addition, if the opinion or evidence involves
novel scientific theory, the proponent must establish that the underlying
scientific evidence is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.

“Under this rule, expert testimony is admissible if: (1) the witness is qualified as an expert;
(2) the expert’s opinion has foundational reliability; (3) the expert testimony is helpful to the
jury; and (4) if the testimony involves a novel scientific theory, it [satisfies] the Frye-Mack

Garland’s motion to exclude. Consequently, Garland’s complaint that at a hearing he
would have introduced even more scientific studies and called on Dr. Nora Rudin to testify
in more detail about the opinions included in her report fall s flat. Garland has failed to
specify how information that he would have elicited or presented at a pretrial evidentiary
hearing meaningfully differs —aside from volume —from what he had already submitted
to the district court. See State v. Ortlepp , 363 N. W.2d 39, 44 -45 (Minn. 1985) (holding
that the failure to hold a hearing was harmless in part because defendant did not
demonstrate that the hearing would have benefitted him).
Garland also argues that an evidentiary h earing would have allowed
cross-examination of the state’s experts on “the Globa lFiler’s lack of accreditation” and
“the BCA employees’ contamination of one of the samples” from the red hat. But as we
discuss later in this opinion , the Globa lFiler was validated in accordance with accepted
protocols and the claim that one of the samples was contaminated is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the record.

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standard.” State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 2011). Garland argues that the State
failed to show that prongs two, three, and four are satisfied.
“We review evidentiary rul ings of the district court, including the admission of
expert testimony, for abuse of discretion.” State v. Anderson , 789 N.W.2d 227, 234 –35
(Minn. 2010). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman,
892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
A.
We first consider Garland’s challenge to foundational reliability. When determining
whether an opinion is foundationally reliable under Rule 702, “the district court must analyze
the proffered testimony in light of the purpose for which it is being offered . . . [and] consider
the underlying reliability, consistency, and accuracy of the subject about which the expert is
testifying.” Doe v. Archdioc ese of St. Paul , 817 N.W.2d 150, 167–68 (Minn. 2012) .
Foundational reliability goes “beyond a mere helpfulness standard.” Id. at 167. Instead, it
“is a concept that looks to the theories and methodologies used by an expert.” Kedrowski v.
Lycoming Engines, 933 N.W.2d 45, 56 (Minn. 2019). We have recognized that “ ‘DNA test
results are only as reliable and accurate as the testing procedures used by the particular
laboratory.’ ” State v. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Minn. 2003) (quoting State v.
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989)).
The district court must also determine whether the expert reliably applied the
underlying theories and methodologies in the particular case. See Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 168–
69. When we assess the “foundational reliability of a laboratory ’s DNA testing

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methodology[,] . . . [we] look[] at ‘whether the laboratory conducting the tests in the
individual case complied with appropriate standards and controls.’ ” Traylor, 656 N.W.2d
at 893–94 (quoting Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d at 819).
Garland argues that the State’s expert opinion lacked foundational reliability because
the mixtures in Items 1-1 and 1-2 were too complex for reliable interpretation. He asserts
that the State failed to show both that the BCA’s testing methods are generally reliable and
that its application of those methods in this case rendered reliable results.
1.
Garland’s primary challenge to the underlying reliability is that the BCA’s testing and
reporting procedures are insufficient for analyzing complex mixtures. The State offered the
DNA testimony to show that Garland could not be excluded as a contributor to the samples
taken from the hat found at the crime scene and that a percentage of the general population
could be excluded. The district court found that the expert testimony would focus on those
conclusions and any challenges brought by the defense. Accordingly, the district court
assessed whether the BCA’s procedures for DNA testing and analysis could reliably,
consistently, and accurately show whether Garland could be excluded as a contributor to the
hat samples and what percentage of the general population could be excluded. See Doe, 817
N.W.2d at 168.
The BCA used the GlobalFiler testing kit as part of its DNA analysis. The BCA
began using GlobalFiler on January 1, 2017, in accordance with Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) requirements that all facilities participating in the National DNA Index

