State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0344

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alberto Fuentes Cruz,
Appellant.

Filed December 30, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-17-205

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
On direct appeal from his convictions of misdemeanor driv ing while impaired
(DWI) and driving after cancelation, appella nt argues that the district court erred by
denying his suppression motion. We affirm.
FACTS
In February 2017, appellant Alberto Fu entes Cruz was lawfully stopped by a
sheriff’s deputy for failing to properly signal a lane change. Upon speaking with appellant,
the deputy detected an odor of alcohol and observed several signs that led the deputy to
believe appellant was under the influence of a stimulant. Although appellant was unable
to complete field sobriety testing due to a bad hip, the deputy obtained a preliminary breath
test (PBT), which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.019%. The deputy also checked
appellant’s license information, which reveal ed that appellant’s dr iving privileges were
canceled as inimical to public safety (IPS).
Appellant was arrested for driving a ve hicle while having a canceled-IPS driving
status. He was then transporte d to the Nobles County Jail wher e, as part of the standard
booking process, appellant was asked to provide a urine sample. The urine sample tested
positive for methamphetamine. A jail sergeant informed the deputy of the test results. The
deputy then applied to the Nobles County District Court for a search warrant to obtain a
sample of appellant’s blood. The search warrant application noted that appellant submitted
a urine sample at the jail, which “gave a positive result for methamphetamine.” The district
court issued the search warrant, and the blood sample confirmed the presence of

3
methamphetamine in appellant’s system. Re spondent State of Minnesota subsequently
charged appellant with one count of gross misdemeanor driving after cancelation—IPS,
and one count of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of a controlled substance.
Appellant moved to suppress the results of the blood test as fruits of an unlawful
search, arguing that the search warrant was invalid because it “was based solely on private
medical data which was improperly disclosed by jail staff to an investigating police officer
during the course of a criminal investigation.” The district court determined that data
stemming from a “urine sample collected as part of the booking process is ‘corrections and
detention data’” under the Minnesota Gove rnment Data Practices Act (MGDPA). See
Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-.90 (2018 & Supp. 2019). The district court also determined that
although this corrections and detention data is classified as private under the MGDPA, see
Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 2, it “may be releas ed to law enforcement if necessary for law
enforcement purposes” under Minn . Stat. § 13.85, subd. 5. Th e district court, therefore,
denied appellant’s motion to suppress because the results of the urine test were
“appropriately reported to law enforcement.”
After stipulating to the state’s case unde r Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, the
district court found appellant guilty and convicted him of both the charged offenses. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges the denial of his mo tion to suppress the blood test results,
arguing that the results of his urine test collected by jail staff and disclosed to the deputy
under Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 5, may not be disclosed to the district court as part of a

4
search warrant application. When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to
suppress, this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
determinations de novo. State v. Ortega , 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). Because
appellant stipulated to the state’s evidence pursuant to rule 26.01, subdivision 4, our
“review is further limited to the pretrial order that denied [appellant’s] motion to suppress.”
Id.
The state contends that a ppellant’s argument is not pr operly before us because
appellant’s argument to the district court wa s more narrow than his argument on appeal.
The state notes that, in his suppression motion, appellant argued that the MGDPA
precluded jail staff from disclosing the resu lts of appellant’s urine sample to law
enforcement. On appeal, appellant appears to concede that the disclosure of this
corrections and detention data to law enforcement did not violate the MGDPA, and instead
argues that disclosure of this same data by law enforcement to the courts violated the
MGDPA. “It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal.”
Taylor v. State , 910 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Although the
argument appellant makes on appeal was not clearly articulated before the district court,
the record reflects that appellant generally argued below that it was a violation of the
MGDPA to use the results of a urine test, taken as part of the booking process, in the search
warrant affidavit and that the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant should be
suppressed. We therefore conclude that appellant’s argument is properly before us.
Turning to the merits of appellant’s argumen t, we note that the parties stipulated
that the MGDPA issue is “dispositive” and that suppression of the blood test is warranted

5
if appellant “prevail[s] on appeal.” By their stipulation, the parties agree that the MGDPA
issue is dispositive. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(c) (stating that defendant and
prosecutor “must acknowledge that the pretrial i ssue is dispositive, or that a trial will be
unnecessary if the defendant prevails on appeal”). But the parties do not reference, nor are
we aware of, any authority that holds that th e exclusionary rule applies to the MGDPA.
Cf. State v. Mike , 919 N.W.2d 103, 110-11 (Minn. App. 2018) (recognizing that not all
statutory violations require suppression of evidence), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019).
Nonetheless, we need not decide whether a violation of the MGDPA requires suppression
of the blood test results because we conclude that appellant has not shown a violation of
the act. Cf. State v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 1985) (declining to decide whether
disclosure of the address of a welfare client to police, absent a court order, violated the
MGDPA because even if there was a technical violation, suppression was not required).
We begin our analysis of the MGDPA by interpreting the a pplicable statutory
language. “The objective of st atutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
Legislature’s intent.” State v. Struzyk , 869 N.W.2d 280, 28 4 (Minn. 2015). When
interpreting a statute, words and phrases are “construed according to the rules of grammar
and according to their common and approved usage.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914,
920 (Minn. 2019) (quo tation omitted). A statute is ambi guous only when the statutory
language is subject to more than one reas onable interpretation, and if the statute is
unambiguous, we apply the statute’s plain meaning. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307
(Minn. 2012). Statutory-interpretati on issues are reviewed de novo. State v. Vasko ,
889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017).

