In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. M. S. and A. M. A., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0311

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A. M. S. and A. M. A., Parents

Filed September 3, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File Nos. 69DU-JV-18-101, 69DU-JV-18-283

Bill L. Thompson, Law Office of Bill L. Thompson, Duluth, Minne sota (for appellant-
mother A.M.S.)

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Benjamin M. Stromberg , Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human
Services)

Sonia Sturdevant, Assistant Public Defender, Duluth, Minnesota (for child S.S.)

Rachel Plachta, Duluth, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larki n, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant A.M.S. (mother) appeals from the district court’s te rmination of her
parental rights to her two children, arguing that the record ev idence supports neither the

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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district court’s finding that a statutory basis for termination exists nor its finding that
termination is in the best interests of the children. We affirm.
FACTS
Mother is the biological parent of child 1 and child 2. Child 1, born January 15,
2007, has no known or adjudicated father. A.M.A. (father) is t he adjudicated father of
child 2, born April 17, 2018.1 Mother is a descendent of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians, but neither child is e ligible for enrollment in an Ind ian tribe. The Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply to these proceedings.
On September 7, 2017, a petition was filed in St. Louis County (the county), alleging
that child 1 was a child in need of protection or services (CHI PS). The CHIPS petition
alleged a long history of the county’s social workers’ involvement with mother starting in
2013. The CHIPS petition also detailed repeated instances of educational neglect, domestic
violence, and drug use. The immediate triggering event for the CHIPS petition was
mother’s treatment for a hand infection at a hospital on August 31, 2017. Hospital
personnel determined that mother was pregnant, and laboratory t ests detected
amphetamines and marijuana components in her system. She was aggressive toward staff
to the point of requiring four-point restraint, and she appeare d to be experiencing drug-
withdrawal symptoms.

1 Before the consolidated termination of parental rights (TPR) trial, father signed and filed
a recognition of parent form with the state, making him the adj udicated father of child 2.
Father’s rights to child 2 were later terminated, and he has not appealed the termination of
his parental rights. Accordin gly, this opinion addresses only mother’s appeal of the
termination of her parental rights.

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On September 8, 2017, the district court found a prima facie ca se to believe that
child 1 was a child in need of protection or services, and it p laced child 1 in foster care.
The initial admit/deny hearing was scheduled for September 13, 2017, but was continued
because mother “appeared to be under the influence” and social workers requested that she
submit to drug testing after the hearing was continued to a lat e r d a t e . A d e n i a l w a s
subsequently entered on behalf of mother at a later admit/deny hearing.
In early October 2017, mother was evicted from her apartment a nd became
homeless. During this time, mother’s cooperation with urine te sting for drugs was
“inconsistent.” She failed to show up for testing several time s and tested positive for
methamphetamine on at least one occasion. In November 2017, mo ther made a limited
admission to the CHIPS petition, admitting that she “has chemical dependency challenges
that make it difficult for her to provide care for her child.” The district court accepted the
admission and ordered a case plan which required mother to find housing, complete a
psychological/parenting assessment, complete a rule 25 assessment, complete random drug
testing (with any missed tests to be deemed positive), “maintai n absolute sobriety,” and
cooperate fully with social services, among other requirements. By mid-November,
mother completed a rule 25 assessment after having rescheduled it three times. Visits with
child 1 were suspended, however, because mother did not take dr ug tests and, on one
occasion, mother yelled, swore at, and attempted to assault Lutheran Social Services staff
members.
Mother was scheduled to enter Marty Mann Halfway House for inpatient chemical-
dependency treatment in mid-Nove mber, but admission was resched uled until mid-

