State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0292

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric Thomas Grondahl,
Appellant.

Filed January 13, 2020
Affirmed
Randall, Judge*

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-18-2042

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jonathan D. Holets, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
Appellant Eric Thomas Grondahl argues that his guilty plea to first-degree burglary
of an occupied dwelling is inaccurate and therefore invalid because a secured laundry room
in an apartment building is not a “dwelling” under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (2018).
We affirm.
FACTS
On July 14, 2018, the Duluth Police Department arrest ed Grondahl for the June 4,
2018 burglary of three apartment buildings in Duluth. The incidents happened in close
proximity to each other, and in all three the burglar used a tool to open secured doors and
washer and dryer coin boxes. The Duluth Police Department analyzed one of the apartment
complex’s surveillance videos and immediately recognized Grondahl as the perpetrator.
The apartment management company believe d the burglar stole about $200.00 from the
three apartment complexes. The state charged Grondahl with one count of first -degree
burglary of an occupied dwelling.
Grondahl pleaded guilty on October 18, 2018. After viewing the surveillance video,
he testified that he was, “100 percent aware that it’s me” in the video, even though he had
no recollection of the incident because he was high on methamphetamine.1 Grondahl also

1 Appellant labels this a “ Norgaard-esque plea” because he has no recollection of the
offense, but the district court did not explicitly label it a Norgaard plea. See State v.
Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015) (“A defendant enters a Norgaard plea
if he claims a loss of memory, through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances
of the offense but the record establishes the defendant is guilty or likely to be conviction
of the crime charged.” (quotation omitted)). We do not review the Norgaard elements

3
testified that he did not believe that he had anyone’s consent to be there , that he had the
intent to steal money from the laun dry machines and , that he did, in fact, steal $200 in
coins. Finally, the prosecutor asked Grondahl, “And this is a multi-unit apartment building,
and, so, you are confident that the building was occupied at the time you were there?”
Grondahl answered, “I can only assume so, yes.”
On November 16, 2018, Grondahl filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The
memorandum in support of his motion states that he wished to withdraw the plea because
“it is the position of the [appellant] that he has a credib le defense to these charges.”
Grondahl argued at the November 19, 2018 sentencing hearing that “he didn’t do it based
on the definition of the law.” There was clear confusion at the hearing about Grondahl’s
legal claim. Grondahl ’s attorney stated “He te lls me he is not culpable under the law. I
guess he’s claiming that I didn’t give him the proper law to make his plea determination
prior to his plea.” The judge responded, “That still doesn’t tell me what his defense is. Is
he claiming that he wasn’t c apable, or that he wasn’t there, or that it wasn’t him in the
video? What exactly is it that is his defense?” Grondahl’s attorney responded, “I have
not—I can’t tell you anything more than what I’ve told you, Your Honor. I —he hasn’t
said any of those things to me.” The district court rejected Grondahl’s motion and stated:
I’m not hearing anything today that would indicate that there
is some defense, other than the bald statement that there is a
defense. The testimony at the plea hearing was clear that Mr.
Grondahl reviewed the video and was 100 percent sure that it
was him . . . . I can find nothing that would support the standard

because appellant is only challenging the interpretation of the statute, not whether appellant
testified about sufficient facts.

4
that’s required in order to withdraw the plea at this time, or to
make it fair and just to do so.

The district court denied the motion. Grondahl did not provide the court with a sufficient
basis to withdraw the plea. Grondahl stated on allocution that:
The reason I had brought the, asked [my attorney] to bring the
motion is after studying the elements involved in First D egree
Occupied Burglary, in the second element it says that
somebody who enters a building open to the general public
does so with consent. And after reading the status of burglary
being that a person enters a building without consent, that was
why, the reason I had asked him to bring that up in front of the
Court.

The district court sentenced Grondahl to forty-four months’ imprisonment. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by rejecting Grondahl’s motion because sufficient
facts support ed Grondahl’s plea. T he locked laundry room is considered a
dwelling under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a).

Grondahl argues that the distr ict court erred by not withdrawing his guilty plea
because the plea was not accurate. The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law which
appellate courts review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “The
court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to
the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “Manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent, and thus the plea may be withdrawn.” Perkins v. State , 559
N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). Pleas must be accurate to protect defendants from pleading
to more serious offenses than they could be convicted for at trial. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at

5
94. “The court should not accept the plea unless the record support s the conclusion that
the defendant actually committed an offense at least as serious as the crime to which he is
pleading guilty.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251-52 (Minn. 1983).
The only issue on appeal is whether the apartment building’s secured laundry room
can be considered a “dwelling” under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a). The statute defines
first-degree burglary as entering a building without consent with both the intent to commit
a crime and “the building is a dwelling and another person, not an accomplice, is present
in it when the burglar enters or at any time while the burglar is in the building . . . .” Minn.
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a). The statute defines a “building” as “a structure suitable for
affording shelter for human being s including any appurtenant or connected structure.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.581, subd. 2 (2018). A “dwelling” is “a building used as a permanent or
temporary residence.” Id. at subd. 3. Statutory interpretation is a question of law which
this court reviews de novo. State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015).
Grondahl argues that the laundry room is not a “dwelling” because it is not used as
a residence and because the apartment units, which are dwellings, have their own l ocks
which make them all individual buildings. The laundry room, Grondahl argues, is also its
own individually secured building. Grondahl relies on State v. Johnson to support this
theory. 679 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004). In
Johnson, this court concluded that the facts were insufficient to support the defendant’s
first-degree burglary conviction because even though his consent to be in the bedroom was
revoked, he still had consent to be in other areas of the apartme nt, which were part of the
same “building.” Id. at 386. The court did not consider the bedroom a self-contained unit.

6
Id. Grondahl extrapolates this opinion to mean that self -contained areas are always
considered individual buil dings and can never be c onsidered as one collective building.
Following this logic, Grondahl argues that the laundry room is its own self -contained
building, distinct from the collective apartment complex building. This interpretation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) throug h Johnson implies that any locked bathroom or
closet would be viewed a s a separate building under the statute. This theory of statutory
interpretation is ruled out. I t creates an absurd result. See State v. Selseth , 933 N.W.2d
541, 544 (Minn. App. 2019).
Even if the laundry room is considered a separate building, caselaw provides that it
may also be a dwelling appurtenant to an apartment unit. State v. Hendrickson, 528
N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. App. 1995). Finally, Grondahl references many cases to support
his theory that a structure is only appurtenant if it provides access to the dwelling.
Henderickson rejects this notion, providing that, “ [a]lthough entry of a dwelling is an
element of the offense, there is no authority for dividing the dwelling, or separating it from
its adjacent structures, for purposes of the burglary statute.” Id. Here, the multi -unit
apartment complex contained both the laundry room and appurtenant dwellings.
Caselaw establishes that areas appurtenant to a dwell ing are part of the dwelling.
Here, the laundry room is appurtenant to the apartment units of the complex. The room
was locked and not open to the public. The locked laundry room is a “dwelling” under the
first-degree burglary statute. Grondahl’s guilty plea to burglary was accurate.
Affirmed.