State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0391

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shantha Jayapathy,
Appellant.

Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-1110

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief A ppellate Public Defender, Amy Law ler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of her postconviction motion to withdraw her guilty
plea under the manifest -injustice standard. Because we discern no error and appellant is
not entitled to relief on her pro se arguments, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I. The District Court Did Not Err by Denying Appellant’s Motion to
Withdraw Her Guilty Plea.
The state charged appellant Shantha Jayapathy by amended complaint with one
count of first -degree controlled-substance sale and one count of first -degree controlled-
substance possession for engaging in a drug transaction. Police officers discovered
approximately 132.55 grams of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on appellant and
in her home. The parties reached a plea agreement, which provided that appellant would
plead guilty to an amended count of first -degree drug possession, possession of over 50
grams of methamphetamine, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining count. The district
court accepted appellant’s guilty plea to the amended drug-possession charge and imposed
the prison sentence negotiated by the parties in their plea agreement. This appeal follows.
a. Legal Standard
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). However, “a court must allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea, even after sentencing, if ‘withdra wal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.’” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Minn. R.

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Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). A manifest injustice occurs if a plea is not valid. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 94. To be valid, a plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. The
defendant bears the burden of proving that the plea was invalid. Id. On appeal, this court
reviews the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id. Here, appellant challenges the accuracy
and intelligence of her plea.
b. Accuracy Requirement
“The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more
serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.”
Id. To be accurate, a guilty plea must be supported by a proper factual basis with “sufficient
facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge
to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003)
(quotation omitted) . The f actual basis of a plea is inadequate if a defendant makes
statements that negate an essential element of the charged offense. Id. at 350. The
adequacy of the factual basis is usually established by the defendant explaining the
circumstances surrounding the crime. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994).
We review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the plea from the record made when the
plea was entered. State v. Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn. App. 1987).
Here, the plea colloquy sufficiently establish es each element of the crime.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to first -degree controlled -substance possession,
possession of over 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subd. 2(a)(1) (20 16). This statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of a controlled
substance crime in the first degree if . . . the person unlawfully possesses one or more

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mixtures of a total weight of 50 grams or more containing cocaine or methamphetamine.”
Id.
The record contains ample evidence that appellant’s plea was accurate. A complaint
“may provide a factual basis for a defendant’s plea,” and a reviewing court is “permitted
to examine the complaint to assess whether a defendant’s plea was accurate.” Sanchez v.
State, 868 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. App. 2015) (citation omitted), aff’d, 890 N.W.2d 716
(Minn. 2017). According to the complaint and the probable -cause statement, police
officers approached appellant outside of her home in December 2016. Appellant threw a
bag, which contain ed 27.97 grams of methamphetamine , onto the ground . Officers
obtained and executed a search warrant at appellant’s home and found an additional 23
baggies containing a total of 104.58 grams of methamphetamine. In total, officers
recovered approximately 132.55 grams of methamphetamine from appellant and her home.
During a police interview, appellant admitted that she purchased methamphetamine every
two to three days and resold it at a higher price. The factual basis established by the state
supports each element of the controlled-substance possession offense.
Appellant argues that her plea was inaccurate and therefore invalid because it was
based on leading questions by the prosecutor. “Ordinarily, an adequate factual basis is
established by questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in his or her
own words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Williams v. State , 760 N.W.2d
8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). T he
use of leading questions to establish a valid guilty plea is discouraged. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d
at 717. However, a prosecutor’s use of leading quest ions will not invalidate a guilty plea

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as long as there is a sufficient factual basis in the record. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 95 -96.
During the factual-basis portion of the plea hearing, appellant admitted that she had over
50 grams of methamphetamine on her person and in her home at the time of her arrest, that
she knew the substance in her possession was methamphetamine, and that she did not have
a legal right to possess it. The district court determined that an adequate factual basis was
established despite the prosecutor’s use of leading questions. The district court did not err
by determining that appellant’s guilty plea was accurate based upon the factual basis
provided at the plea hearing.
c. Intelligence Requirement
Appellant argues that her guilty plea also did not satisfy the intelligence requirement
for a valid plea. The intelligence requirement ensures that the defendant understands the
state’s charges against her, the rights she is waiving, and the consequences of her plea. Id.
at 96.
Appellant claims that her plea was unintelligent because she may have a traumatic
brain injury (TBI) and mental health issues arising from an earlier motorcycle accident
requiring brain surgery. This argument is based primarily on facts developed in an
unrelated case. See Jayapathy v. State , No. A13 -2041, 2014 WL 4056025, at *1 (Minn.
App. Aug. 18, 2014) (affirming Jayapathy’s conviction for first -degree controlled -
substance possession and concluding that postconviction court did not abuse its discretion
by denying petition to withdraw guilty plea). While publicly available, appellant’s earlier
case is not part of the record on appeal in this case. See State v. Brown, 597 N.W.2d 299,
305 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Sept. 14, 1999) (“An appellate court may not base

