State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0313

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terrance Trevelle Hill,
Appellant.

Filed October 14, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-13-520

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. W ithall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkm an, Presiding Judge; Jesson, J udge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After pleading guilty to one count of criminal sexual conduct p ursuant to a plea
agreement, appellant Terrance Trevelle Hill received a stayed sentence and fifteen years of

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probation. After Hill violated his probation conditions, the d istrict court revoked Hill’s
probation. Hill now challenges his sentence and that revocation. Because Hill’s challenges
to his sentence are not properly before this court, we decline to address Hill’s arguments
pertaining to it. But because the district court’s findings ar e insufficient to support the
revocation of Hill’s probation, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
In February 2013, the state charged appellant Terrance Trevelle Hill with two counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. The charges
stemmed from D.S.’s disclosure that Hill sexually abused her se veral years earlier when
she was between six and eight years old.1 The case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted
in a hung jury.
Before proceeding to a second trial, the state offered Hill a plea agreement. Pursuant
to the agreement, in exchange for Hill pleading guilty to one count of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, the state offered to dismiss a separate crimina l-sexual-conduct charge
stemming from allegations made by a different victim, and recommend a stay of execution
of a top-of-the-box guidelines sentence of 187 months. At the plea hearing, Hill pleaded
guilty to sexual contact with a person under age 13, acknowledg ing that the offense

1 According to D.S., Hill—a family friend—entered her bedroom an d asked her if she
wanted to play a game. Thinking that Hill meant a board game, D.S. agreed. Hill then
took off his pants and D.S.’s pants, exposed his penis to her, and placed his penis in D.S.’s
vagina or anus and moved back and forth. D.S. expressed that it hurt. Once Hill stopped,
he told D.S. not to tell her parents what happened. D.S. alleged that this happened a second
time, but she could not remember all the details.

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occurred between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008. The di strict court accepted
Hill’s plea and adjudicated him guilty.
At sentencing, the district cour t addressed an issue raised in the presentence
investigation regarding the offense date. New sentencing guide lines had gone into effect
on August 1, 2006. But the date of the offense that Hill plead ed guilty to spanned from
January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2008, making it unclear which version of the sentencing
guidelines should apply.2 The district court therefore asked Hill to stipulate that the offense
occurred “in the fall of 2006; therefore, after August 1, 2006” so that the 2006 sentencing
guidelines would apply, making the agreed-upon 187-month senten ce within the
permissible range of sentences. Hill agreed and acknowledged t hat he did not know the
exact offense date. Then, the district court sentenced Hill in accordance with the plea
agreement: a stay of execution of 187 months and 15 years of probation.3
Almost three years later, the st ate alleged that Hill violated his probation. The
district court ordered Hill to serve 30 days in jail but reinstated his probation with the same
conditions. Hill violated his probation again about two years later, and the district court
directed Hill to serve 120 days in jail but again reinstated his probation with the same terms
and conditions.

2 The 2005 and 2006 versions of the sentencing guidelines differ in the permissible sentence
for Hill. The 2006 guidelines contemplate a sentence within th e range of 144 months to
187 months for first-degree criminal sexual conduct for an offender with a criminal-history
score of one.
3 Hill’s sentence constituted a downward dispositional departure , which the district court
stated was due to Hill being amen able to probation and willing to participate in
sex-offender treatment.

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Roughly seven months later, Hill appeared at a probation-revoca tion hearing after
the state alleged that he violated his probation for a third time. The state asserted that Hill
violated five conditions of his probation: failing to submit to urinalysis testing, failing to
abstain from the use of illegal drugs, failing to enter inpatie nt chemical-dependency
treatment, failing to complete sex-offender treatment, and failing to maintain contact with
probation. At the hearing, Hill admitted to violating all five of the identified conditions of
his probation. Through testimony, Hill explained that he had t ried to enter inpatient
chemical-dependency treatment but was not admitted and that fin ancial reasons were
preventing him from completing sex-offender treatment. Hill also testified that he had not
knowingly ingested illegal drugs but had eaten candy which appa rently contained them.
Hill noted that he was usually good about keeping in contact with his probation officer but
acknowledged that he had recently missed some appointments.
The state sought revocation of Hill’s probation and execution of his sentence. The
district court agreed. The court stated that it thought “the Austin factors . . . [were] pretty
clear” and that “there comes a time when if you are not meeting the requirement of
probation for serious crimes that your sentence need[s] to be executed.” The district court
also found that Hill’s continued substance usage and failure to complete sex-offender
treatment indicated that the needs of the community outweighed the preference for
treatment and that not revoking Hill’s probation would “unduly depreciate the system.”
Accordingly, the district court ordered Hill’s 187-month sentence to be executed, followed
by a 10-year conditional-release period. Hill appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Hill challenges both his sentence and the revocation of his probation. Specifically,
Hill contends that his original sentence was calculated using a n incorrect criminal-history
score and that the district court selected an offense date with the express purpose of giving
him a longer sentence in violation of his rights under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). But the state argues that Hill’s challenges to his sentence—raised
for the first time as part of h is probation-revocation appeal—are not properly before this
court. As such, we first examine whether Hill’s challenges to his sentence are properly
before us, and conclude that—having never been presented to the district court—they are
not. We then evaluate Hill’s ar gument that the district court did not make sufficient
findings to support revocation of his probation. And because t he district court’s findings
are insufficient, we reverse and remand.
I. Hill’s challenges to his sentence, imposed pursuant to a ple a agreement, are not
properly before this court.

