State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0318

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Archie Leon Price,
Appellant.

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-16080

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lee R. Johnson, Johnson & Greenberg, P.L.L.P., St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of third -degree controlled -substance sale,
arguing that the warrant to search the barbershop where he worked was not supported by
probable cause, that his statements and the evidence obtained in subsequent searches
should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, and that the property and funds
seized during the search of the barbershop should be returned to him under Minn. Stat.
§ 626.21 (2016). We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Archie Leon Price with th ird-
degree controlled -substance sale and fifth -degree controlled -substance possession. The
complaint alleged that on May 23, 2018, officers executed a search warrant at the
barbershop in Minneapolis and located a backpack in the basement containing appellant’s
wallet, approximately 27 oxycodone pills, 16 suspected ecstasy pills, $4,138 in cash, and
a loaded 9mm semi -automatic pistol. Appellant did not have a valid prescription for the
oxycodone pills. Inside a closet in the basement, officers discovered approximately 741.2
grams of marijuana.
Appellant moved to suppress the evidence found in the barbershop, arguing that the
warrant to search the barbershop was not supported by probable cause. Appellant also
moved to suppress evidence obtained from the se arches of a 2007 Cadillac Escalade and
the Minnesota Prescription Monitoring Program pursuant to two additional search
warrants, arguing that evidence obtained during those searches constituted the fruit of the

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illegal search of the barbershop. Appellant moved that all property and funds seized during
the searches of the barbershop and the vehicle be retu rned to him under Minn. Stat.
§ 626.21.
Following the submission of written arguments by the parties, the district court
denied appellant’s motion.1 Appellant stipulated to the prosecution’s case under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of the district court’s suppression ruling, and the
district court found him guilty as charged. The district court entered judgment s of
conviction on both counts and sentenced appellant to a 36-month prison term on the third-
degree sale count. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Police generally must
obtain a valid search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate before conducting
a search. State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014). To be valid, a search
warrant must be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. “Probable cause exists if the judge issuing a warrant determines that ‘there is a fair
probability t hat contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’” Yarbrough, 841
N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).

1 The district court amended its order on October 15, 2018, to correct typographical errors.

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Appellate courts afford an issuing magistrate’s probable -cause determination great
deference. State v. Rochefort , 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001). An appellate court
reviews an issuing magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant “only to consider whether the
issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id.
Whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant is determined by examining the
“totality of the circumstances.” State v. Zanter , 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995)
(quotation omitted). “In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the totalit y of the
circumstances test, courts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in
isolation.” State v. Wiley , 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985). The components of the
affidavit “viewed together may reveal . . . an internal coherence tha t gives weight to the
whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Furthermore, the resolution of doubtful or marginal
cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants.” Id. at 268
(quotation omitted).
In this case, the circumstances set forth in the search-warrant affidavit regarding the
search of the barbershop are as follows. An officer of the Minneapolis Police Department
received information from a confidential reliable informant (CRI-1), that a person known
to the informant as “T RUE” was involved in the distribution of controlled substances,
including marijuana, from inside a barbershop located on West Lake Street in Minneapolis
where “TRUE” worked as a barber. CRI-1 provided a physical description of “TRUE” and
a cell-phone number for the phone “TRUE” used to facilitate sales of controlled substances.
CRI-1 had “provided ongoing assistance to law enforcement leading to the recovery of

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evidence and prosecution of the defendants involved ,” and the officer believed the
information CRI-1 provided was reliable.
The officer conducted surveillance at the barbershop identified by CRI-1 over a 30-
day period prior to applying for the search warrant . The officer observed a gold Toyota
Camry displaying a Minnesota license plate. The veh icle’s registration indicated it was
registered to E.G. The officer showed CRI-1 a photograph of E.G. , and CRI-1 positively
identified E.G. as “TRUE.”
During surveillance of the barbershop, the officer observed E.G. exit the rear door
to the barbershop and meet with a man who arrived on foot in an alley outside the
barbershop. E.G. accessed the passenger compartment and trunk of the Camry and made
a hand exchange with the man. The man left on foot in the alley. E.G. returned to the
barbershop through the rear door. The meeting between E.G. and the man was for a “short
period of time” and the search -warrant affidavit stated that the officer believed, based on
his experience and training, that the meeting was “consistent with a narcotics deal.”
On another occasion during the officer’s surveillance of the barbershop, the officer
observed E.G. sitting in the driver’s seat of a silver Camaro that displayed a Minnesota
license plate. A person walked up to E.G. and they met for a short period of time, during
which they made a hand exchange. The search -warrant affidavit stated that the officer
believed, based on his experience and training, that the meeting was consistent with a
narcotics deal.
At some point during the three-day period prior to applying for the search-warrant,
law enforcement conducted a controlled buy of marijuana from E.G. using another

