A19-0317 Precedential Affirmed Processed

In re the Marriage of: Cynthia A. Linnerooth, petitioner, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed January 21, 2020

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0317

In re the Marriage of:
Cynthia A. Linnerooth, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Gerald R. Linnerooth,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-FA-17-3525

Kay Nord Hunt, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Gregory J. Lange, Charpentier & Lange, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Stephen M. Lindlof, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
In this dissolution matter, husband argues that the district court (1) made findings
of fact that are not supported by the record, (2) chose an incorrect valuation date,
(3) misvalued property, (4) failed to recognize his nonmarital interests in certain assets,
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(5) should have invaded wife’s nonmarital property to accomplish an equitable property
division, and (6) should have awarded him attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2017, respondent-wife Cynthia A. Linnerooth petitioned for dissolution
of her marriage to appellant-husband Gerald R. Linnerooth. The parties were married in
1989, but separated in 2007. In her petition, wife sought a limited number of personal
items and her retirement accounts. Husband requested, among other things, permanent
spousal maintenance, a portion of wife’s nonmarital property, and contribution to his
attorney fees.
At trial, wife testified that she is 66 years old. She has been employed since 1970,
and is currently employed by the state, earning $22.13 per hour, and an additional 65 cents
per hour for a shift differential. Wife testified that she planned to retire at the conclusion
of the dissolution matter. Wife testified that she contributed to the state-retirement and
deferred-compensation plans prior to the marriage. Wife testified that she has medical and
dental insurance through the state, which also covers husband. She testified that when she
retires, she will no longer have this insurance and will have to secure new coverage.
Wife testified that in 1991, the parties purchased a parcel of land for $4,500 and
built the marital home. In 1997, the parties had a mortgage on the home for $60,000. In
2007, the mortgage had a balance of $27,613.32, and the marital equity in the home was
approximately $188,000. W ife testified that in December 2007, she and the parties’ two
sons, then teenagers, moved out of the home and she never again contributed to it
financially.
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Wife testified that after she moved out, she lived on her own until she moved in with
her mother in 2013. Wife does not pay rent to her mother. Wife testified that her mother
is 90 years old, and after her mother passes away, her mother’s house will be sold and any
proceeds will be split among wife and her siblings. At that time, wife will have to obtain
new housing.
Wife testified that she waited nearly ten years to file the dissolution petition because
she was busy supporting herself and the parties’ sons. Wife testified that husband did not
pay her support, child or otherwise, nor did he ever request financial assistance from her.
She stated that since the separation, the parties never lived together, did not support each
other financially, had their own financial accounts, and had little common debt. Wife
testified that the only financial tie the parties had following their separation was filing joint
tax returns, which they did until 2012 based on advice from their tax preparer.
Wife testified that the parties had a “modest standard of living,” and lived “paycheck
to paycheck.” Wife testified that she used a credit card during the marriage for larger
purchases, including furniture, a trailer, an air compressor, and a snow blower. Although
the credit card was wife’s financial obligation, she was in possession of only one piece of
furniture purchased with the credit card. In 2007, the card had a $16,000 balance.
Following the separation, the parties took out a second mortgage to pay off the balance.
Wife then paid off the second mortgage.
Husband testified that he lost his job in March 2007. Husband then sought medical
treatment because he experienced dizzy spells and underwent surgery for pres sure on his
brain. Husband collected unemployment benefits. When his benefits ran out, he applied
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for social security disability benefits. Although his application was initially denied,
husband was eventually approved and he received a n initial lump-sum payment of
approximately $41,000, and then m onthly payments of $1,134.90. Husband testified that
before he received the lump-sum payment, he supported himself with his savings and his
401(k). When he received his lump-sum payment, he redeposited it into his 401(k).
Husband testified that he has no debt. He will receive $224 per month from his
pension when he reac hes age 65 in February 2019. Husband testified that he will take
home $1,773 per month from social security after Medicare deducts $134. In 2017,
husband received a $74,000 inheritance. Husband also testified that he earned income for
several years by harvesting wild rice.
Husband testified that the appraised value of the home is $155,000, which is lower
than it should be because he has been unable to maintain it the past ten years. Husband
testified that he contributed $10,500 in nonmarital assets to build the home. Although
husband was involved in building the home, he testified that he cannot do repairs because
he is “disorganized” as a result of his brain injury. He also testified that his “pride” prevents
him for contacting a program in the community that could assist him.
On August 28, 2018, the district court filed the judgment and decree. The district
court found that the parties separated on December 1, 2007, and that it was “fair and
equitable” to use this date as the valuation date. The district court awarded husband the
homestead and his retirement accounts. The district court awarded wife her retirement
accounts. The district court concluded that neither party would receive spousal
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maintenance, and that each would be responsible for their own attorney fees. Husband
moved for amended findings, which the district court denied. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Spousal maintenance
Husband first argues that the district court should have awarded him permanent
spousal maintenance. A district court may award maintenance if, in light of the marital
standard of living, the spouse seeking maintenance “lacks sufficient property . . . to provide
for [his] reasonable needs,” or is otherwise “unable to provide adequate self -support.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2018); see Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989)
(stating that an award of maintenance requires a showing of need). A district court has
broad discretion in deciding whether to award maintenance, and its decision will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn.
