In re the Marriage of: Teresa Corinne MacNabb, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0376

In re the Marriage of: Teresa Corinne MacNabb, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

John Michael Kysylyczyn,
Appellant.

Filed February 18, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-08-2020

Teresa Corinne MacNabb, Little Canada, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Carl A. Blondin, Oakdale, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this child -custody modification dispute, appellant father argues that the district
court erred in denying his motion because he had not attempted to mediate the matter before
taking it to the district court. Because there was no error in the denial, we affirm.

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FACTS
During their marriage, appellant John Kysylyczyn and respondent Teresa MacNabb
had two children, S.C, born in March 2003, and M.A., born in November 2005. Their
marriage was dissolved in 2010. The dissolution judgment provided that:
The parties agree that they be awarded joint legal and
joint physical custody, and have worked out a pa renting and
holiday schedule. T he parenti ng provisions are set out in
Attachment A. The [c]ourt finds that these provisions are in
the best interests of the children, are fair under the
circumstances, and provide the clarification required to
minimize confusion and possible conflict between the parties.
These provisions maximize the time the children can spend
with their parents, maximize the quality of the co -parenting,
and provide a framework for mutual decision-making between
the parents.

(Emphasis added.)
Attachment A on “Parenting Time and Other Parenting Provisions” lists “Custody”
as the first item and provides specifically that, when parenting issues arise, the parties are
to consult with each other and attempt to reconcile, then attempt reconciliation with the aid
of an involved profess ional. If they are still unsuccessful, they seek the services of a
parenting consultant/coordinator, who has authority to make a deci sion that may be
challenged in family c ourt, but “will be binding unless and until the [c]ourt determines
otherwise.”
In March 2018, the parties, with a parenting -time expeditor, agreed to a new
parenting-time arrangement, and the court approved it. In September 2018, S.C., then 15

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and a half, wrote to respondent stating that she was changing her parenting time to spend
more time at appellant’s house because he lived closer to her school.
In December 2018, respondent moved for an order enforcing the parenting -time
schedule set out in the parties’ March 2018 agreement and notified the court that she had
purchased a house in the children’s school district . Appellant moved the court for sole
physical custody of S.C. and stated in an affidavit that respondent’s purchase of a home
close to S.C.’s school had “little or no impact on the overall situation,” despite S.C. having
stated in her letter that she was moving to appellant’s house because it was more convenient
for her school activities.
At the hearing on their motions, both parties informed the district court that they
had not complied with the requirement for mediat ion o r with the dispute -resolution
provisions of the 2010 parenting plan. The district court denied appellant’s motions for
sole physical custody of S.C. or an evidentiary hearing “in light of the 2010 Dispute
Resolution provision,” and granted re spondent’s mo tion for enf orcement of the March
2018 parenting-time decision, because enforcement of previous orders is not subject to the
dispute-resolution provision.1
Appellant challenges the denial of his motions, arguing that the requirement for the
parties to attempt to resolve parenting disputes did not pertain to custody.

1 Respondent, now pro se, took no part in this appeal, which by order of this court
proceeded under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that, when the respondent does
not submit a brief, the case shall be determined on the merits).

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D E C I S I O N
“Courts . . . favor the use of stipulations in dissolution proceedings. Stipulations are
treated as binding contracts. . . . A mediated settlement agreement is in the nature of a
contract.” Tornstrom v. Tornstrom, 887 N.W.2d 680, 685-86 (Minn. App. 2016) (citation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 2017). Appellant does not deny that he agreed to
the provisions of the dissolution and its attachments.
He argues instead that the district court erred in basing the denial of appellant’s
motions to modify custody or for an evidentiary hearing on the attachment provision that,
if the parties were unable to resolve a dispute on their own or with an involved professional,
they would use the services of a parenting consultant/coordinator whose decisions could
be challenged in family c ourt but would be binding unless overrul ed by the family court.
In appellant’s view, although custody is the first item listed on the attachment pertaining
to “ Parenting Time and O ther Par enting Provisions,” the requirement that disputes be
submitted to a parenting consultant/coordinator does not apply to custody disputes. His
only support for this view is Richardson v. Richardson, No. C6-02-1002, 2003 WL 105378
(Minn. App. Jan. 14, 2003). As an unpublished decision of this court, that opinion has no
precedential value. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2018).
Moreover, Richardson is factually distinguishable. In that case, the dissolution
judgment provided that one parent had sole physical custody, the parents had joint legal
custody, and “disputes over the access schedule and requests for modification of the
schedule were to be handled by sub mitting the matters to mediation.” Richardson, 2003
WL 105378, at *1. One party moved for a change in custody and challenged the denial of

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this motion. Id. This court rejected the argument that the mediation clause in the
dissolution judgment applied to the custody dispute because “[a] request for sole physical
custody is not a ‘dispute regarding the access schedule,’ nor is it a request for ‘a
modification of the schedule.’” Id. at *4.
Here, the first item listed in the “Parenting Time and Other Par enting Provisions”
attachment to the d issolution judgment is “Custody ” and the attachment provides that, if
neither direct communication nor consultation with an involved professional produces
resolution of a parenting dispute , the parties will “seek out t he services of a parenting
consultant/coordinator.” There is no indication that custody disputes are excluded from
this provision. Thus, Richardson is irrelevant.
The district court did not err in declining to address appellant’s motion for custody
modification before the parties attempted to resolve the issue with a parenting
consultant/coordinator.
Affirmed.