William Jepsen, as Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Eric Parker Dean, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0271

William Jepsen, as Trustee for the Heirs and
Next of Kin of Eric Parker Dean,
Appellant,

vs.

County of Pope, et al.,
Respondents,

David Dean, et al., Defendants.

Filed December 23, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Pope County District Court
File No. 61-CV-17-58

Anu Chudasama, Paul D. Peterson, William D. Harper, Harper & Peterson, P.L.L.C.,
Woodbury, Minnesota (for appellant)

James R. Andreen, Samantha R. Alsadi, Er stad & Riemer, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondents)

Jason L. DePauw, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
Minnesota Association for Justice)

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A ., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

2
S Y L L A B U S
Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4(b) (2018) 1 does not abrogate the common-law
doctrine of official immunity for county social workers.
O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from partial summa ry judgment in favor of respondents on appellant’s
negligence claims arising out of the wrongful death of a child, appellant argues that the
district court erred by deciding (1) that Pope County and its child-protection social workers
were immune from liability under the doctri nes of official immunity and statutory
immunity and (2) that, as a matter of law, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the
social workers’ failure to cross-report susp ected child abuse to law enforcement was a
proximate cause of the child’s death. We affirm.
FACTS
This case arises out of the tragic death of a child, Eric Parker Dean.2 In March 2013,
Eric died from internal injuri es after his father’s girlfr iend, Amanda Peltier, threw him
against a wall. Eric was four years old.

1 We cite the most recent version of Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4(b), because it has not
been amended during the relevant period in a way that affects the abrogation issue. See
Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000)
(stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on
a case”).

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the child by his first name, Eric, to avoid confusion
with his father, who has the same last name.

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Appellant William Jepsen is the trustee for Eric’s heirs and next of kin. The trustee
sued respondents Pope County and Pope County Human Services (PCHS) social workers
Kelly Lurken-Tvrdik, Amy Beckius, and Mary Schley for negligence, gross negligence,
and wanton and willful negligence for the wrongful death of Eric. 3 The following facts,
which the district court determined to be uncontested in its summary-judgment order, are
not challenged on appeal. The parties instead dispute the legal implications of those facts.
Eric lived with his mother and father, David Dean, until they separated in early
2010. Eric then lived with hi s mother until late 2010, when Pope County child protection
removed him from his mother’s home based on multiple reports of abuse. Eric was placed
in his father’s home, and his father was granted permanent physical custody and legal
custody. From July 20, 2011, until August 2, 2012, there were multiple reports to PCHS of
suspected abuse perpetrated ag ainst Eric. During that time, Eric was living with Dean,
Peltier, their five other joint a nd nonjoint children, and, for most of that time, Peltier’s
mother.
Minnesota’s statute governing the reporting of maltreatment of minors, Minn. Stat.
§ 626.556 (2018) (RMMA),4 controls the handling of reports of child abuse. The statute

3 The trustee also sued David Dean (Eric’s father) and Elizabeth Peltier (Amanda Peltier’s
mother), but they are not parties to this appeal. In this opinion, “Peltier” refers to Amanda
Peltier, not Elizabeth.

4 Parties refer to this statute by different names in their briefs. The trustee refers to section
626.556 as the “Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors Act” or “RMMA.” Respondents refer
to it as the “Child Abuse Reporting Act” or “CARA.” It has been referred to by both names
in previous cases. Compare, e.g. , R.S. v. State , 459 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Minn. 1990)
(“Minnesota Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors Act”), with, e.g. , Becker v. Mayo
Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn. 2007) (“Child Abuse Reporting Act”). RMMA