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System use kits that target 20 core DNA markers. The BCA’s previous testing kit, Identifiler,
targeted only 13 DNA markers. GlobalFiler meets the FBI requirement.
The GlobalFiler kit uses the PCR -STR method to amplify —that is, replicate —
fragments of DNA.3 Once those fragments have been replicated, a BCA analyst compares
the DNA marker s in fragments of an unknown DNA sample —for example, a sample
collected at a crime scene—with the DNA markers in fragments of a sample from a known
individual. The analyst will determine whether all DNA markers present in the known
sample are also present at the same locations in the unknown sample. If they are, that known
individual cannot be excluded as a possible contributor to the unknown sample.
If the analyst determines that the known individual cannot be excluded, the analyst
will use some of the DNA markers to calculate the “combined probability of exclusion”
(CPE). The CPE expresses the proportion of the general population that can be excluded
from the unknown sample. This number can be expressed as a decimal or a fraction. The
CPE does not allow an analyst to affirmatively determine whether a person’s DNA is

3 We have explained:

Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) is a method for replica ting, also
known as amplifying a portion of an individual’s DNA. It essentially copies
DNA, thus increasing the amount available to be tested. This method does not
replicate the entire DNA strand. Instead, it generates millions of copies of a
particular portion of DNA by repeatedly replicating a small, defined portion
of the strand . . . .
Recently, PCR testing began to exa mine a portion of human DNA
known as short tandem repeats, or STRs[,]. . . in which a DNA sequence is
repeated along the strand.

Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 888–89.

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included in an unknown sample, only whether a person cannot be excluded as a contributor
to the sample.
Garland raised three primary objections to the BCA’s procedures. Each objection
was based on and supported by Dr. Nora Rudin’s expert report, which Garland submitted to
the district court. Dr. Rudin reached her conclusions by reviewing documentation from the
BCA, including DNA reports, bench notes, logs, and raw electronic data, as well as BCA
protocols and validation studies. Dr. Rudin did not perform independent testing of the DNA
samples from the hat.
Dr. Rudin first opined that the BCA’s analytical threshold is too high. The analytical
threshold is the level above which DNA markers in a sample can be distinguished from other
“noise” produced by the testing kit and equipment performing the analysis. According to
Dr. Rudin’s review, the BCA opted to use an analytical threshold that was too high.
Dr. Rudin’s second objection concerned another BCA threshold —the stochastic
threshold. The stochastic threshold is the level above which both DNA markers at a given
location in a sample would be expected to be detected. This threshold is established using
the previously determined analytical threshold. Dr. Rudin stated that the stochastic threshold
was improperly determined and therefore was incorrect.
According to Dr. Rudin, when stochastic and analytical thresholds are incorrect, the
testing kit may fail to detect DNA m arkers. And because mixtures contain DNA from
multiple contributors, there is an increased risk that some markers will go undetected. When
that happens, the analyst may overestimate the number of people who can be excluded from

16
an unknown sample. In oth er words, the resulting statistic may make it seem more likely
that the defendant is a contributor to the sample.
Finally, Dr. Rudin stated that CPE calcula tions are not valid for analyzing samples
containing DNA mixtures. She opined that no “scientific validation exists, either in the
literature or from the BCA laboratory, to support the use of such statistics.” She further
opined that the more commonly used statistical calculation is the combined probability of
inclusion (CPI). CPI is the inverse of CPE—it expresses what proportion of the population
is included in a sample. She also stated that the CPI statistic is better expressed as a fraction,
not a decimal.
The State presented evidence to refute each of the defense expert’s arguments. Most
important was an affidavit from Dr. Marlijn Hoogendoorn, Technical Leader for the biology
section of the BCA. Dr. Hoogendoorn explained how the BCA determined its analytical and
stochastic thresholds.
Dr. Hoogendoorn identified substantial support for the BCA ’s decision to use its
chosen analytical threshold. She attested that a similar analytical threshold is commonly
used in forensic science for the type of equipment the BCA uses to run the GlobalFiler test
kit and that previous testing kits run on the same equipment were validated for the chosen
analytical threshold . She therefore concluded that the BCA’s analytical threshold is
“determined more by the instrumentation than by the specific amplification kit chemistry.”
Dr. Hoogendoorn’s affidavit also refuted Dr. Rudin’s conclusion that the stochastic
threshold was improperly determined. She stated that the stochastic threshold was, in fact,
determined using the appropriate analytical threshold, not a “different analytical threshold.”

