Marcus Kendrick Jones, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0373

Marcus Kendrick Jones, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 14, 2019
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-CR-16-4580, 62-CR-16-6804

Marcus Kendrick Jones, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Marcus Jones pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree possession of cocaine with
intent to sell after Saint Paul police found cocaine in the back seat of his car in May 2016
and Minneapolis police found cocaine in the apartment where he lived two days later. The
district court sentenced Jones on both counts. Jones appeals, arguing that one of his
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convictions must be vacated because the offenses were both part of the same course of
conduct. He relatedly contends that the district court exaggerated the criminality of his
conduct by Hernandizing his sentences. And he argues that the district court erroneously
failed to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence. Because Jones’s convictions
resulted from different behavioral incidents and because the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying his request for a durational or dispositional sentencing departure, we
affirm.
FACTS
On May 18, 2016, Saint Paul police officers stopped a car with a broken light and
spoke with its driver, Marcus Jones. The officers noticed a plastic bag on the rear floor
containing over 25 grams of cocaine. Two days later, Minneapolis police officers obtained
a warrant to search Jones and the apartment where he was staying. They found a
brick-shaped package and 17 baggies containing cocaine. In total, the officers recovered
about 1,603 grams of cocaine from the apartment.
The state charged Jones based on the apartment search with one count of first-degree
possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of first-degree possession of cocaine.
In a separate complaint, the state charged Jones based on the traffic stop with one count of
first-degree possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of first-degree
possession of cocaine.
Jones pleaded guilty to both counts of first-degree possession with intent to sell, and
the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Before sentencing, Jones argued that the
district court could convict him on only one count because the two offenses were part of a
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single behavioral incident. He also requested either a dispositional or a durational
sentencing departure. The district court found that Jones’s two offenses were not part of
the same behavioral incident and declined to depart from the sentencing guidelines, citing
Jones’s prior drug convictions, the fact that he was on probation when the two crimes
occurred, and the amount of drugs found in his apartment. The district court sentenced
Jones to 158 months’ imprisonment for the May 18 offense and 161 months for the May
20 offense, with the terms to be served concurrently.
Jones appealed. We stayed the appeal at Jones’s request so he could pursue
postconviction relief. In his postconviction petition, Jones requested that his sentences
be reduced under the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act. 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18
at 590–91. The district court reduced his sentences, and Jones voluntarily dismissed his
initial appeal.
Jones petitioned for additional postconviction relief in 2018, arguing that he could
not be sentenced for both of his offenses because they were part of the same course of
conduct and that the district court erred by not departing from the sentencing guidelines .
The district court recounted its single- behavioral-incident determination and affirmed its
presumptive-sentence decision. But it ultimately concluded that Jones forfeited his claims
by failing to raise them in his prior postconviction petition.
Jones appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Jones argues that the district court erred by finding that his offenses were not part
of the same behavioral incident and by failing to depart from the sentencing guidelines. We
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will overturn a district court’s summary denial of a postconviction petition only if the
denial reflects an abuse of discretion. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn.
2018). A district court may deny a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing
if the petition and the record “conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2016)).
The state argues that we need not reach the merits of Jones’s arguments because he
is barred from raising them . When a petitioner has already directly appealed, any issues
raised in that appeal or those issues that were known but not raised cannot be raised in a
later postconviction petition. State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). This
Knaffla bar extends to issues that were raised or should have been raised in a prior
postconviction petition . Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2014). But if a
petitioner’s claims fail on the merits, we need not decide whether they are Knaffla-barred.
Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010). Because none of Jones’s arguments
succeeds on the merits, we affirm.1
Jones unconvincingly argues that his two convictions stemmed from the same
course of conduct. Whether Jones’s offenses were part of a single behavioral incident
presents a mixed question of fact and law, so we review the district court’s findings for
clear error and its application of the law de novo. See State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264,

1 Jones argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his first
postconviction petition. He contends his first petition ought to have been presented as a
motion to correct his sentence, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, sparing him from the
district court’s Knaffla-bar ruling. Because we conclude Jones’s arguments fail on their
merits, we need not address his ineffective-assistance argument.
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270 (Minn. 2016). Unless an exception applies, if a defendant has committed multiple
offenses within the same course of conduct, he cannot be punished for both offenses.
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2016). Courts consider three factors to determine whether
multiple offenses were part of the same behavioral incident: “time, place, and whether the
offenses were motivated by a desire to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Gould,
562 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 1997). Jones’s convictions resulted from his possessing drugs
on two different days and in two separate locations. It is true that in both instances Jones
had the same criminal objective to sell drugs. But the broad goal of selling drugs “is too
broad an objective to constitute a single criminal goal.” Id. Jones’s two offenses were part
of different behavioral incidents.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Jones’s argument that Saint Paul police and
Minneapolis police worked together toward the charges. The focus of the
single-criminal-objective test is the defendant’s conduct. State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d
517, 522 (Minn. 1966). Police objectives are not our focus. That the two police agencies
allegedly worked together does not render erroneous the district court’s decision to convict
Jones for both offenses.
Jones relatedly argues that the district court improperly exaggerated the criminality
of his conduct when it used the Hernandez method in sentencing him. Under that method,
a district court sentencing a defendant for multiple convictions can use the convictions that
occurred earlier in time to calculate the defendant’s criminal-history score. State v.
Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 480–81 (Minn. 1981). A district court can use the Hernandez
method only if the offenses were not part of the same behavioral incident. Id. at 481.
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Because Jones’s offenses were not part of the same behavioral incident, the district court
did not improperly use the Hernandez method to calculate his sentence.
Jones also argues that the district court erred by not granting his request for a
sentencing departure. We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307–08 (Minn. 2014). The district court may
depart from the sentencing guidelines only if there are “identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances” supporting departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2015).
The supreme court opined in dicta that “it would be a rare case which would warrant
reversal of the refusal to depart.” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). The
district court decided not to depart from the sentencing guidelines because of the large
amount of cocaine found in Jones’s apartment, his prior convictions, and the fact that he
was on probation at the time he committed the crimes. The district court’s sentencing
decision is supported by the record and does not reflect an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.