4
addresses the screening of and responses to reports of child abuse by local welfare agencies.
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10. It also requires that local welfare agencies cross-
report child-abuse reports to local law enforcement. See, e.g., id., subd. 7.
The Minnesota Department of Human Services provides child-maltreatment
screening guidelines to aid so cial workers in assessing and responding to reports of child
maltreatment. Under the guidelines as they existed during the relevant time period for this
case, upon receiving a report of child maltreat ment, child-protection staff first had to
determine whether the report met the legal defi nition of child maltreatment. Only reports
meeting the legal definition could be acce pted, with each report being considered
independently from any prior referral history in determining whether to accept the report.
Once a report was accepted, the guidelines provided two child-protection response types:
a family assessment or a full investigation. The guidelines stated that a family assessment
was “the preferred response when conditions of safety permit.”
The first report in this case was made on July 20, 2011. Eric was treated for a broken
arm after reportedly falling down the stairs. Doctors who treated Eric believed that the type
of fracture could indicate ch ild abuse and made a report to PCHS. PCHS screened the
report, accepted it, and opened a full inve stigation; Lurken-T vrdik conducted the
investigation. Lurkin-Tyrdik interviewed Dean and Peltier, among others. She also
consulted with a pediatrician specializing in child abuse, who indicated that there were
some red flags but that the injury could have occurred fro m falling. The investigation

appears to be more common and is us ed within the statutes themselves, e.g., Minn. Stat.
§ 256.01, subd. 15 (2018), so that is the acronym we use here.

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concluded that no abuse had occurred. PCHS social workers did not cross-report the
incident to law enforcement.
On October 25, a month after the inves tigation closed, a preschool teacher made
another report to PCHS about bite marks an d bruising on Eric. Beckius took the intake
information, and the report was then screened by Beckius, Schley, Lurken-Tvrdik, and two
others. They determined there was not enou gh information to meet child-maltreatment
criteria. They still decided to offer services to Dean and Peltier, but Dean declined the
services.
On November 14, the same preschool teacher again reported visible injuries
suffered by Eric. The teacher i ndicated that Eric said that his brother had hit him. The
teacher also said that Eric reported that he had fallen down the stairs the previous weekend.
Schley, Beckius, and another social worker discussed the report and decided it did not meet
child-maltreatment criteria.
Reports of suspected child maltreatment we re also made on January 24, 2012, this
time by Eric’s new daycare provider and an early childhood education teacher who worked
with Eric. They indicated that Eric had bite marks and bruising on his face and that, when
they asked Eric about what happened, he said that he had hurt himself. Schley, Beckius,
Lurken-Tvrdik, and three others screened the report, determined it met child-maltreatment
criteria, and elected to respond with a family assessment. They chose a family assessment,
rather than a full investigation, because they concluded the case did not involve “substantial
endangerment.” As part of the assessment, PCHS social workers interviewed Dean, Peltier,
and their children, and also assessed Eric’s behavior at daycare. Dean admitted that he did

6
sometimes spank the children with his hand. The children indicated that Eric hurt himself,
but they also admitted that sometimes they would bite and pinch each other. The reporting
daycare provider told PCHS interviewers that Eric had unexplained bite marks and bruises
and that she had never seen him harm himself. Dean and Peltier indicated that they would
supervise Eric more and that they would st art him in play therapy, so Lurken-Tvrdik
determined that no further child-protection response was necessary. The social workers did
not cross-report this incident to law enforcement.
The same daycare provider then reported, on February 3, that Eric had suffered new
injuries—a bruised right ear and swollen lip. When the provider asked Peltier about what
had happened, she said that Eric tripped and hit his lip on a table. When the provider asked
one of Eric’s siblings what had happened, he said that Eric hit his lip on the couch the night
before. Eric simply said that he “got hurt.” The report was screened by Beckius and Lurken-
Tvrdik, who determined that the allegations did not meet child-maltreatment criteria.
The last report that was accepted as mee ting child-maltreatment criteria occurred on
March 12, 2012. The same day care provider reported a number of injuries that Eric had
suffered during the previous month. Throughout February, the provider noticed a variety
of bruises on Eric’s face, head , and neck, swollen cheeks, sc ratches, a black eye, and a
bleeding ear. Peltier gave various explanations of how Eric was injured to the daycare
provider, including that Eric had hit himself on a door frame and that, on one occasion, he
had thrown a temper tantrum and beaten himself up. Beckiu s, Schley and another PCHS
employee screened the case, determined it me t child-maltreatment criteria, and opted for
another family assessment.

