In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0284

In re the Marriage of:

Paul Matthias Hobday, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Mary Kay Hobday,
Respondent.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-10-9117

Alan C. Eidsness, Benjamin J. Hamborg, Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Laurie Mack-Wagner, Elizabeth E. Due, Mack & Santana Law Offices, P.C., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
In this spousal-maintenan ce, childcare-expense, and parenting-time modification
dispute, appellant Paul Matthias Hobday (husba nd) argues that the district court used an
incorrect marital standard of living as the baseline fo r his spousal-maintenance
modification motion. He asserts that the increase in respondent Mary Kay Hobday’s (wife)
income was not anticipated by the parties’ s tipulated judgment and decree. However, at
the time of their dissolution, husband and wife stipulated to the amount of monthly spousal
maintenance without agreeing to, or the district court finding, the marital standard of living
against which any request for modification would be measured. Husband next argues that
the district court should have retroactively modified his childcare-expense obligation back
to the date wife stopped incurring this expens e. Finally, husband argues that the district
court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its partial denial of his motion for
increased parenting time. Because the district court’s careful findings were supported by
the record—particularly by the stipulation of the parties—the district court did not abuse
its discretion. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Husband and wife were married in July 1988. They ha ve four children together,
two of whom have emancipated. Husband filed a petition in December 2010 to dissolve
their marriage. In February 2012, the district court entere d stipulated findings of fact,
conclusions of law, order for judgment, and judgment and decree.

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Pursuant to the stipulated decree, husband and wife agreed to joint legal custody of
the children, with wife receiving sole physical custody subject to husband’s parenting time.
Husband had one third of the parenting time with the two youngest children, on Tuesday
evenings, alternating Wednes day evenings, and alternati ng weekends, with additional
provisions for vacation and holiday time.
At the time of the dissolution, husband and wife could not agree upon their marital
standard of living or their respective post-decree budgets. Despite this, they stipulated that
husband would pay wife $15,000 each month in spousal maintenance. With cost-of-living
adjustments, this amount was $16,102.42 per m onth at the time the district court decided
the motion. Husband and wife each attached their proposed post-decree budgets to the
2012 stipulated judgment. In these attachments, husband proposed that wife’s budget for
herself and the children should total $11,451 per month, while wife’s proposed budget was
$17,120 per month, for herself plus an additional $9,780 for the children.
At the time of the stipulated judgment, husband was earning $571,000 per year as
an orthodontist, and wife was earning $42,00 0 per year as a registered nurse. For the
five-year period following the dissolution, husb and’s average-yearly income increased to
$767,950, while wife’s increased to $72,420.
In November 2017, husband moved the district court to modify his childcare support
obligations. Husband filed a second amended motion in October 2018, seeking, among
other things, to expand his parenting time, reduce his spousal-maintenance obligation, and
recover $53,367 in overpaid childcare suppor t. Despite the relative changes in their

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incomes, husband sought to reduce his spou sal-maintenance obligation from $16,102 to
$5,830 per month.
Following a hearing, the district court found that wife’s marital standard of living at
the time of the dissolution was $17,120, wh ich meant that the stipulated-maintenance
amount left her with a $2,120 monthly shortfa ll. Therefore, the district court denied
husband’s motion to reduce his spousal-maintenance obligation. The district court granted
husband additional parenting time on Sunday nights, but not the full amount of additional
time he requested. Finally, the district court declined to order wife to reimburse husband
for the overpaid childcare support he incurred pr ior to the date he served his notice of
motion. Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Husband argues that the district court used the incorrect marital standard of living
as the basis for denying his motion to re duce his spousal-maintenance obligation.
Relatedly, husband argues that his spousal-m aintenance obligation should have been
reduced because wife’s increased income was not foreseeable at the time of the parties’
stipulated judgment. Next, husband asserts that the district court should have retroactively
modified his childcare-support obligation back to the date wife st opped incurring this
expense. Finally, husband claims that the district court fa iled to fully analyze his motion
for increased parenting time. We address each argument in turn.

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I. Husband is not entitled to reduce his spousal-maintenance obligation because
the stipulated amount is below the ma rital standard of living, and wife’s
increased income was foreseeable.

Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to reduce his spousal-maintenance obligation. Specifically, husband asserts that the district
court used the incorrect baseline to determin e whether a substantial change in wife’s
circumstances had occurred and made unsu pported findings regarding the parties’
reasonable expectations of wife’s future income.
Appellate courts review a district c ourt’s decision to modify an existing
maintenance award for an abuse of discretion. Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 710
(Minn. 1997). A district court abuses its discretion if its fi ndings of fact are unsupported
by the record or if it improperly applies the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202
(Minn. 1997). We will set aside a district cour t’s findings of fact onl y if they are clearly
erroneous. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008).
The terms of a maintenance order “may be modified upon a showing of one or more
of the following, any of which makes the terms unreasonable and unfair: (1) substantially
increased . . . gross income of an . . . oblig ee; (2) substantially . . . decreased need of
an . . . obligee.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)(1)-(2) (2018). However, we note that
the maintenance obligation that husband seeks to modify was the result of a stipulation
between the parties. Courts only modify a stipulated maintenance obligation with
reluctance. Claybaugh v. Claybaugh, 312 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Minn. 1981) (“Although the
[district] court is vested with broad discretion to determine the propriety of a modification,

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we have suggested that [district] courts exercise that discretion carefully and only
reluctantly alter the terms of a stipulation governing maintenance.”).
The Marital Standard of Living

Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by adopting wife’s
budget as the marital standard of living. “The purpose of a maintenance award is to allow
the recipient and the obligor to have a sta ndard of living that approximates the marital
standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the circumstances.” Peterka v. Peterka,
675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. Ap p. 2004). Generally, a stipul ated judgment and decree’s
“relevance in a modification context is in th e identification of the baseline circumstances
against which claims of substantial change are evaluated.” Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709.
Here, however, the parties’ stipulated judgment and decree does not contain an
agreement as to the marital standard of living. Instead, the parties left the matter open and
attached competing estimated budgets to their stipulation, without reaching any agreement
as to the actual budget or appropriate sta ndard. As pointed out by this court in
Maschoff v. Leiding, unless a support order recites “the parties’ then-existing
circumstances, the litigation of a later motion to modify that order becomes unnecessarily
complicated because it requires the parties to litigate not only their circumstances at the
time of the motion, but also their circumstan ces at the time of the order sought to be
modified.” 696 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709).
That unnecessary complication is precisely what has occurred here.
Because the parties did not stipulate to a marital standard of living in their 2012
judgment and decree, the distri ct court, in resolving the pr esent motion, chose to adopt

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wife’s proposed 2012 budget as the mar ital standard for the purposes of spousal
maintenance. The district court based this determination on the following findings:
(1) husband’s proposed budget for wife did not differentiate
between wife’s expenses and those of the children;

(2) husband’s combined budget wa s significantly higher than
his estimation of wife’s combined budget, even though he
had substantially less parenting time;

(3) husband’s budget lacked supportive analysis; and

(4) wife’s proposed budget wa s prepared by her financial
expert based upon extensive evaluation of the family’s
actual expenditures.

Each of these findings is suppor ted by the record. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by adopting $17,120 as the baseline marital standard of living for the
purpose of evaluating husband’s spousa l-maintenance-modification motion. See Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d at 202 (stating that a district c ourt abuses its discreti on while considering a
motion to modify a maintenance award if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record).
Still, husband argues that the district court abused its discretion because wife’s 2012
budget included four line-items that lacked evidentiary support. See Rask v. Rask ,
445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (M inn. App. 1989) (“A trial court’ s calculation of living expenses
must be supported by the evidence.”). The line-items that husband assails are: (1) $4,625
per month for cabin expenses, when husban d was awarded the cabin and wife does not
currently own a cabin; (2) $1,706 per month for home improvements, which included plans
to finish the basement, redo the driveway, refinish wood floors, replace the carpet as
needed, and hang new blinds; (3) $2,969 pe r month for childcare expenses, which wife

