State of Minnesota, by its Commissioner of Transportation, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0343

State of Minnesota,
by its Commissioner of Transportation,
Respondent,

vs.

Cole A. Schneider, et al.,
Respondents Below,
Richard A. Kelly, Jr., et al.,
Appellants.

Filed September 9, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-15-760

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jeffery S. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kenneth D. Butler, Kenneth D. Butler, Ltd., Duluth, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Tracy M. Smith, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
In eminent-domain proceedings, interest accrued under Minn. Stat. § 117.195, subd.
1 (2018), is not included in the final judgment or award of damages to determine eligibility
for reimbursement of attorney fees under th e plain meaning of Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a)
(2018).

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O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In this condemnation action, appellant landowners challenge the district court’ s
denial of their motion for attorney fees, which was based on the court’s determination that
appellants’ final judgment or award of damages did not exceed the $25,000 threshold for
reimbursement of attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a). Appellants argue that the
district court erred in concluding that interest accrued under Minn. Stat. § 117.195, subd.
1, is not included in the final judgment or award of damages under Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a).
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant landowners Richard A. Kelly, Jr., and Sandra L. Kelly (the Kellys) owned
real property described as Parcel 35. In 2015, the state petitioned to acquire several parcels
of land, including Parcel 35, to make highway improvements. The taking occurred in
August 2015. In October 2018, court -appointed commissioners held a hearing regarding
the taking of Par cel 35. The commissioners iss ued a report, awarding the Kellys
$24,552.00 as compensation for damages they su stained from the 2015 taking. Pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1, the Kellys were entitled to interest on their dama ges in
the amount of $2,104.87. The Kellys filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 117.031(a). The district court denied the Kellys’ motion, determining that their final
damages award of $24,552.00 did not exceed the $25,000 threshold requirement under
section 117.031(a) to qualify for reimbursement of attorney fees. The district court
reasoned that the Kellys failed to exceed the $25,000 threshold because “the accrued

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interest [under section 117.195, subdivision 1] is not included in the final award of damages
under [section] 117.031.” This appeal follows.
ISSUE
Did the district court err in holding that interest accrued under
Minn. Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1, is not included in the final judgment or award of
damages under Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a), to determine eligibility for reimburs ement
of attorney fees?

ANALYSIS
The Kellys argue that the district court erred by determining that interest accrued
pursuant to section 117.195, subdivision 1, is not included in the final judgment or award
of damages under section 117.031(a), because M inn. Sta t. § 549.09, subd. 1(a) (2018)
states that interest shall be “added to the judgment or award.” We disagree.
Generally, we review a district court’ s award of attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987).
But when, as here, that decision turns on the interpretation of a statute, we review de novo.
Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Minn. 2000). “When interpreting a statute, we first
look to see whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” Am. Family
Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000) . A statute is ambiguous if it is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Christianson v. Henke , 831 N.W.2d
532, 537 (Minn. 2013). If it is unambiguous, we interpret the statute’s text according to its
plain language. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001).
When a statute does not defin e a word, we assume the legislature is aware of its
common-law meaning and intended to use the word according to that meaning. U.S. Bank

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N.A. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 802 N.W.2d 363, 372 (Minn. 2011). To identify the plain
meaning of a word, we refer to its common usage. TCI Bus. Capital, Inc. v. Five Star Am.
Die Casting, LLC, 890 N.W.2d 423, 430 (Minn. App. 2017).
The narrow issue before us is whether the plain language of section 117.031(a)
unambiguously provides that interest is included in the final judgment or award of damages
to determine eligibility for attorney fees. Chapter 117 governs eminent -domain
proceedings. Section 117.031(a) provides that “[n]o attorney fees shall be awarded under
this paragraph if the final ju dgment or award of damages does not exceed $25 ,000.” We
conclude that this language is clear and unambiguous, and we therefore look to the plain
meaning of the statute.
A “[f]inal judgment” is “[a] court’s last action that settles the rights of the parties
and disposes of all issues in controversy, except fo r the award of costs (and, sometimes
attorney’s fees) and enforcement of the judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 919 (10th ed.
2009). An “award” is “[a] final judgment or decision, [especially] one by an arbitrator or
by a jury assessing damages. ” Id. at 157. “Damages” refers to “[m]oney claimed by, or
ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury.” Id. at 445. Section
117.031(a) does not reference the word “interest,” nor does it authorize including other
amounts in the final judgment or award of damages used to determine eligibility . And it
does not cite to section 117.195 or section 549.09 regarding interest. See Minn. Stat.
§ 117.031(a). We must not read into a statute language that the legislature omitted. In re
Estate of Eckley, 780 N.W.2d 407, 41 3 (Minn. App. 2010) . Therefore, we hold that the