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As part of the assessment, the daycare provider submitted a written report indicating
that Eric had frequently come to daycare w ith bruises on his face and that Peltier had
frequently changed her explanati ons for the injuries. The prov ider indicated that she had
seen Peltier discipline Eric “in a mean way.” Despite this, she reported that she was unsure
of who had harmed Eric and that she was unsure if Eric was in danger. Eric’s pediatrician
also examined Eric and found a number of bruises but did not suggest that there were child-
maltreatment issues, noting that Eric was “e xtremely active” and that he was “crashing
into” things during the examination.
Beckius and Lurken-Tvrdik also went to the family home unannounced to again
interview Dean, Peltier, and their children. Wh ile there, the social workers suggested
parenting-style changes, communication cla sses, play therapy, and a psychological
assessment of Eric. During the interviews, a ll of the children asserted that Eric’s own
actions had caused his bruising. The social work ers also arranged to have Eric tested for
iron deficiencies and blood clotting and to have his vision checked because Peltier claimed
that he had depth-perception issues. The tests revealed that Eric was slightly farsighted but
did not indicate that he had a problem with depth perception. Beckius also left a phone
message for Peltier after learning that Peltier ha d failed to take Eric to a scheduled play-
therapy session. Beckius then determined there was no need for ongoing services, and the
family assessment was closed. PCHS social wo rkers did not cross-report the incident to
law enforcement.
The daycare provider reported a final incident on August 2, 2012. She reported that
Peltier wanted Eric to have to sit at a desk all day at the daycare as punishment for having

8
run away at the county fair. The provider confronted Peltier about this, and Peltier “yanked
[Eric] out of [the provider’s] arms and put him down.” The provider stated that Peltier
might have thrown Eric down but that she was not sure because she was in shock from the
incident. The provider also indicated that Er ic had some scratches on his cheek. Schley,
Lurken-Tvrdik, and another social worker screened the report and found it did not meet
child-maltreatment criteria.
No other reports were made to PCHS . Approximately seven months later, on
March 26 or 27, 2013, Peltier threw Eric against a wall. Eric died on March 28 from internal
injuries. Just a couple of days before he was injured, Eric was seen by a public health nurse,
who indicated that he was in good health and that there were no signs of child maltreatment.
The trustee brought this case in 2016, alleging that the Pope County social workers
were negligent in failing to take additional action to protect Eric and not cross-reporting to
law enforcement and that Pope County was vicariously liabl e for their negligence. Pope
County and its social workers asserted that they were entitle d to official immunity and
statutory immunity. Pope County and its social workers filed a motion for summary
judgment. Before that motion was heard, th e trustee moved for partial judgment on the
pleadings, seeking to have Pope County a nd its social workers’ immunity defenses
dismissed.
The district court denied the trustee’s motion to dismiss the immunity defenses. The
district court then granted Pope County’s summary-judgment motion. The district court
determined that Pope County and its social workers were entitled to both official immunity
and statutory immunity for their actions in screening and investigating reports of

9
maltreatment. The district cour t also concluded that, as a ma tter of law, the trustee had
presented insufficient evidence to establish that the failure to cross-report the incidents to
law enforcement was a proximate cause of Er ic’s death. A final partial judgment was
entered under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and this appeal followed.
ISSUES
I. Are Pope County and its social wo rkers entitled to common-law official
immunity as a matter of law?
II. Did the trustee produce evidence that cr eates a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Pope County social workers’ failure to cross-report to law enforcement was
a proximate cause of Eric’s death?
ANALYSIS
A district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of
fact, considering the record as a whole, could find for the nonmoving party. Frieler v.
Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2008). Appellate courts apply a de
novo standard of review to a district cour t’s legal conclusions on summary judgment and
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. RAM Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Rohde, 820 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2012). Appellate courts will affirm summary judgment
if it can be sustained on any ground. Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163
(Minn. 2012).

