In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0299

In re the Marriage of:

Christina L. Suhsen, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Karl W. Suhsen,
Appellant.

Filed February 18, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-16-1893

Mary L. Hahn, Jacqueline A. Dorsey, Hvis tendahl, Moersch, Dorsey & Hahn, P.A.,
Northfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

M. Sue Wilson, James R. Todd, M. Sue Wilson Law Offices, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pr esiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this marital dissolution dispute, appe llant-husband Karl W. Suhsen argues that
the district court abused its discretion by (1) awarding $2,500 in monthly permanent

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spousal maintenance to respondent-wife Christina L. Su hsen, (2) ordering husband to
maintain an annuity survivorship benefit for wife, (3) requiring husband to maintain a life-
insurance policy with wife as the beneficiary, (4) assigning 75% of the marital debt to
husband, and (5) declining to consider the in come-tax consequences when apportioning
husband’s personal-injury award. Because the di strict court’s findings are insufficient to
allow for effective appellate review of the spousal-maintenance award, we reverse and
remand on that issue. On all other issues, we affirm.
FACTS
Husband and wife married in 1990 and re mained married for over 25 years before
wife filed a dissolution petition on July 13, 2016 . Husband is 52 years old, and wife is 51
years old. They have two children, ages 15 and 18.
During their marriage, husband worked as an air traffi c controller for the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), where he was employed for about 19 years. When the
dissolution action commenced, his income was $15,100 per month, or $181,200 per year.
Wife worked as an elementary school teac her at the beginning of the marriage before
leaving the workforce when the parties’ daughter was born in 2001. She then cared for the
children for the next 16 years. The parties’ younger child has specia l needs and requires
full-time care and supervision.
In May 2016, a few months before the dissolution action commenced, husband was
injured in an automobile accident. Due to his consequent use of disqualifying medications,
he lost the medical certification required to work as an air traffic controller. This change in
husband’s employment status led to prolonged dissolution proceedings, as it was initially

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unclear whether he woul d qualify for disability or early-re tirement benefits available to
federal employees. This uncerta inty, in part, led to multiple evidentia ry hearings and
resulted in the district court issuing (1) a partial decree on November 28, 2017; (2) a final
decree on August 9, 2018; and (3) an amended final decree on December 21, 2018.
August 2017 trial and resulting partial decree
The district court held a trial on the financial issues1 in this case on August 15, 16,
and 21, 2017. Five witnesses testified: wife, husband, John Mandt, Johanna Clyborne, and
Justin King. Mandt, a financial advisor, te stified as an expert in “estimat[ing] an
individual’s projected federal benefits.” Clyborne, an attorney and brigadier general in the
Minnesota National Guard, testified as an expert on Federal Employees Retirement
Systems (FERS) issues. King, a rehabilita tion psychologist, tes tified regarding the
vocational evaluation he conducted on wife.
Following the trial, the district court issued a partial decree on November 28, 2017.
The partial decree decided many of the financial issues, including the division of financial
accounts, marital debt, vehicles, and personal pr operty. The district court found that the
parties’ marital debt totaled about $60,468. It decided that it was fair and equitable to
allocate 75% of the marital debt to husband a nd 25% to wife. It also divided the marital
financial accounts, which totaled $6,481,2 by allocating 75% to husband and 25% to wife.

1 The matter was bifurcated into financial i ssues and child-custody issues. This appeal
involves only financial issues.

2 This total excludes the parties’ savings accounts for their children, which the district court
ordered be held in husband’s name but disbursed only by agreement of both parents or by
court order.

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The district court found that husband had a pending personal-injury claim related to
his automobile accident and that he had re fused to provide any information about it,
“clearly . . . hiding the claim from discovery a nd at trial.” The district court decided that,
“[s]ince [husband] was not forthcoming,” wife would be awarded 50 % of all recoveries
made by husband in connection with the accident. The court later revised this award in the
amended final decree, discussed below.
The partial decree also orders that husband pay wife $2,000 per month in temporary
spousal maintenance. The district court found that wife was currently unemployed but was
considering returning to teachin g, that she was presently able to earn $2,000 per month,
and that she has the capacity to earn up to $3,000 per month if fully employed. The partial
decree contains no findings as to the parties’ reasonable monthly expenses.
The partial decree reserved the issues of permanent spousal maintenance, child
support, and distribution of husband’s FERS pension accoun t because, when the partial
decree was issued, it was unclear how long husband could remain employed by the FAA,
given his injury from the automobile accident . At the time of tria l, he was exhausting
available leave, receiving a smaller payc heck, and had applied for FERS “disability
retirement” benefits. The fo llowing information regardin g FERS disability retirement
benefits was presented at trial.
Mandt testified that husband would likely qualify for FERS disability retirement, as
opposed to deferred retirement or eligible retirement.3 Under FERS disability retirement, a