6
The MGDPA “regulates the collection, creation, storage, maintenance,
dissemination, and access to government data in government entities.” Minn. Stat. § 13.01,
subds. 1, 3. A government entity is “a state agency, statewid e system, or political
subdivision.” Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 7a. The MGDPA differentiates between “data on
individuals” and “data not on individuals.” See Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subds. 4, 5. “After
the initial classification as either data on indi viduals or not on individuals, the data is
categorized as either public, private, or confidential.” Int’l Bhd. Of Elec Workers, Local
No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. 2009). Public data on individuals
is accessible to the public. Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 15. Private data on individuals is
data which is made not public by statute or fe deral law, but is accessible to the subject of
the data. Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 12. Confidential data on individuals is data made not
public by statute or federal law, and is not accessible to the individual subject of that data.
Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 3. While private data and confidential data generally may not
be disclosed to the public, private data may be disclosed as specficially authorized by law.
Minn. Stat. § 13.05, subd. 4(b).
Under Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 2, certa in “corrections and detention data on
individuals are classified as private.” “C orrections and detent ion data” is data on
individuals that is “created, collected, used or maintained because of their lawful
confinement or detainment in state reformatories, prisons and correctional facilities,
municipal or county jails, lockups, workhouses, work farms and all other correctional and
detention facilities.” Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 1. Corrections and detention data may be
released “to any law enforcement agency, if necessary for law enforcement purposes, or to

7
the victim of a criminal act where the data are necessary for the victim to assert the victim’s
legal right to restitution.” Minn. Stat. § 13.85 , subd. 5. And Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 4
provides that “[a]fter any presentation to a court, any data made private or confidential by
this section shall be public to the extent reflected in court records.”
Here, the parties agree that the test results from the urine samp le collected at the
county jail are private “corrections and detention data” within the meaning of the MGDPA.
Appellant appears to concede that the jail was authorized to release the results of the urine
test to the deputy for “law enforcement purposes” under section 13.85, subdivision 5. But
appellant argues that because the district court “is part of the judiciary,” which is separate
and distinct from law enforcem ent, the deputy l acked authority u nder the MGDPA to
release appellant’s urine-test results to the court in the warrant application. Appellant
argues that disclosure of his urine-test result s to the district court in the search warrant
application violated the MGDPA, and theref ore the search warrant was invalid and the
results of his blood test should be suppressed.1 We disagree.
When interpreting a statute, we must construe the statute “as a whole and the words
and sentences therein are to be unders tood in light of their context.” State v. Alarcon ,
932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted). Various provisions of the same
statute must also be “interpreted in the light of each other, and the legislature must be
presumed to have understood the effect of it s words and intended the entire statute to be

1 Appellant appears to contend that if the sear ch warrant is determined to be invalid, both
of his convictions should be reversed. Bu t appellant’s convicti on of driving after
cancelation was not dependent upon the info rmation sought in the search warrant.
Consequently, appellant’s challenge on appeal is limited to his DWI conviction.

8
effective and certain.” Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc. , 93 N.W.2d 690, 698
(Minn. 1958).
Construing section 13.85 as a whole, and its words and sentences in light of their
context, we conclude that the disclosure of appellant’s urine-test results to the district court
in the search-warrant affidavit did not violate the MGDPA. Although appellant’s urine-test
results are private corrections and detention data under Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 2, these
results may be released “to any law enforcement agency, if necessary for law enforcement
purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 13.85, subd. 5. A search warrant serv es a law enforcement
purpose.
Additionally, subdivision 4 of the statute pr ovides that “[a]fter any presentation to
a court, any data made private . . . by this sec tion shall be public to the extent reflected in
court records.” Id., subd. 4. The fact that Minn. Stat . § 13.85, subd. 4 contemplates that
private data under section 13. 85 may be presented to a co urt indicates that private
corrections and detention data may be disclosed by law enfor cement to the district court
“for law enforcement purposes” without viol ating the MGDPA. And the provision in
subdivision 4 that the private corrections and detention data becomes public only “to the
extent reflected in court records” demonstrates that the filing of private data with the courts
is not the same as disclosing private data to the public and is permitted by the MGDPA.
Finally, appellant’s argument, if adopted, would lead to an absurd result. See Minn.
Stat. § 645.17(1) (2018) (directing that courts are to presume that “the legislature does not
intend a result that is absurd ”). As the state points out, if the MGDPA precludes law
enforcement from filing private corrections and detention da ta with the courts in a

9
search-warrant application, then law enforcement would also be precluded from disclosing
criminal investigative data to the courts. See Minn. Stat. § 13.82, subd. 7 (“[I]nvestigative
data collected or created by a law enforcement agency in order to prepare a case against a
person, whether known or un known, for the commission of a crime . . . for which the
agency is the primary investigative responsib ility are confidential or protected nonpublic
while the investigation is active.”). If that were the case, then law enforcement would be
severely hampered in obtaining search warrants and investigating crimes.
Because the results of appellant’s urine test were validly disclosed to the district
court by law enforcement for law enforcement purposes in the search warrant application,
appellant’s claim of a violation of the MGDPA is without merit. Appellant has not shown
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We therefore affirm
appellant’s convictions.
Affirmed.