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I. Pope County and its soci al workers are entitled to official immunity with
respect to their screening and handling of reports of maltreatment.
The trustee argues that the district court erred by concluding that the Pope County
social workers are entitled to official imm unity—and that Pope Co unty is entitled to
vicarious official immunity—with respect to the social workers’ screening and handling of
maltreatment reports. The trustee’s primary ar gument is that the defense of common-law
official immunity is abrogated by the RMMA. Trustee also makes a more limited argument
that, even if not abrogated, common-law official immunity does not apply to the conduct
in this case. Before turning to our analysis of these issues, we first describe the general
contours of common-law official immunity.
A. Official immunity under the common law
The common-law doctrine of official immu nity provides that “a public official
charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his [or her] judgment or discretion
is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or
malicious wrong.” Vassallo ex rel. Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014)
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted). The purpose of the official-immunity doctrine
is to ensure that “individual government actors [are] able to perform their duties effectively,
without fear of personal liability that might inhibit the exercise of their independent
judgment.” Kariniemi v. City of Rockford , 882 N.W.2d 593, 5 99-600 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). “In general, when a public official is found to be immune from suit on
a particular issue, his government employer will enjoy vicarious official immunity from a

11
suit arising from the employee’s conduct.” Schroeder v. St. Louis County, 708 N.W.2d 497,
508 (Minn. 2006).
To determine whether a public official is entitled to official immunity, courts
conduct a three-step inquiry. At the first step, courts iden tify “the conduct at issue.”
Kariniemi, 882 N.W.2d at 600. At the second step, courts determine whether that conduct
is discretionary or ministerial in nature. Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923
(Minn. 1998). A public official ’s conduct is discretionary if it “requires the exercise of
individual judgment in carrying out the official’s duties.” Id. The conduct is ministerial if
it arises from duties that are “absolute, certa in, and imperative, [a nd] involv[e] merely
execution of a specific duty ar ising from fixed and designa ted facts,” thereby “leaving
nothing to the discretion of the official.” Kelly v. City of Minneapolis , 598 N.W.2d 657,
664 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). At the th ird step of the analysis, a public official
who engaged in discretionary conduct will be entitled to official immunity unless his or
her conduct was willful or malicious. Kariniemi, 882 N.W.2d at 600; Kelly, 598 N.W.2d
at 664. A public official who engaged in mi nisterial conduct, on the other hand, will be
entitled to official immunity unless the ministerial duty “was either not performed or was
performed negligently.” Anderson v. Anoka Hennepi n Indep. Sch. Dist. 11 , 678 N.W.2d
651, 660 (Minn. 2004).
The application of immunity is a question of law, which appellate courts review de
novo. Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462.

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B. The RMMA does not abrogate soci al workers’ comm on-law official
immunity.

We now turn to the question of statutory abrogation of the common-law defense of
official immunity. The trustee and amicus Minnesota Association for Justice (MAJ) argue
that the legislature abrogated common-law o fficial immunity for county social workers
when it provided them immunity in the RMMA. Under subdivision 4(b) of the RMMA, a
county social worker is immune from any civil or criminal liability related to their actions
in performing their duties under that law “if the person is (1) acting in good faith and
exercising due care, or (2) acting in good fa ith and following the information collection
procedures established under subdivision 10, paragraphs (h ), (i), and (j).” Minn. Stat.
§ 626.556, subd. 4(b). The trustee and MAJ argue that this language displaces any official
immunity under the common law.
Courts presume that statutes are consistent with the common law. Ly v. Nystrom ,
615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000); see also Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River ,
639 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2002) (“Unless st atutory provisions instruct otherwise, the
conclusion we reach under the common law will stand.”) “[I]f a statute abrogates the
common law, the abrogation must be by ex press wording or necessary implication.” Ly,
615 N.W.2d at 314.
The RMMA does not include any express wording abrogating common-law official
immunity, and the trustee agrees that the legislature “has been silent on the issue.” But the
trustee contends that the immunities that are provided by the RMMA abrogate the
common-law doctrine of official immunity by necessary implication. He argues that the