3 Husband was unlikely to qua lify for the other types of re tirement because he had not
accumulated enough “good tim e.” “Good time” generally means time controlling air

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recipient receives an annuity th at is computed based on the recipient’s age and length of
service. If husband were to qualify for disa bility retirement, Mandt testified, he would
receive an annuity equal to 60 % of his high three-year aver age (less any social security
benefits he received) for the first twelve months. After the firs t twelve months, and
continuing until he reached age 62, he would receive 40% of his high three-year average.
At age 62—eligible retirement age—his annuity would be recomputed based on his actual
service plus the service he would have co mpleted had he worked until retirement age.
Mandt estimated, based on factors including husband’s age, years of service, and high-
three income, that husband’s FERS disability retirement annuity (1 ) would be $106,150
gross during the first twelve months, (2) woul d decrease to $64,684 gross after the first
twelve months and remain at that amount un til he reached age 62, and (3) would rise to
$89,845 gross once he reached age 62.
Clyborne testified regardi ng ways that the district court could elect to treat
husband’s FERS annuity for the purposes of equitable distribution. She presented and
explained a sample court order acceptable for processing (COAP) that she had drafted for
the case—similar to a qualified domestic relations order—which directs the federal office
of personal management (OPM) regardi ng how husband’s FERS annuity (whether
disability or retirement) should be allocated between the parties, if he qualified for it. She

traffic, which he could no longer do since he lacked the requisite medical certification. He
would have been eligible for retirement in May or April of 2018 had he been able to keep
working or to use his available leave until that time, but his leave was almost exhausted at
the time of the trial.

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also testified that the district court could treat the FERS account as e ither an asset or an
income stream and explained the effects of either choice on the dissolution proceedings.
Based on this information, the district c ourt decided in the partial decree that, if
husband were to receive retirement benefits out of the FERS account, they would be
considered an asset. But, if he were to receive disability benefits out of the FERS account,
they would be considered an income stream. Neither part y contests this designation on
appeal.4
March 2, 2018 evidentiary hearing and resulting final decree
On December 28, 2017, husband filed a moti on for amended findings, a new trial,
and modification of spousal maintenance. As to spousal maintenance, he claimed that he
was unable to pay any because, beginning on January 1, 2018, the only income he would
receive was $264.02 a month in VA benefits. On January 29, 2018, the district court denied
husband’s motion to amend the findings, reserved the motion for a new trial, and suspended
husband’s temporary spousal-maintenance requirement in light of his alleged inability to
pay.
On March 2, 2018, the district court held an evidentiary hear ing to discuss the
equitable division of husband’s FERS disability retirement benefits, although husband still
did not know whether he had qualified for disability retire ment. He had applied for and

4 Wife argued in the district court that the FERS disability annuity should be treated as an
asset as well, while husband wanted it treated as income. According to Clyborne, treating
both the disability and retirement payments out of the account as an asset is the “preferred
way to do it.”

