In re the Marriage of: Thomas W. Krabbenhoft, petitioner, Respondent

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0353

In re the Marriage of: Thomas W. Krabbenhoft, petitioner,
Respondent

vs.

Norma A. Krabbenhoft, n/k/a Norma A. Flores,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2020
Reversed
Florey, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-FA-14-1153

Robert Schultz, Conmy Feste, Ltd., Fargo, North Dakota (for respondent)

Heidi H. Uecker, Legal Services of Northwest Minnesota, Moorhead, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In a motion to amend a judgment and decree, respondent sought reimbursement for
child support paid to appellant over the three years following their stipulated divorce
decree. The district court denied the motion to amend , but used its equitable powers to

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issue a money judgment against appellant in favor of respondent to compensate the latter
for the claimed overpayments. We reverse.
FACTS
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Thomas Krabbenhoft and Norma Flores
divorced in 2014. They negotiated and signed a marital -termination agreement (MTA),
the terms of which were incorporated into a judgment and decree entered in November
2014. Among the terms of the MTA was Krabbenhoft’s obligation to pay Flores $307 per
month in child support. This state of affairs continued for over three years , until
Krabbenhoft sought review of his child -support obligation by a child-support magistrate.
Upon reviewing the MTA and judgment, the magistrate found a mistake in the calculations.
Specifically, on the child-support worksheet, counsel erroneously recorded the children’s
derivative benefits from Krabbenhoft’s social security/veterans benefits as coming from
Flores. Had the $780 payment been placed in Krabbenhoft’s column , as it should have
been, he would have had no child-support obligation.
The magistrate , having limited authority to retroactively modify child support,
issued an order that prospectively corrected Krabbenhoft’s obligation to $0 per month.
Minn. Stat. § 519A.39, subd. 2(f) (2018) (limiting retroactive modifications to periods
during which petitions to modify were pending). The parties do not dispute that
Krabbenhoft’s overpaymen ts were the result of a mistake , and therefore neither party
challenges the magistrate’s order correcting it going forward.
Krabbenhoft brought a motion in district court to amend the 2014 j udgment to
recover the $11,666 he overpaid to Flores. After a contested hearing, th e district court

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denied Krabbenhoft’s motion to amend, but also entered a money judgment against Flores
in favor of Krabbenhoft for the total amount of overpayments. The district court’s rationale
was that neither amendment of the judgment nor retroactive modification of the MTA were
necessary to grant Krabbenhoft the relief to which equity entitled him. Rather, the district
court reasoned, it need only exercise its “inherent power to grant equitable relief.” Flores
brought, and the district court denied, a motion to amend the findings of the order awarding
the money judgment. Flores now seeks review of that denial.
D E C I S I O N
In its order, the district court found that the usual mechanism for recovering
overpaid child support—Minn. Stat. § 518A.52 (2018)—was of no help in this matter, and
we agree. Section 518A.52 states that a party who has overpaid child support is entitled to
a return thereof in the form of a reduction of future child support payments, not more than
20 percent of any given payment, until the total amount is recouped. Here, as the district
court recognized , Krabbenhoft has no future child -support obligations . But a more
fundamental problem with section 518A.52 here is that it applies only in the context o f
public authorities. Id.
Rather than apply section 518A.52, t he district court cited our decision in Bauerly
v. Bauerly for the idea that “section 518A.52 reflects a policy in favor of compensation
where overpayment has occurred , but . . . . [it] does no t limit a district court’s inherent
power to grant equitable relief.” 765 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Minn. App. 2009). Finding then
that (1) Flores had been unjustly enriched ; (2) “the interests of justice and equity en title
[Krabbenhoft] to a refund”; and (3) modification of the judgment or MTA is unnecessary;

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the district court awarded Krabbenhoft the money judgment again st Flores. It denied
Krabbenhoft’s motion to amend, did not reopen or amend the 2014 judgment and decree,
or otherwise address the actual error therein.
On appeal, Flores levies several arguments against the district court’s order. First,
she argues that Krabbenhoft was required to prove a statutory basis for the relief he sought,
and the district court’s granting him relief in the absence of such a showing constituted
reversible error. Second, she argues that the district court erred in allowing Krabbenhoft’s
motion to modify when that motion was untimely. Third, Flores argues that the district
court’s “retroactive modification” of the child support order —three years prior to when
Krabbenhoft served and filed the motion to modify—was erroneous. Finally, she contends
that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a money judgment against her on
equitable grounds. We agree with Flores’ final argument, as well as isolated portions of
the first three. But most of the legal principles on which Flores bases her analysis apply to
motions to amend —such as when those motions may be brought, what is required to
succeed, and the effects such a motion can and cannot have. However, the district court
was clear that it denied Krabbenhoft’s motion to amend . Contrary to Flores’ assertions,
the district court did not retroactively modify the child support order, amend the judgment,
or allow Krabbenhoft’s motion. The applicable parts of Flores’s arguments will be
addressed below.
Krabbenhoft contends that the district court did have legal authority to correct the
overpayments under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01, which provides that clerical mistakes may be
corrected at any time . In response to Flores’ s assertion that Krabbenhoft’s motion was