13
plain language, operation, and history of the RMMA necessarily imply legislative intent to
abrogate the common law. Specifically, the tr ustee contends that, by expressly providing
RMMA immunity in a narrow set of circumstan ces that, according to the trustee, would
already be covered by common-law official immunity, the legislature must have intended
to limit immunity to only those narrow circumstances.
We disagree that the plain language of the RMMA necessarily implies a contraction
of the immunity defenses available to a social worker. Subdivision 4 of the RMMA
addresses the topic of immunity for person s with responsibilities under the statute. See
Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 4. The clause at issue here—s ubdivision 4(b)—states that a
social worker “is immune” wh en the social worker performs duties under the RMMA in
good faith and exercises due care or follows identified information-collection procedures.
See id., subd. 4(b). Similarly, subdivision 4(a), wh ich immediately precedes the clause in
dispute here, states that “[t]he following persons are immune” if they take action under the
RMMA in good faith. See id., subd. 4(a). This language a ffirmatively grants immunities;
it does not necessarily suggest that those are the only immunities available and that other
immunities are extinguished. Cf. Brekke v. THM Biomedical, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 771, 775-
76 (Minn. 2004) (holding that common-law waiver and estoppel defenses were not
abrogated by statute listing ot her exceptions to liability und er the statute). Under the
trustee’s theory, subdivision 4(b) of the RMMA would remove almost all of the immunity
defenses available to social workers by provi ding them immunity only after they had
already shown they satisfied the statutory st andard. The RMMA thus would not only be
assuring social workers of immunity for perfo rming statutory duties in satisfaction of the

14
RMMA immunity standard but also would be revoking the broader common-law immunity
they otherwise might have. We do not see that result necessarily implied by the language.
Nor do we see abrogation necessarily implied by the operation of the statute and its
interplay with the common law. In some cases, Minnesota cour ts have determined that a
statute abrogates the common law by necessary implication when it would be impossible
for both the common law and the statute to apply. See Swanson v. Brewster, 784 N.W.2d
264, 270 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the colla teral-source statute, which prohibits double
recoveries in certain cases, partially abroga ted the common-law rule that a plaintiff’s
recovery cannot be reduced by certain payments the plaintiff received outside the scope of
their case); Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto’s, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Minn. 1983) (noting the
longstanding rule that attorn ey fees are not recoverable under the common law, unless a
statute or specific contract says otherwise); Beck v. Groe, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891-92 (Minn.
1955) (explaining how Minn. Stat. § 573.02 (1954) permits a wrongful-death claim by
relatives, despite the common law orig inally prohibiting such claims); First Class Valet
Servs. v. Gleason , 892 N.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Minn. App. 2017) (holding that a statute
requiring an employer to indemnify an empl oyee abrogated the common-law right of the
employer to recover damages which the em ployer had to pay due to the employee’s
negligence). In each of these cases, it would not be possible for both the common law and
the statute to apply: a damages award cannot be both reduced an d not reduced by a
collateral source, a party cannot both recover attorney fees and be prohibited from doing
so, and an employer cannot both absolve their employee of responsibility and hold them
responsible for their negligence.

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Here, in contrast, it is possible to cons istently apply both RMMA immunity and
common-law official immunity in the same case. Both common-law official immunity and
statutory immunities can coexis t, even if they overlap. Cf. State by Beaulieu v. City of
Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 570-71 (Minn. 1994) (holding that the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA) does not abrogate co mmon-law official immunity because the
doctrine is consistent with the terms of the MHRA and its remedial purpose). The operation
of the statute thus does not necessarily imply abrogation.
The trustee points to Minnesota’s Civil Damages Act (CDA) as an example where
the supreme court found that a statute abro gated common law by necessary implication
because of its interplay with the common law. In Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn. ,
plaintiffs brought a claim under the CDA against a local American Legion post for illegally
serving alcohol to a drunk driver. 723 N.W. 2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. 2006). They also brought
respondeat-superior claims against the nati onal and regional entities of the American
Legion. Id. The supreme court, noting that the CDA created a new cause of action not based
in the common law, decided that the CDA abrogated cert ain common-law respondeat-
superior claims. Id. at 5. It pointed out that, if respondeat-superior claims were available, a
section of the CDA making “licensees” respon sible for the actions of their employees
would be redundant. Id.
But Urban is distinguishable from this case. Urban involved the attempted use of a
common-law doctrine to extend a cause of action based entirely in statute. Id. Respondeat
superior would have effectively expanded the scope of the CDA, which specified similar,
but more limited, claims. Id. The Urban court noted the specific context of the CDA,

