Dennis Charles Roberts, petitioner, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0389

Dennis Charles Roberts, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 12, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-13478

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Publi c Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
Within the context of the statutory scheme and c onsistent with the plain language
of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2015), prohibiting persons who have been
adjudicated delinquent of a “crime of violence” from possessing firearms, the definition of
“crime of violence ” contained within Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (Supp. 2015),
unambiguously includes juvenile adjudications for the listed offenses.

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O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from a conviction for possession of a firearm by an ineligible person,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) , appellant argues that because he was
adjudicated delinquent, rather than convicted, of a “crime of violence,” the statute does not
apply to him and his conviction must be vacated. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. In 2013, when he was a minor,
appellant Dennis Roberts was adjudicated delinquent of a fifth -degree drug offense , in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2012). In 2016, after reaching the age of majority,
appellant was arrested, char ged with, and pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person , in violation of Minn. Sta t. § 624.713, subd. 1 (2). The d istrict court
departed dispositionally and sentenced appellant to 60 months stayed prison time with five
years of probation. In 2018, appellant violated his probation and the district court executed
his sentence.
Appellant then filed a petition for post conviction relief, arguing that as a matter of
law, his prior juvenile adjudication did not qualify as a “crime of violence .” The
postconviction court denied appellant’s petition, concluding that appellant’s reading of the
relevant statutes would contrave ne clear legislative intent and render relevant statutory
language “meaningless.” This appeal follows.

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ISSUE
Does the definition of “crime of violence” contained within Minn. Stat. § 624.712,
subd. 5 (2014), encompass juvenile adjudic ations of the listed offenses , such that Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), prohibits persons who have been adjudicated delinquent under
one or more of the relevant statutes from possessing firearms?

ANALYSIS
This court reviews the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion.
Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We review findings of fact for clear
error and issues of law de novo.” Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2017).
Appellant’s arguments require us to engage in statutory interpretation. “The
threshold issue in any statutory inte rpretation analysis is whether the statute ’s language is
ambiguous.” State v. Peck , 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009). A statute is only
ambiguous if its language is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation .” Id. If
this court determines that a statute is ambiguous, the next step is to consider the canons of
construction set out in Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1) -(8) (2018) to determine legislative intent .
But if the “words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing the spirit.” Id.
Courts interpret specific statutory terms “in the context of the entire statute. ”
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 412, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680
(2012). “A statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its

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provisions; no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or
insignificant.” Am. Fam ily Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000)
(quotation omitted).
Overview of the statutory scheme
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) , renders ineligible to possess ammunition or
firearms “a person who has been convicted of, or adjudicated delinquent or convicted as
an extended jurisdiction juvenile for committing, in this state or elsewhere, a crime of
violence.” The definitional statute, Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, states that: “‘Crime of
violence’ means: felony convictions of the fol lowing offenses: sections 609.185 (murder
in the first degree); . . . and chapter 152 (drugs, controlled substances); and an attempt to
commit any of these offenses.” (Emphasis added.) Further, Minn. Stat. § 260B.245, subd.
1(b) (2018), provides, “A person who was adjudicated delinquent for, or convicted as an
extended jurisdiction juvenile of, a crime of violence as defined in section 624.712,
subdivision 5, is not entitled to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm for the
remainder of the person’s lifetime.”
These statutes unambiguously criminalize possession of a firearm by a person who
has been adjudicated delinquent under one of the statutes listed in the definition of “crime
of violence.”

Appellant argues that a delinquency adjudication cannot constitute a “crime of
violence” because section 624.712, subdivision 5, requires “convictions” for the specified
statutes, and juvenile adjudications are not convictions. Respondent argues that Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.245, subd. 1(b) , explicitly provides for a lifetime ban on possession of a firearm
for a juvenile adjudication of a “crime of violence,” which clearly demonstrates the intent