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stopped incurring in 2014; and (4) $2,417 per month for private school tuition, even though
the children did not end up attending private school. We disagree with husband’s analysis.
First, wife did not include the per-month costs for childcare or private-school tuition
in her monthly budget. Therefore, these items are irrelevant to whether the district court
made unsupported findings regarding the baseline for spousal maintenance.
Second, the record indicates that husba nd and wife owned a cabin and incurred
home-improvement expenses during the course of their marriage. Because husband does
not argue that these items were not indicative of the parties’ standard of living prior to the
divorce, instead asserting that wife did not continue to incur these expenses on a monthly
basis following the divorce, the items reflected the marital standard of living. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by including them in its determination of the $17,120
baseline of the marital standard of living.
Finally, we note that this $17,120 baselin e was substantially consistent with the
stipulated monthly maintenance amount of $15,000. And we return to our earlier
refrain: district courts shou ld modify a stipulated spou sal-maintenance agreement only
with reluctance. Claybaugh, 312 N.W.2d at 449. The district court properly exercised this
reluctance and did not abuse its discretion by determining that husband was not entitled to
modification where the stipulated-maintenance amount is below the marital standard of
living.
The Increase in Wife’s Income
Husband also argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by finding that
wife’s increased monthly income did not c onstitute a substantial increase warranting

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modification of husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation. At the time of the dissolution,
husband and wife stipulated that “[wife] is employed as a registered nurse . . . earning
$42,000 per year. The parties stipulate that [wife’s] potential income/earning capacity [is]
$65,000 per year, working 32 hours per week.” The district court determined that wife’s
current income of $84,864 does not constitute a substantial increase because “the parties
reasonably anticipated that [w ife] would work full time afte r the children needed less
care . . . [and] the increase was reasonably foreseeable given the ages of the children at the
time of the J&D.” Husband fails to establish that this finding is clearly erroneous.
Extending the stipulated hourly rate of $39 per hour to a 40-hour work week, the
district court determined that the parties re asonably expected that wife could eventually
earn $81,120 at the time they entered into the stipulation, even though by its express terms
the stipulation only contemplated an increase to 32 hours per week. The district court’s
analysis of what the parties re asonably anticipated at the tim e of the stipulated judgment
was not clearly erroneous.
When determining whether a substantial change in income has occurred, making
the maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair, “the stipulation may be relevant if one
party claims this change was not or could not have been anticipated.” Kemp v. Kemp ,
608 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. App. 2000). Here, the distri ct court multiplied the hourly
rate stipulated to by the parties by a nor mal 40-hour-work week, an amount of time
reasonably anticipated as their children aged and became more independent. The district
court did not clearly err by doing so, and as a result, appropriately determined that wife’s

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income of $84,864 di d not constitute a substantial ch ange warranting modification of
husband’s maintenance obligation.
II. The district court was not required to retroactively modify husband’s
childcare-support obligation to the date wife stopped incurring this expense.

Husband has been paying $941 per mont h for childcare suppor t since 2012 based
on anticipated monthly childcare expenses of $1,642. Wife acknowledged that she has not
incurred any actual childcare expenses since 2 014. Husband therefore moved the district
court in November 2017 to retr oactively modify his childcare obligation back to the date
wife stopped incurring this expense, and to order that she reimburse him for his
overpayment of $53,367. Th e district court granted husb and’s modification motion, but
only made it retroactive to the first month after husband served his notice of motion,
awarding him reimbursement of $12,233.
Whether to modify child support is within the broad discretion of the district court.
Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. App. 2017). A district court has discretion
to set the effective date of a childcare-support modification. Finch v. Marusich ,
457 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. App. 1990 ). “A modification of support is generally
retroactive to the date the moving party served notice of the motion on the responding
party.” Bormann v. Bormann, 644 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. App. 2002) (emphasis added).
However, under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 7 (2018), “[c]hild care support must be based
on the actual child care expenses. The court may provide that a decrease in the amount of
the child care based on a decreas e in the actual child care expenses is effective as of the
date the expense is decreased.” (Emphasis added.)