16
observing that “[l]itigation under the CDA is entirely a creation of the legislature” and the
CDA is to be “strictly construed in the sense that it cannot be enlarged beyond its definite
scope.” Id. at 5-6 (quotation omitted). This case, in contrast, involves the use of an existing
immunity defense against a negligence action. The common law is not being used to extend
or enlarge a statutory creature. Instead, the common law provides an immunity defense that
already existed indepe ndently of the immunities descri bed in the RMMA. Furthermore,
there is no special, case-law context indicating that courts should make efforts to strictly
construe the RMMA to avoid enlarging it, as there was with the CDA.
We also disagree with the trustee that the history of the statute necessarily implies
abrogation. The trustee argues that the history of the RMMA supports abrogation because
the legislature added immunity for social workers in the RMMA in 1983 against a backdrop
of already existing and br oader official immunity. See 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 229, § 1, at
801. But, again, the fact that the legislatur e codified specific immunities related to the
performance of duties imposed by the RMMA does not necessarily imply that the
legislature intended to abrogate common-law immunity.
Moreover, the history of the statute may also be viewed as supporting the continued
viability of official immunity . In a number of cases sinc e 1983, Minnesota appellate
courts—while not presented with the ques tion of abrogation—have applied common-law
official immunity to social workers in negligence cases. In Olson v. Ramsey County , the
supreme court applied the doctrine of official immunity to county social workers in a
negligence action for the wrongful death of a child. 509 N.W.2d 368, 371-72 (Minn. 1993).
And, in S.L.D. v. Kranz, this court applied official immunity to the screening decisions of

17
county social workers in a case involving child sexual abus e. 498 N.W.2d 47, 52 (Minn.
App. 1993). These cases, both decided in 19 93, were not overturned by the legislature,
despite numerous subsequent ame ndments made to section 626.556. 5 If the legislature
intended to abrogate common-law immunity in 1983, it is arguably unlikely that it would
have ignored the fact that the courts have not implemented the abrogation. The statute’s
legislative history does not necessarily imply abrogation.
Finally, we note that the parties and amici raise policy arguments in support of their
respective positions. The trustee and amicus MA J stress that the legislature intended to
protect children from abuse in passing the RMMA. They argue that this policy purpose
supports the conclusion that the RMMA abrogates official immunity, as it would encourage
greater care in child-protection decisi ons. Amicus Minnesota Defense Lawyers
Association, however, points out a competing policy concern: the legislature would also
want to protect children from premature removal from their families; it would not want to
encourage officials to inappr opriately remove children fro m their homes for fear of
liability. This court has, itself, noted th ese same competing po licy objectives when
considering Minn. Stat. § 626.556. S.L.D., 498 N.W.2d at 53. The policy concerns on both
sides of the issue are substantial, but, because they pull in opposite directions, they do not
persuade us that the necessary implication is that the RMMA abrogates the common-law
official immunity.

5 For instance, section 626.556 was modified three times in 1994 and twice in 1995. 1994
Minn. Laws ch. 434, §§ 8-10, at 252-56; 1994 Minn. Laws ch . 631, § 31, at 1892; 1994
Minn. Laws ch. 636, art. 2, §§ 57-59, at 2222-25; 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 187, §§ 1-7, at 789-
96; 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 229, art. 4, § 20, at 1965.