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been denied social security disability benefits, but FERS disability retirement benefits
relate more specifically to the ability to do the job of an air traffic controller.
Clyborne testified again at this hearing and provided a revised draft COAP that
accounted for the district court’s decision to treat FERS retirement benefits as an asset and
FERS disability benefits as in come. She testified regarding the need for husband to elect
and maintain an annuity survi vor benefit for wife should he receive payments out of the
FERS account, as the payouts would otherwise cease if husband died . Clyborne also
explained the need for husband to maintain an existing Federal Employee’s Group Life
Insurance (FEGLI) policy with wife as the beneficiary. Clyborne testified that the FEGLI
policy protects wife’s marital share of the FERS account by covering the “gray period” that
could potentially occur if husband was ne ither considered employed by OPM nor
considered an annuitant for retirement purposes.
On August 9, 2018, the district court issued a final decree. The final decree dissolved
the marriage; provided a method for distributi on of husband’s FERS retirement benefits
upon husband’s retirement; provided for dist ribution of spousal ma intenance and child
support to wife if husband r eceives FERS disability benefits ; directed that, if husband
receives FERS disability benefits, he sha ll elect and maintain the maximum possible
annuity survivorship benefit for wife; and directed that husband maintain the FEGLI policy
with wife as the beneficiary. The final decree reserved the amount of spousal maintenance
and the distribution of proceeds from husband’s personal-injury claim, still pending at that
time.

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On August 14, the district court issu ed a corresponding FE RS annuity COAP
directing OPM to act in a manner consistent with the final decree.
October and November 2018 hearings and resulting amended final decree
In October 2018, wife received informati on that husband had qualified for FERS
disability retirement and that he had settled his personal-injury case. She accordingly filed
a motion requesting that the district court de termine spousal maintenance, calculate child
support, and determine the distribution of proceeds from husband’s personal-injury award.
The district court held a hearing on Octo ber 30, 2018, to discuss the now-concrete
FERS disability retirement annuity and personal-injury award. At this hearing, wife asked
that the temporary spousal maintenance award be reinstated retroactive to January 1, 2018,
because husband’s new attorney (his third in these proceedings) had sent wife’s counsel a
statement that reported the commencement date for husband’s FERS disability annuity as
February 6, 2018. Husband’s counsel argued in response (and husband himself testified at
the next hearing) that husband did not actually receive the first payment until June 2018.5
The matter was left unresolved, and the district court eventually continued the hearing until
November 30, 2018, because the parties did not have a breakdown of the personal-injury

5 This claim raises some concern, as husband apparently never advised the district court of
the June annuity payment because the final de cree was issued August 9, 2018, and states
that husband still did not know whether his FERS disability retirement application was
granted. Wife pointed out this inconsistency between the August 9, 2018 final decree and
husband’s actual knowledge at the November 30 hearing, accusing husband of committing
fraud on the court.

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award, making it impossible to determine what portion of the award was subject to division
as marital property.
At the November 30 hearing, the distri ct court heard arguments regarding the
appropriate amount of spousal maintenance, wife’s request for attorney fees, and the
distribution of the marital portion of the personal-injury award.
The district court issued an amended final decree on December 21, 2018. The
amended final decree ordered $2,500 in monthly permanent spousal maintenance to wife,
denied wife’s request for attorney fees,6 and awarded wife 40% of the portion of husband’s
personal-injury award that is for lost wages. It specifies that the net amount of the personal-
injury award is $252,260, and 91.69% of that is for lost wages, so wife’s share is $92,519.
Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Husband challenges the amended final decr ee on five grounds. He argues that the
district court abused its discretion by (1) awarding $2,500 in mont hly permanent spousal
maintenance to wife, (2) ordering him to maintain an annuity survivorship benefit for wife,
(3) requiring him to maintain a life-insurance policy with wife as the beneficiary,
(4) assigning him 75% of the marital debt, a nd (5) declining to consider the income-tax
consequences when apportioning husband’s personal-injury award.

6 In denying the request, the district court found that “the amount of attorneys fees incurred
by both parties are extremely high in view of the issues. Both sides were each responsible
for the high fees and have acted unreasonably in the course of this case.”

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As an initial matter, wife ar gues that the first, second, th ird, and fifth issues fall
outside this court’s scope of review because husband failed to bring a motion for amended
findings or for a new trial with respect to these issues. When a party does not bring a motion
for a new trial or amended findings, appellate review is limited to substantive legal issues
properly raised to and considered by the district court, as well as to whether the evidence
supports the court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law. Alpha Real Estate Co. v. Delta Dental Plan, 664 N.W.2d 303, 308-09,
311 (Minn. 2003); Gruenhagen v. Larson , 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 1976). We
conclude that, for the most part, the issues ra ised by husband can be reviewed within this
narrow scope, as his arguments primarily concern whether the district court’s conclusions
are supported by adequate findings. We review each issue in turn.
I. The district court’s findings are insuffi cient to allow for effective appellate
review of the spousal-maintenance award.

