In the Matter of the Application of Debora Lee Neu, Brian Joseph Neu for a Change of Name of Minor.
The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the district court acted within its broad discretion and correctly applied the requisite factors. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the application for a name change. Because evidence in the record supports the district court’s determination that there were clear and compelling reasons for the name change, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Application of Saxton 309 N.W.2d 298
- In Re the Welfare of C.M.G. 516 N.W.2d 555
- Foster v. Foster 802 N.W.2d 755
- Robinson v. Hansel 223 N.W.2d 138
- Marriage of Dobrin v. Dobrin 569 N.W.2d 199
- County of Stearns v. Schaaf 472 N.W.2d 191
- Thiele v. Stich 425 N.W.2d 580
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0314
In the Matter of the Application of
Debora Lee Neu, Brian Joseph Neu for a Change of Name of Minor.
Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed
Segal, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-18-5779
Enamidem Celestine Okon, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Debora and Brian Neu, St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se respondents)
Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Judge
In this appeal from a district court’s grant of respondent -grandparents’ request to
change the surname of appellant-father’s child, father argues that the district court (1) erred
by denying father’s request for an evidentiary hearing; (2) failed to adequately address the
factors listed in In re Application of Saxton , 309 N.W.2d 298 , 301 (Minn. 1981), for
assessing whether to change a child’s na me; and (3) made findings of fact not supported
by the record. We affirm.
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FACTS
The child in this case was born in January 2010. The child’s mother died when the
child was approximately six years old. Appellant-father was convicted of aiding and
abetting criminal sexual assault and sentenced when the child was about three years old.
The child moved in with respondent-maternal-grandparents when she was approximately
five years old and has continued to live with them since that time. Grandparents were
granted guardianship of the child on June 14, 2016.
On July 10, 2018, grandparents petitioned the district court to change the child’ s
surname from father’s to their surname. A hearing was held on October 26, 2018.
Grandparents appeared with the child and argued for the name change, maintaining that it
was important for the child to share the ir surname. The child also spoke with the district
court judge and indicated that it was he r preference to change her surname because her
father had done “something very wrong.” Father did not appear before the district court,
but did receive notice and filed a written objection.
The district court issued its order granting the application for a name change on
November 27, 2018. In its order, the district court found that the name change was
appropriate because it was the child’s preference to change her surname, there would be
little effect on the child’s relationship with father because she has little to no contact with
him, and there may be har assment or embarrassment associated with father’s surname
because of his conviction.
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On December 7, 2018, father moved for a new order, a new hearing and amended
findings of fact, arguing that grandparents had no legal or statutory right to initiate t he
name-change proceedings and that there was no clear and compelling evidence to support
the name change. Father also maintained that the district court erred when it failed to issue
“a writ” that would require him to “testify in person, present [a] defense, reb ut[] evidence
and question witnesses.” The district court denied father’s motions in a detailed order on
January 16, 2019. Father appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Father challenges the district court’s grant of an application for a name change. He
also argues that the district court erred by failing to require that he be physically present in
the courtroom during the October 26, 2018 hearing. Grandparents did not file a brief in
this appeal and the appeal proceeded under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it was in the
child’s best interests to change the child’s surname.
This court reviews a district court’s grant of a request to change a minor child’s
name for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of C.M.G. , 516 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn.
App. 1994). “A district court abuses its discretion when evidence in the record does not
support the factual findings, the court misapplied the law, or the court settles a dispute in a
way that is against logic and the facts on record.” Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 757
(Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
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Minnesota Statutes sections 259.10-.11 (2018) govern the procedures for changing
a name. Section 259.10, subdivision 1, provides that if a name change involves a minor,
the application must be made by the child’s guardian and that both of the child’s parents
must be provided notice. A district court shall grant an application for a name change
involving a minor unless the court finds the change is not in the best interests of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 259.11(a); Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757. A best-interests-of-the-child analysis
concerning a name change includes the consideration of the following factors:
(1) how long the child has had the current name , (2) any
potential harassment or embarrassment the [child may
experience from the present or proposed surname], (3) the
child’s preference , (4) the effect of the change on the
child’s relationship with each parent, and (5) the degree of
community respect associated with the present and
proposed names.