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And in response to Dr. Rudin’s objection to CPE, Dr. Hoogendoorn stated that CPE
has long been accepted by the forensic community as a valid method for calculating the
probability of exclusion from a DNA mixture. Other evidence before the district court
supported Dr. Hoogendoorn’s opinion, including a peer-reviewed scientific article regarding
best practices for using CPE when evaluating DNA mixtures.
Finally, the State presented evidence demonstrating the reliability and accuracy of the
BCA’s internal validation of GlobalFiler. Validation is the testing needed to verify that the
BCA’s equipment and techniques are working properly. We have held that “ ‘the
admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory’s compliance
with appropriate standards and controls.’ ” Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 896 (quoting Schwartz,
447 N.W.2d at 428). When determining the appropriate standards and controls, “we look to
[those] that are currently accepted by the scientific community .” Id. Dr. Hoogendoorn
attested that the BCA’s validation of GlobalFiler included all studies required by the FBI
Quality Assurance Standards and followed the guidelines of the Scientific Working Group
of DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), a group that advises the FB I and the forensic
community regarding best practices in forensic science. The evidence before the district
court showed that FBI and SWGDAM guidelines are accepted by the scientific community
as measures of quality control in forensic testing.
The district court reviewed all of the evidence before it and found that the State met
its burden of showing that the BCA’s theories and methodologies were foundationally
reliable. It concluded that disagreements between the two experts should be heard by the
jury, as is often appropriate when qualified experts arrive at differing conclusions. We hold

18
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the State presented sufficient
evidence to show that the BCA’s approach to testing complex mixtures is reliable, consistent,
and accurate.
2.
Garland also contends that the BCA’s procedures did not produce reliable results in
this case. In her expert report, Dr. Rudin asserted that Item 1 -1 should not have been
analyzed by the BCA. She stated that, because the BCA’s analytical threshold was too high,
the number of possible contributors to the sample was underreported. Dr. Rudin opined that,
had the BCA used an appropriate analytical threshold, it would have concluded that Item 1-1
contained five or more contributors and therefore should not have been analyzed. According
to the BCA’s protocols, no sample that contains a mixture of five or more contributors should
be analyzed.
This argument hinges on Dr. Rudin’s conclusion that the BCA’s analytical threshold
was too high. But we have already concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that the BCA’s practices and procedures —including its analytical
threshold—are reliable and accurate. We therefore also conclude that the district court acted
within its discretion when it found that the BCA’s procedures complied with appropriate
standards and controls. See Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 896.
Dr. Rudin also opined that Item 1 -2 had virtually no statistical value. Only 16.7
percent of the population could be excluded as contributors to the sample. She stated that
this statistic meant that “effectively anyone could be a contributor to this profile” and that
therefore the statistic was “essentially meaningless . . . for determining who might be a

19
contributor.” Nonetheless, Dr. Rudin agreed that the BCA’s mathematical calculation was
accurate. Her objection to the analysis of Item 1-2 related more to the weight of the evidence,
rather than its admissibility. The a ppropriate weight to give evidence is a determination
properly left to the trier of fact. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017). We
therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the BCA’s
procedures produced reliable results with regard to Item 1-2.
Garland raises one final challenge to the reliability of Item 1 -1. He asserts that the
BCA analyst “discovered that two BCA employees’ DNA were identified” in the sample,
rendering the results unreliable. This argument relies on a misunderstanding of the record.
The record reflects that two BCA employees could not be excluded as contributors to
Item 1-1. This determination does not mean that the DNA of the two employees was found
in or contaminated the DNA samples from the hat. As previously stated, analysts cannot
determine whether an individual contributed DNA to a profile. They can determine only
whether an individual can be excluded as a contributor. In other words, those employees
were part of the 8 percent of the population that could not be excluded from the DNA sample.
And the BCA verified that the two employees had not been involved in the han dling or
testing of Item 1-1. Garland’s contamination argument therefore fails.
Based on the evidence b efore the district court, we hold that it did not abuse its
discretion by finding that the State’s expert opinion was foundationally reliable.
B.
Garland next challenges the helpfulness of the State’s expert opinion under Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 702. “Expert testimony is not helpful if the expert opinion is within the