Husband’s first challenge is to the district court’s award of spousal maintenance. A
district court abuses its discretion regarding spousal maintenance if its findings of fact are
unsupported by the record, if it improperly applies the law, or if it resolves the question in
a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d
199, 202 & n.3 (Minn. 1997) (citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)).
“A district court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact
and is not set aside unl ess clearly erroneous.” Peterka v. Peterka , 675 N.W.2d 353, 357
(Minn. App. 2004).

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“Maintenance” is statutorily defined as “a n award made in a di ssolution or legal
separation proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for
the support and maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2018).
“Income” is defined by reference to “gross income” in Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2018),
which includes “any form of periodic payment to an individual, including, but not limited
to, salaries, wages, commissions, . . . work ers’ compensation, unemployment benefits,
annuity payments, . . . pensio n and disability payments, . . . and potential income under
section 518A.32.” See Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 635 n.5 (Minn. 2009).
A district court may order spousal maintenance if it finds that the spouse requesting
it lacks sufficient means to pr ovide for their reasonable needs or is unable to provide
adequate self-support. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a)-(b) (2018); see Lyon v. Lyon, 439
N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989) (stating that an award of maintenance requires a showing of
need). If the movant proves need, the district c ourt must then consider various factors to
determine the amount and duration of maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018).
The statute provides eight non-exclusive factors:
(a) the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to the
party, and the party’s ability to meet needs independently,
including the extent to which a provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment, and the probability, given the party’s
age and skills, of completing education or training and
becoming fully or partially self-supporting;
(c) the standard of livi ng established during the
marriage;

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(d) the duration of the marriage and, in the case of a
homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the
extent to which any education, skills, or experience have
become outmoded and earning capacity has become
permanently diminished;
(e) the loss of earnings, seniority, retirement benefits,
and other employment opportuni ties forgone by the spouse
seeking spousal maintenance;
(f) the age, and the physical and emotional condition of
the spouse seeking maintenance;
(g) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is
sought to meet needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(h) the contribution of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in the amount or
value of the marital property, as well as the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or in furtherance of the other party’s
employment or business.

Id. “No single statutory factor is controlling and each case must be determined on its own
facts.” Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. App. 1989). Either party may move the
district court for an order modifying a pe rmanent maintenance obligation. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 1 (2018); Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 359.
Husband does not argue that wife failed to prove a need fo r permanent spousal
maintenance. Rather, he argues that the dist rict court abused its discretion by ordering
maintenance in the amount of $2,500 becaus e (1) the amount is unreasonably high and
(2) the district court failed to consider th e required statutory fact ors under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2—specifically, the factor re garding husband’s ability to pay. We begin
with whether the district court failed to cons ider relevant statutory factors for setting a
maintenance obligation.

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Husband emphasizes that the district court made no findings regarding either party’s
monthly expenses, how those expenses compare to the marital standard of living, and,
“most importantly,” husband’s ability to pay maintenance wh ile meeting his own needs.
Wife concedes that the distri ct court did not include specif ic findings on each of the
statutory factors but contends that this was not reversible error. She argues that detailed
findings were unnecessary because husband “stipulated” to paying $2,000 in maintenance
and the evidence in the record supports the maintenance award.
We note that, while the district court did find that husband “agreed” to pay $2,000
in monthly spousal maintenance, such agreement cannot be characterized a stipulation. The
district court’s finding appears to be based so lely on a comment that husband’s attorney
made at the October 30 hearing. The agreement was never reduced to writing or signed by
the parties, and, on appeal, husband argues that his attorney’s statement of that number was
a mistake. We thus decline to give the purported agreement the weight that wife argues is
due.
We return to the ab sent findings. In Stich v. Stich , the supreme court held that a
district court’s findings were insufficient to allow for effective appellate review of a
spousal maintenance award and remanded the case to the district court. 435 N.W.2d 52
(Minn. 1989). The supreme court explained th at “[e]ffective appellate review of the
exercise of [the district court’s] discretion is possible only when the [district] court has
issued sufficiently detailed findings of fact to demonstrate its consideration of all factors
relevant to an award of pe rmanent spousal maintenance.” Id. at 53. It remanded the case
because, although “[t]he [district] court did make findings with regard to the parties’

