State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0352

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jimmy Lee Robinson,
Appellant.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-13539

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi L. Proulx, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A Hennepin County jury found Jimmy Lee Robinson guilty of second-degree
assault based on evidence that he stabbed his brother in the back with a knife . Robinson

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argues that the district court erred by denying his request for substitut ion of counsel. We
conclude that Robinson’s request was untimely, that Robinson did not make serious
allegations concerning his attorney ’s ability or competence, and that there were no
exceptional circumstances that required the substitution of counsel. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
During the evening of May 20, 2018 , Robinson’s brother, J.R., visited Robinson’s
Minneapolis home with a friend who was interested in purchasing a crossbow from
Robinson. When J.R. and his friend arrived at Robinson’s home, they saw that Robinson
was talking with another person. J.R. retrieved the crossbow from Robinson’s home and
took it outside to show it to his friend. After J.R.’s friend and Robinson’s guest departed,
Robinson came outside and asked J.R. about the location of the crossbow. J.R. told
Robinson that it was in his truck. Robinson then hit J.R. on his head with a glass brandy
bottle, chased J.R., and stabbed him in the back with a knife. A bystander called 911.
Police officers responded to the call and arrested Robinson.
The state charged Robinson with second-degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 1 (2016). Robinson’s public defender demanded a speed y trial on
Robinson’s behalf. In late July 2018, Robinson sent a letter from the county jail to the
assigned district court judge in which he asserted that he should not be in custody because
there was “no victim [in] this case.” Robinson did not express any dissatisfaction with his
public defender.
Robinson appeared for trial in September 2018. A different public defender
appeared with him because Robinson’s first public defender was in trial in a different case.

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The second public defender informed the district court that Robinson was frustrated, in part
because he had appeared for trial “not with his lawyer but with somebody stepping in to
just kind of handle the matter today.” The district court judge continued the trial.
Trial began in October 2018. Robinson appeared with his first public defender .
After a jury was selected, the state called four witnesses: J.R., a records custodian for the
city’s 911 system, a juvenile who was a n eyewitness to the stabbing, and one of the
responding police officers. On the morning of the third day of trial, Robinson addressed
the district court by saying that he was not getting a fair trial and that he wanted a new
attorney, a new jury, and a new judge. The district court asked Robinson to explain the
reasons for his requests. Robinson stated that his attorney had met with him only once
before the trial for only five minutes and was not knowledgeable about the case. Robinson
further stated that he did not receive discovery responses from the state and that his public
defender did not follow up on Robinson’s suggestions of three possible defense witnesses.
The district court denied Robinson’s requests because the case was in the middle of trial
and Robinson’s attorney was prepared to proceed.
Robinson continued to express concerns, stating that he no longer wanted to be
present during trial, re iterating that he wanted to fire his attorney, and stating that his
attorney was on Facebook during trial. The district court responded by stating that
Robinson’s attorney was not on Facebook and that Robinson would not be assigned another
public defender. After additional colloquy, Robinson waived his right to be present during
trial and left the courtroom.

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The trial resumed. The state called two additional police officers as witnesses. The
defense did not introduce any evidence . The case was submitted to the jury on the
afternoon of the third day. The jury found Robinson guilty. The district court sentenced
him to 61 months of imprisonment. Robinson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Robinson argues that the district court erred by denying his request for the
substitution of his court-appointed attorney on the grounds tha t the district court did not
conduct a “searching inquiry ” into his complaints and that exceptional circumstances
warranted substitution.
The United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution guarantee criminal
defendants the right to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 6. Criminal defendants who cannot afford to hire an attorney are entitled to a court-
appointed attorney at public expense . Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 339 -45,
83 S. Ct. 792, 794-97 (1963); State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn. 2013). “But the
right of an indigent defendant to court-appointed defense counsel is not an ‘unbridled right
to be represented by counsel of [the defendant ’s] choosing.’” Id. at 586 (alterations in
original) (quoting State v. Fagerstrom, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1970)). If an indigent
defendant requests the substitution of a court-appointed attorney, a district court must grant
the request “‘only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and
reasonably made.’” State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 278 (Minn. 1998) (quoting State v.
Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1977)). If a defendant expresses “serious allegations”
about an appointed attorney’s ability or competence, “the district court s hould conduct a

