Waasohn Dorliae, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0328

Waasohn Dorliae,
Appellant,

vs.

Metro Transit,
Respondent.

Filed November 4, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-17848

Waasohn Dorliae, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Jeannie Provo-Peterson, Daniel J. Stahley, Provo-Petersen & Associates, P.A., Lake Elmo,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Roden berg, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Waasohn Dorliae appeals from the district court’s or der granting
respondent Metropolitan Council’s motion for summary judgment d ismissing appellant’s
complaint with prejudice. Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that
respondent is not liable as a common carrier because appellant’s injury was unforeseeable

2
and that respondent has both statutory and vicarious official immunity from liability. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant sued respondent for da mages she claims were caused b y an altercation
that occurred on respondent’s Metro Transit bus on October 20, 2017. Surveillance video
of the event shows appellant seated near the rear exit of the bus. Standing near that exit is
an unidentified man. The beginning of the recording depicts no physical or verbal contact
between appellant, the unidentified man, or the bus driver.
Approximately six minutes int o the surveillance video, appella nt requests that the
bus stop. As she moves to get off the bus, there is a physical altercation between appellant
and the unidentified man. The video recording does not reveal w h a t p r o v o k e d t h e
altercation. The bus driver can be seen and heard directing bo th appellant and the
unidentified man to leave the bus. Both of them get off the bus.
On December 8, 2017, seven weeks after her claimed injuries, a ppellant sued
respondent. She alleged that, as s h e a t t e m p t e d t o l e a v e t h e b us , s h e w a s a s s a u l t e d a t
knifepoint by an unidentified ma le passenger, and that she sust ained injuries as a result.
Appellant contended that the bus driver asked her “to get off the bus with the person who
assaulted [her].”
During discovery, appellant contended that respondent was with holding portions of
the surveillance video because t he recording that was provided to her through discovery
did not begin until a pproximately six minutes before the alterc ation. She argued that,
before the disclosed recording be gan, she boarded the bus and t he unidentified man

3
harassed her. Appellant maintained that respondent ought to ha ve retained the recording
from the time appellant got on the bus. Respondent contended t o the district court that,
due to the limited internal storage space for the recording system on Metro Transit busses,
surveillance videos are recorded over in the normal course of b usiness unless specifically
downloaded. The disclosed record was retained because police r equested that recording
shortly after the incident as part of a police investigation. No other request for downloading
more of the recording of the bus ride was made until appellant requested the recording
several months after the altercation. The recording from October 20 was, by then, no longer
available.
Respondent moved to dismiss appellant’s complaint for failure to comply with
discovery or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Appellant appeared pro se and did
not provide affidavits or other motion papers. The district co urt granted respondent’s
motion for summary judgment. It found that the record presente d no genuine issue of
material fact, and concluded that there was no evidence in the record to support a claim
that respondent’s bus driver should have foreseen the altercati on. Therefore, it held
respondent is not liable to appellant as a common carrier as a matter of law. The district
court also determined that respondent would also be entitled to both statutory immunity
under Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (2018), and vicarious official immunity on the record
as constituted.
This appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
A district court’s grant of su mmary judgment is reviewed de novo. Montemayor v.
Sebright Prods., Inc. , 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017). In doing so, we determine
whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the d istrict court erred in its
application of law. Fedke v. City of Chaska , 685 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 2004),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 2004). Appellate courts view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party against whom summary judgment was granted. Id.
“[S]ummary judgment is inappropri ate when reasonable persons mi ght draw different
conclusions from the evidence presented.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.
1997). A genuine issue of material fact must be established by substantial evidence. Id..
Although we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
the nonmoving party is required to present more than “mere aver ments” to withstand a
motion for summary judgment and must produce “specific facts sh owing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848
(Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). “Speculation, general assert ions, and promises to
produce evidence at trial are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact . . . .”
Id.
Appellant argues on appeal that “t he district court erred in fi nding this [assault]
sudden and unforeseeable,” thereby relieving respondent of common-carrier liability.
A person generally has no legal duty to act on behalf of or to protect another person,
even if the person knows that action is imperative. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d