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income,” it “made no findings as to their separate expenses. Moreover, it made no specific
finding with regard to [husband’s] financial ability to provide maintenance.” Id. In Peterka,
this court stated that “[a] finding of a mainte nance obligor’s ability to pay maintenance is
required to support an award of maintenance.” 675 N.W.2d at 358.
As in Stich and Peterka, the district court here did not make findings regarding the
parties’ separate expenses or the maintenance obligor’s ab ility to pay while meeting his
own needs. Without these findings, we cannot effectively review whether the evidence
supports the court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions of law. We accordingly reverse and remand the case to the district court on the
issue of spousal maintenance. The district court may reopen the record at its discretion.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering husband to elect and
maintain the FERS annuity survivorship benefit for wife.

Minnesota law specifically gran ts authority to the courts to award all or part of a
survivor benefit to a former spouse, unless su ch is prohibited by the pension plan. Minn.
Stat. § 518.581, subd. 1 (2018). The statute states:
If a current or former employee’ s marriage is dissolved, the
court may order the employee, the employee’s pension plan, or
both, to pay amounts as part of the division of pension rights
that the court may make under s ection 518.58, or as an award
of maintenance in the form of a percentage of periodic or other
payments or in the form of a fixed dollar amount. The court
may, as part of the order, award a former spouse all or part of
a survivor benefit unless the pl an does not allow by law the
payment of a surviving spouse benefit to a former spouse.

Id.

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Husband’s argument against the survivor a nnuity benefit is not entirely clear and
seemed to change between his principal brief, reply brief, and oral argument. It appears,
though, that he believes the district court a bused its discretion by or dering him, and not
wife, to bear the cost of maintaining the survivor annuity from his disability benefits.
Husband first appears to contend that, because the district court classified his FERS
disability benefit as income, and survivor benefits are “property assets to be divided,” the
requirement that he maintain the survivor annuity “at a cost [to him] of at least 5% of his
gross [disability] annuity paym ent” effectively divides his income as property. And
something cannot be simultaneously treated as both income and property. See Kruschel v.
Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn. App. 1988).
This argument lacks legal su pport. Husband cites no ap posite authority for the
proposition that a survivor bene fit is an “asset to be divide d”; he merely includes a “ see,
e.g.,” citation to Minn. Stat. § 518.581. The stat ute defines “surviving spouse benefit” as
“(1) a benefit a surviving spouse may be e ligible for under the la ws and bylaws of the
pension plan if the employee di es before retirement,” or “(2) a benefit selected for or
available to a survivin g spouse under the laws and bylaws of the pension plan upon the
death of the employee after retirement.” Minn. Stat. § 518.581, subd. 4 (2018). Rather than
being an “asset to be divided,” the surviving-spouse benefit instead appears to be a means
of securing an asset. A requirement that a party provide security against nonpayment of the
property settlement is “an inherent part of the property division.” Landwehr v. Landwehr,
380 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Minn. App. 1985). At the March 2, 2018 evidentiary hearing,

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Clyborne testified about the importance of the survivor annuity for this purpose. She
explained:
[T]he reason for [the survivor annuity] . . . is that upon
dissolution of marriage Ms. Suhsen would become a former
spouse. Retirement payout stop s when the employee or the
retiree dies, and so in order to ensure that the marital share of
income stream still continues, y ou have to have the survivor
benefit annuity in order to ensu re that the mar ital share still
continues to be paid out.

Husband offered no testimony to rebut that of Clyborne. He did not raise an argument to
the district court about the survivor annuity causing “income [to] be divided as property.”
He has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by ordering this election.
Husband next contends that the district court issued conflicting orders regarding the
survivor benefit. He points to the language in the amended final decree that states: “[Wife]
is awarded the maximum possible annuity/survivorship rights available to a former spouse
and [husband] shall timely ma ke all necessary elections to establish and sustain the
surviving spouse coverage for [wife] as former spouse.” He contrasts this with the language
in the earlier COAP that states: “The costs associated with providing this surviving spouse
annuity coverage shall be divided equally between the Employee and the Former Spouse.”
We discern no conflict between these two or ders, though, as the first merely says
that husband must make the election and does not discuss cost sharing. It appears that
husband’s underlying concern here, as expressed at oral arguments, is that the district court
never devised a mechanism for him and wife to share the cost of electing the survivor
benefit. But husband did not br ing a motion for a new trial or amended findings on this