20
knowledge and experience of a lay jury and the testimony of the expert will not add precision
or depth to the jury’s ability to reach co nclusions.” Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 289 (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, if the jury can reach an informed
conclusion just as easily as the expert, the expert’s testimony is not helpful to the jury. See
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982).
Garland argues that the State’s expert opinion was based on unreliable evidence and
therefore could not add precision or depth to the jury’s decision. We have already held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the BCA’s pro cedures were
reliable, consistent, and accurate, both generally and in this case. A helpfulness argument
that focuses on a lack of reliability therefore must fail.
Under our standard, the State’s expert testimony was helpful to the jury. An
understanding of complex DNA analysis is not within the knowledge and expertise of a lay
jury. A forensic scientist’s opinion therefore helps a jury interpret DNA evidence and
enables the jury to reach more precise conclusions regarding the weight of that evidence.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the expert
testimony about the DNA evidence would be helpful to the jury.
C.
Finally, we address Garland’s contention that the district court was required to assess
the State’s expert opinion under the Frye-Mack standard. He contends that such analysis
was necessary because the GlobalFiler kit is a “brand new method of analyzing DNA
evidence” and “utilizes a method of DNA analysis not used in a ny of the BCA’s previous
testing methods.”

21
The Frye-Mack standard, which was incorporated into Rule 702 in 2006, “governs
the admissibility of expert testimony that involves a novel scientific theory,” Doe, 817
N.W.2d at 156 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), or “emerging scientific
techniques,” State v. Jobe , 486 N.W.2d 407, 419 (Minn. 1992). Before engaging in the
Frye-Mack analysis, a district court must first determine whether the proffered evidence
involves a novel scientific theory or technique. See State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 806
(Minn. 2019). If the court finds that the evidence involves a novel technique, it must then
determine whether the underlying science is generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community and whether the particular scientific evidence in th e case is shown to have
foundational reliability. Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 165 (citing Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d
800, 814 (Minn. 2000)). However, if the court determines that the evidence does not involve
a novel technique, the court “need not consider whether [the evidence] has been generally
accepted by the scientific community” and should instead focus on the second prong of the
Frye-Mack standard. See Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 806.
Garland argues that because we have not approved the use of the GlobalFiler testing
kit, the district court was required to conduct a Frye-Mack analysis. See Roman Nose, 649
N.W.2d at 822 (stating that when “novel scientific evidence is offered that has not been
reviewed by this court, the district court must determine whether the method of producing
the scientific evidence is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community”). But we
have clarified that “scientific evidence is [not] novel simply because Minnesota appellate
courts have not yet analyzed a particular form of scientific evidence under the requirements

22
of Rule 702.” Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 807. Instead, whether a scientific technique is novel
is determined based on whether the technique is new. Id.
In Harvey, we concluded that cell-site location information (CSLI) technology was
not novel. Id. at 808. In reaching that conclusion, we considered evidence that the federal
government had been using CSLI technology for more than 15 years; the FBI used the
technology in its investigations; the FBI has presented CSLI evidence in over 1,000 trials;
and Minnesota courts had been admitting CSLI evidence for more than 10 years. Id. Those
same considerations inform our analysis here.
The district court found that the GlobalFiler kit does not involve novel scientific
theories or techniques. GlobalFiler uses the same type of analysis —PCR-STR—used by
earlier kits. We approved of PCR-STR analysis 17 years ago. See Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at
893 (holding that PCR -STR testing is “generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community”). And the BCA has been using the PCR -STR technique since that time.
Moreover, Minnesota courts have been admitting evidence obtained through PCR -STR
testing for almost two decades. See id. at 900. Because the PCR-STR technique has been in
longstanding use in Minnesota, it is not novel. See Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 808. The district
court therefore need only have focused on whether the evidence had foundational reliability.
The foundational reliability analysis under Rule 702 is “nearly identical to the
analysis done under the second prong of the Frye-Mack test.” Doe, 817 N.W.2d at 168 .
Therefore, as long as the district court considers the relevant foundational reliability factors,
“it makes little difference whether the district court cal led the analysis a ‘ Frye-Mack’
analysis or a ‘Rule 702’ analysis.” Id. We have already concluded that the district court did

23
not abuse its discretion by finding that the State’s expert opinion was foundationally reliable
under Rule 702. We have also held that any error in failing to hold a hearing on foundational
reliability was harmless. The district court therefore did not err by not analyzing the DNA
evidence under the Frye-Mack standard.
III.
We next turn to Garland’s challenge under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403. That
rule states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Again, we “afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters,
and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v.
Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015).
“[T]he term ‘prejudice’ in Rule 403 ‘does not mean the damage to the
opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the
evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the
capacity of the evidence to persuade [the jury] by illegitimate means.’ ” State
v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Cermak, 365
N.W.2d 243, 247 n.2 (Minn. 1985)). And we have affirmed a district court’s
decision to exclude evidence where the evidence was “speculative and
confusing,” see State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 699 (Minn. 2001), or
“not supported by an offer of proof,” see State v. Wilson , 900 N.W.2d 373,
386 (Minn. 2017).
Here, the DNA evidence is probative because it connects Garland to the scene of
the crime. And we have already held that the evidence is helpful to the jury. Accordingly,
the question we must address is whether the DNA evidence is prejudicial to Garland.

