State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0395

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Juan Carlos Garcia-Morales,
Appellant.

Filed March 23, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-21652

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion
because law enforcement impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop. We affirm.

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FACTS
In 2017, police officers were surveilling a home in Maple Grove, Minnesota , for
drug activity. The residents of the home had multiple open drug cases, a history of drug
charges, and had recently engaged in drug trafficking. In fact, nine days before the events
of this case , officers recovered narcotics from two vehicle s associated with that address,
including half a pound of methamphetamine from a vehicle driven by one of the residents.
Officers testified that this amount of methamphetamine indicated narcotics sale, n ot
possession for personal use.
On March 3, Officer Sellman saw appellant, Juan Garcia-Morales, exit his vehicle
and walk toward the surveilled home. Officers observed that a person inside the home
opened the blinds, allowed Garcia -Morales to enter, and closed the blinds immediately.
Garcia-Morales returned to his car seven minutes later. Officers believed Garcia-Morales
was engaged in drug trafficking due to him entering through a secondary door of a home
recently and historically known to be involved in narcotics trafficking at a late ho ur and
for a short time. Officers followed Garcia-Morales’s vehicle. They observed minor traffic
violations, including failure to signal a turn, crossing or touching lane dividers, and expired
tabs.
Officer Sellman initiated a traffic stop. Officer Sellma n asked Garcia -Morales
where he was coming from. He an swered that he was traveling from picking up the child
in the passenger seat in Coon Rapids. Officer Sellman asked if he had st opped anywhere
else, and Garica -Morales denied it. Officer Sellman thought that Garcia -Morales’s

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“deceptive behavior” was suspicious. Officer Sellman returned t o the squad car to check
Garcia-Morales’s identification.
Another officer removed Garcia-Morales from the vehicle and asked him where he
had been coming from. This time, Garcia -Morales stated that he was coming from a
friend’s residence in Maple Grove.
The officers compared their inconsistent stories, and requested a canine unit. The
dog alerted to drugs at the driver’s -side door. Officers searched the vehicle and found
71.68 grams of methamphetamine u nder the drive r’s seat. Garci a-Morales was placed
under arrest, and charged with second-degree possession, which was later amended to first-
degree possession of methamphetamine.
Garcia-Morales moved to suppress the drug evidence and evidence of his
subsequent confession to police.1 The district court denied both motions after a Rasmussen
hearing. The case was submitted to the district court on stipulated evidence. The district
court found Garcia -Morales guilty of first -degree possession and sentenced him to 90
months in prison. Garcia-Morales appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Garcia-Morales contends that the district court erred by denying his moti on to
suppress the drug evidence , arguing that the police officers impermissibly expanded the
scope of the traffic stop without reasonable articulable suspicion.

1 Garcia Morales is not appealing the district court’s suppression of his confession.

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“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’ s legal determinations de nov o.” State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted ). “When facts are not in dispute, as here, we review a
pretrial order on a motion to suppress de novo and determine whether the police articulated
an adequate basis for the search or seizure at issue. ” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867,
871 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Traffic stops resulting in searches, seizures and/or arrests are governed by the
principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). See State v. Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). Each incremental intrusion during the stop must be tied
to, and justified by: “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent
probable cause, or (3) reasonableness as defined in Terry.” Id. at 365. The basis for the
intrusion “must be individualized to the person toward whom the intrusion is directed.” Id.
A police officer may order a driver “out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without an articulated
reason.” Id. at 367.
Garcia-Morales does not contest the validity of the initial stop, but rather asserts that
the officers’ questions about his whereabouts constituted investigative questioning and
impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop. An officer must have reasonable articulable
suspicion to conduct investigative questioning during a traffic stop. State v. Fort , 660
N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003).
In Fort, the Supreme Court held that questioning a passenger in a car that was
stopped for speeding and a cracked windshield was particularl y intrusive because the

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questions were intended to solicit “evidence of drugs or weapons.” Id. at 418. Here, the
officers simply asked Garcia-Morales about where he had been coming from and whether
he had stopped anywhere else. These are not the same intrusive questions, unrelated to the
basis of the stop, as in Fort.
To the extent that the questions asked expanded the scope of the stop , they were
justified by reasonable articulable suspicion. Here, the officers observed Garcia-Morales
entering and leaving a home under police observation for drug trafficking , late at night,
and for a short period of time. This information , coupled with the traffic violations , is
sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a question a bout Garcia -Morales’s
whereabouts. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 353. Because we conclude that the officers’
conduct was reasonable, we affirm the district court’s denial of the suppression motion.
Affirmed.