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untimely, Krabbenhoft again cites rule 60.01 as allowing corre ctions “at any time.”
However, Krabbenhoft did not cite rule 60.01 in his original motion, and the district court
did not mention it in its order.1 Finally, Krabbenhoft argues that the district court did not
err by “correcting the child support error as of the date of divorce.” However, as stated,
the district court did not “correct” the mistake—it entered a money judgment against Flores
in attempt to compensate Krabbenhoft for the effect of that mistake. The error remains to
date.
Even if it is appropriate to address Krabbenhoft’s rule 60.01 argument, we disagree
with the characterization of the error involved here as “clerical.” In Egge v. Egge, we held
that a clerical error is one of form; one that keeps the document from saying what the
parties agreed it should say—not one that makes the document express something contrary
to what it should have said but the parties agree to it nonetheless. 361 N.W.2d 485, 488
(Minn. App. 1985) (“Thus, a motion under [rule 60.01] can only be used to make the
judgment or record speak the truth and cannot be used to make it say something other than
what originally was pronounced.” (quotation omitted)). The error in Egge—deemed to be
non-clerical—was a “formulaic” one. Id. One party argued that the parties intended that
they would divide the proceeds from a sale of the homestead evenly. Id. However, the
terms of the agreement governing exactly how the division would be calculated resulted in
one party receiving more of the proceeds than the other . Id. Nevertheless, because the
parties agreed to the terms , including the calculations, as written and as read into the

1 Krabbenhoft also cited Minnesota General Rules of Practice 375.01, which also states
that clerical errors may be corrected at any time. However, this rule is inapplicable here.

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record, the error was not clerical; and to correct the alleged error would be to change the
substantive terms to which the parties agreed . Id. The error was not at odds with the
parties’ intentions, but was “an error of the parties in expressing their basic intent.” Id.
Egge can be contrasted with Johnson v. Johnson, wherein we held that the drafting
party’s mistaken substitution of the word “respondent” for the word “petitioner” was a
clerical error. 379 N.W. 215, 218 (Minn. App. 1985). The provision at issue concerned a
former husband’s alimony payments to his former wife. Id. at 217. The husband was the
respondent, and the agreement provided that he “shall pay to the petitioner [(wife)] the sum
of $800 per month . . . until the respondent dies or is remarried.” Id. The husband was
remarried three years later and stopped making the ali mony payments. Id. We held that
the error was caused by the drafter’s oversight and that the parties actually intended for the
husband to make alimony payments until the petitioner, his ex-wife, died or remarried. Id.
at 218. The parties’ actual intent was evidenced by, inter alia, the husband’s statement that
he expected to make alimony payments “forever ;” the fact that it is normal procedure for
the alimony payer to make such payments until the payee, not the payer, dies or remarries;
and that terminating that obligation upon the payer’s death or remarriage would be contrary
to statute, caselaw, and the purpose of alimony generally. Id.
Here, the mistake was that a certain benefit was placed in Flores’ column on the
child-support worksheet when it should have been in Krabbenhoft’s . This was a mistake
not because the parties originally intended for Krabbenhoft to have no child -support
obligation. Rather, it was a mistake because it was a misattribution of a source of funds .
The effect of the mistake was to oblige Krabbenhoft to $307 per month when , under a

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proper application of the child-support worksheet and guidelines, he should have had no
child-support obligation; the mistake did not have the effect of making the document say
something different from that which the parties thought they were agreeing. Regardless of
how the figure should have been counted , the parties agreed to all of the terms of the
MTA—including Krabbenhoft’s monthly child -support payments. When the parties
stipulated to the MTA and it was incorporated into the judgment, they were aware and
expected that Krabbenhoft would be obligated t o the chi ld-support payment s. That
obligation was not an unanticipated and unintended effect of a mere drafting oversight as
in Johnson. Id.
Moreover, as Flores correctly points out, the parties negotiated the terms of the
MTA, and she agreed to the terms that she did on the condition that, inter alia, Krabbenhoft
would pay her $307 per month in child support. See Solberg v. Solberg, 382 N.W.2d 859,
861 (Minn. App. 1986) (“It is not clear how the parties reached a stipulated agreement . . . .
Had appellant correctly requested $ 871.12 instead of $4711.12, perhaps a different credit
amount or final judgment amount would have been negotiated.”). We cannot equitably
revoke, especially retroactively, one party’s entitlement under an agreement because there
was a mistake in the drafting, the practical effect of which—Krabbenhoft’s child-support
obligation—the parties knowingly agreed to anyway.
Because this is not a clerical error, Krabbenhoft’s only other avenue for relief is
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2018). Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997)
(“The sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting th e requirements of Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.”). That statute allows, on “motion and upon terms as are just,”

