State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0275

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Craig Eugene Hawkins,
Appellant.

Filed February 3, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge
Dissenting, Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-5009

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenber g, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After punching his girlfriend in the head and damaging her ey e, appellant Craig
Eugene Hawkins was convicted of third-de gree assault. Hawkins challenges that

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conviction, arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted
substantial bodily harm. Furt her, he contends that the guilty verdict for domestic assault
was not supported by sufficient evidence that he and the vi ctim were in a significant
romantic relationship. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 23, 2018, C.R. called 911 and reported that “m y boyfriend beat me
up.” She told the 911 operator that she was at his house in Rogers and he punched her in
the head. Officers resp onded to the call and arrested a ppellant Craig Eugene Hawkins.
While in custody, Hawkins admitted that he was arrested at “my house.” And, from the
back of the squad car, he thre atened the officer, stating “I whoop people’s a*ses all the
time . . . I see you in town, [I] beat you’re a*s.”
At the time of the arrest, the officers also took photographs of C.R., Hawkins, and
Hawkins’s bedroom. The photographs of C.R. depicted scratches on her neck, bruising on
her face, blood above her lip, and a missing clump of hair on top of her head. And a
photograph of Hawkins showed bruising to his eye, forehead, ear, and neck. The
photographs of Hawkins’s bedroom reveal bloodstains on his sheets and carpet, along with
a large clump of hair atop a bloodstain on the carpet.
The day after the assault, C.R. was examined by Dr. Dane Peterson, an
ophthalmologist. She came to Dr. Peterson complaining of a new floater, or flash of light,
in her vision after being hit in the head multiple times. Duri ng his examination,
Dr. Peterson detected that C. R. had a subconjunctival hemorrh age, or burst blood vessel,
in her left eye, along with a posterior vitreal detachment in the same eye. A posterior vitreal

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detachment is a separation of th e material in the ba ck of the eye from the retina or optic
nerve—and it is a permanent injury, which increases the risk of retinal detachment for the
rest of a person’s lifetime. During his examination, Dr. Peterson also observed swelling to
the side of C.R.’s head and around her eye, and bruising under her eye, which indicated
that the injuries to her left eye were caused by the recent blows to her head.
The state initially charged Ha wkins with felony domestic assault by strangulation
and misdemeanor domestic assault. While in jail following his arrest, Hawkins called an
unknown woman. During that recorded conversation, he implicated himself in the physical
fight with C.R. The state amended the complaint to add a charge of third-degree assault at
the outset of trial.
The matter was tried to a jury. Dr. Peters on testified consistent with the facts set
out above. C.R. did not testify, but her 911 call was played for the jury. The photographs
depicting her injuries, Hawkins’s injuries, and the bloodstains a nd hair clump in his
bedroom, were also shown to the jurors. 1 The jury then f ound Hawkins guilty of
third-degree assault and misdemeanor domestic assault. The dist rict court sentenced
Hawkins to 32 months in prison on the third- degree assault charge, which it stayed for
five years on conditions including 365 days in jail. It did not adjudicate Hawkins guilty of
the misdemeanor domestic assault charge, because it was a lesser-included offense.
Hawkins appeals.

1 Following the close of evidence, the state dismissed the charge of felony domestic assault
by strangulation.

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D E C I S I O N
On appeal, Hawkins argues that insuffici ent evidence supports his conviction for
third-degree assault and the charge of mi sdemeanor domestic assault for which he was
found guilty but not adjudicated. In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, appellate
courts review the record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to r each their verdict.”
State v. Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004).
Both parties agree that this convictio n was obtained based on circumstantial
evidence.2 To review the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, an appellate court uses a
two-step process. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). First, the appellate
court identifies the circumstances that the state proved. Id. To do so, it “winnow[s] down
the evidence . . . by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the [guilty] verdict” and
disregarding any evidence inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,
600 (Minn. 2017).
Second, the appellate court determines “whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inc onsistent with any rational hy pothesis other than guilt.”
State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013 ). “We examine independently the
reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved,” and
whether the circumstances exclude any re asonable inference other than guilt.

