Lance Gerald Milliman, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0360

Lance Gerald Milliman,
Appellant,

vs.

Sandra K. Karsten, et al.,
Defendants,
Howell County, et al.,
Respondents,
Mona Dohman,
Respondent.

Filed September 16, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CV-18-704

Lance Gerald Milliman, Eden Valley, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Matthew D. Wilson (pro hac vice), Keck & Austin, L.L.C., Springfield, Missouri; and

Timothy J. Carrigan, Kari M. Dahlin, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Howell County, et al.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Mona Dohman)

Considered and decided by Tracy M. Smith, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Pro se appellant challenges the dismissal of his civil -rights claims arising out of a
DWI arrest in Missouri and subsequent revocation of his Minnesota driver’s license,
arguing that the district court erred by (1) admitting pro hac vice counsel for respondents
from Missouri; (2) concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Missouri
respondents; (3) dismissing appellant’s claims under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (2012) (section
1983 claims) as time-barred; (4) dismissing his conspiracy claim for failure to state a claim;
and (5) denying his motions for injunctive relief. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2011, a Missouri commercial-vehicle-enforcement inspector questioned
appellant Lance Gerald Milliman, a Minnesota resident, at a Missouri weigh station.
During the questioning, the inspector discovered that Milliman had two outstanding arrest
warrants from a prior traffic stop in Missouri. The inspector detaine d Milliman and
searched his truck. As a result of the search and Milliman’s refusal to submit to a blood or
urine test, the Missouri State Highway Patrol charged him with several criminal offenses
and suspended his Missouri driving privileg es. The Minnesota Department of Public
Safety subsequently revoked his Minnesota driver’s li cense pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 171.17, subd. 1(a)(9) (2010).1

1 “The [Minnesota Department of Public Safety] shall immediately revoke the license of a
driver upon receiving a record of the driver’s conviction of . . . an offense in another state
that, if committed in this state, would be grounds for revoking the driver’s license.” Minn.
Stat. § 171.17, subd. 1(a)(9).

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Milliman filed unsuccessful petitions for reinstatement of his Minnesota driver’s
license in 2011, 2014, and 2018. In 2018, Milliman filed a summons and complaint against
several respondents based in Missouri 2 and Minnesota respondent Mona Dohman, who
was the commissioner of public safety at the time of the alleged events, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they consp ired to bring “baseless” criminal charges against
him. Milliman also requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a permanent
injunction against the Missouri respondents to preclude them from making unconstitutional
stops and searches under Missouri statutes, and against Dohman, to order the reinstatement
of his Minnesota driver’s license.
Dohman moved to dismiss Milliman’s complaint against her under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 12.02 and the relevant statute of limitations. The Missou ri respondents also moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and under the relevant statute of
limitations. The district court granted respondents’ motions, dismissing Milliman’s
complaint with prejudice, and denied Milliman’s moti ons for a TRO and a permanent
injunction. This appeal follows.

2 The Missouri respondents include Sandra Karsten, colonel of the Missouri State Highway
Patrol, Scott Nelson, Missouri State Highway Patrol sergeant, Kenneth Shewey, Missouri
commercial vehicle officer, Levi Stoops, commercial vehicle enforcement inspector,
Howell County, a state subdivision, and Michael Hitchings, Howell County prosecutor.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by admitting pro hac vice counsel for the Missouri
respondents.

Milliman argues that the district court erred by admitting the Missouri respondents’
counsel pro hac vice because he violated the reciprocity requirement under Minn. Stat.
§ 481.02, subd. 6 (2018), by failing to disclose to the district court that Missouri does not
permit members of the Minnesota bar to act as attorneys for clients in Missouri. Milliman
relies on rule 5 of the Minnesota General Rules of Pract ice, but that rule does not support
his argument. Rule 5 provides that it supersedes Minn. Stat. § 481.02, to the extent that
the rule may be inconsistent with the statute. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 5, 1 991 adoption cmt.
Because rule 5 does not impose a reciprocity requirement, the district court did not err by
admitting pro hac vice counsel for the Missouri respondents.
II. The district court did not err in its construction and application of the statute
of limitations to dismiss Milliman’s section 1983 claims against all
respondents.3

Milliman argues that the district court erroneously determined that the statute of
limitations for section 1983 claims against all respondents had run, because the district
court failed to consider several factors. We disagree.
We review de novo a district court’s interpretation and application of a statute of
limitations. Ford v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. , 874 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn. 2016). In

3 Analysis of the statute of limitations for his section 1983 claims precludes the need to
address Milliman’s fourth argument that he made a prima facie case for conspiracy because
this forms the basis of his section 1983 claims. This analysis also precludes the need t o
address Milliman’s second argument regarding personal jurisdiction over the Missouri
respondents, as they are included in his section 1983 claims.