The state presents two arguments that Hill’s challenges to his sentence are not
properly before this court. First, relying on State v. Coles , 862 N.W.2d 477, 481-82
(Minn. 2015), the state argues that Hill must challenge his sentence through postconviction
proceedings because it was imposed as part of a plea agreement. Alternatively, the state
contends that if Hill may challenge his sentence as part of pro bation-revocation
proceedings, he is required to first raise his challenges to his sentence to the district court.
We first review the procedural mechanisms available for an offe nder to challenge his or
her sentence, and then turn to address each of the state’s arguments.

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I n g e n e r a l , a n o f f e n d e r m a y c o l l a t e r a l l y c h a l l e n g e a s e n t e n c e in two alternative
ways. Washington v. State , 845 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. App. 2014). First, under rule
27.03, subdivision 9 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedu re, an offender may
request that the district court “correct a sentence not authori zed by law.” Second, an
offender can file a petition for postconviction relief. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2018).
But a third way for an offender to challenge a sentence—often referred to as a Fields
appeal—has emerged in the probation-revocation context based on State v. Fields ,
416 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Minn. 1987). In Fields, the supreme court held that an offender can
challenge his or her sentence for the first time after his or h er probation is revoked.
416 N.W.2d at 736. In reaching this decision, the supreme cour t noted important policy
reasons for allowing challenges to a sentence after probation i s revoked, stating that
requiring a direct appeal at the time a sentence is imposed cou ld lead to an increase in
sentencing appeals. Id. Without the opportunity to challenge a sentence after revocatio n
of probation, an offender who believed he might be successful w ith probation may be
compelled to appeal a questionable sentence in order to protect himself from serving an
improper sentence in the event his probation is revoked. Id.
Although these three methods are generally available to challen ge a sentence, the
state, relying on Coles, argues that Hill must challenge his sentence through a petition for
postconviction relief. In Coles, the supreme court recognized that “a challenge to a
sentence imposed as part of a plea agreement involves more than simply the sentence.”
862 N.W.2d at 481; see also State v. Lewis , 656 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn. 2003). For
instance, in certain plea agreements, “the conviction component a n d t h e s e n t e n c e

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component are interrelated.” Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481 (quotation omitted). And in those
cases, “[i]f the defendant succeeds in reducing his or her sent ence, he or she retains the
benefit of the reduced criminal charge but the [s]tate no longer receives the benefit of the
longer sentence.” Id. Accordingly, the supreme court determined that the proper
mechanism to challenge a senten ce that implicates a plea agreem ent is a petition for
postconviction relief. Id. at 482. The state contends that because Hill’s sentence was
imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, Coles dictates that he may only challenge his
sentence through a postconviction petition.
But the supreme court has not yet applied Coles to challenges to a sentence that arise
in the probation-revocation context. And, because we can resolve this appeal without doing
so, we decline to decide whether Coles mandates that an offender who wishes to challenge
a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement after his or her probation has been revoked
may only do so through a postconviction petition.
Declining to address the state’s argument under Coles, we turn to the state’s second
argument that Hill’s challenges to his sentence are not properl y before this court: that to
properly challenge a sentence as part of a Fields appeal, Hill needed to raise his sentencing
arguments at the probation-revocation hearing in district court. We agree.
Assuming that Hill may challenge his sentence pursuant to Fields, we conclude that
Hill did not follow the procedural requirements. We read Fields, in light of the rationale
provided in Coles, as requiring a challenge to a sentence which was imposed as p art of a
plea agreement to be raised first at the district court level. This requirement allows both
the state and the offender the opportunity to consider plea withdrawal, consistent with the