2 We note that both direct and circumstantial evidence supports Hawkins’s conviction. But,
as is the case here, “[w]hen the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone
sufficient to sustain the verdict,” appellate courts apply the circumstantial-evidence
standard of review. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).

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State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The appellate
court evaluates the circumstan ces as a whole in determinin g whether an inference other
than guilt is reasonable. State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). At this step,
the court does not give “deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted).
I. Sufficient evidence supported Hawkins’s conviction for third-degree assault.
A person who assaults another and inflicts substantial bodily harm commits assault
in the third degree. Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2 016). Hawkins challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for third-degree assault on two bases.
First, he asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he struck C.R. on
February 23, 2018. Next, he argues that there was insufficient evidence that he caused the
injuries to C.R.’s left eye which constituted substantial bodily harm.
A. Hawkins’s Participation
Despite Hawkins’s assertion that the evid ence does not connect him to the assault
of C.R., Hawkins directly implicated himself in the February 23, 2018 assault. On that
date, C.R. called 911 and reported that 15 mi nutes before placing the call, her boyfriend
beat her up at his apartment in Rogers. Police officers then arrived to the scene and took
photographs of Hawkins, C.R., and Hawkins’s bedroom, which showed injuries to C.R.’s
and Hawkins’s faces, and bloodstains and a clump of hair in Hawkins’s bedroom.
And following his arrest at the scene, Hawkins placed a call from jail. During this
call, the other person on the line asked: “Were you just hell bent yesterday?” and Hawkins
responded by stating: “Well, Mom fired me up, that didn’t help. And [C.R.] continued to

6
fire me up and I ended up with a lot worse than her I’ll tell you right now, got a black eye
and I’m all scratched up . . . .” Hawkins also stated: “[C.R.] always told me . . . I’ll never
call the cops, don’t worry . . . it’s all over and done; once a cop caller, always a cop caller.”
In this call, Hawkins directly admitted he had been in a fight with C.R. in his house
and that she called the police—he even used her nickname in the admission. This is
evidence that Hawkins was the “boyfriend” C.R. referred to during her 911 call. The
photographs taken at the scene of the assault of the injuries to Ha wkins and C.R., along
with the bloodstains and clump of hair in his bedroom, further directly implicate Hawkins
in the assault. Therefore, the inferences drawn from this evidence point solely to Hawkins
as the person who assaulted C.R., and the evid ence is inconsistent with any reasonable
hypothesis other than the inference that Hawkins assaulted C.R. on February 23, 2018.
B. Substantial Bodily Harm
Hawkins next argues that there was insufficient evidence that he inflicted substantial
bodily harm on C.R., which is a necessary element of third-degree assault. Minn.
Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1. “Substantial bodily harm” is defined as “bodily injury which
involves a temporary but substantial disfi gurement, or which causes a temporary but
substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which
causes a fracture of any bodily member.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2016).
Hawkins does not contest that the inju ries to C.R.’s left eye identified by
Dr. Peterson—a posterior vitreal detachment and subconjunctival hemorrhage—constitute

7
substantial bodily harm.3 Indeed, after the close of testimony, when arguing for a judgment
of acquittal under subdivision 18 of rule 26.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Hawkins’s counsel stated:
There are injuries that have come into evidence. We get that.
Those could arguably be consid ered substantial bodily harm.
We get that. The question is: Wh at connects those injuries to
Mr. Hawkins? There is no evidence.4

Based on our review of the evidence, we disagree with Hawkins’s contention that
“no evidence” connects him to C.R.’s subs tantial bodily injuries. The following
circumstances were proven at trial:
1) C.R. called 911 and reported that her boyfriend punched her
in the head.

2) While being transported to jail following his arrest,
Hawkins bragged of his own ferocity, stating that he
“woop[s] people’s as*es all the time” and threatening to
beat up the officer.