17
issue, and, within the scope of review appl icable in that circumstance, we discern no
reversible error because no substantive legal issues were properly presented to the district
court on the question, the evid ence supports the court’s findi ngs of fact, and the findings
of fact support the conclusions of law. See Brooks, 481 N.W.2d at 124. We conclude that
the evidence supports the district court’s order that husband maintain the survivor annuity.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring husband to maintain
the FEGLI policy with wife as the named beneficiary.

Husband next argues that the district court’s order that he maintain a FEGLI policy
was an abuse of discretion because it is duplicative of the requirement that he maintain the
FERS survivor annuity benefit.
District courts have broad discretion to consider whether the circumstances justify
securing either a property award or spousal maintenance with a life-insurance obligation.
See Laumann v. Laumann, 400 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. App. 1987) (“The [district] court
has discretion to consider whether the circum stances justifying an award of maintenance
also justify securing it with life insurance.”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987);
Landwehr, 380 N.W.2d at 140 (noting that a requi rement that a party provide security
against nonpayment of the property settlement is “an inherent part of the property
division”). As to securing maintenance obliga tions with life insuran ce, courts assess the
effect of a loss of maintenance on a mainte nance obligee’s ability to self-support when
determining whether to require security. See Kampf v. Kampf , 732 N.W.2d 630, 635-36
(Minn. App. 2007) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by not requiring life
insurance to secure maintena nce for a 52-year old obligee with a high-school degree,

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limited work experience, and expected income of $14,872 per year), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 21, 2007).
Husband’s argument is that maintainin g the FEGLI policy is duplicative of
maintaining the FERS survivor annuity. The district court was presented with the issue of
whether the two were duplica tive at multiple junctures and decided that they were not.
Clyborne testified about the di stinction between the two at the March 2, 2018 hearing,
explaining that the FEGLI polic y covers the “gray period” that would occur if husband
died while he was not considered employed by OPM and not considered an annuitant for
retirement purposes. This gray period could occur because OPM does not view
qualification for disability benefits as long term; it requires annual recertification. The idea,
Clyborne explained, is that the medical condition could ch ange and the r ecipient could
return to work with the federal government or elsewhere. This means that husband could
become decertified and stop receiving the FERS disability annuity. If he is not yet eligible
for retirement, Clyborne explained, “then there’s no survivor benefit. And so if they don’t
get to the retirement piece, the marital shar e disappears, even though they would have
gotten there had they lived long enough to ge t to the age where th ey can collect the
retirement.”
At the November 30, 2018 hearing, the need for the FEGLI policy came up again.
Husband had stopped paying for FEGLI b ecause he thought it had been rendered
unnecessary once he qualified fo r FERS disability and elected the survivor benefit. After
hearing testimony from husband, the district c ourt asked for clarification as to why, “ if
[husband] has full survivor benefits, [there would] be a need for FEGLI?” Wife’s attorney

19
informed the court that she would review the testimony in the record on the matter and get
the district court that information. The distri ct court agreed to allow the parties to make
submissions on the matter in li ght of husband’s testimony. On December 1, 2018, wife
accordingly filed “Petitioner’s Letter Brief Submission Following Court Hearing Dated
November 30, 2018.” The letter referred to Clyborne’s March 2 testimony about the need
for FEGLI, stating that “[i]t is not certain wh ether [husband] will retain disability status
from year to year. If there is a gap in time between disability retirement and non-disability
retirement, and if [husband] were to die during that time, [wife] would have zero protection
other than FEGLI.”
The amended final decree, issued about a month later, states in regards to FEGLI:
OPM will only honor a court order that includes former spouse
survivor annuity protection for an individual classified as an
active employee or a retiree. This leaves the possibility of lost
survivorship benefit during any period when [husband] leaves
Civil Service employment and dies before retirement or
disability. To prevent the loss of benefit and loss of [wife]’s
interest in marital property, [h usband] shall name [wife] as
beneficiary of FEGLI . . . .