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final judgment or award of damages in section 117.031(a) does not include interest accrued
pursuant to section 117.195, subdivision 1.
The Kellys focus on sections 117.195, subdivision 1, and 549.09, subdivision 1(a).
“We are to read and construe a statute as a whole and must interpret each section in light
of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at
277. Section 117.195, subdivision 1, provides that “[a]ll damages allowed under this
chapter . . . shall bear interest . . . [and] [t]he rate of interest shall be determined according
to section 549.09.” Minn. Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1 (emphasis added) . Section 549.09
governs interest on verdicts, awards, and judgments in civil actions, and subdivision 1(a)
provides:
When a judgment or award is for the recovery of money,
including a judgment for the recovery of taxes, interest from
the time of the verdict, award, or report unti l judgment is
finally entered shall be computed by the court administrator or
arbitrator as provided in paragraph (c) and added to the
judgment or award.

(Emphasis added.) The Kellys argue that, because section 549.09, subd ivision 1(a),
requires that in terest shall be added to the award, their final damages award amounts to
$26,656.87, and this exceeds section 117.031(a)’s $25,000 eligibility threshold, thus
entitling them to reimbursement of attorney fees. We are not persuaded. Section 117.195,
subdivision 1, refers to section 549.09 to determine how to calculate the rate of interest.
The interest-rate calculation is found in section 549.09, subdivision 1(c), not subdivision
1(a). Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(c) (2018). Also, subdivision 1(a) refers to subdivision
1(c) for interest-rate calculation. Section 549.09, subd ivision 1(c)(1)(i) provides for rate

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calculation on a per -annum basis. Neither section 117.195, subdivision 1, nor section
549.09, subdivision 1(c)(1)(i), provides that interest shall be included in section
117.031(a)’s final judgment or award.
The Kelly s further argue that the district court erred in relying on State ex rel.
Mondale v. Gannons Inc ., which noted that “the law presumes that [interest] will not be
included in the award.” 145 N.W.2d 321, 330 (Minn. 1966). They argue that, pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 645.39 (2018), subsequent amendments to section 117.195, subdivision 1,
“effectively abolished” the presumption in Gannons. Section 645.39 provides:
When a law purports to be a revision of all laws upon a
particular subject, or sets up a general or exclusive system
covering the entire subject matter of a former law and is
intended as a substitute for such former law, such law shall be
construed to repeal all former laws upon the same subject.

They further argue that, “[h]ad the legislature intended to keep interest separate from an
award of damages pursuant to [section] 117.195, [subdivision] (1). . . it could have done
so” in its 1984 amendment, “but it did not.”
Gannons, decided in 1966, analyzed section 117.16, the precursor to section
117.195. 145 N.W.2d at 330. Section 117.16, as it appeared in 1966, provided that “[a]ll
damages allowed under this chapter, whether by the commissioners or upon appeal, shall
bear interest from the time of the filing of the commissioner’s report. ” Minn. Stat.
§ 117.16 (1965) (emphasis added). In 1971, the legislature repla ced section 117.16 with
section 117.195, but preserved the substantiv e statutory requirement that “[a]ll damages
allowed under this chapter , whether by the commissioners or upon appeal, shall bear
interest from the time of the filing of the commissioner’ s report or from the date of the

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petitioner’s possession whichever occu rs first.” Minn. Stat. § 117.195 (1971) (emphasis
added).
In 1984, the legislature amended section 117.195 as follows:
All damages allowed under this chapter, whether by the
commissioners or on appeal, shall bear interest from the time
of the filing of the commissioner’s report or from the date of
the petitioner’s possession whichever occurs first. The rate of
interest shall be determined according to section 549.09.

(Emphasis added.) Once again, the legislature preserved the substantive statutory
requirement that all damages bear interest . It added a reference to section 549.09 solely
for the purpose of calculating the rate of interest owed on a final award. This addition did
not repeal the substantive provision of the statute requiring payment of interest on a final
award of damages , nor did it change the Gannons court’s interpretation of the statutory
language that interest “will not be included in the award” for damages . Therefore, the
substantive requirement analyzed in Gannons remains in effect, and the district court did
not abuse its discretion in relying on Gannons to support its denial of the Kellys’ motion
for attorney fees.
D E C I S I O N
The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a) does not mention interest, nor does
it authorize adding other amounts to the final judgment or award of damages used to
determine eligibility for reimbursement of attorney fees. Therefore, we hold that, interest
accrued pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.195, subd. 1, is not included in the “final judgment

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or award of damages ” under Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a) to determine eligibility for
reimbursement of attorney fees. The district court properly denied the Kellys’ motion for
attorney fees.
Affirmed.