24
Garland argues that the BCA’s unreliable testing and analysis was misleading and
that it produced misleading results. But w e have already affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the BCA’s statistical and analytical methods are reliable and produced
reliable results in this case. We therefore cannot conclude that the DNA evidence is
misleading on that basis.
The DNA evi dence was not confusing or distorted. The BCA analyst simply
determined the probability that Garland could be excluded as a contributor to Items 1 -1
and 1-2. And the defense expert agreed that the BCA’s math was correct. Finally, as stated
previously, the BCA analyst’s method of reporting the probability—as a CPE—is used and
approved of by forensic scientists across the United States. The State’s DNA evidence was
not confusing simply because the defense expert would have preferred that the probability
be reported as a CPI in the form of a fraction.
Neither was the State’s evidence speculative. As discussed above, the BCA analyst
reached her conclusions using me thods that have been approved by the FBI and other
advisory organizations in the forensic scientific community, as well as by this court.
Finally, the defense had the opportunity to cross -examine the State’s expert and
present its own expert at trial. Garland therefore had ample opp ortunity to point out the
weaknesses in the State’s evidence and convince the jury to give it less weight.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the DNA evidence because its probative value outweighed a ny prejudice to
Garland.

25
IV.
Garland next argues that , by answering questions from the jury, “the prosecutor
improperly intruded upon the jury’s independent fact -finding mission and participated in
their deliberations.” The prosecutor answered two questions from the jury regarding time
stamps at particular parts of the surveillance videos. She also answered a question about
the name of a street on the video.
Garland contends that the prosecutor’s conduct was structural error requiring
automatic reversal. See State v. Kuhlmann , 806 N.W.2d 844, 851 (Minn. 2011) (stating
that structural errors require automatic reversal of a conviction). “Structural errors are
defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism , which defy analysis by harmless -error
standards.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When a structural error occurs, “[t]he entire conduct of the trial
from beginning to end is obviously affected.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10.
Only certain types of errors are structural errors. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana ,
508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993) (constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt jury instruction);
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (noting cases holding that total deprivation of t he right to
counsel at trial and non-impartial judges as structural errors ); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 177 –78 n.8 (1984) (denial of the right to self -representation at trial); State v.
Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 252–53 (Minn. 2005) (presence of a biased judge as fact finder);
State v. Reiners , 664 N.W.2d 826, 835 (Minn. 2003) (erroneous denial of a defendant’s
peremptory challenge); State v. Logan, 535 N.W.2d 320, 324–25 (Minn. 1995) (prejudice
resulting from failure to dismiss a potential juror for cause). Here, the prosecutor’s conduct

26
does not rise to the level of structural error. 4 Garland argues that this case is similar to
three cases in which we held that improper interactions with the jury necessitated automatic
reversal of a conviction. See Brown v. State , 682 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2004); State v.
Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 2002); State v. Mims , 235 N.W.2d 381 (Minn. 1975).
We disagree. The concerns that drove our decisions in those cases do not apply here.
In Mims and Brown, the district court judges entered the jury room during
deliberations and communicated with the juries. In both cases, at least some of the
communication happened in the absence of counsel. Brown, 682 N.W.2d at 164–65; Mims,
235 N.W.2d 383–84. On appeal, we were pr imarily concerned with the judge’s outsized
power to influence the jury. We stated that “ ‘[i]n view of the judge’s dominant role during
earlier stages of the trial, an uninvited entrance into the sanctity of the jury room for any
purpose offends the integrity of the proceedings and risks influencing the jury’s decisional
process in some degree, however difficult to define or impossible to measure. ’ ” Brown,
682 N.W.2d at 167 (quoting Mims, 235 N.W.2d at 388).
Moreover, the judges in those ca ses did not simply provide factual answers to
straightforward juror questions. Instead, in both Brown and Mims, the judges inquired of
each jury how quickly it would reach a decision. Brown, 682 N.W.2d at 165; Mims, 235
N.W.2d at 383–84. We stated that such questioning ran the unacceptable risk of intruding

4 We remind judges and attorneys that attorneys have only two opportunities to speak
directly to the jury: during opening and closing arguments. Attorneys should not
attempt—nor should judges allow them —to speak to the jury at any other time before,
during, or after trial.