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December. During this period of delay, mother refused to take mandated drug tests and,
when she did cooperate, she tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. Mother
was discharged from Marty Mann five days after admission for “l eaving against staff
recommendations,” having been “inconsistently compliant with the program expectations,”
demonstrating “‘minimal awareness of her addiction,’ and was ‘minimally cooperative.’”
Mother completed a second rule 25 assessment at the end of Jan uary 2018, but did
not cooperate with the county for drug testing or progress beyo nd completing another
chemical-dependency program’s intake. Mother continued to have no visits with child 1
during this time. On February 14, 2018, the county filed a pet ition to terminate both
mother’s and the unknown father’s parental rights to child 1. The TPR petition largely
reiterated the allegations of the earlier CHIPS petition and mother’s inaction on the CHIPS
case plan.
In March, while still pregnant with child 2, mother entered Do uglas Place, an
inpatient chemical-dependency treatment center. Mother “wanted to leave the program”
and was on the verge of being discharged due to lack of attenda nce and leaving the
treatment center for long periods of time, but the staff was “c oncerned about discharging
her due to her chemical dependency issues during pregnancy.” Less than three weeks later,
mother transferred back to Marty Mann, where she did not participate in programming and
would often leave the facility for long periods of time. On Ap ril 17, 2018, mother gave
birth to child 2, who was immediately “placed on a police hold due to the mother’s ongoing
child protection concerns, chem i c a l u s e , m e n t a l h e a l t h i s s u e [ s ], homelessness, and
instability.” Three days later, the county filed a TPR petitio n concerning child 2, and an

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emergency protective care hearing was held that same day. “[G]iven the mother’s lack of
progress towards addressing the child protection concerns,” chi ld 2 was also placed in
foster care and mother was afforded two supervised visits per week.
After giving birth to child 2, mother returned to Marty Mann. While in treatment,
she consistently submitted to drug testing and was sober and drug-free. However, she had
“a great amount of difficulty” adapting to the treatment program and would not participate
in groups. She would “leave the program for long periods of time” without informing staff
of her whereabouts, and was placed on a behavior plan because o f these problems.
Mother’s counselor “questioned wh ether or not she was even capa ble of working the
program.” Despite these strong concerns, mother graduated from the program on May 25,
2018. Staff noted, however, that mother displayed “poor recognition and understanding of
relapse and appeared at a moderately high level of risk for relapse for further substance use
or mental health problems” and that she “would likely benefit from continued attention to
mental health, relapse prevention, and accountability.” While at Marty Mann, mother was
able to find an apartment that she shared with father, but, wit hin a week of leaving the
program, the landlord asked her and father to leave because father was selling drugs from
the apartment.
Within two weeks following her discharge from Marty Mann, moth er again began
using methamphetamine, and she continued to test positive for m ethamphetamine up to
and throughout the TPR trial. Mother also remained homeless, b ut would stay at her
mother’s home occasionally. Mot her was referred to a psycholog ical evaluation in May
and underwent an evaluation by Dr. Megan Paris in July. But she scheduled the follow-up

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appointments for the end of Au gust despite the psychologist’s r ecommendation that
appointments begin sooner. Duri ng this time, mother attended o ut-patient treatment, but
continued to have attendance issues. Mother’s attendance was s ufficiently inconsistent
that, in November, mother’s counselor stated that “if [mother] attended treatment regularly
she would have completed treatme nt in August.” The counselor c oncluded that mother
“needs inpatient treatment.”
Dr. Paris filed her psychological/parental capacity evaluation with the district court
on September 14. Her report noted that mother minimized her “limited compliance” with
drug testing, attendance, and participation in chemical-dependency programming. Mother
had “minimal comprehension or appreciation” of the programming. The report concluded
that mother had post-traumatic stress disorder, a “mild neurocognitive disorder” resulting
from an earlier traumatic brain injury (secondary to a car cras h in 2001), and stimulant
(methamphetamine) and marijuana addiction. Dr. Paris noted tha t mother’s “degree of
disorganization, distractibility, and disjointed presentation [ are] the result of the
overlapping conditions of her trauma symptoms, [traumatic brain injury] concerns, and
methamphetamine use.” Dr. Paris also concluded that, even if m other were to follow all
treatment recommendations, her parenting ability would be, at best, “guarded.”
The two TPR petitions were consolidated for trial. At the outset of trial, the parties
agreed that the proceedings only concerned the termination of m other’s parental rights
because father had only recently filed a recognition of parenta ge form. The parties
stipulated to the admission of eight exhibits, which included m other’s psychological
evaluation, her drug test results, her discharge summaries and treatment plans, and police