3) Hawkins called an unknown woman from jail following his
arrest and said he got it worse in the fight with C.R. than
C.R. did, and that their re lationship was over because she
was a cop caller.

4) Photographs taken at the scene depicted injuries to C.R.’s
face and neck, along with bloodstains and clumps of hair in
Hawkins’s bedroom.

3 We are mindful that arguably there is a distinction—when it comes to substantial bodily
harm—between the vitreal detachment (which “never repairs itself”) and a subconjunctival
hemorrhage (which is “essentially a bruise” according to Dr. Pete rson’s testimony). But
given that Hawkins does not contest that th e overall injury to C.R.’s eye constitutes
substantial bodily harm, that distinction is not directly before us.
4 On appeal, Hawkins notes that in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, the district
court described the state’s evidence as “relatively thin”. But read in context, the comment
described the connection of Hawkins to the “interaction” with C.R. not whether the injuries
to her left eye were substantial.

8

5) C.R. was examined by Dr. Peterson the following day, and
she told him that she had a new floater in her vision caused
by being hit in the head.

6) Dr. Peterson identified that C.R. had a posterior vitreal
detachment (which he identified as a permanent injury) and
a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye.

7) Dr. Peterson also noted that C.R. had “swelling to the side
of her head and around her eye, [with] bruising under the
eye and along the skin” which supported his diagnosis that
the injuries to her left eye were caused by the recent trauma
to her head.

These proven circumstances are consistent with the rational hypothesis that the injuries to
C.R.’s left eye identified by Dr. Peterson were caused by Hawkins punching her in the head
on February 23, 2018. There was no circum stance proven at trial to support Hawkins’s
proposed reasonable alternative hypothesis that C.R. had a preexisting condition in her left
eye.
Still, Hawkins urges us to credit his altern ative hypothesis: that the injuries were
unrelated to the February 23 assault. He first argues that C. R.’s description of the floater
in her vision as “new” indicates that she suffered floaters previously, and therefore supports
his reasonable alternative hypothesis that the “new” floater was unrela ted to the assault.
This argument, however, isolates one word of the testimony and ignores its surrounding
context. Dr. Peterson treated C.R. the day after the assault. He testified that her “[c]hief
complaint was a new floater after trauma.” C.R. described this trauma as “hits to the sides
of her head,” therefore connecting her complaint of a new floater to being hit in the head.

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Furthermore, Dr. Peterson tes tified that a posterior vitr eous detachment cannot be
diagnosed by examining the outside of the ey e. Rather, a patient’s complaint of new
floaters or flashes of light are how a doctor diagnoses the vitreous detachment condition.5
Which he did here. Dr. Peterson also testified that the detachment can be caused by trauma.
Therefore, C.R.’s complaint that she had a new floater caused by trauma—which she
described as being hit in the side of th e head—connects Dr. Peterson’s diagnosis of
posterior vitreous detachment to Hawkins’s assault.
Similar to his reliance on the word “new ,” Hawkins next argues that C.R.’s
statement to the 911 dispatcher that “I worried, [sic] I already have a [Inaudible]” supports
his proposed reasonable alternative hypothesis that C.R.’s eye damage preexisted his
assault. This hypothesis is not a reasonable interpretation of the statement. The key word
is inaudible, and cannot be limited in the manner proposed by Hawkins. See
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that the state is not
required to remove all doubt, but only all reasonable doubt).
In sum, based on Dr. Peterson’s testimony, and the supporting photographs of C.R.’s
injuries taken at the scene, it is reasonable to infer that Hawkins caused the substantial
bodily injuries to C.R.’s left eye. Hawkins’s reliance on isolated or inaudible words does
not undermine the sole rational hypothesis that he caused those injuries. To hold otherwise,
one must ignore the fact that C.R. did not a ppear in Dr. Peterson’s office simply with an

5 This is the only testimony in the record regarding the diagnosis of a vitreal detachment—
that a patient’s complaint of a “new” floater is how a treating physician diagnoses that a
detachment has occurred.