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The record indicates that the distri ct court considered granting husband
reimbursement back to 2014. It declined to do so, because the district court determined
that husband knew that wife was not incurring childcare expenses at that time, and thus it
would be inequitable to order her to re pay the entire amount now when it would be
financially difficult for her to do so. Because the statute uses the permissive word “may,”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd . 7, the district court ha s discretion to modify a
childcare-support obligation back to the date wife stoppe d incurring childcare expenses,
but it is not required to do so. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2018) (“‘May’ is
permissive.”).
While we may have imposed a different effective date for the modification, in light
of the various equitable factors considered by the district court—including the amount of
time and expense wife incurred caring for the pa rties’ children—the district court did not
abuse its discretion by declining to make its childcare-modification order retroactive to the
date wife stopped incurring the actual expense. See Bauerly v. Bauerly, 765 N.W.2d 108,
111-12 (Minn. App. 2009) (rema nding childcare overpayment i ssue back to the district
court to weigh the equities rega rding mother’s financial hardsh ip and father’s desire for
compensation and make appropriate findings).
III. The district court properly analyzed husband’s motion for increased parenting
time.

Husband argues that the district court faile d to make adequate findings of fact to
support its partial denial of his motion for increased parenting time and failed to consider
the expert affidavit he submitted in support of his motion. The district court has broad

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discretion in deciding parenting-time questions and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d at 75. We address each of husband’s arguments in turn.
Findings of Fact
Husband first argues that the district cour t failed to make the statutorily required
findings when deciding his motion for increas ed parenting time. Husband moved the
district court to modify his parenting-time schedule for the two youngest children by adding
Sunday nights to his alternating weekends and every We dnesday, instead of every-other
Wednesday. In the alternative, he requested that the district court implement a 5-2-2-5
parenting-time schedule. The district court granted husband’s request to add every-other
Sunday night and denied his request to add the additional Wednesday, but did not explicitly
address his request to switch to a 5-2-2-5 schedule.
A district court is required to “make detailed findings on each of the [best-interests]
factors in paragraph (a) based on the evidence presented and explain how each factor led
to its conclusions and to the determinatio n of custody and parenting time.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1) (2018). Here, the district court analyzed each factor set forth
in section 518.17, subdivision 1(a) (2018) and explained wh y the factor supported its
conclusion to add only the alternating Sunday night.
The district court found th at adding only the additiona l Sunday night maximizes
parenting time with both parents while avoiding wife’s concerns that it would add to the
children’s transitions between homes. And while the distri ct court did not explicitly
address husband’s request for a 5-2-2-5 schedule, appellate courts treat a district court’s
silence on a motion as an implicit denial. Anderson v. Anderson , 897 N.W.2d 828, 832

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(Minn. App. 2017), review granted (Minn. Aug. 22, 2017) and appeal dismissed (Minn.
Jan. 30, 2018).
Husband’s reliance on In re Custody of M.J.H. for the proposition that remand is
required when a district court fails to consid er an alternative parenting-time modification
request does not persuade us otherwise. 899 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. App. 2017), rev’d on
other grounds 913 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 2018). In M.J.H. the father alternatively requested
to increase his parenting time, and this co urt remanded the parenting-time issue because
the district court neither specifically addre ssed the father’s alternative request nor made
sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interests. Id. at 575, 580-81.
Unlike in M.J.H., here, the district court analyzed all of the statutory best-interests
factors and stated why they supported the district court’s conclusion. Therefore, the district
court complied with Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1) by making the necessary findings
to demonstrate why adding only the alternati ng Sunday night is in the children’s best
interests.
Expert Affidavit
Finally, husband argues that the distri ct court abused its discretion by not
considering the expert affidavit he submitte d in support of his motion to modify his
parenting time. But evidentia ry rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. App. 2009), and the only authority provided
by husband in support of his assertion that th e district court was required to consider his
expert’s affidavit is an unpublished opinion, which is distinguishable in addition to lacking
precedential authority. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

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The district court acted within its broad discretion when it did not consider the expert
report. The district court explained that it re viewed husband’s expert’s affidavit, but did
not rely on the report in making its findings and conclusions. Because father does not point
to any authority requiring a district court to consider expert test imony when deciding a
motion to modify a parenting-time schedule, th e district court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to rely on the affidavit in its findings.
Affirmed.