Sokkhan Ka, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0249

Sokkhan Ka,
Appellant,

vs.

Lonvigson’s Service Center, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed November 4, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-18-9119

Sokkhan Ka, Shoreview, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Ned E. Ostenso, Merrigan, Brandt, Ostenso & Cambre, P.A., Hopkins, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s summary -judgment dismissal of appellant’s
claim for late payment of final wages, appellant argues that the district court erred by

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dismissing his claim, dismissing respondent’s counterclaim without prejudice, and
awarding costs and disbursements to respondent. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2016, appellant Sokkhan Ka began working for respondent
Lonvigson’s Service Cent er Inc. (LSC) as a sales associate. Ka’s job duties included
cashiering. On March 5, 2018, LSC terminated Ka’s employment. On March 6, Ka sent
LSC an email, requesting his final w ages. On March 13, Ka received his final paycheck
from LSC.
In April 2018, Ka sued LSC in conciliation court, alleging that LSC had not timely
issued his final paycheck and that it owed him a penalty under Minn. Stat. § 181.13(a)
(2018). In May 2018, the conciliation court dismissed Ka’s claim. Ka removed the case
to district court for a trial de novo.1 In his complaint in district court, Ka asserted that under
Minn. Stat. § 181.13(a), his final wages were due on March 7, 2018, “24 hours from the
time [they] were demanded,” and that LSC was thus “in default for a total of six (6) days.”
Ka alleged $672 in damages.
In July 2018, LSC counterclaimed against Ka, alleging that, subsequent to LSC’s
termination of Ka’s employment, he intentionally turned the thermostat at LSC to its
highest setting, spoiling food worth $199.26. LSC also requested costs, disbursements,
and attorney fees. In December 2018, LSC moved for summary judgment, arguing that

1 “Any person aggrieved by an order for judgment entered in conciliation court after
contested trial may remove the cause to district court for trial de novo (new trial).” Minn.
R. Gen. Prac. 521(a).

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because Ka’s job duties included the collection, disbu rsement, and handling of money,
LSC had ten days to provide Ka with his final paycheck after his demand under Minn. Stat.
§ 181.14, subd. 4 (2018), and that its payment was therefore timely.
In February 2019, the district court held a hearing on LSC’s s ummary-judgment
motion. At the hearing, the district court stated that it agreed with LSC that the ten -day
time limit in Minn. Stat. § 181.14, subd. 4, applied and that it would grant LSC’s motion
for summary judgment on Ka’s claim. LSC moved to dismiss its counterclaim against Ka
without prejudice. The district court granted summary judgment for LSC, dismissing Ka’s
claim with prejudice . The district court also dismissed LSC’s counterclaim , without
prejudice, and awarded LSC its costs and disbursements. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Ka contends that the district court erred in granting LSC summary judgment on his
unpaid-wage claim under Minn. Stat. § 181.13(a).
“A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo , 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). A genuine
issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole,
could find for the nonmoving party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558,
564 (Minn. 2008). This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

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novo. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014). “We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party agai nst whom summary judgment was
granted to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the
district court correctly applied the law.” Id.
Resolution of this case involves the interplay between two statutes: Minn. S tat.
§ 181.13 (2018), and Minn. Stat. § 181.14 (2018). Section 181.13(a) provides,
When any employer employing labor within this state
discharges an employee, the wages or commissions actually
earned and unpaid at the time of the discharge are immediately
due and payable upon demand of the employee. . . . If the
employee’s earned wages and commissions are not paid within
24 hours after demand, whether the employment was by the
day, hour, week, month, or piece or by commissions, the
employer is in default. In addition to recovering the wages and
commissions actually earned and unpaid, the discharged
employee may charge and collect a penalty equal to the amount
of the employee’s average daily earnings at the employee’s
regular rate of pay or the rate required by la w, whichever rate
is greater, for each day up to 15 days, that the employer is in
default, until full payment or other settlement, satisfactory to
the discharged employee, is made.