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confidential reliable informant, CRI-2. The officer directed CRI-2 to meet with E.G. at the
barbershop. Officers monitored that location and observed E.G. sitting in the silver
Camaro in the rear parking lot of the barbershop. CRI-2 reported to the officer that CRI-2
met with E.G. at the vehicle, where CRI-2 observed E.G. in possession of marijuana,
baggies, and a scale. CRI -2 reported that E.G. sold CRI-2 a quantity of marijuana in
exchange for buy funds provided by law enforcement. CRI-2 provided the officer with the
suspected marijuana he purchased from E.G., which the officer found field-tested positive
for marijuana. After the meeting, officers observed E.G. enter the barbershop.
Appellant contends that information provi ded by CRI -1 was not “sufficient to
establish probable cause” and that the search-warrant affidavit “does not provide a nex us,
either directly or by inference, between the barbershop and [E.G.]’s drugs and contraband.”
We address each argument in turn.
CRI-1’s Tip
Appellant argues that CRI-1’s tip was not sufficient to establish probable cause
because the search-warrant affidavit did not establish that CRI-1 “had a proven track record
of providing reliable information, ” CRI-1’s information about illegal activity inside the
barbershop “was disproved by subsequent police investigation,” and CRI-1’s information
was “too vague and uncertain to establish probable cause.”
When a search -warrant application includes information from an informant, the
supporting affidavit “must provide the magistrate with adequate information from which
he can personally assess the informant’s credibility.” State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113,

7
114 (Minn. 1978). This court has articulated six factors that are relevant when assessing
the reliability of a confidential, but not anonymous, informant:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police can corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if th e informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. June 15,
2004).
As to CRI -1’s reliability, only the second and third reliability factors are relevant
here. “The second factor is fulfilled by a simple statement that the informant has been
reliable in the past . . . .” Id. It is not necessary for officers to provide details regarding
the informant’s past veracity. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999); Ross,
676 N.W.2d at 304.
Appellant argues that the search -warrant “affidavit does not state that CRI -1 had
provided reliable information in the past . . . [i]nstead, the affidavit states the obvious, that
CRI-1 is providing information to police about the present case and the present
defendants.” But appellant misinterp rets the relevant statement from the search -warrant
affidavit. The affidavit states that “CRI -1 has provided ongoing assistance to law
enforcement leading to the recovery of evidence and prosecution of the defendants
involved.” (Emphasis added.) Given that the affidavit uses the past participle “provided”
and refers to obtaining evidence and prosecuting multiple defendants based on CRI -1’s

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information, which had not happened in this case at the time the officer submitted the
search-warrant application, it is clear that the affidavit is referring to CRI-1’s past conduct.
The search -warrant affidavit’s statement regarding CRI -1’s past assistance to law
enforcement shows that CRI-1 was currently reliable.
As to the third reliability factor, appellant argues that the “investigation conducted
by police after they spoke with CRI -1 disproved any notion [E.G.] was selling or storing
drugs and contraband inside the barbershop.” Appellant notes that
(1) police saw that all three drug sales took place outside the
barbershop; (2) police observed that [E.G.] conducted two
sales (second suspected and controlled buy) in his car without
accessing the barbershop; (3) police saw that before the third
drug deal (first suspected sale), [E.G.] accessed two storage
areas of his car before meeting his alleged customer; and
(4) the informant who participated in the controlled buy told
police he/she saw a scale, baggies and other marijuana in
[E.G.]’s car.

