Stanley Paul Wenell-Jack, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0264

Stanley Paul Wenell-Jack, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 3, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CR-16-1142

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matti R. Adam , Itasca County Attorney, Nichole J. Carter , Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth -degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that the evidence supporting the conviction should have been
suppressed as the result of an illegal seizure. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Stan ley Paul Wenell -Jack with
felony fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor providing a false
name or date of birth to a peace officer, and misdemeanor possession of a legend drug. 1
Wenell-Jack moved to suppress the state’s evidence, a rguing that it was obtained as the
result of an illegal search and seizure. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion and established the following factual record.
In the early morning hours of April 22, 2016, Grand Rapids Police Officers Ashley
Moran and Shaun Pomplun were separately patrolling downtown Grand Rapids. Several
local businesses had been burglarized recently, and no suspects had been identified. At
approximately 1:55 a.m., Officer Moran saw a man, later identified as We nell-Jack, who
appeared to be sleeping inside a 24-hour laundromat.
Officer Moran asked Officer Pomplun to meet her at the laundromat. Officer
Pomplun arrived , and the officers entered the laundromat. They saw Wenell -Jack
“slumped over” in a chair, and he appeared to be sleeping. The officers saw a “small duffel

1 A “legend drug” is a “drug that is required by federal law to be dispensed only pursuant
to the prescription of a licensed practitioner.” Minn. Stat. § 151.01, subd. 17 (2014).

3

bag, measuring approximately one foot in length by eight inches in width” on the ground
by Wenell-Jack’s foot. The officers woke Wenell -Jack and began to question him. The
officers stood side by side, directly in front of Wenell-Jack, approximately eight feet away
from him. The officers were positioned between Wenell-Jack and the laundromat’s exit.
As soon as Wenell-Jack woke, he grabbed the duffel bag that was at his feet, placed
it on his lap, and held it close to his body. Officer Moran thought that behavior was
suspicious and that the bag might contain burglary tools in light of the recent burglaries in
the area. Officer Pomplun thought that Wenell -Jack was trying to hide something in the
bag.
Officer Pomplun asked Wenell-Jack what he was doing, and Wenell-Jack responded
that he had been at a nearby apartment complex and was waiting for a friend to pi ck him
up. Officer Pomplun asked Wenell-Jack for his name, and he identified himself as “Jordan
James Carson,” with a date of birth of June 4, 1983. When Officer Pomplun asked Wenell-
Jack what was in the duffel bag, he responded that it contained his “stuff and some tools.”
Officer Pomplun asked Wenell-Jack to open the bag and he complied, revealing a sweater
and a propane tank with a torch. Wenell-Jack told the officers that he was using the torch
to help a friend weld something. Officer Pomplun knew that propane torches are generally
not used for welding and he also knew, based on his training and experience, that propane
torches are frequently used to heat drugs such as methamphetamine and heroin.
At that point, Officer Moran contacted police dispatch and requested a database
search of the name and date of birth that Wenell-Jack had provided, and they came back as
“not on file.” Officer Pomplun told Wenell-Jack that it was a crime to give a peace officer

4

a false name and again asked for his identification. Wenell-Jack stated that he did not have
picture identification with him and once again asserted that his name was “Jordan James
Carson.”
Officer Pomplun asked Wenell-Jack to remove the sweater and propane torch from
the duffel bag, and he complied. Officer Pomplun stepped closer to Wenell -Jack to see
what was in the bag and observed a methamphetamine pipe and several loose yellow pills.
Wenell-Jack admitted that the pills belonged to a friend and that he did not have a
prescription for them. Based on his observations of the pipe and the pills, Officer Pomplun
placed Wenell-Jack under arrest and performed a pat search. During the search, the officer
discovered a wallet containing Wenell-Jack’s Minnesota state identification card. Officer
Moran provided dispatch with Wenell-Jack’s name, and dispatch reported that he had two
outstanding gross misdemeanor arres t warrants and that he was on felony probation in
Itasca County.
The district court denied Wenell -Jack’s motion to suppress, concluding that
“reasonable suspicion supported an investigative stop of [Wenell -Jack] to investigate
burglary related crimes.” The parties agreed to proceed under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4, which allows a defendant to stipulate to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of
a district court’s pretrial ruling. The district court found Wenell-Jack guilty of fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance and giving a false name to a peace officer and not
guilty of possession of a legend drug. The district court entered judgment of conviction
for the controlled-substance crime and sentenced Wenell-Jack to a prison term of one year
and one day. Wenell-Jack did not file a direct appeal.