Section 181.14, subdivision 1(a), generally provides that when any employee “quits
or resigns employment,” the “wages or commissions earned and unpaid at the time the
employee quits or resigns shall be paid in full not later than the first regularly scheduled
payday following the employee’s final day of employment, unless an em ployee is subject
to a collective bargaining agreement with a different provision.” “Wages or commissions
not paid within the required time period shall become immediately payable upon the
demand of the employee,” and “[i]f the employee’s earned wages or commissions are not

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paid within 24 hours after the demand,” the employer is liable to the employee for a penalty
identical to the penalty described in section 181.13(a). Minn. Stat. § 181.14, subd. 2.
However, section 181.14, subdivision 4, provides,
In cases where the discharged or quitting employee was,
during employment, entrusted with the collection,
disbursement, or handling of money or property, the employer
shall have ten calendar days after the termination of the
employment to audit and adjust t he accounts of the employee
before the employee’s wages or commissions shall be paid as
provided in this section, and the penalty herein provided shall
apply in such case only from the date of demand made after the
expiration of the period allowed for payment of the employee’s
wages or commissions.

(Emphasis added.)
Ka argues that “Minn. Stat. § 181.14 (2018) does not apply to employees who were
involuntarily terminated” and that the 24 -hour time limit in section 181.13(a) therefore
applies here instead of the ten-day time limit in section 181.14, subdivision 4. Ka argues
that the title of section 181.14 “specifies it is for an employee who quits or resigns.”
Ka’s arguments raise an issue of statutory interpretation. Issues of statutory
interpretation are questions of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Overweg, 922
N.W.2d 179, 182 -83 (Minn. 2019). “The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate
the intent of the Legislature.” Kremer v. Kremer , 912 N.W.2d 617, 623 (Minn. 2018).
“The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s language, on
its face, is ambiguous.” Overweg, 922 N.W.2d at 183 (quotations omitted). “A statute is
ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one rea sonable
interpretation.” State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012). If a statute is

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unambiguous, then appellate courts must apply the statute’s plain meaning. Larson v.
State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010).
“The headnotes printed in boldface type before sections and subdivisions in editions
of Minnesota Statutes are mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the section or
subdivision and are not part of the statute.” Minn. Stat. § 645.49 (2018); see Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Ve ntura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 303 n.23 (Minn. 2000) (stating that
“revisor’s headnotes are not part of [a] statute and thus do not determine its scope or
meaning”). Thus, although the headnote for 181.14 states, “Payment to Employees W ho
Quit or Resign; Settlement of Disputes,” that headnote is not part of the statute. See Minn.
Stat. § 181.14.
The language of section 181.14, subdivision 4, is unambiguous. The relevant
provision expressly states that it applies “[i]n cases where the discharged or quitting
employee was, during employment, entrusted with the collection, disbursement, or
handling of money or property.” Id., subd. 4 (emphasis added). The only reasonable
interpretation of that language is that subdivision 4 applies to discharged employees as well
as employees who have quit. Indeed, the supreme court has stated that sections 181.13 and
181.14 “must be read together.” Chatfield v. Henderson, 90 N.W.2d 227, 231 -32 (Minn.
1958).
Under the plain language of section 181.14, subdivision 4, the ten-day time limit to
pay a discharged employee’s unpaid wages or commissions applies so long as the employee
was “during employment, entrusted with the collection, disbursement, or handling of
money or property.” In a response to interrogatories submitted by LS C, Ka admitted that