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Minnesota, section 1983 claims are subject to a six -year limitations period. Berg v.
Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. App. 1989). The statute of limitations begins to run
when the cause of action accrues. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 832
(Minn. 2011).
The complaint allege s that the Missouri State Highway Patrol conducted an
unconstitutional search of Milliman’s truck and subsequently conspired with the Howell
County prosecutor to file “baseless” criminal charges against him on April 5, 2011. This
is the date when Milliman’s cause of action for an allegedly unconstitutional search and
ensuing conspiracy accrued. Applying the six-year limitations period, Milliman’s section
1983 action against all respond ents expired on April 5, 2017. Because Milliman did not
bring his section 1983 claims against all respondents until 2018, they are barred by the
statute of limitations.
Milliman argues that the statute of limitations for his section 1983 claims does not
begin to run unless and until he is convicted and sentenced for his criminal charges in
Howell County. Milliman relies on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364,
2364 (1994) and Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1170 (8th Cir. 2000), without analysis, to
support his argument . Neither case stands for the proposition that there must be a valid
conviction and sentence before the statu te of limitations begins to run, and neither case
addresses the statute of limitations.
Milliman contends that, under United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans , 431 U.S. 553, 561,
97 S. Ct. 1885, 1890-91 (1977), the “Continued Violation Doctrine” extends the statute of
limitations for his section 1983 claim. He argues that the “continuing violation” started

6
when the district court failed to give him an opportunity to confront the Missouri
respondents who filed “baseless” criminal charges against him at his first reinstatement
hearing in 2011 and persisted when the same criminal charges were filed with the district
court in his subsequent 2014 and 2018 hearings.
The supreme court recognized the continuing -violation doctrine in Bhd. of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks v. State by Balfour , 229 N.W.2d 3, 1 2 (Minn. 1975), in which it held that
discriminatory employment practices that are continuing in nature extend the statute of
limitations. Id. The continuing-violation doctrine is generally applied in the employment-
discrimination context , and Milliman provides no authority to apply it to his case. In
National R .R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , the Supreme Court distinguished between
discrete acts and continuing violations, primarily hostile environments, 536 U.S. 101, 105,
122 S. Ct. 2061, 2 068 (2002) . It held that the statute of limitations for “discrete”
discriminatory acts, such as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal
to hire,” id. at 114, 2073, runs from the occurrence of that act, and that Title VII “precludes
recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur ou tside the statutory
time period. ” Id. at 105, 2068. National makes clear that the continuing -violations
doctrine does not apply to Milliman’s case because he does not allege a hostile environment
or other recognized continuing violation.
Lastly, Milliman argues that the district court “incorrectly oversimplified the statute
of limitations” by omitting consideration of several factors from its analysis , such as
“tolling and sav ings issues.” None of these factors are relevant to the determination of
whether his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Milliman’s motion for
a TRO against all respondents.4

Milliman argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a TRO against all respondents because he “met his burden and made a fair showing of
the [required] elements.” We disagree.
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a TRO for an abuse of discretion.
Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979). The moving party has the burden
of proof. Humenansky v. Minn. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs., 525 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Minn. App.
1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995). Factors relevant to the district court’s decision
include: (1) the nature and background of the relationship between the parties preexisting
the dispute giving rise to the request for relief; (2) the weight of irreparable harm alleged
by the moving party as compared to that inflicted on the nonmoving party if the decree is
granted; (3) the likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits; (4) public policy
considerations; and (5) the administrative burdens on the district court to su pervise and
enforce the decree. Dahlberg Brothers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22
(Minn. 1965).
A. Milliman’s motion for a TRO against the Missouri respondents fails
under the doctrine of comity and Dahlberg.

The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide issues “clearly involving
only Missouri law and procedure,” and did not reach an analysis under Dahlberg. The
doctrine of comity requires district courts to “exercise extreme care and restraint in taking

4 Milliman’s motions for permanent injunctions against all respondents also fail because
they are based on time-barred section 1983 claims.

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an action that may interfere with the ju risdiction of a foreign court.” Reed v. Univ. of N.
Dakota, 543 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn. App. 1996). It would be an “affront” to Missouri’s
sovereignty for a Minnesota district court to adjudicate a matter involving facts that
occurred in Missouri, pursuant to Missouri law. Id. at 110. Therefore, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to analyze Milliman’s request for injunctive relief.
Even if the district court had analyzed Mil liman’s motion under Dahlberg, it fails
under the third and fourth prongs. See In re Commitment of Hand , 878 N.W.2d 503, 509
n.4 (Minn. App. 2016), review denied (Minn. June 21, 2016) (determining that failure to
prove any one Dahlberg factor obviates need to address remaining four factors). Milliman
cannot succeed on his section 1983 claims because they are time-barred. Even if his section
1983 claims were timely, it is unlikely that he would prevail on the merits of his underlying
claim to reinstate hi s driver’s license because he failed to undertake the required actions
for reinstatement and the reinstatement period has long since passed. And, as noted above,
the doctrine of comity weighs against granting injunctive relief against the Missouri
respondents.
B. Milliman’s motion for a TRO against Dohman fails under Dahlberg.

Milliman’s motion for injunctive relief against Dohman fails Dahlberg’s third prong
because, as noted above, his section 1983 claim is time -barred and it is unlikely that he
would prevail on the merits of his underlying claim to reinstate his driver’s license.
Furthermore, in seeking to reinstate his driver’s license, Milliman seeks to change, rather
than preserve, the status quo, which is not the purpose of a TRO. Pickerign v. Pasco Mktg.,
Inc., 228 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Minn. 1975).

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Because Milliman fails to establish all five of the Dahlberg factors concerning both
the Minnesota and Missouri respondents, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying his motion for a TRO.
Affirmed.