The amended final decree then includes language that was not present in the final decree
about how husband discontinued the life insurance policy and orders him to reinstate it.
The district court considered husba nd’s argument that the FEGLI policy was
unnecessary before ordering it in the amende d final decree. Accord ing to Clyborne’s
testimony, the FEGLI policy covers a specific situation not covere d by the survivor
annuity. And it is not entirely im probable that the specific situation could arise. Husband
must reapply annually for FERS disability benefits, and he has been deemed “disabled” in

20
a rather narrow sense, as the certification only applies to his ability to do the job of an air
traffic controller. In fact, the ev idence shows that he applied for social security disability
benefits and was denied, and the district court found that “[i]t would appear that [husband]
is capable of finding other employment, if necessary.” The district court found Clyborne’s
testimony credible, and husband presented no ev idence to refute it. Based on this record,
the district court acted within its discretion by requiring the FEGLI policy to protect wife’s
marital share of the FERS account.
IV. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by assigning husband 75% of the
marital debt.

A district court must “make a just and equ itable division of the marital property.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2018). Marita l debts are apportionable as property. Filkins
v. Filkins , 347 N.W.2d 526, 529 (M inn. App. 1984). A dist ribution need not be
“mathematically equal” to be equitable. Justis v. Justis, 384 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. App.
1986), review denied (Minn. May 29, 1986). The distri ct court’s decision on distribution
of marital property is afford ed “broad discretion” and an appellate court will affirm the
property division “if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle,” even if it might have
done it differently. Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002).
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by assigning 75% of the
marital debt to him and 25% to wife. He argue s that the district court erred by failing to
explain why it found that this division was “fair and equitable.” The district court assigned
the debt in the partial decree, and its deci sion appears identically in the amended final
decree.

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Wife argues that the district court did not err and that this case is analogous to Justis.
In Justis, this court held:
While the [district] court did not make an express finding that
it was awarding a disproportionate share of the marital property
to respondent, we find, in reviewing the judgment and decree,
that the court made the findings required by Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58 as well as findings that justify the disproportionate
division.

384 N.W.2d at 888. This court decided that the unequal distribution ($131,516 in marital
assets to the wife, $115,593 in marital assets to the husband, and the entire $30,000 of the
marital debt to the husband) was equitable as supported by the record because the evidence
showed that the wife’s vocati onal skills were outmoded, her license was out of date, and
she had been out of the workforce for many years. Id. at 887-88. Add itionally, she had
received a homestead that was in need of repairs, was the custodian of five young children,
was unable to work for the imme diate future, and received al most no liquid assets in the
property division. Id. at 888. The husband, on the othe r hand, was “in a better position to
acquire future capital assets.” Id.
Here, the district court found that wife had been out of the workforce for over 16
years caring for the parties’ children—one of whom has sp ecial needs and requires full-
time care—and that she would ne ed time to gain suitable em ployment. Wife testified at
trial about her return to substitute teaching, her efforts to reinstate her teaching license, and
the numerous applications sh e had submitted to various po sitions. The district court
initially found her current earning capacity wa s $2,000 per month and found that, if fully
employed, she could earn up to $3,000 per m onth. It found that husband’s income, based

22
on full-time work as an air traffic controller, was $15,100 per month, or $181,200 per year.
At the time of the trial and when the partia l decree was issued, it was unclear whether
husband would be able to remain employed by the FAA, but the distri ct court found that
“[i]t would appear that [husband] is capable of finding other employment, if necessary.”
The district court updated its findings on the parties’ employment in the amended
final decree to reflect that wife was currently working two different part-time jobs. It found
that her earnings were $2,289.77 per month a nd her earning capacity, if she were fully
employed, remained at $3,000. It found that husband was receiving a gross monthly FERS
annuity payment of $7,989 per month and maintained that he was capable of finding other
employment.
The findings on the parties’ earning capacity suggest that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by assigning husband a greater share of the marital debt. Though neither
party is in an ideal position to pay off the debt, husband seems to be in a better position.
See Filkins, 347 N.W.2d at 529 (“Cons idering [husband]’s greater ability to pay and the
nature of the debts, it is not ine quitable to make him pay them.”); see also Hattstrom v.
Hattstrom, 385 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by allocating $21,000 of marital debt to husband and $412 to wife after equal
property division, when husband earned s ubstantial income and received substantial
benefits and wife was unemployed), review denied (Minn. June 30, 1986). Further, the
district court’s division of marital property must be viewed holistically. Here, much of the
marital property was equally di vided, but husband was also awarded 75% of the parties’
checking and savings accoun ts ($4,861.20) and one of the pa rties’ houses (the other two