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‘searching inquiry ’ before determining whether the defendant ’s complaints warra nt the
appointment of substitute counsel.” Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 586 (quoting State v. Clark ,
722 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006)). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard to
review a district court ’s denial of a request for the substitution of a court -appointed
attorney. Id.
We begin by addressing one of the state’s responsive arguments, which is focused
on a prerequisite of a request for substitution of counsel. The state argues that Robinson’s
request was untimely. Indeed, a district court must grant a request for the substitution of
counsel “only if . . . the demand is timely and reasonably made.” Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at
278 (quotation omitted ) (emphasis added) . In Worthy, the defendants requested the
substitution of their court-appointed attorneys on the morning of the first day of trial.
583 N.W.2d at 278. The supreme court concluded that the requests were untimely. Id. at
278-79. Similarly, in Clark, the defendant requested substitution of his court-appointed
attorney after jury selection had begun. 722 N.W.2d at 465. The supreme court concluded
that the request was untimely. Id. In this case, Robinson requested the substitution of his
court-appointed attorney on the third and last day of trial, after the parties had selected a
jury and after the state had presented four witnesses. Robinson had not expressed any
concerns about his attorney on the first or second day of trial. In light of Worthy and Clark,
Robinson’s request was untimely.
Robinson’s primary argument is that the district court erred by denying his request
for substitution of counsel without conducting a “searching inquiry” into his concerns. The
state responds by arguing that the district court was not obligated to conduct a searching

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inquiry because Robinson did not “voice[] serious allegations of inadequate
representation.” See Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 586. The state is correct that serious allegations
are a prerequisite to a searching inquiry: “When the defendant ‘voices serious allegations
of inadequate representation,’ the district court should conduct a ‘searching inquiry’ before
determining whether the defendant ’s complaints war rant the appointment of substitute
counsel.” Id. (quoting Clark, 722 N.W.2d at 464). In Munt, the supreme court rejected an
argument similar to Robinson’s argument on the ground that the defendant merely “may
have been dissatisfied with his defense counsel” but that “neither of his statements
constituted serious allegations of inadequate representation that would have triggered the
district court’s duty to further inquire and determine whether it needed to appoint substitute
counsel.” Id. Robinson’s concerns in this case are similar to the concerns expressed in
Munt. Robinson’s concerns do not implicate his attorney ’s “ability or competence ” to
provide Robinson an adequate defense. See State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn.
2001). Thus, the district court was not obligated to conduct a searching inquiry into his
concerns before ruling on his untimely request for the substitution of his court-appointed
attorney. Even if the district court were obligated to conduct a searching inquiry, we likely
would conclude that the district court satisfied that duty because the district court asked
Robinson to explain his concerns and patiently listened to his explanations.
Robinson’s secondary argument is that the district court erred by denying his request
for substitution of counsel on the ground that exceptional circumstances were apparent and
required substitution. Exceptional circumstances warranti ng the substitution of court-
appointed counsel are “those that affect appointed counsel ’s ability or competence to

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represent the client. ” Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 586 (quotation omitted) . General
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel does not amount to an exceptional circumstance. Id.
Robinson asserts that exceptional circumstances existed be cause his attorney was not
prepared for trial, did not “vet out” possible witnesses that Robinson had identified on the
second day of trial, did not engage the state or its witnesses in the adversarial process, and
was distracted during trial . Robinson’s assertions are not supported by the record . The
district court stated on two occasions that Robinson’s attorney was adequately prepared for
trial. The district court also implied that Robinson’s attorney was advocating on his behalf
in a satisfactory manner. The district court further stated that Robinson’s attorney was not
on Facebook . Because the record does not reveal any reason to doubt Robinson’s
attorney’s “ability or competence” to provide him with an adequate defense, there were no
exceptional c ircumstances requiring the substitution of the attorney. See Munt ,
831 N.W.2d at 586; see also Gillam, 629 N.W.2d at 449.
In sum , the district court did not err by denying Robinson ’s request for the
substitution of his court-appointed attorney.
Affirmed.