2016). A district court abuses its discretion by making factual findings that are unsupported
by the evidence, misapplying the law, or “rendering a decision that is against logic and the
facts on record.” Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation
omitted). This court will not disturb findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
In considering the appropriateness of a spousal- maintenance award, the district
court must consider all relevant statutory factors, including the (1) financial resources of
the party see king maintenance and his ability to m eet his needs independently; (2) time
required for the party seeking maintenance to acquire education or training to f ind
appropriate employment; (3) marital standard of living; (4) length of the marriage and, in
the case of a homemaker, the length of the absence from employment; (5) loss of
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employment opportunities and benefits foregone by the party seeking maintenance; (6) age
and health of the party seeking maintenance; (7) ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet her needs and the needs of the spouse requesting
maintenance; and (8) contribution of each party to the acquisition and preservation of
marital property and the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker. Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 2 (2018).
Husband claims that the most relevant factors are the first—his lack of resources
and inability to meet his needs; the sixth— his age and permanent disability; and the
seventh—wife’s ability to meet both parties’ needs.
In evaluating whether husband was able to meet his needs independently, the district
court determin ed that husband will receive $1,997.56 monthly, but found his claimed
monthly expenses of $2,399 “troubl[ing]” and not “credible.” See Haefele v. Haefele, 621
N.W.2d 758
, 763 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that we give due deference to a district court’s
evaluation of evidence, because it is in the best position to weigh evidence and make
credibility determinations), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001). The district court found
that husband submitted duplicative expenses. The district court also found that husband
was awarded marital property valued at $100,000 more than that awarded to wife. Husband
received his retirement accounts, his inheritance, the home, and all of the items in the home
(including those purchased by wife).
Additionally, husband has been meeting his needs independently over the past ten
years. Husband claims that he spent money only to meet his basic needs and that he should
now have a budget that includes a new vehicle, home repairs, savings, vacations, and
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insurance. But wife testified that the parties had a modest standard of living and lived
paycheck to paycheck. Husband did not contradict wife’s testimony.
The district court appropriately found that husband is disabled and it was unaware
of any suitable employment he could pursue. But the district court noted that husband has
not had any kind of occupational therapy to address his issues and has not looked into any
resources to assist him. The district court also found that husband has earned income
harvesting wild rice since his disability.
Finally, the district court did find that wife would be able to meet her needs and
husband’s needs. But “[n]o single factor is dispositive.” Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d
666
, 668 (Minn. App. 2009). Based on the marital standard of living, and the fact that the
parties have been living financially independent of each other for nearly ten years, the
district court properly exercised its broad discretion in deny ing husband’s request for
spousal maintenance.
Valuation date
Husband argues that the district court erred in choosing 2007 as the valuation date.
Husband claims that the district court should have used February 28, 2018, the date of the
prehearing settlement conference. We review the district court’s choice of a valuation date
for an abuse of discretion. Grigsby v. Grigsby , 648 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. App. 2002),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002). There is no abuse of discretion when the district
court’s factual findings regarding its choice of a valuation date are supported by the record
and its decision has “an acceptable basis in fact and principle.” Id. at 719-20 (quotation
omitted).
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“The court shall value marital assets for purposes of division . . . as of the day of the
initially scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless a different date is agreed upon
by the parties, or unless the court makes specific findings that another date of valuation is
fair and equitable.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2018). Here, the district court made
specific findings that the separation date was fair and equitable. The district court found
that the parties lived “independent and separate lives” since they separated, had minimal
contact, were separated in their daily lives, and that neither was affected by the benefit nor
detriment of the other.
Wife testified that since the separation, the parties never lived together, did not
support each other financially, had few common debts, took care of their own day -to-day
costs, and had their own financial accounts. Wife’s testimony supports the district court’s
findings. And husband did not contradict wife’s testimony. Husband’s only testimony
regarding the fairness of the valuation date related to wife’s pension, which he “was always
planning on.” Based on the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
choosing a valuation date because its factual findings are supported by the record and its
decision has an acceptable basis in fact and principle.
Husband also argues that even if the valuation date was appropriate, the district
court should have “adjust[ed] the valuation of [an asset that had a substantial change in
value] to effect an equitable distribution.” See id. Husband claims that the district court
should have adjusted two assets awarded to him that decreased in value by $154,000. First,
husband was awarded the home, which had an appraised value significantly less than
comparables. But the district court found th at husband was “solely responsible for the
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depreciation in the value of the home [because] [h]e has not properly cared for the home.”