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body-camera videos of mother. The county’s only witness on the first day of trial was
mother, who testified that, while she agreed with the history o f the cases as recited in the
petition(s), she would like to regain custody of both children. She testified that she would
need to again complete chemical-dependency treatment and would need to obtain housing.
Mother also testified that she was going to take care of a warr ant for her arrest issued in
January 2017. On October 5, the c ounty filed an amended TPR pe tition naming A.M.A.
as the father of child 2 and seeking termination of his parental rights.
Due to the district court’s schedule, the next day of trial was not held until about
two months after the first day of trial. Between the two trial dates, mother tested positive
for methamphetamine on at least six occasions. Mother again te stified, and admitted that
she had not taken care of the Ja nuary 2017 warrant, continued t o remain homeless, and
continued to use methamphetamine . S h e h a d n o t c o m p l e t e d t h e G enesis treatment
program. Mother testified that it was her intention after the trial to start an inpatient
t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m , b e c a u s e s h e f e l t t h a t s h e “ d i d n ’ t r e a l l y l e arn anything from [Marty
Mann] and didn’t really get anything out of it.”
The county social worker also t estified at trial. She met with mother on multiple
occasions over the course of the CHIPS and TPR cases to discuss mother’s case plan. She
asked mother to submit to drug te sting, to complete the rule 25 assessment, to participate
in chemical dependency treatment, and generally to do what was necessary under the court-
approved case plan for mother to reunite with her children. The social worker also testified
that:
I did identify mental health as an issue, but I knew that unles s
we got some of the sobriety under control, it wouldn’t even

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make sense for [mother] to do a psychological evaluation,
because then they wouldn’t be able to tell if the results are
because she is high or are the results because she has mental
health issues.

The social worker testified that, once mother obtained a period of sobriety at Marty Mann,
she was referred for a psychological evaluation, which mother a ttempted to delay and
cancel. The social worker noted that the county had “tried and t r i e d a n d t r i e d t o g e t
[mother] what she needs with reg ards to the treatment so that s he can be a sober person”
but mother’s intransigence significantly delayed the county’s a ttempts at getting mother
into treatment. The social worker concluded that it was in the best interests of the children
to terminate mother’s parental rights and “it would be very dif ficult” for mother to reach
the point of being capable of parenting the children in the reasonable future.
Mother called a worker from the “Superior Babies Program,” who testified that her
interactions with mother were p ositive. But the worker agreed t h a t t h e r e r e m a i n e d
concerns about mother’s sobriety.
Following trial, the parties submitted written closing argumen ts. The county argued
that it had proved all of the statutory bases for termination o f mother’s parental rights
alleged in the petitions and that termination is in the best in terests of the children. The
county noted that “[i]n short, w hen this matter first came befo re the [district] court in
September 2017, [mother] was homeless, actively using methamphetamines and in need of
treatment, and had multiple unaddressed mental health issues. By her own testimony, 14
months later, none of those thi ngs had changed.” In mother’s c losing argument, mother
argued that “[a]ll she is asking for is more time. She is just asking the [district] court with
good cause to extend the [perman ency] timelines, and grant her the time to go through

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treatment and ensure she follows through with any aftercare recommendations, and is able
to maintain her sobriety.”
On January 3, 2019, the distric t court ordered that mother’s p arental rights to both
children be terminated. The district court found that the county “established by clear and
convincing evidence that [mother] continues to be a danger to her children due to her drug
use, her inability to seek assistance for her mental health issues, and her complete inability,
over 17 months, to secure affordable and safe housing for her children.” The district court
also noted mother’s repeated drug -treatment failures. It also noted that both the social
worker and the guardian ad lite m (GAL) opined that termination was in the best interests
of the children. The district c ourt did not specifically indic ate the statutory ground(s) on
which it was granting terminati on. Following this order, the c ase was reassigned to a
different district court judge because the initial district court judge was retiring.
Mother timely moved for a new trial or, alternatively, for ame nded findings of fact.
Mother argued that the district court erred in terminating her parental rights because “she
does not agree that for the foreseeable future she would be unable to parent her children,”
she “recently completed treatment,” and intended to deal with the outstanding January 2017
warrant. The county opposed moth er’s motion. It moved the dis trict court to amend its
findings and order to identify the statutory bases for terminat ion and to make statutorily
required findings.
Mother argued at the motion hear ing that “[t]he evidence does n ot support the
decision that was reached” because mother had by then dealt with the outstanding warrant
and had recently completed inpatient treatment. The county noted that mother’s argument

