In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Stringer

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0377

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Stringer

Filed July 22, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel
File No. AP18-9008

Michael C. Hager, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Drew Bredeson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jennifer Inz, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant, an individual indeterminately committed in the Minnesota Sex Offenders
Program (MSOP), challenges the commitment appeal panel’s decision to deny his request

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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to transfer to community preparation services (CPS), arguing that his current treatment in
MSOP is no longer appropriate. Because the commitment appeal panel properly addressed
appellant’s petition in relation to the statutory factors outlined in Minn. Stat. § 253D.29,
subd. 1(b) (2018) , and there is sufficient evidence to support the panel’s findings and
conclusions, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Michael Stringer is indeterminately committed to the MSOP as a sexually
Dangerous Person (SDP). In April 2017, appellant petitioned the Special Review Board
(SRB) for a transfer to CPS, provisional discharge, or discharge from civil commitment.
Respondent Commissioner of Human Services opposed the petition and t he SRB denied
appellant’s requests after hearings were held. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a
rehearing and proceeded only on his request for transfer to CPS. The rehearing was held
before a commitment appeal panel, which again denied appellant ’s request for transfer.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal and argues that his current treatment in MSOP is no
longer appropriate and that the panel did not properly weigh the evidence.
D E C I S I O N
When this court reviews the d enial of a transfer petition, we evaluate the panel’s
decision “for clear error, examining the record to determine whether the evidence as a
whole sustains the appeal panels’ findings and not weighing the evidence as if trying the
matter de novo.” Larson v. Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotations
omitted). “If the evidence as a whole sustains the panel’s findings, it is immaterial that the

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record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.”
In re Civil Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017).
A person civilly committed as a SDP “shall not be transferred out of a secure
treatment facility unless the transfer is appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(a)
(2018). The statute sets forth the factors that determine whether a transfer is appropriate.
See Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b) (describing the factors); Piotter v. Steffen , 4 90
N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn. App. 1992) (In evaluating whether a petitioner has demonstrated
the appropriateness of transfer by a preponderance of the evidence, “[t]he panel must
address the statutory factors.” ). In this case, the commitment appeal panel wei ghed the
evidence presented with the statutory factors and determined that transfer was not
appropriate.
Appellant does not argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the
commitment appeal panel’s findings and conclusions . Instead, he argues that the
commitment appeal panel placed too much weight on the evidence and recommendations
provided by MSOP’s staff, who opposed the transfer. He argues that his proffered
evidence, a report from Dr. George Komaridis, supported transfer and that “[t]he statutory
factors for transfer when viewed by a detached independent observer, . . . appear to be
met.” But regarding the conflicting evidence presented to the panel, this court “do[es] not
reweigh the evidence,” and it is “immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” In re Civil Commitment of Fugelseth,
907 N.W.2d 248, 253 (Minn. App. 2018).

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Appellant also challenges the impropriety of “static factors” utilized in the MSOP
Sexual Violence Risk Assessment (SVRA) , which do not take into account appellant ’s
progress in treatment. He argues that the static factors that take into consi deration his
criminal-history score will always result in him being labeled a high-risk offender, and this
high-risk status prevents the commitment appeal panel from genuinely reviewing whether
his treatment progression warrants a reduction in custody. Bu t this argument fails to take
into consideration the commitment appeal panel’s expressed reasons for denying transfer.
Specifically, the commitment appeal panel indicated that appellant needed to “make
progress in areas of personal accountability, cooperating with his treatment team, and
gaining a deeper insight into his sexual offense pattern,” and that appellant must “continue
to progress in transpa rency around sexual thoughts, [and] fantasies.” The appeal panel
stated that appellant has yet to “fully address or understand his sexual offense cycle and
how it surfaces today. He has not yet demonstrated the motivation and self -monitoring
skills necessary for a reduction in supervision.”
It is significant that the rationales underlying the decision to deny appellant’s
transfer petition were not predicated on his high -risk status, which stemmed in part from
the referenced static factors. Moreover, appellant provides no authority for the proposition
that a SDP’s transfer petition is contingent on risk -labels, instead of the statutory factors.
Consequently, appellant’s challenge to the static risk factors utilized in the SVRA does not
warrant a reversal.
Lastly, appellant challenges the denial of his petition on constitutional grounds. He
argues that his commitment violates due process because he has been participating in

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treatment for over 14 years without a reduction in custody. The commissioner argues that
appellant’s constitutional argument is not properly before this court because appellant
narrowed the scope of issues “to proceed just on transfer” and the commitment appeal panel
is barred from considering “petitions for relief other than those co nsidered by the special
review board from which the appeal is taken,” and “may not grant a transfer or provisional
discharge on terms or conditions that were not presented to the special review board.”
Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 3 (2018). We agree with respondent that appellant’s due
process argument, which was not presented to the SRB and not argued to the commitment
appeal panel, is not properly before this court. However, even if we were to consider his
argument, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the period review process complies
with due process. See In re Blodgett , 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994) (upholding the
constitutionality of the predecessor to the SDP statute under which appellant is
indeterminately committed).
Affirmed.