Husband admitted that the house is in need of significant repairs and that he did not care
for it in the past ten years. Husband also claims that his roll-over IRA lost $13,000 in value
and that he was forced to withdraw from this account to support himself. But husband
testified that he paid back his 401(k) with his lump-sum social security disability payment.
The statutory language here is permissive —the district court “may” adjust valuation.
See id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subds . 1, 15 (2018) (stating that the word “[ m]ay,”
when used in Minnesota Statutes, means “permissive”). Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to adjust the date for valuing these assets.
Valuation of property
Husband next argues that the district court erred in assigning a marital value to
wife’s pension. The district court’s valuation of an item of property is a finding of fact,
and it will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous on the record as a whole. Maurer
v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). An appellate court does not require the
district court to be exact in its valuation of assets; “it is only necessary that the value arrived
at lies within a reasonable range of figures.” Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211
(Minn. 1979).
Wife’s expert determined that the marital value of wife’s retirement account, on the
valuation date, was $155,147. The expert’s report was admitted into evidence and husband
did not object. The district court awarded wife her retirement account as it awarded
husband his retirement account. As of the valuation date, husband’s 401(k) had a value of
$127,382.86.
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Husband claims that the district court should have used an approach explained in
Janssen v. Janssen, for pensions that are not mature because they contain contingencies on
the payment of benefits. 331 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. 1983). While Janssen recognizes
an approach to assigning a marital value to a pension, a district court may exercise its
discretion in assigning a value. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
assigning the value determined by wife’s expert, and unchalle nged by husband at trial.
Nonmarital interests
Husband also argues that the district court erred in failing to factor his two
nonmarital interests in the home into the property division, and in failing to find that his
Vanguard Roth IRA was nonmarital.
Husband claims that he was not credited for the $10,485 he contributed to the home
or the $27,613.32 that was remaining on the mortgage that he paid off. The district court
found that in December 2007, the home was valued at $226,100 and that the mortgage
balance was $27,613.32. Husband was awarded the home, at its December 2007 value,
despite wife’s marital interest in the home. Wife was not awarded any interest in the home;
thus, husband received his nonmarital contribution.
Husband also claims that he was not credited for paying off the $27,613.32
mortgage. But wife also requested to be credited for paying off the marital credit-card
debt, which she did pay off in the amount of $16,269.01. Most of the items purchased with
the credit card remain with husband. Thus, any disparity does not render the division
unfair. See Digatono v. Digatono, 414 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that a
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district court does not abuse its discretion when the division of debt is just and equitable),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988).
Husband also argues that the district court failed to find that his Vanguard Roth IRA
account, with a value of $18,612.73, was nonmarital property. But even if the district court
included this $18,612.73 in the marital-property division, it found that husband was
awarded “approximately $100,000 more than” wife in the marital-property division.
Therefore, there is nothing inequitable for us to correct.
Wife’s nonmarital property
Husband next argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to invade
wife’s nonmarital assets so that husband received a portion of her pension. Husband argues
that given the fact th at he is disabled, his income is less than $2,000 per month and
inadequate to meet his needs, and the fact that wife has income over and above her needs,
the district court abused its discretion by failing to award him a large portion of wife’s
nonmarital pension.
Husband argues that it is the “directive” of section 518.58 that the district court
award him a portion of wife’s pension. However, the statute provides that “[i]f the court
finds that either spouse’s resources or property, including the spo use’s portion of the
marital property . . . are so inadequate . . . the court may, in addition to the marital property,
apportion up to one-half of the property otherwise excluded [as nonmarital property] . . .
to prevent [an] unfair hardship.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2018) (emphasis added).
The district court did not make such a finding. Rather, the district court found that husband
was awarded marital property “valued at approximately $100,000 more than the property
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awarded to [wife].” Further, the district court did not find that husband would not be able
to meet his needs because it did not find husband’s monthly expenses credible. There was
no need for the district court to invade wife’s pension when it did not find that husband’s
resources or property were inadequate to work an unfair hardship.
Attorney fees
Finally, husband argues that the district court should have awarded him need-based
attorney fees. A district court “shall award attorney fees, costs, and disbursements in an
amount necessary to enable a party to carry on or contest the proceeding” if it finds that
(1) they are necessary for a party to assert his rights in good faith; (2) the party from whom
they are sought can afford to pay them; and (3) the party seeking them cannot afford to pay
them. Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2018). The district court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to award need-based attorney fees. Husband makes no legal argument as to
why he should have been awarded attorney fees. He claims only that he “should receive
an award of attorney fees because of [the parties’] disparate incomes, the wife had the
means to pay them, and the husband does not have the means to pay them.” There is
nothing in the record showing that wife can pay her fees along with husband’s fees. Wife
submitted an affidavit asserting that she, in fact, cannot pay both her and husband’s
attorney fees. Husband fails to show an abuse of discretion without an argument supporting
his claim.
Affirmed.