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of the legislature for section 624.712, subdivision 5, to refer to more than just adult
convictions under the listed statutes. Appellant dismisses 260B.245, subd. 1(b), as only a
“civil consequence[]” that has nothing to do with criminal penalties for possession of a
firearm.
We first note that when reading Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) alone, its plain
language indicates that appellant’s juvenile adjudication under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, a
“crime of violence,” renders him ineligible to possess a firearm. But the definitio n of
“crime of violence” in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, which only refers to “convic tions”
of specific listed offenses, causes tension between the sections and creates the basis for
appellant’s argument.
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether there is an
ambiguity. For a statute to be ambiguous, there must be at least two reasonable
interpretations. Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 772. Respondent’s interpretation, that persons who
have been adjudicated delinquent of a crime of violence can be convicted of possession of
a firearm by an ineligible person, is one reasonable interpretation and comports with
existing application of the law. See, e.g., State v. Grillo, 661 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. App.
2003) (affirming a conviction for possession of a firearm by an ineligible person where the
predicate “crime of violence ” was a juvenile adjudication) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 5
2003).
Appellant’s interpretation, that the term “convictions” in the definitional statute
excludes prior juvenile adjudications, is not reasonable. Appellant ’s argument is directly
contradicted by other statutory language. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.245, subd. 1(b ) (“A

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person who was adjudicated delinquent for . . . a crime of violence as defined in section
624.712, subdivision 5, is not entitled to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm for
the remainder of the person ’s lifetime.”). As appellant concedes, that statute specifically
contemplates an individual being adjudicated delinquent of a “crime of violence,” as laid
out in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5. Therefore, the only reasonable way to interpret the
term “convictions” in the definition of “crime of violence ” is that it is not limited to
criminal convictions only, but refers to the elements of the offenses codified in the statutes
listed within subdivision 5. See State v. Moon, 463 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 1990) ( “We
hold that the definitions of the offenses listed as crimes of violence . . . relate to the elements
of the offense for which the defendant was originally convicted . . . .”); see also Markham
v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409, 66 S. Ct. 193, 195–96 (1945) (stating that a law will not be
strictly read if such reading “results in the emasculation or deletion of a provision which a
less literal reading would preserve”).
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(7) (2018), would also make no sense within the
statutory context if we were to adopt appellant’s argument. That section renders ineligible
to possess firearms under criminal penalty “a person under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, who has been charged with committing a crime of violence.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(7). This plainly refers to both individuals under extended juvenile jurisdiction and
minors facing a delinquency petition. Under appellant’s interpretation of the term “crime
of violence ,” a minor who was facing a delinquency petition for one of the statu tes
referenced in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, but who had not yet been adjudicated
delinquent, could be charged with violating Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 , but once

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adjudicated delinquent, would be free to possess firearms without facing the possibility of
such a charge . This would be an absurd result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (1) (2018)
(directing that courts are t o presume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is
absurd”). Because appellant ’s literal interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 ,
makes no sense in the context of the greater statutory scheme , the only reasonable
interpretation is t hat the term “convictions” refers to the elements of the underlying
statutory offenses, rather than the ultimate disposition by the district court.
State v. Moon also clearly demonstrates this principle. 463 N.W.2d at 517. That
case revolved around a sta y of imposition for felony theft that was subsequently reduced
to misdemeanor theft when Moon was discharged from probation. Id. at 518–19. Moon
focused his argument on the definitional statute’s inclusion of “felonious theft” as a crime
of violence. Id. at 519–20. The issue was that felony theft was considered a “crime of
violence” that carried the collateral consequence of a 10-year loss of firearms rights, while
misdemeanor theft carried no such consequence under the firearms statute in effect at the
time. Id. After a detailed analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that regardless of
the fact that Moon no longer had a conviction under one of the relevant statutes, “We hold
that the definitions of the offenses listed as crimes of violence in se ction 624.712,
subdivision 5, relate to the elements of the offense for which the defendant was originally
convicted rather than the disposition subsequently imposed by the trial judge.” Id. at 521.
This holding is relevant to the instant case, where the re is no debate that appellant
committed all of the elements of one of the offense s that would constitute a crime of
violence, and the only issue regards the ultimate disposition.

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Appellant also argues that his position furthers the legislature’s purposes in enacting
the delinquency provisions of the juvenile court act. But there is only one reasonable
interpretation of the statutory language, rendering it unambiguous. And when a statute is
unambiguous, we do not look at factors beyond the plain language of the statute to
determine the intent of the legislature. Peck, 773 N.W.2d at 772.
D E C I S I O N
We hold that in the context of the statutory scheme, the de finition of “crime of
violence” contained within Minn. Stat. § 624.712, sub d. 5, unambiguously includes
juvenile adjudications for the listed offenses, and that Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2),
therefore prohibits persons who have been adjudicated delinquent of a “crime of violence”
from possessing firearms.
Affirmed.