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“largely relies on information outside of the record.” The dis trict court concluded that
“simply disagreeing with the [di strict] court’s decision and ar ticulating actions taken
subsequent to the trial are insu fficient.” It denied mother’s motions. It issued amended
findings on the county’s motion and identified the statutory ba ses for termination. The
district court clarified that mother’s rights to the children w ere being terminated under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (7), and (8).
Mother appealed. Her notice of appeal stated that she was appealing the initial order
“dated February 4” and the amended order filed “February 15.” On March 1, we issued an
order construing mother’s appeal “as taken from the orders file d on January 3, 2019, and
February 7, 2019.”
D E C I S I O N
We note at the outset the significance of the district court’s amended order of
February 7, which identified the statutory bases for termination of mother’s parental rights.
The January 3 order of the district court failed to do so. The January 3 order found that
termination of mother’s parental rights is in the children’s be st interests, but did not
expressly find “at least one condi tion” for involuntary termina tion, as required by In re
Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. 200 4). The statute authorizing
termination of parental rights requires that the district court must “find[] that one or more”
specific conditions exist. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.1 (201 8). And the best-interests
finding, in the absence of a statutory basis for termination, i s insufficient to support
termination. R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54. On this record, the absence of a finding by a district
court of a statutory basis for termination in the January 3 ord er would require reversal or

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remand. But the amended order, after the posttrial motions, identifies five statutory bases
for termination and, as noted above, we have construed the appe al as being from both
orders.
Parental rights should not be terminated “except for grave and weighty reasons.” In
re Welfare of HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). We may affirm a termination of
parental rights if “at least one statutory ground” has been pro ved and if termination is in
the best interests of the involved children. R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55.
I. The record supports the distr ict court’s finding that reason able efforts failed
to correct the conditions that led to the children’s placement out of the home.

Mother contends that the district court erred in finding that reasonable efforts failed
to correct the conditions that le d to the out-of-home placement . Mother argues that the
county did not provide reasonable efforts because “[t]he level of chemical dependency
treatment [afforded her] was not adequate, nor were any service s for her mental health
provided.”
A district court may terminate a parent’s rights if reasonable efforts have failed to
correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5). Reasonable efforts are presumed to have failed upon showing that: (1) a child has
resided out of the home for a cu mulative period of 12 months wi thin the preceding 22
months or, if the child is under the age of eight, has resided out of the home for 6 or more
months unless the parent maintained regular contact with the child and complied with the
out-of-home placement plan; (2) the district court approved the out-of-home placement
plan; (3) the conditions have not been corrected; and (4) the county made reasonable efforts
toward reunification. Id. “It is presumed that conditions leading to a child’s out-of-home

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placement have not been corrected upon a showing that the paren t or parents have not
substantially complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan.” Id. However,
“[r]easonable efforts encompass more than just a case plan” and the required services “must
be aimed at alleviating the conditions that gave rise to out-of -home placement.” In re
Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012).
In the January 3 order, the district court found that
over the 17 months these matters have been pending, [mother]
has been unable to maintain sobriety, unable to deal with her
m e n t a l h e a l t h i s s u e s , u n a b l e t o s e c u r e a n d m a i n t a i n s a f e
housing for herself and her ch ildren, and has been generally
unsuccessful in beating her addiction to marijuana and
methamphetamine despite multiple chemical dependency
treatment opportunities.

The district court also noted that mother continued to test positive for illicit substances on
multiple occasions throughout the CHIPS and TPR proceedings. In its amended order, the
district court found that:
The St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services
Department made reasonable effo r t s t o r e u n i f y t h e c h i l d r e n
with their mother . . . . These extensive efforts were
unsuccessful in addressing the issues which led to the need for
out of home placement and the provision of further services
would be futile and therefor e unreasonable. Moreover,
[child 1] has resided in out of home placement for
approximately 14 consecutive months and [child 2], who has
not yet reached one year of age, has been in placement for more
t h [ a ] n s e v e n c o n s e c u t i v e m o n t h s ( a s o f t h e l a s t d a y o f t r i a l )
with a court ordered reunification plan in place; the conditions
leading to the children’s pla cement away from their mother
have not been corrected in that [mother] continues to use
methamphetamines, remains homeless, and her mental health
issues remain undressed; and efforts provided by the agency
and others were reasonable unde r the circumstances. By
operation of Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i-iv) it is

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presumed that reasonable reunification efforts have failed. No
evidence has been presented to rebut that presumption.