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eye injury—she came after she reported a viol ent assault. She came with significant
bruising and swelling. We decline to wi pe these facts from th e scene. Hawkins’s
conviction for third-degree assa ult was supported by sufficien t evidence that he caused
C.R.’s substantial bodily injury.
II. Because Hawkins was not adjudicated guilty of domestic assault, we do not
reach the sufficiency of the evidence supporting this charge.

Hawkins also argues that there was insufficient evidence that he and C.R. were in a
significant romantic or sexual relationship, which is a necessary element of domestic
assault. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.2242, subd. 1 (statin g that whoever inte ntionally inflicts
bodily harm upon a family or household member is gu ilty of misdemeanor domestic
assault), 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(7) (defining “f amily or household member” for the purpose
of domestic abuse to include “persons invol ved in a significant romantic or sexual
relationship”) (2016).
However, while the jury fo und Hawkins guilty of misd emeanor domestic assault,
the district court did not adjudicate him on that charge, and did not impose a sentence for
domestic abuse. Therefore, we do not addre ss the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jury’s guilty verdict for domestic abuse. See State v. Ashland , 287 N.W.2d 649, 650
(Minn. 1979) (stating that an appellate cour t need not decide wh ether the evidence was
sufficient to support convictions for counts for which the defendant was neither sentenced
nor adjudicated guilty).
Affirmed.

D-1
ROSS, Judge (dissenting)
I agree with the majority in all regards except its conclusion that the circumstantial
evidence was sufficient on the element of whether Craig Hawkins’s actions caused C.R. to
suffer substantial bodily harm. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I agree that the circumstantial evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hawkins’s attack caused C.R. to suffer bruising. But the majority says too little by
acknowledging only “that arguably there is a distinction” (emphasis added) between a
permanent vitreal detachment and a mere hemorrhage, “which is ‘essentially . . . a bruise,’”
as it regards the statutory standard of “subs tantial bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.223,
subd. 1 (2016). I do not think it is merely an “arguable” distinction but an obviously legally
significant distinction that separates a pe rmanent injury carryin g identifiable and
substantial consequences from a temporary injury carrying no significant consequences at
all. A bruise, even a bruise to the eye, is not disfiguring, does not substantially impair any
bodily function, and does not constitute a fracture, and these alone are the kinds of bodily
harms that qualify as “substan tial” under Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision
7a (2016). The majority dismisses this distinction because Hawkins does not emphasize it
on appeal and because his trial couns el conceded that the injuries “ could be considered”
(not “ are considered”) substantial bodily harm . Hawkins hints at the difference by
recognizing on appeal that the vitreal detachment is the “most serious injur[y].” Regardless,
the distinction is important because the only one of C.R.’s reported injuries that could
possibly meet the definition of a “substantial bodily harm” is her vitreal detachment.

D-2
I differ strongly from the ma jority’s view of the evidence about C.R.’s vitreal
detachment. A vitreal detachment produces specific indicia—floaters or flashes of light—
and is permanent. Dr. Dane Peterson testifie d that a vitreal detachment is manifested
by “floaters” in the eye visible to the patient and that a “vitreal detachment never repairs
itself. Once it detaches, it’s always detached.” So if C.R. had a vitreal detachment before
Hawkins’s assault, his assault did not cause her vitreal detachment and he cannot be guilty
of third-degree assault. The record establishes that, at the time Dr. Peterson examined C.R.,
she had a vitreal detachment as evidenced by her seeing a new floater in her left eye. From
this testimony, and from testimony that Hawkin s attacked C.R., the jury received only
circumstantial evidence supporting the element that Hawkins’s attack caused C.R.’s vitreal
detachment. “When the State relies entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove an element
of the offense, we use a two-step test to determine whether the State presented sufficient
evidence to prove the element.” State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 411 (Minn. 2016). And we
must reverse a conviction that rests on circumstantial evidence if the circumstances proved
are consistent with “any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. For the following reasons
I think the dearth of evidence related to causation is dispositive, but to the extent one can
say there is any such evidence on the issue, it supports a rational hypothesis other than guilt
because it supports the hypothesis that C.R.’s vitreal detachment preexisted the assault.
Completely lacking in the record is any evidence whatsoever that could establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Hawkins’s atta ck caused C.R.’s vitreal detachment. In
criminal cases involving the interpretation of physical injuries, the state routinely
recognizes the need to supp ort an inculpatory interpretation with convincing medical