5

Nearly two years later, Wenell-Jack petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that
“[t]he officers did not have individualized reasonable articulable suspicion to justify an
investigatory stop.” The postconviction court denied Wenell-Jack relief.
Wenell-Jack appeals from the postconviction court’s denial of relief.
D E C I S I O N
A person convicted of a crime who claims that the conviction violates his rights
under the constitution or laws of the United States or Minnesota may petition for
postconviction relief unless direct appellate relief is available. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
1 (2018). The petition must include “a statement of the facts and the grounds upon which
the petition is based and the relief desired.” Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(1) (2018). This
court reviews a denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State ,
925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). In doing so, we review the postconviction court’s legal
determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d
612, 617 (Minn. 2017).
I.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against “unrea sonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
Generally, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. State v. Horst,
880 N.W.2d 24, 33 (Minn. 2016). But a police officer may stop and detain a person without

6

a warrant, for investigative purposes, based on specific a nd articulable facts that create
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000)
(citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). “[T]he reasonable
suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” State
v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted) . An officer may
not stop a person based on “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Marben v. State, Dep’t
of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (quotation omitted).
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the
totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are
permitted to make inferences and deduction s that would be beyond the competence of an
untrained person.” State v. Richardson , 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001). Evasive
behavior is a pertinent factor in a reasonable-suspicion determination. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000). An appellate court reviews a determination
of reasonable suspicion de novo, but accepts the supporting factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
Wenell-Jack contends that he was illegally seized and that “[t]he evidence obtained
as a result of the illegal seizure must be suppressed.” 2 See State v. Jackson , 742 N.W.2d

2 In district court, Wenell-Jack also challenged the search of his bag, arguing that it was an
unconstitutional warrantless search, to which he did not voluntarily consent. See State v.
Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn . 2011) (“ Consent is an except ion to the warrant
requirement. For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that consent was given freely and voluntarily .” (citation
omitted)). The district and postconviction courts rejected that challenge, and Wenell-Jack
does not seek review of that aspect of the postconviction court’s ruling in his primary brief.

7

163, 178 (Minn. 2007) (stating that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment generally must be suppressed).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, a seizure occurs when, given the totality of the
circumstances, “a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have concluded that
he or she was not free to leave.” In re Welfare of E.D. J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn.
1993); see also State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 2004) (explaining that
article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment, under which a seizure only occurs when the police use physical force
or a person submits to a show of authority by the police).
Wenell-Jack contends that the seizure occurred when Officer Pomplun asked him
for identification. The state does not dispute that contention. Because the issue is
undisputed, we assume without deciding that Officer Pomplun’s request for identification
constituted a seizure. As to the basis for th at seizure, the relevant circumstances are as
follows. Officers Moran and Pomplun encountered Wenell -Jack, slumped over and
sleeping, in a 24-hour laundromat at approximately 1:55 a.m. A series of recent, unsolved
burglaries had t aken place in th e area. When the officers approached Wenell -Jack, they
saw a small duffel bag, approximately one foot long and eight inches wide, on the ground
by his foot. When the officers woke Wenell -Jack, he immediately grabbed the duffel bag
and placed it on his lap. Officer Moran thought that reaction was suspicious and that the
bag might contain burglary tools. Officer Pomplun believed that Wenell -Jack was trying
to hide something in the bag. Officer Pomplun asked Wenell-Jack what he was doing, and

8

Wenell-Jack replied that he was waiting for a friend to pick him up. There was no
indication that Wenell-Jack was doing laundry.
Again, the standard for reasonable, articulable suspicion is low, and police officers
can make reasonable inferences. See Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393; Richardson, 622
N.W.2d at 825. Given the circumstances, including the small size of Wenell -Jack’s bag,
the fact that he was not doing laundry, and his evasive act of grabbing the bag when he
woke and observed the officers , we conclude that there was reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity to support an investigatory seizure.
Wenell-Jack argues that his “sleeping in a laundromat did not provide an objective
basis to believe he was involved in previous burglar ies at other businesses.” But Wenell-
Jack’s argument ignores the other circumstances that combined to create reasonable,
articulable suspicion including the time of day, the lack of any indication that he was doing
laundry, and his immediate, evasive move ment of the bag at his feet when he woke and
observed two police officers in front of him . Wenell -Jack also argues that there was an
innocent explanation for his behavior and that the officers did not provide any details
regarding the previous burglaries that would indicate any link between those incidents and
his conduct. But “seemingly innocent factors” may contribute to a finding of reasonable,
articulable suspicion. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007). And , given all
of the circumstance s, the officer’s generalized knowledge regarding previous burglaries
was adequate to contribute to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Again, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Johnson,
813 N.W.2d at 5 (quotation omitted) . Given the totality of the circumstances, the

9

minimally intrusive act of requesting Wenell -Jack’s identification was reasonable. And
because the police lawfully seized Wenell -Jack for investigative purposes, his argument
that the contraband should be su ppressed as the result of an illegal seizure fails.
Accordingly, we affirm without addressing the state’s arguments that Wenell -Jack lacked
standing to challenge Officer Pomplun’s actions and that under Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056 (2016), the evidence need not be suppressed.
II.
Wenell-Jack submitted a pro se brief raising additional issues. The majority of his
pro se arguments address whether his seizure was supported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion, and they are consistent with the arguments in his primary brief. We therefore
do not discuss them separately. Wenell -Jack also argues that the police officers’ actions
constituted a seizure, an issue that is not disputed on appeal. Lastly, Wenell -Jack
summarily refers to his “alleged” consent to the officers’ request to see his bag. But he
does not offer any legal argument or authority challenging the search of his bag. Wenell-
Jack’s unsupported assertion of error regarding the search of his bag is waived, and we
therefore do not address it. See Brooks v. State, 897 N.W.2d 811, 819 (Minn. App. 2017)
(“[I]ssues not adequately briefed are waived.”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 8, 2017); State
v. Andersen , 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015 ) (stating that mere assertio ns of error
without supporting legal authority or argument are waived unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection).
Affirmed.