“[C]orroboration of even minor details can lend credence to the inf ormant’s
information where the police know the identity of the informant.” State v. Ward , 580
N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted).
In this case, the officer conducted surveillance at the barbershop identified by CRI-
1 and observed the gold Camry registered to E.G. The officer confirmed with CRI-1 that
E.G. was the “TRUE” identified in CRI -1’s tip. The officer observed E.G. engage in two
short meetings with other persons near the barbershop that the officer believed, based on
his experi ence and training, were consistent with narcotics deals. E.G. returned to the
barbershop after the first meeting. The officer directed CRI-2 to conduct a controlled buy
of marijuana from E.G. and CRI -2 purchased marijuana from E.G. while E.G. sat in the

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Camaro in the rear parking lot of the barbershop. E.G. returned to the barbershop after the
controlled buy. In short, police confirmed that the person who CRI -1 reported was
involved in the distribution of controlled substances from inside the barbershop was
distributing controlled substances in the area of the barbershop.
Contrary to appellant’s argument, the fact that police and CRI-2 only observed E.G.
conduct drug transactions outside the barbershop does not disprove CRI -1’s tip that
“TRUE” was “in volved in the distribution of controlled substances” from inside the
barbershop. Instead, those observations tend to corroborate CRI-1’s tip by establishing
that the criminal activity that CRI-1 had reported—the distribution of controlled substances
including marijuana—occurred in the immediate area of the barbershop.
As to CRI-1’s basis of knowledge, appellant argues that CRI-1’s tip was “vague and
uncertain” and the affidavit “provides no clue as to when and how CRI -1 got [that]
information.”
A “basis of knowledge may be supplied directly, by first-hand information, such as
when a CRI states that he purchased drugs from a suspect or saw a suspect selling drugs to
another,” or it may be “supplied indirectly through self -verifying details that allow a n
inference that the information was gained in a reliable way and is not merely based on a
suspect’s general reputation or on a casual rumor circulating in the criminal underworld.”
State v. Cook , 610 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25,
2000).
Although the search -warrant affidavit does not contain evidence of first -hand
information directly establishing CRI-1’s basis of knowledge, CRI-1 provided details that

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suggest that he was familiar with E.G. and his narcotics sales. CRI -1 (1) identified E.G.
by a nickname, “TRUE” ; (2) reported that E.G. was involved in the distribution of
controlled substances, including marijuana, from a Minneapolis barbershop at a specific
address; (3) stated that E.G. was a barber at the barbershop; (4 ) provided a physical
description of E.G.; and (5) identified the cell -phone number of the phone E.G. used to
facilitate the sales of controlled substances. Moreover, police surveillance of the
barbershop and CRI-2’s controlled buy established a link between E.G. and narcotics sales
at the barbershop, which allows an inference that CRI -1’s information was gained in a
reliable way and is not merely based on reputation or rumor.
The search-warrant affidavit adequately established CRI-1’s reliability and basis of
knowledge. Because whether CRI -1’s tip gave the issuing magistrate a substantia l basis
for the issuing magistrate’s probable -cause determination is dependent on whether the
search-warrant affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the barbershop and E.G.’s
criminal activity, we next address that issue.
Nexus between Barbershop and E.G.’s Criminal Activity
Appellant argues that “[a]ll evidence obtained during the search of [the] barbershop
must be suppressed because there was no nexus between the barbershop and [E.G.]’s illegal
activities.”
“Probable cause not only requires that the evidence sought likely exists, but also
that there is a fair probability that the evidence will be found at the specific site to be
searched.” Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622. That is, a “sufficient ‘nexus’ must be
established between the evidence sought and the place to be searched.” Id. “[T]here must