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the court to “relieve a party from a judgment and decree, order, or proceeding” under five
enumerated circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. The applicable one here is the
first: “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Id. However, as Flores
argues, a motion under this subsection must be brought “not more than one year after the
judgment and decree, order, or proceeding was entered o r taken .” Id. Krabbenhoft’s
motion was filed well past the one-year limit, and as such is time barred.
Finally, we address whether the district court erred in entering the judgment on the
bases of unjust enrichment and equity. “The district court . . . has inherent power to grant
equitable relief as the facts in each particular case and the ends of justice may require.”
DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa , 309 N.W.2d 755 , 758 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). We
review such discretionary decisions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See id. at 757.
“In order to establish a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must show that another
party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled, and that the
circumstances are such that it would be unjust for that person to retain the benefit.”
Schumacher v. Schumacher , 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 2001). Additionally, “it
must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term ‘unjustly’ could
mean illegally or unlawfully,” which has since “been extended to also apply where . . . the
defendant’s conduct in retaining the benefit is morally wrong.” Id.
Here, other than concluding that Flore s was not entitled to the child -support
payments she received, the district court’s order is devoid of any findings that Flores’s
receipt of the payments was unjust in the sense that it was illegal or unlawful, or that her
retention of them is somehow “morally wrong.” Id. Tellingly, Krabbenhoft also makes no

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such arguments, and our review of the record has failed to reveal any evidence that would
support such findings had they been made. Therefore, to the extent that the district court’s
order was based on unjust enrichment, it is reversed.
With respect to equity, “[a] party may not have equitable relief where there is an
adequate remedy at law available. Equitable relief is available only upon a showing that
no adequate legal remedy exists.” Stocke v. Berryman , 632 N.W.2d 242, 245 -46 (Minn.
App. 2001) (citation omitted) , review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 201) . We agree that no
remedy at law exists for Krabbenhoft, but this is not because he is in a highly unique
situation unanticipated by the legislature or unconsidered in caselaw. Rather, it is because
his sole avenue for relief—section 518.145—is time-barred.
Moreover, while district courts have broad discretion in using their equitable
powers, they mus t make and include for the record sufficient findings to support their
rationale for doing so. See Nelson v. Nelson, 384 N.W.2d 468, 472-74 (Minn. App. 1986)
(remanding in part because “the record is devoid of any findings to support the trial court’s
equitable restitution awards to respondent”). Here, the district court found that it would be
inequitable to prevent Krabbenhoft from recovering t he money he overpaid; but “[e]quity
cuts both ways,” and there are no findings to support the necessarily implied conclusion
that it would be less inequitable to burden Flores with a judgment of $11,666 when her
receipt of that money was pursuant to the agreed-upon terms of the MTA. Anderson v.
DeLisle, 352 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. App. 1984).
It is true that Krabbenhoft committed no wrongdoing and that it may appear unfair
to preclude recovery of money he overpaid; but it is also the case that Flores committed no

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wrongdoing. The error here was in the negotiation and drafting of the MTA to which both
parties, who were represented by counsel, consented and agreed was a full and final
settlement of all issues related to the dissolution of their marriage. This was not a clerical
error.
By failing to address Minn. Stat. § 518.145 and using its equitable powers to grant
a money judgment for Krabbenhoft, the district court has created a situation in which the
judgment of $11,666 in favor of Krabbenhoft—which is based on a magistrate’s order that
has prospective application only—coexists with the 2014 judgment and incorporated
MTA, which still reflects that Krabbenhoft had a child support obligation of $307 per
month for the period between the judgment and the magistrate ’s order —the period for
which this money judgment purports to reimburse him. Such a result is untenable and
unsupported by the law.
Because Krabbenhoft’s only potential remedy at law is time-barred, and because the
district court lacked an adequate basis for using its equitable powers, we reverse the district
court’s judgment.
Reversed.