D-3
testimony. See, e.g., State v. McBride , 666 N.W.2d 351, 365–66 (Minn. 2003) (holding
evidence sufficient because examining physician “testified that to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, McBride was the source of the bite marks at the base of Dillon’s penis,
on the left side of Dillon’s scrotum, and on Dillon’s tongue”); State v. Morris, 606 N.W.2d
430, 437–39 (Minn. 2000) (affirming convicti on based in part on physical evidence and
on medical testimony that the victim died in the course of criminal sexual conduct);
State v. Harris , 589 N.W.2d 782, 792 (Minn. 1999) (“Such evidence led the medical
examiner to testify that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, McGrath had been
sexually assaulted at or about th e time of death. This evidence is sufficient to support the
jury’s conclusion that Harris killed McGr ath while committing or attempting sexual
assault.”).
By contrast to these cases, here the ju ry received no testimony by a treating
physician or expert medical witness opining to any degree of certainty that Hawkins’s
attack caused C.R.’s vitreal detachment. The closest the state came to introducing evidence
of causation was presenting the testimony of Dr. Dane Peterson, C.R.’s treating
optometrist. Dr. Peterson’s causation testim ony fell far short of meeting the state’s
burden of proof of causation. He testif ied only that vitreal detachment is “ usually a
spontaneous . . . occurrence” (emphasis added) and that the condition can also be caused
by trauma “or through connective tissue disorders.” He never said what he thought caused
C.R.’s detachment particularly. In fact, th e prosecutor never even asked Dr. Peterson
whether he had concluded (or even suspec ted) that Hawkins’s actions caused the
detachment. Nor did the prosecutor ask whether C.R. informed the doctor that she had no

D-4
previous floaters or whether she had a prio r diagnosis regarding he r vitreal detachment.
The jury received no physical evidence establishing that Ha wkins’s attack caused C.R.’s
vitreal detachment. It received no medical re cords or any other evid ence indicating that
C.R.’s vitreal detachment was a new medica l condition occurring on ly after the attack
rather than being a preexisting condition. In my view, the utter absence of any evidence on
the element concerning the cause of C.R.’s vitreal detachment requires this court to reverse
and remand for entry of conviction on a lesser-included assault.
Although I believe that this lack of evidence alone demands reversal, there is more.
According to Dr. Peterson, C.R. complained to him only about having a “new floater” after
the incident, not about having merely a “floate r.” If a patient reports to a physician, “I’ve
noticed I have a new mole” or “a new bruise” or a new anything, it is at least reasonable
(if not compelling) to infer that the new thing presupposes the existence of an old, other,
prior thing. That C.R. had a “new floater” does not establish that the vitreal detachment
was new where no evidence supports the infere nce that by “new floater” she meant “first
and only floater.” The majority too easily dismisses the possibility that, by reporting a “new
floater,” C.R. may have been reporting a floa ter that was in addition to a floater she had
been experiencing before th e attack. The majority has no t explained how dismissing the
natural implication of the adjective “new” is consistent with our standard of review in
circumstantial-evidence challenges.
But again, most important, my dissent aris es from the lack of sufficient causation
evidence. The lack of any me dical evidence or even lay testimony on the question of the
timing of C.R.’s vitreal detachment makes it impossible for me to agree with the majority’s

D-5
conclusion that “it is reasonable to infer that Hawkins caused substantial bodily injuries to
C.R.’s left eye.” And the evidence at the ve ry least allows for an exculpatory reasonable
inference, which is that the condition preexisted Hawkins’s assault.