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its decision on matters outside the record on appeal or consider matters that were not
produced and received in evidence before the [district] court.”).
Here, appellant acknowledged in the plea petition that she understood the charges
against her and wanted to plead guilty. A ppellant’s oral statements during the plea
colloquy supported the guilty-plea petition she signed. At the hearing, defense counsel
discussed the plea petition with appellant:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . . I have a four -page document, a
petition to enter a plea of guilty in a felony case. Have you had
an opportunity to go through with—this document with me?
DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: We’ve met several times and
discussed this document; correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right. And last week we went
through it specifically line by line; is that correct?
DEFENDANT: That’s correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Is that your signature on the last page?
DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you si gn that because you’re
acknowledging to [the district court] you understand all the
terms and conditions of this document including the plea we
just put on the record?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you have any questions of [the
judge] or myself before we proceed?
DEFENDANT: No.

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Defense counsel discussed each of appellant’s rights and asked if she understood that she
was waiving those rights by entering a guilty plea. Appellant indicated that she understood
that she was waiving her rights. The district court also inquired:
COURT: All right. Well, Ms. Jayapathy, I know this has been
a difficult decision, but have you had enough time to think
about this?
DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am, I have.
COURT: All right. And have you had enough time to consult
with your lawyer?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: And are you —are you making this decision freely
and voluntarily? In other words, is this your decision, or are
you feeling some type of undue pressure or coercion?
DEFENDANT: No. This is my decision.
The prosecutor later inquired, “And you’re clear-headed today, Ms. Jayapathy?” Appellant
replied, “Yes.” The issue of appellant’s TBI and mental illness was not raised at the
hearing.
On this record, we determine that appellant acknowledged that she understood the
terms of the plea petition, understood that she was waiving certain rights by pleading guilty,
and wanted to proceed with the plea hearing. Appellant’s plea was intelligent because she
had sufficient time to speak with counsel, understood the charges against her, understood
the rights she was waiving, and understood the consequences of her plea. See Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 94, 96 (discussing accuracy and intelligence requirements).

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Appellant also argues that the district court erred by failing to order a presentence
investigation (PSI) under Minn. Stat. § 609.115 (2016) 1 to gather information about her
mental state. However, Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 1(B)(1)(a), provides that a district
court “ may . . . order a presentence investigation” in a felony sentencing proceeding
(emphasis added); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subds. 15, 16 (2016) (noting that “may”
is permissive and “shall” is mandatory). This conflict is resolved by Minn. Stat. § 480.059,
subd. 7(1) (2016), which permits the rules of crimi nal procedure to supersede certain
statutes relating to criminal actions, including Minn. Stat. § 609.115. Thus, the district
court was not required to order a PSI. And in this case, neither party requested a PSI and,
indeed, the parties agreed to a specific term of imprisonment in their plea agreement. The
district court did not err by imposing the sentence agreed to by the plea agreement and not
ordering a PSI.
II. Appellant Is Not Entitled to Relief on her Pro Se Arguments.
Appellant raises several additional arguments in her pro se supplemental brief.
Appellant argues that she is entitled to reversal because the state mailed the criminal
complaint to an incorrect address. Appellant fails to identify any error and we consider
this argument forfeited. See State v. Manley , 664 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Minn. 2003)

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.115, subd. 1(a) provides “[w]hen the defendant has been convicted of
a felony, the court shall, before sentence is imposed, cause a presentence investigation and
written report to be made to the court concerning the defendant’s individual characteristics,
circumstances, needs, potentialities, criminal record and social history, the circumstances
of the offense and the harm caused by it to others and the community” (emphasis added).

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(considering arguments forfeited when they are unsupported by facts in the record and
contain “no citation to any relevant legal authority”).
Appellant also challenges the search of her home and her con fession during a
post-Miranda police interview. Appellant’s arguments are barred as a result of her guilty
plea. A guilty plea generally operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects that arose
before the plea. State v. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 371 (Minn. 2007); see also State v.
Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980) (“The traditional viewpoint in Minnesota,
as well as elsewhere, has been that a guilty plea by a counseled defendant operates as a
waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects, including Fourth Amendment claims. ”). By
admitting her guilt, appellant waived her remaining pro se claims and we do not address
them.
In sum, because appellant’s guilty plea was accurate and intelligent and she is not
entitled to relief on her pro se cl aims, we conclude that the district court did not err by
denying her postconviction motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
Affirmed.