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supreme court’s rationale in Coles. Further, first addressing the challenges to a sentence
at the district court level provides the opportunity for develo pment of a record regarding
any factual issues surrounding the plea agreement.
Indeed, Fields appears to implicitly require raising a challenge to a sentenc e after
the revocation of probation duri ng the probation-revocation hea ring. The appellant in
Fields moved for a modification of his s entence at the district court probation-revocation
hearing and then appealed the denial of that motion. Fields, 416 N.W.2d at 735. And the
supreme court concluded that the “defendant properly raised the sentencing issue at the
revocation hearing and that the court of appeals erred in refusing to decide that issue on
appeal.” Id. (emphasis added). We thus read Fields, while permitting a challenge to a
sentence as part of probation-revocation proceedings, as requiring a challenge to a sentence
to first be presented to the district court for a ruling before appellate review is appropriate.
Nothing in the record indicates that Hill raised his challenges to his sentence to the
district court as part of his probation-revocation hearing. An d Hill’s case illustrates why
raising sentencing challenges to t he district court is importan t. In order to address his
challenges to his sentence, Hill essentially asks us to make a factual determination about
when the district court concluded his offense occurred: in the fall of 2006 or sometime after
August 1, 2006. And this court does not serve as a fact-finder . Wright Elec.,
Inc. v. Ouellette, 686 N.W.2d 313, 324 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 14, 2004). Had Hill raised his arguments at his probation -revocation hearing, the
district court could have made factual findings, which we could then review. But Hill
failed to do so. Accordingly, we conclude that because he did not challenge his sentence

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at the probation-revocation hearing, Hill’s sentencing challeng es are not appropriately
before us under a Fields appeal, and decline to address his arguments.4
II. The district court failed to make sufficient findings to su pport the revocation
of Hill’s probation.

Hill contends that the district court did not make adequate fi ndings to support
revoking his probation. Distric t courts have broad discretion to determine whether
sufficient evidence exists to revoke probation, and we only rev erse a district court’s
decision for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50
(Minn. 1980). But it is a question of law whether the district court made the required
findings to revoke probation, which we review de novo. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d
602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
Before revoking probation, the district court must make three s pecific findings.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. The district court must “1) designate the specific condition or
conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and
3) find that the need for confinement outweighs the policies fa voring probation.” Id.
Further, when evaluating the third factor, district courts shou ld additionally consider
whether “(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public fro m further criminal activity
by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctiona l treatment which can most
effectively be provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness

4 We note that part of Hill’s challenge to his sentence involves an assertion that his sentence
is based on an incorrect criminal-history score. But we conclude that in order to challenge
a sentence, which is the result of a plea agreement, as part of a Fields appeal, Hill must
first present his challenges to his sentence to the district court.

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of the violation if probation were not revoked.” Id. at 251. As previously stated by the
supreme court, “[t]he decision to revoke [probation] cannot be a reflexive reaction to an
accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing tha t the offender’s behavior
demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antis ocial activity.”
Id. (quotations omitted). And in making findings to support revoking probation, the district
court “must seek to convey [the] substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied
upon.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.
Here, the district court made sparse findings before revoking Hill’s probation. The
entirety of the district court’s rationale is provided here:
Okay. Mr. Hill, to not keep you in suspense, I’m going
to let you know my intent is to vacate the stay of execution and
have you execute the sentence.

And the reason is I think that the Austin factors that were
mentioned by both defense and the State in this case are pretty
clear, in my mind, that there comes a time when if you are not
meeting the requirement of probation for serious crimes that
your sentence need[s] to be executed. This is obviously a
serious crime. The continuation of the use of a controlled
substance as well as the failure to complete sex offender
treatment indicate that the needs of the community outweigh
the normally the favor of treatment within the community.

And a third violation on a serious felony would unduly
depreciate the system unless the sentence was executed.

Therefore, I will revoke the stay of execution. Sentence
you to commit to the Commissioner of Corrections for a period
of 187 months.

We conclude that these findings are insufficient to support revoking Hill’s probation. Even
if we construe the district court’s mention of “the continuatio n of the use of a controlled

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substance” and “the failure to complete sex offender treatment” as a finding that Hill
violated those conditions of probation, there is no mention of the second factor—whether
the violation was intentional or inexcusable—in the district court’s analysis. Additionally,
the district court’s finding that “a third violation on a serio us felony would unduly
depreciate the system unless the sentence was executed” does no t adequately address the
third factor: whether the need for confinement outweighs the po licies favoring probation.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Caselaw is clear that district courts mus t explicitly make the
three required findings before revoking probation. See Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608. That
was not done here.
The state acknowledges that the district court did not use the terms intentional or
inexcusable, but argues that H ill admitted to the violations an d that the record supports a
finding that the violations were intentional. But this argument conflicts with the mandate
in Austin and Modtland that the district court must make findings on the identified factors.
295 N.W.2d at 250; 695 N.W.2d at 608.5 And it is not this court’s role to find evidence in
the record to justify a probation revocation. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608 (stating that “it
is not the role of appellate cour ts to scour the record to dete rmine if suffici ent evidence
exists to support the district court’s revocation”). Accordingly, we reverse the revocation
of Hill’s probation and remand for the district court to make additional findings.
Reversed and remanded.

5 The state cites an unpublished case from this court in support of its argument, but our
unpublished opinions are not precedential. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).