18
In sum, in light of the presumption that the legislature intends for statutes to be
consistent with the common law, we conclude that the language, operation, and history of
the RMMA do not lead to the necessary implication that the legislature abrogated common-
law official immunity. Rather, the RMMA may be interpreted to indicate that the
legislature intended to add to or ensure the immunities of soci al workers, not to contract
them. Thus, the district court did not e rr by concluding that Minn. Stat. § 626.556,
subd. 4(b), does not abrogate common law official immunity.
C. The district court correctly determ ined that the Pope County social
workers were partially protected by official immunity.
We turn next to the application of official immunity in this case. The first step of
official-immunity analysis is to identify the conduct in question. The conduct in question
here falls into two categories: (1) the screening and assessment/investigation of reports of
child maltreatment and (2) the cross-reporting of these reports to law enforcement. The
district court concluded that the screening and handling of reports of maltreatment were
discretionary actions protected by official immunity. As for the fa ilure to cross-report
suspected abuse to law enforc ement, the district court did not make any explicit
determination about whether that conduct was protected by official immunity but instead
concluded that the failure to cross-report could not have been a proximate cause of Eric’s
death. We examine in this s ection whether official immun ity applies to respondents’
screening and assessment/investigation of reports of child maltreatment. As for the failure
to cross-report, we assume without deciding that it is a ministerial action not protected by
official immunity and address the proximate-cause issue in the next section.

19
Respondents point out that the trustee does not appear to dispute the district court’s
determination that, if common-law official immunity has not been abrogated, then it
applies to Pope County and its social workers. It is certainly true that the trustee focuses
his arguments on whether the RMMA abrogates official immunity. But the trustee does
make other arguments that implicate the application of official immunity. For example, the
trustee highlights that the RMMA requires certain information-collection procedures to be
followed, suggesting that the procedures describe ministerial tasks rather than discretionary
ones.
This court has held that county social wo rkers’ determinations of whether a report
involves the maltreatment of a child is a discretionary ac tion that qualifies for common-
law official immunity and that a county is vicariously i mmune from claims arising from
those determinations. See S.L.D., 498 N.W.2d at 52-53. The supreme court has held that
social workers are also entitled to official immunity in developing a case plan to address a
report of child maltreatment. See Olson, 509 N.W.2d at 371-72.
This court has also determined, however, th at social workers engage in ministerial
activities for which the official-immunity protections are not as broad. S.L.D., 498 N.W.2d
at 53-55. In S.L.D., we held that a social worker (a nd thus the county) did not have
immunity for failures to accu rately convey comp lete information to colleagues because
conveying information was a ministerial task rather than a discretionary one. Id.
Here, the district court determined that, with respect to screening and handling the
reports of abuse, the “PCHS social worker s were making judgments and discretionary
decisions as to what steps they would need to take.” It reasoned that the workers were not

20
merely executing a specific plan but instead were asked to make discretionary judgments
as to what to do next. They were thus entitled to official immunity, with Pope County, in
turn, receiving vicarious official immunity.
The district court’s analysis parallels the analysis in S.L.D. with respect to the social
workers’ screening and assessment/investigation of the reports. “The legislature did not,
and indeed could not, articul ate every conceivable fact pa ttern that would constitute
neglect.” S.L.D., 498 N.W.2d at 52. Instead, social wo rkers have to determine, based on
their professional judgment, whether or not a reported set of alleged facts constitutes
neglect under a set of general criteria desc ribed in Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(g).6 If
they screen the report in, they must then apply their independent judgment in investigating
the situation and evaluating appropriate solutions that balance an array of policy concerns.
Additional guidelines exist, but these decisi ons are complicated and involve assessing
difficult circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
Because screening, assessment, and inve stigation of child-maltreatment reports
involve the exercise of independent judgmen t, these actions constitute discretionary
conduct under the official-immu nity doctrine. The social workers here are entitled to
official immunity in the contex t of this conduct, as there are no allegations that their
conduct was willful or malicious. Pope County , in turn, is entitled to vicarious official
immunity, as there do not appear to be any circumstances that warrant a departure from the

6 The definition of “neglect” was found in subdivision 2(c) at the time of S.L.D. See Minn.
Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(c) (1992). It has since been moved to subdivision 2(g). See Minn.
§ 626.556, subd. 2(g) (2018).