23
were sold), whereas wife was renting a home. Even though the district court did not explain
its rationale for the debt division, its decision is supported by the record and is equitable in
light of the property division as a whole.
V. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by declining to consider income-
tax consequences when apportioning husband’s personal-injury award.

Husband’s final argument is that the dist rict court abused its discretion by not
considering income-tax conseq uences when it divided the marital portion of husband’s
personal-injury award. Wife counters that th e tax consequences were too speculative for
the district court to consider and also notes that the equitablene ss of the division is
supported by the district court’s finding that husband had “unclean hands” in regards to the
personal-injury award.
Under Minnesota law, “it is within the [dis trict] court’s discretion to consider the
tax consequences of its [marital property] award.” Maurer v. Maurer , 623 N.W.2d 604,
607 (Minn. 2001) (quoting Aaron v. Aaron, 281 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. 1979)). However,
the supreme court has “repeatedly stated that the [district] court should not speculate about
possible tax consequences.” Miller v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Minn. 1984) (citing
O’Brien v. O’Brien , 343 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1984); Aaron v. Aaron , 281 N.W.2d 150
(Minn. 1979)). “The court must have sufficien t information that the actual tax liability
resulting from the property division can be ca lculated with a reasonable degree of
certainty.” Id.
At the November 30, 2018 hearing regarding the personal-injury award, husband’s
attorney argued that the taxes on the persona l-injury award would be “substantial.” The

24
district court responded: “Well, you know, th e taxes are what the taxes are. . . . I’m not
going to figure out what that number is.” Wh en husband’s attorney replied that husband
would be forced to bear the entire tax burden, the district court responded that husband
should have provided the court with something from a tax accountant that gave a number
for the tax amount. Husband’s attorney then re ferenced a “pro forma tax return on that
amount, which I did provide.” The district court indicated that it would review this form,
but the calculations therein were never discussed on the record. Wife’s attorney argued that
the form that husband’s attorney referenc ed was only the attorney’s own “Fin Plan
calculation,” which “assumes the entire payment in this calendar year with absolutely no
deduction.” The calculation has no probative value, she argued, as there are many possible
ways to reduce tax implications.
Husband references the calculation in the above form in his appellate brief when he
says that a “post-trial submission” estimate d the taxes at $166,897. This figure, though,
appears to represent his own attorney’s calculation, and the record contains no information
as to how it was generated. Thus, it does not appear that husband presented the district
court with sufficient information to assess the reliability of his lawyer’s calculation of the
projected tax liability from the division of the personal-inj ury award with a reasonable
degree of certainty.
Further, as wife argues, the district court balanced the equities when it divided the
personal-injury award and was “troubled” by husband’s evasiveness regarding the
personal-injury lawsuit throughout the dissolution proceedings. The district court stated at
the November 30, 2018 hearing:

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The other thing is, in terms of an equity distribution, I always
have been troubled by the fact that at trial in this case,
Mr. Suhsen was consistently asked about the automobile suit,
what was going on, and was evasive and was not forthcoming
about this what ended up being a half a million dollar lawsuit
pending at the time of the di ssolution trial. And so for
somebody to come in and ask the Court to act in equity. You
know, the old saying always used to be if you wanted equitable
relief, you had to come in with clean hands. Mr. Suhsen doesn't
come to this court with clean hands on this.

(Emphasis added.) Despite this concern, the district court awarded wife less of the
personal-injury award than she requested. Sh e requested 50% of the portion of the award
for lost wages, and the district court awarded her 40% of the portion of the award for lost
wages. The district court balanced the equities and did not abuse its discretion by declining
to consider speculative tax consequences when it divided the personal-injury award.
In sum, we reverse and re mand on the issue of spousal maintenance, noting that the
district court may reopen the record at its discretion. On all other issues, we affirm.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.