27
upon the jury’s independent fact -finding role and pressuring the jury to shorten its
deliberations. Brown, 682 N.W.2d at 167–68; Mims, 235 N.W.2d at 387–88.
Finally, in each case the judge communicat ed with the jury in the absence of the
defendant and defense counsel. We concluded that the judges’ actions violated the
defendants’ right to be present at all stages of the proceedings. Brown, 682 N.W.2d at 166;
Mims, 235 N.W.2d at 388.
The exchange between the jury and the prosecutor in this case raises none of these
same concerns. The prosecutor does not possess the same influence over the courtroom
and the jury as a judge. The prosecutor provided factually accurate answers to basic
questions; she d id not exert pressure on the jury to reach a decision. And the exchange
occurred in open court, on the record, and in the presence of the defendant and his attorney.
Neither is this case analogous to Costello, in which the district court judge permitted
the jury to question witnesses during trial. 646 N.W.2d at 205–07. On appeal, we said that
when jurors are permitted to qu estion witnesses, they are encouraged to form hypotheses
and opinions prior to the submission of the case, which risks jurors drawi ng conclusions
about the case before the court has instructed the jury on the law. Id. at 210–11. We also
expressed concern that questions from the jury alter the burden of proof and production
and relieve the State of its burden to prove all elements of a crime. Such a change risks
undermining the balance of our adversarial system. Id. at 211–12.
The issues raised in Costello are not present here. The jury’s questions were not
posed to witnesses. The inquiries from the jury here came after the case had been
submitted. And the answers only provided the jury with information that had already been

28
presented at trial; the exchange betwe en the prosecutor and the jury did not affect the
burden of proof or encourage the jury to form premature opinions about the case.
We conclude that the prosecutor’s responses to three straightforward fact questions
from the jury do not constitute structural error. Accordingly, Garland’s claim is subject to
plain-error review because he failed to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s
conduct. See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2006) (holding “that appellate
courts should use the plain error doctrine when examining unobjec ted-to prosecutorial
misconduct”). “[B]efore an appellate court reviews an unobjected-to error, there must be
(1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. If these three
prongs are met, the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to
ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d
736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (footnote omitted).
When the unobjected-to error involves prosecutorial misconduct, the State bears the
burden of showing that the error did not affect the defendant’s subst antial rights—that is,
that it did not prejudice the defendant. See Ramey , 721 N.W.2d at 300. An error “is
prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question
would have had a significant effect on the verdict o f the jury.” State v. MacLennan, 702
N.W.2d 219, 236 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We need not reach the question of whether the prosecutor committed an error that
is plain. Instead, we turn to the question of whether the State carried its burden of showing
that the prosecutor’s answers to the jury’s questions affected Garland’s substantial rights.
See State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258 (Minn. 2007) ( stating that if we conclude that a

29
claimed error did not affect a defendant’s substantial rights, “we need not consider the other
factors”).
The prosecutor answered only three questions from the jury. Each brief answer
provided information that the jury could have readily obtained by moving closer to the
computer screen. Garland was present during the exchange. And , as we set forth in our
discussion of whether the district court erred by declining to hold a hearing on Garland’s
motion to exclude, the totality of the evidence against Garland in this case was compelling.
Considering all of the evidence, the State established that it is not reasonably likely
that the jury would have reached a different result had the prosecutor not answered the
three jury questions. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s answers did not affect Gar land’s
substantial rights. The plain error test is therefore not satisfied.
V.
The jury found Garland guilty of both first -degree murder and second -degree
murder for killing Dunn. The district court adjudicated Garland guilty on both counts but
imposed only one sentence. “Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of
either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1
(2018). When a defendant is found guilty of a charged offense and a lesser -included
offense, the district court should “adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count
only.” Petersen v. State , 937 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because second -degree murder is a lesser -included offense of
first-degree murd er, the district court erred by entering a formal adjudication on both

30
counts in its sentencing order. Id. Therefore, we remand to the district court to correct the
error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affi rm in part and reverse in part the decision of the
district court.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.