C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d at 561 (citing Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 301). If a parent objects to a
name change, a district court should exercise “great caution” and grant the name change
“only where the evidence is clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child
necessitates such change.” Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 301 ( quoting Robinson v. Hansel, 223
N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. 1974)).
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did not properly
consider or weigh the five factors when granting grandparents’ request for the name
change. We conclude that the district court acted within its broad discretion and correctly
applied the requisite factors. On the first factor, the district court found that the child has
used the father’s surname since birth. On the second factor, the district court examined the
potential harassment and embarrassment associated with the father’s surname because of
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father’s conviction. The court noted that father’s cri me was “sexual in nature” and that
grandparents sought to protect the child “from difficulties that could come from keeping”
father’s surname.
With respect to the third factor, the district court found that it is the child’s
preference to change her surname. The court noted that the child was eight years old and
wanted to change her surname because she wanted to share the same name as her extended
family. The district court also indicated that she desired to change her name because “her
father did something bad.”
In analyzing the fourth factor, the district court found the name change would “not
greatly affect the preservation and development of the child’s relationship with” father
because he is incarcerated and has little contact with the child. The court further found
there would be little effect on the child’s relationship with father if the child’s name was
changed.
Finally, the court analyzed the degree of community respect associated with
grandparents’ surname. The district court noted that there was a high degree of respect for
grandparents’ surname because they have lived in the community for several years, have
strong military ties and significant extended family members. Accordingly, the district
court granted the application for a name change.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the
application for a name change. The record supports the district court’s determination that
there were clear and compelling reasons for the change. Grandparents’ testimony indicates
that father has not played a major role in the child’s life since his incar ceration, with the
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only contact being a five-minute weekly telephone conversation. This testimony supports
the finding that the name change would have little effect on the child’s relationship with
father. The record further indicates that father has been convicted of aiding and abetting
criminal sexual conduct and that grandparents were concerned that the child would be
ashamed or embarrassed as she grew older and learned of father’s conviction, thus
supporting the district court’s determination that there may be embarrassment or
harassment associated with father’s surname.
Grandparents’ testimony regarding their standing in the community, including their
military background, supports the district court’s determination that there is a degree of
respect associated with their surname. Finally, the child’s testimony before the district
court supports the distri ct court’s determination that it was her preference to change her
surname. Because evidence in the record supports the district court’s determination that
there were clear and compelling reasons for the name change, we conclude the district court
did not abuse its discretion.
Father raises several additional arguments asking us to reweigh the evidence
presented to the district court on the question of whether there were clear and compelling
reasons to grant the application for a name change. He suggests that the child’s preference
for her name change was “tainted by manipulative conduct” and that there is a great deal
of respect associated with his surname. Under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review,
we are not permitted to reweigh evidence, but rat her are limited to evaluating whether the
record supports the district court’s findings and whether the court properly applied the law.
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Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). Since we conclude that the findings
are supported by the record, these arguments fail.
II. The district court did not err by failing to require father to be present at the
hearing on the application for a name change.
Father also argues that the distric t court erred by failing to issue a writ that would
require him to be present in the court during the October 26, 2018 hearing so that he would
be able “to testify in person, present [a] defense, rebut[] evidence, and question witnesses.”
In support of this argument, father cites Minn. R. Civ. P. 5 0.02 and 59.01. Both sections
relate to motions seeking a new trial. However, we have previously stated that proceedings
commenced “independently of a pending action by petition or motion” are not trials, but
are special proceedings. County of Stearns v. Schaaf, 472 N.W.2d 191, 192 (Minn. App.
1991). The request for a name change is commenced by filing an application, independent
of a pending action. See Minn. Stat. § 259.10, subd. 1. The name -change proceeding is,
thus, a special proceeding, rather than a trial . And the two rules cited by father , both of
which apply to trial proceedings, are therefore not relevant to this case.
Father’s argument also fails on the merits. Minnesota Statutes section 259.10,
subdivision 1, does not require that a district court issue a writ requiring a parent to be
present at a hearing on an application for a name change. Rather, all that is required is that
a parent be provided notice, whic h father acknowledged he received. Further, there is
nothing in the record to support father’s contention that he even requested a writ to be
present at the hearing, or that the district court denied such a request. See Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 5 82 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts address only those
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questions previously presented to and considered by the district court). Accordingly, father
has failed to demonstrate an error by the district court.
Affirmed.