The district court also found that mother’s “circumstances and conduct are such that the
children cannot be returned to her and [mother] has, despite th e availability of needed
rehabilitative services, failed to make reasonable efforts to a djust her circumstances,
conditions, and conduct.” The district court terminated mother ’s parental rights under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), “because following the children’s placement out of
the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of social ser vices, have failed to correct
the conditions leading to the children’s placements.”
The record supports the findings of the district court that, ov er the course of the
CHIPS and TPR proceedings, the co unty provided mother services such as “family
assessments, [access to the par ental support outreach program], transportation assistance,
assistance with obtaining benefits, and foster care.” The coun ty also provided supervised
visits for mother, even after her behavior resulted in a suspension of her visiting rights for
a time. The county also provided mother with referrals to pare nting classes and several
rule 25 assessments and the treatment indicated by those assessments. All of these services
were aimed at helping mother comply with the case plan and obtain sobriety. These efforts
are consistent with what we have previously considered to be reasonable efforts. Cf. In re
Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 903 (Minn. App. 2011) (noting that the
county’s reasonable efforts included providing a psychological evaluation and that
“counseling, aftercare, urinalysis, a rule 25 chemical dependen cy assessment, parenting
classes and other services were available to mother”), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).

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Mother argues first that “the tr eatment program at Marty Mann d id not meet [her]
needs.” Mother’s argument misstates the record. At Marty Mann, mother “would just be
gone, she’d take off” for hours without informing anyone of whe re she was going. She
often refused to attend the morning or afternoon groups. When she was present, she did
not meaningfully participate. As a result of mother’s refusal to participate in her treatment,
Marty Mann moved her to “a less intensive program” that was inp atient but mother “only
had to attend the groups in the morning.” The social worker testified that Marty Mann was
“trying to accommodate and get [mother] to buy in as much as th ey could and realizing
that maybe she couldn’t do all of it, but if she could at least get some of it that it might, you
know, any piece of it could help.” The social worker noted that “[t]he way they described
it to me was the harm reduction model. They were just trying t o get her in, trying to get
her to do some of the groups and learn and do some of the education.”
It is true that Marty Mann graduated mother despite serious concerns regarding her
progress. However, the social worker testified that Marty Mann graduated mother because
of their “harm reduction model,” where, despite mother’s failur e to engage in treatment,
“some [treatment] is better than none” and because mother “had set herself up with the
inpatient program at Genesis.” Fairly read, the record supports that the issue was not with
Marty Mann or the county’s reasonable efforts to get mother into treatment; the issue was
mother’s refusal to meaningfully engage with the chemical-depen dency programming, as
the district court found.

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Mother also relatedly argues th at the county failed to address her mental-health
issues until “almost a year after the child protection matter b egan.” Mother’s argument
fails here as well.
Mother was referred for a psycho logical evaluation in May 2018, but she delayed
the appointments so that the evaluation was not completed until S e p t e m b e r . M o t h e r ’ s
argument also ignores the social worker’s explanation, which the district court implicitly
accepted, that mental health treatment would be useless until m other first became sober.
The social worker explained that “they wouldn’t be able to tell if the results are because
she is high or . . . because she has mental health issues.” On ce mother appeared to regain
sobriety, she was referred for a psychological evaluation but b egan using drugs again by
the time the evaluation was to take place. This is supported by Dr. Paris’s conclusion that
mother’s “disorganization, dis tractibility, and disjointed pres entation is the result of the
overlapping conditions of her trauma symptoms, [traumatic brain injury] concerns, and
methamphetamine use.”
The record supports the district court’s finding that reasonabl e efforts to reunify
were made by the county, but thos e efforts failed to correct th e conditions leading to the
children’s placement out of the home.2

2 Reasonable efforts to reunify are required in all cases, excep t where excused by statute.
Mi n n. St a t . § 2 6 0C. 30 1, s u bd. 8 ( 20 1 8) . H e r e , be c a us e t he r e c ord supports the district
court’s finding that reasonable efforts under the court’s direc tion failed to correct the
conditions leading to the out-of- home placement, the reasonable-efforts finding inheres in
the statutory basis found, and we therefore do not separately a nalyze whether reasonable
efforts were required.