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be specific facts to establish a direct connection between the alleged criminal activity and
the site to be searched.” State v. Souto , 578 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 1998). However,
“direct observation of evidence of a crime at the place to be searched is not required” and
“[a] nexus may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Yarbrough, 841
N.W.2d at 622. Circumstances that courts consider in determining whether there is a
sufficient nexus between the evidence sought and the place to be searched include “the
type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of the defendant’s opportunity for
concealment, and the normal inferences as to where the defendant would usually keep the
items.” Id. at 623; State v. Pierce, 358 N.W.2d 672, 673 (Minn. 1984).
Appellant argues that the “district court erred” by denying his suppression motion
“when it found the affidavit supported an inference police would find proceeds from E.G.’s
drug deals inside the barbershop” and that “[i]f probable cause depends on police finding
cash proceeds inside the barbershop, then probable cause is stale.” However, when
reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, appellate courts
review the district court’s legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145,
149 (Minn. 2009). And appellate courts “may affirm the district court on any ground,
including one not relied on by the district court.” State v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707
(Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012). T hus, unlike the issuing
magistrate’s probable-cause determination, to which we defer, we are not bound by the
district court’s legal reasoning in its suppression order.
The search warrant regarding the barbershop in this case identifies many items other
than cash proceeds, including marijuana and other controlled substances, cell phones and

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storage media, scales and packaging materials, and firearms and ammunition. We therefore
do not limit our nexus analysis to whether there was a nexus between c ash proceeds and
the barbershop. Instead, we consider whether there was a nexus between the evidence
sought as a whole and the barbershop.
Appellant argues that “[t]he type of cri me involved, drug dealing, is, like many
crimes, conducted in secret locations, not a public place like a barbershop.” But CRI -1’s
tip that E.G. was involved in the distribution of controlled substances from inside the
barbershop supports the inference th at narcotics and related contraband would be found
inside the barbershop, especially given that E.G. returned to the barbershop after both the
first suspected drug transaction and the controlled buy.
Appellant argues that “there is no reason for [E.G.] to stash money at work when he
could easily keep it on his person.” Depending on the volume of potential drug
transactions, it may not have been feasible for E.G. to keep all of the proceeds on his
person. And even if E.G. were more likely to keep money on his person, it is reasonable
to infer that E.G. would have kept some of the other items sought —such as controlled
substances, storage media, firearms, and ammunition —at the barbershop if he were using
the barbershop to facilitate drug dealing.
Appellant argues that “[t]he public nature of a business like a barbershop, with the
continuous presence of co -workers and customers, provided limit ed opportunity for
concealment.” Although it may be difficult to conceal contraband in the publicly
accessible parts of the barbershop, it would be s ignificantly easier to conceal it in parts of
the barbershop not open to the public.

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Lastly, appellant argues that it is unreasonable to infer that E.G. would “stash drug
proceeds at his workplace” rather than in his home or vehicle . This argument is
unpersuasive because CRI-1’s tip supports the inference that the barbersho p was not just
E.G.’s workplace; it was also a place he used to distribute controlled substances.
The totality of circumstances here established a sufficient nexus between the
evidence sought and the barbershop.
In sum, the totality of circumstances —including CRI-1’s tip, police observation of
suspected narcotics deals during surveillance of the barbershop, and CRI -2’s controlled
buy—provided the issuing magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed. The district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained in the search of the barbershop.
II.
Appellant contends that his motions to suppress statements and the searches of his
Cadillac Escalade and records on the Minnesota Prescription Monitoring Program should
“be granted under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctr ine” because his “statements would
not have been made but for the illegal search” of the barbershop and because “the warrants
for the searches of his vehicle and records were obtained using information from” that
search. “Evidence that ‘would not have com e to light’ but for police exploitation of their
illegal actions is generally deemed ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and excluded from the
state’s use at trial.” State v. Davis, 910 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963)). Because the issuing
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the

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search warrant for the barbershop, the search of the barbershop was not illegal. Therefore,
appellant’s statements and evidence obtained in the subsequent searches are not fruit of the
poisonous tree. The district court did not err in denying appellant’s motions to suppress
that evidence.
III.
Appellant contends that his motion for “return of money and property seized during
the search of the barbershop” should be granted because “Minn. Stat. § 626.21 requires the
return of property and money seized during illegal searches.” Minn. Stat. § 626.21 allows
a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure” to move the district court “for the
return of the property.” Because the search of the barbershop was not an unlawful search,
Minn. Stat. § 626.21 does not apply. The district court did not err by denying appellant’s
motion for the return of money and property seized during the search of the barbershop.
Affirmed.