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his “job duties included cashiering” and that his duties as a cashier “included the collection
of money, the disbursement of money, and/or the handling of money or property belonging
to [LSC].” Because Ka admitted that his job duties involved the collection, disbursement,
and handling of money or property, section 181.14, subdivision 4, applie s, and LSC had
ten days to pay Ka’s unpaid wages after he made his demand on March 6. Thus, LSC’s
payment of Ka’s unpaid wages on March 13 was timely, LSC does not owe Ka a penalty,
and LSC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In sum, the district court did not err by
granting LSC summary judgment on Ka’s unpaid-wage claim.
II.
Ka contends that the district court violated his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment because it dismissed his claim with prejudice but dismissed LSC’s
counterclaim without prejudice.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provid es that no state shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Minnesota Constitution similarly guarantees that “[n]o member of
this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Minn. Const.
art. I, § 2. “Both clauses have been analyzed under the same principles and begin with the
mandate that all similarly sit uated individuals shall be treated alike, but only invidious
discrimination is deemed constitutionally offensive.” Scott v. Minneapolis Police Relief
Ass’n, 615 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 2000) (quotation o mitted). To establish an equal -
protection claim, a claimant must show that “the claimant is treated differently from others

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to whom the claimant is similarly situated in all relevant respects.” State v. Holloway, 916
N.W.2d 338, 347 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). If a claimant establishes that the
claimant has been treated differently from others who are similarly situated, a court then
reviews the merits of the equal -protection challenge under the appropriate standard of
scrutiny. Id. at 348.
Ka fails to cite or apply the law governing an equal -protection analysis. Mere
assertions of error without supporting legal authority or argument are waived unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection. State v. Modern Recycling, Inc. , 558
N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997). Moreover, “issues not adequa tely briefed are
waived.” Brooks v. State, 897 N.W.2d 811, 819 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 8, 2017). Because Ka does not support his equal -protection claim with supporting
legal authority or legal argument, and prejudicial error is not obvious, his claim is waived.
Ka also contends that “[t]here is no basis of fact or law for [LSC’s] dismissal without
prejudice.” LSC asked the district court to dismiss its counterclaim without prejudice
because “Ka has done a lot of things to disrupt [LSC’s] business besides this . . . and [LSC
did not] put it past him to maybe do some other things where it might be useful for [it] to
maintain the ability to raise that allegation at a later time.”
The district court may dismiss a party’s counterclaim upon motion of the party in
an “order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(b) (describing court -ordered voluntary dismissal of plaintiff’s
action); Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.03 (providing that p rovisions of rule 41.01 apply to the
dismissal of c ounterclaims). Unless otherwise specified, a court -ordered voluntary

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dismissal is without prejudice. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(b); Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.03. This
court reviews the district court’s decision to grant a voluntary dismissal without prejudice
for an abuse of discretion. Kelbro Co. v. Vinny’s on the River, LLC, 893 N.W.2d 390, 397-
98 (Minn. App. 2017).
Given that court-ordered voluntary dismissals are generally without prejudice, and
LSC’s assertion that additional claims against Ka might arise, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by dismissing LSC’s counterclaim without prejudice.
III.
“In every action in a district court, the prevailing party . . . shall be allowed
reasonable disbursements paid or incurred . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 549.04 (2018). “The
prevailing party in any action is one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and
judgment entered.” Borchert v. Maloney , 581 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. 1998). “A
prevailing party is one who prevails on the merits in the underlying action, not one who
was successful to some degree.” Elsenpeter v. St. Michael Mall, Inc. , 794 N.W.2d 667,
673 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review a district court’s
award of costs and disbursements, including its prevailing -party determination, for an
abuse of discretion. Posey v. Fossen , 707 N.W.2d 712, 714 (Minn. App. 2006). The
district court abuses its discretion “when its decision is against logic and facts on the
record.” Id.
Ka contends that the “District Court did not determine any prevailing party and erred
in awarding Costs and Disbursements to [LSC].” Ka argues t hat the district court’s order
“reflected both parties prevailing.” The record refutes that argument. The district court

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granted LSC’s request for summary dismissal of Ka’s unp aid-wage claim on the merits.
But the district court’s dismissal of LSC’s cou nterclaim was not based on the merits and
was without prejudice. Although the district court did not expressly refer to LSC as the
prevailing party, its award of costs and disbursements to LSC indicates that the district
court correctly determined that LSC was the prevailing party on the merits of Ka’s unpaid-
wage claim. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by treating LSC as the
prevailing party and awarding it costs and disbursements.
Affirmed.