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We may affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights i f “ a t l e a s t o n e
statutory ground for terminati on is supported by clear and conv incing evidence and
termination is in the child’s best interests.” R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55. We decline to analyze
the remaining grounds on which mother’s parental rights were terminated, but note that the
record appears to us to support those additional statutory grounds for termination found by
the district court.
II. The record supports the distr ict court’s finding that termi nation of mother’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

Mother also appears to summarily argue that the district court erred by determining
that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Mother’s only
argument concerning the best interests of the children is a section of her brief titled: “Did
the trial court err in determining it was in the child[ren’s] best interests to transfer custody?
Yes.” However, that section does not address the best interests of the children. Instead, it
discusses whether mother is palpably unfit under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).
Nevertheless, we construe mother’s appeal as arguing generally that the district court erred
in determining that termination was in the children’s best interests.
Even if a statutory basis for terminating a parent’s rights is found, a district court
must also find that termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interests of the children.
R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55. “[I]n terminating parental rights, the bes t interests of the child
are the paramount consideration, and conflicts between the rights of the child and rights of
the parents are resolved in favor of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902; see also Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018). “In analyzing the best inter ests of the child, the court
must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preser ving the parent-child

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relationship; (2) the parent’s in terest in preserving the paren t-child relationship; and
(3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, s ubd. 3(b)(3). “Co mpeting interests
include such things as a stable environment, health considerati ons and the child’s
preferences.” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. The district court “must consider a child’s best
interests and explain its rationale in its findings and conclus ions.” In re Tanghe , 672
N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003). We review a district court’ s determination that
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests u nder an abuse-of-discretion
standard. In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008).
In its initial order, the district court found that “[b]oth the [s]ocial [w]orker handling
this matter and the GAL opined that it is in the best interests of the children that [mother’s]
parental rights be terminated.” In the amended order, the district court found that:
The [district] [c]ourt has balanced the children’s and mother’s
respective interests in preserving the parent and child
relationships with the childre n’s competing interests in
severing that relationship and finds that the balance tips
overwhelming toward terminati on of parental rights. With
regard to [mother], her interest in preserving her relationship is
undeniably very strong and very real. The evidence is clear
that [mother] loves her children and wants what is best for
them. As for the children, wh ile they both have an obvious
interest in preserving their relationships with their mother, both
children’s respective interests in this regard are minimized by
the facts of this matter. [Child 1] has been in continuous out
of home placement for more than 14 months following the
filing of the CHIPS petition and her contact with her mother in
that time has been limited to supervised visitations, a
circumstance that is highly unlikely to change in the reasonably
foreseeable future. [Child 2]’ s interest in preserving his
relationship with his mother is even less in that he has never
resided with her. Since the filing of the CHIPS petition,
[mother] has not made any significant progress in adjusting her

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circumstances and behavior in order to be able to successfully
parent her children. The children are entitled to caregivers who
will be able to put their needs first and there is simply no
evidence they will get that from [mother]. By contrast,
termination of parental rights will . . . open up new avenues for
permanent placement options which will allow the children to
grow up together in a safe, stable, permanent living
environment. Under these circumstances, the children’s
respective interest in severing the parent-child relationship
therefore significantly outweigh any interests in preserving it.

The record supports the district court’s determination that te rmination of mother’s
parental rights is in the best interests of the children. The district court acknowledged that
mother loves her children and that her interest in retaining her parental rights is very strong.
However, the district court properly balanced that interest aga inst the children’s lesser
interest in maintaining that rel ationship and their strong inte rest in having “a safe, stable,
[and] permanent living environment.”
The record abounds with evidence supporting the district court’ s best-interests
finding. Mother has not maintained sobriety. She failed to complete or even meaningfully
engage in multiple chemical-depe ndency treatment programs. She failed to adequately
address her mental-health issues. The district court specifically identified this evidence as
demonstrating that termination is in the best interests of the children. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the
best interests of the children.
Affirmed.