21
general rule that a government employer recei ves vicarious official immunity when its
employee receives official immunity on a given issue. See Schroeder v. St. Louis County,
708 N.W.2d at 508.
The district court did not err by determining that Pope County and its social workers
are entitled to official immunity with respect to their screening and handling of the reports
of maltreatment of Eric. Because this conclusion is dispositive with respect to that conduct,
we do not reach the question of whether statutory immunity applies as well.
II. The district court did not err by determ ining that, as matter of law, the trustee
did not produce sufficient ev idence to establish that Pope County’s failure to
cross-report to law enforcement was a proximate cause of Eric’s death.
Without explicitly rejecting the application of official immunity to PCHS’s failure
to cross-report to law enforcement,7 the district court turned to the merits of the negligence
claim based on that conduct and concluded that the trustee had failed to produce sufficient
evidence to establish that the failure to cross-report was a proximate cause of Eric’s death.
We assume, without deciding, that immunity does not apply, and we turn to the issue
decided by the district court.
The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) the existen ce of a duty of care, (2) a
breach of that duty, (3) an injury was sustained, and (4 ) breach of the duty was the
proximate cause of the injury. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn.
2005). A negligent act is the proximate cause of a harm if “the act was a substantial factor

7 The district court, likewise, did not explicitly reject the application of statutory immunity
to this conduct. We do not reach Pope County’s contention that statutory immunity applies
to the failure to cross-report.

22
in the happening of that result.” Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc. , 749 N.W.2d 367, 372
(Minn. 2008). “Whether proximate cause exists in a particular case is a question of fact for
the jury to decide.” Id. at 373. But summary judgment is appropriate if the party asserting
the negligence claim has failed to present material facts that could demonstrate causation.
Hastings v. United Pac. Ins. Co. , 396 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Minn. 1986). Appellate courts
review such a determination de novo. See RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rohde , 820 N.W.2d 1, 6
(Minn. 2012) (noting that appellate courts review “legal decisions on summary judgment
under a de novo standard”).
The district court concluded that, while the failure to cr oss-report the child-
maltreatment reports to law enforcement viol ated Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 7, this
failure was not the proximate cause of Eric’s death. It was undisputed that local law
enforcement had a policy of not independently investigating or assessing any child-abuse
allegations, instead leaving the investigation to PCHS. Thus, the district court reasoned,
the failure to report to law enforcement could not have been the proximate cause of Eric’s
death.
The trustee argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
causation such that summary ju dgment was inappropriate. He points out that the record
contained an affidavit from an expert who op ined that, based on her own experiences in
child-protective services in Hennepin County, had Pope County’s employees reported the
incidents to local law enforcement, law enforcement would have conducted a more
thorough investigation of th e abuse allegations. The expe rt pointed to interviews
subsequent to Eric’s death as evidence that law enforcement would have investigated and

23
prevented the death because, in those interv iews, Peltier and Eric’s siblings told law
enforcement that Peltier abused Eric.
This expert’s affidavit appears to be the extent of the trustee’s causation evidence.
But, even assuming that the expert’s affidavit correctly described the situation in Hennepin
County, the undisputed evidence established that this was not the practice in Pope County.
An affidavit from the PCHS director described how local law enforcement had indicated it
was going to “do no independent investigation or assessment beyond what Pope County
Human Services was going to do.” The affida vit explained that, while PCHS had child-
protection investigative experts, the sheriff’s department and local law enforcement did not
have trained child-protection investigators at that time. Instead, it was the practice for
PCHS child-protection investigators to send reports to law enforcement only when the
investigator believed there was a safety issue necessitating the involvement of law
enforcement. Thus, as the district court explained, “there is nothing in the record to suggest
cross[-]reporting to law enforcement would have changed this horrible tragedy, given law
enforcement by its policy did not independently investigate or assess any of these claims.”
Without evidence of proximate cause, the district court co rrectly concluded that the
negligence claim failed as a matter of law.
D E C I S I O N
Because the RMMA does not abrogate common-law official immunity, that
common-law defense remains available to county social workers performing discretionary
functions in handling child-maltreatment reports. The district court did not err by applying
common-law official immunity to respondents Pope County and its social workers with

24
respect to their conduct in screening and handl ing reports of abuse of Eric Dean. As for
respondents’ failure to cross-report the ma ltreatment reports to law enforcement, the
district court did not err by concluding that, as a matter of law, appellant trustee could not
establish negligence because he did not submit evidence that the failure to cross-report was
the proximate cause of the child’s death.
Affirmed.