5
165, 169 (Minn. 1989). The exist ence of a legal duty “depends . . . on the relationship of
the parties and the foreseeable risk involved.” Id. at 168-69.
A legal duty to act for the protection of an individual arises when there is a special
relationship between the parties. Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth,
539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that
common carriers have a special relationship giving rise to a duty to protect passengers. Id.
But, despite this special relati onship, a common carrier’s duty to protect passengers is
limited to foreseeable harm. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
In a case such as th is one, where one passenger is alleged to have attacked another,
the common carrier’s liability depends on whether the common carrier knew or had reason
to know that danger existed. See Boone v. Martinez, 567 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. 1997)
(holding that liability exists only when a proprietor has notic e of the danger, an adequate
opportunity to protect the injured party, fails to take reasonable steps to protect the injured
party, and that the resulting injury is foreseeable). In the a bsence of foreseeable danger,
the common carrier has no duty to act. Id.
The video record here depicts appellant seated quietly on the bus. The unidentified
man is standing nearby. The two have no contact or interaction for several minutes. The
record does not reveal what, if anything, provoked the altercat ion. The district court
reviewed the record and could di scern “no warning at all—no app reciable indication that
either [appellant] or the uniden tified man were contemplating a ny sort of attack.”
Appellant presented the distric t court no other admissible evid ence to suggest that
respondent’s bus driver could or should have foreseen trouble. In her deposition, appellant

6
admitted that she did not communi cate any concerns she had to t he bus driver before the
altercation. And the record contains no evidence that appellant or anyone else advised the
bus driver of any danger on the bus before the altercation.
Appellant argued to the distric t court that the unidentified man harassed her before
the start of the surveillance footage, and that the unseen events should have alerted the bus
driver that there was a safety risk. But, aside from appellant ’s personal assertion that the
bus driver should have foreseen the risk despite having not bee n alerted to it, appellant
produced no evidence to the district court suggesting that the altercation was foreseeable.
As the district court correctly noted, the altercation took pla ce on a busy bus with many
witnesses. No witness statements or depositions from other pas sengers were produced to
support appellant’s claim that the altercation was foreseeable. Appellant’s lone argument
is that the bus driver, with whom she had not communicated at a ll before the altercation,
should have foreseen t rouble. This is insufficient to survive summary judgment. The
district court concluded that, “[e]ven viewing the evidence ava ilable in [the] light most
favorable to [appellant], there is simply nothing in the record that would support a finding
that the attack that day was foreseeable,” and that summary jud gment was therefore
appropriate. Upon careful review of the record, we agree with the district court in all
respects.
In the alternative, the district court determined that respond ent is also entitled to
both statutory and vicarious official immunity on these facts. Although it is not necessary
to our decision, we see no error in the district court’s altern ative reasoning. Official
immunity applies to respondent’s bus drivers when they make judgments about what to do

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when an altercation occurs on a bus. See Watson by Hanson v. Metro Transit Comm’n ,
553 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn. 1996) (holding that official immunity protects discretionary
rather than ministerial duties). Given the spontaneous alterca tion depicted on the
surveillance video, respondent’s bus driver was required to exercise his discretion. He did
so by directing both belligerents to get off the bus. Appellan t challenges that exercise of
discretion as negligence, but provides no legal argument supporting her contention that the
supreme court’s reasoning in Watson is inapplicable here. We see no error in the district
court’s alternative basis for summarily adjudicating appellant’ s claim by way of official
immunity. Likewise, appellant provides no cognizable legal argument on appeal as to why
the district court’s statutory-immunity analysis is in error. Her argument is that respondent
should be “a neutral party and not let hate exist,” and she cit es no legal authority beyond
generalities of this sort. We decline to reach the statutory-i mmunity issue because
appellant has waived this assignment of error by inadequately b riefing it. See Ganguli v.
Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to addre ss claims
on appeal that are not supported by any legal analysis or citation).
In short, appellant fails to s how error in the district court’ s immunity analysis just
as she fails to demonstrate on appeal that there is a genuine issue of material fact remaining
for trial on respondent’s liability as a common carrier.
The district court did not e rr in granting summary judgment.
Affirmed.