State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0337

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Isaiah Rakeem Wallace,
Appellant.

Filed March 16, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-11978

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles F. Clippert, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction for aiding an offender, appellant challenges
the accuracy of his guilty plea. Appellant also raises several challenges to his conviction

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in a pro se supplemental brief. Because appellant’s guilty plea was accurate, and because
his pro se arguments are unsupported by the record, we affirm.
FACTS
On May 15, 2017, the state charged appellant Isaiah Rakeem Wallace with second-
degree murder. The complaint alleges that appellant was the driver in a drive-by shooting
when a passenger in the vehicle shot and killed a pedestrian. When police interviewed
appellant, he initially denied being present at the shooting and denied knowing who fired
the shots. After this initial denial, he admitted that the shooting occurred while he was
driving and he identified which of his two passengers had fired the shots.
On October 25, 2018, appellant pleaded guilty to an amended charge of aiding an
offender after the fact , in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 3 (2016). At the plea
hearing, in response to a combination of open -ended and leading questions, appellant
admitted he was driving the vehicle during the shooting and admitted to lying to police
about being present during the shooting and knowing the identity of the shooter. The
district court accepted the plea and sentenced appellant to 195 months’ imprisonment—an
upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range that appellant agreed to in the plea
agreement. Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea in this direct appeal.
D E C I S I O N
A defendant may seek plea withdrawal in a direct appeal from final judgment if the
record is sufficient to review the issue. State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 , 354-55
(Minn. 2003); Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). “Assessing the validity
of a plea presents a question of law that [ appellate courts] review de novo.” State v.

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Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). The burden is on the defendant to show that
his plea was invalid. Id. “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. Appellant challenges the accuracy of his plea.
Appellant argues that his plea was not accurate because it lacks an adequate factual
basis. “A proper factual basis must be established for a guilty plea t o be accurate.” State
v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). This requirement “protect[s] a defendant
from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to
insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). Typically,
a factual basis is established by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the district court
“questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in his or her own words the
circumstances surrounding th e crime.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716. The defendant’s
explanation “usually will suggest questions to the court which then, with the assistance of
counsel, can interrogate the defendant in further detail.” Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251.
A factual basis may also be established through the “testimony of witnesses and statements
summarizing the evidence.” Id. The district court should not accept the guilty plea “unless
the record supports the conclusion that the defendant actually committed an offense at least
as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty.” Id. at 252.
Appellant argues that the factual basis for his plea is insufficient because his
attorney established it solely through leading questions. The supreme court “discourage[s]
the use of leading questions to establish a factual basis.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717. It has
cautioned that the district court, which is responsible for ensuring that a sufficient factual
basis is established on the recor d, “must be particularly attentive to situations in which a

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defendant is pleading guilty and is asked only leading questions by counsel.” Id. at 716
(emphasis added). However, while disfavored, leading questions are not necessarily a fatal
defect to a pl ea, and “a defendant may not withdraw his plea simply because the court
failed to elicit proper responses if the record contains sufficient evid ence to support the
conviction.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94, 96 (determining that “the factual basis for [the
defendant]’s plea is sufficient, despite its disfavored format”).
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the factual basis for his guilty plea was established
through both open -ended and leading questions. His attorney began by asking him a
combination of open-ended and leading questions, and used open-ended questions for key
parts of the factual basis. For example, after ascertaining that appellant stopped the vehicle
at the shooter’s request, defense counsel had appellant explain the shooting in his own
words by asking “what happened from there?” It was only after a comprehensive series of
questions that elicited the details of the shooting that appellant’s attorney asked specific
leading questions that appellant challenges here:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And you agreed to talk to the
police; correct?
APPELLANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right. And nobody forced you to
talk to the police; right?
APPELLANT: No.
. . . .
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, when you talked to the police,
you lied and said that you did not know the shooter; correct?
APPELLANT: Correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, at some point, you even said
that you weren't there; correct?
APPELLANT: Correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you -- and you agreed that that
was not the truth?

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APPELLANT: Correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you did know who [the shooter]
was; correct?
APPELLANT: Correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you agreed that you did lie so
that [the shooter] would not be arrested; correct?
APPELLANT: Correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you agreed that there was
participation by three individuals; correct?
APPELLANT: Correct.

Thus, although appellant’s attorney asked him about lying to the police using leading
questions, this is not a case in which the entire factual basis was established through leading
questions. By the time appellant’s attorney asked the leading questions at issue, appellant
had already described his involvement with the shooting in response to several key open-
ended questions. The entire exchange between appellant and his attorney reveals a
sufficient factual basis for appellant’s guilty plea.
Appellant also argues that his plea was not accurate because the factual basis does
not comport with the elements of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Appellant pleaded
guilty to aiding an offender after the fact, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 3:
Obstructing investigation . Whoever intentionally aids
another person whom the actor knows or has reason to know
has committed a criminal act, by destroying or concealing
evidence of that cri me, providing false or misleading
information about that crime . . . or otherwise obstructing the
investigation or prosecution of that crime is an accomplice
after the fact . . . .

(emphasis added .) Appellant argues that he was not questioned about whethe r he
intentionally aided the shooter by providing false or misleading information or otherwise

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obstructed the investigation. Appellant’s answers support his conviction for violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 3.
The law does not require that appellant’s answers provide a verbatim recitation of
the offense elements. The well-established standard is that “before a plea of guilty can be
accepted, the trial judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt
of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred .” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861
(Minn. 2016) (emphasis added). Appellant admitted to facts that establish that he
intentionally gave false information to obstruct the investigation . He admitted to lying
about his presence at the shooting and knowing the identity of the shooter , and admitted
that he did this so that the shooter would not be arrested. His guilt of aiding an offender
after the fact “can be reasonably inferred.” Id.
Appellant also submitted a pro se supplemental brief in this appeal that appears to
assert two arguments. First, appellant claims that his “attorney and the . . . county attorney”
pressured him into pleading guilty. The record indicates otherwise. During the plea
hearing appellant r epeatedly acknowledged that he was not pressured or forced into
pleading guilty. The record contains no evidence to the contrary that allows us to review
this claim. See State v. Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 13, 1987).
Next, appellant argues that his sentence, which was a n upward departure from the
sentencing guidelines range, violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004). Blakely requires that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

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doubt.” 542 U.S. at 30 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quotation omitted). Appellant’s pro se
argument ignores that he waived his rights under Blakely. A Blakely waiver must be
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See State v. Barker , 705 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn.
2005). Appellant waived his Blakely rights in the following exchange:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you understand that, with this --
with this plea agreement, you will be receiving an aggravated
sentence of 195 months; correct?
APPELLANT: Correct.
. . . .
THE COURT: [A]nd you’re relieving the State of any burden
to prove any facts that would allow you to be sentenced
upwardly.
APPELLANT: Yes, ma’am.
. . . .
THE COURT: And this is what you want to have happen
today?
APPELLANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Very well. Then I find you’ve made a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of your rights with regard to
those factors -- Blakely as well.

Appellant does not contend that this waiver was unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent.
His argument that his Blakely rights were violated is without merit.
Affirmed.