Jason Wallace Horsman, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0401

Jason Wallace Horsman, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed October 21, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CV-18-2043

Brenton M. Tunis, Thomas R. Braun, Restovich Braun & Associates, Rochester,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Stephen D. Melchionne, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Respondent commissioner of public safety di squalified appellant’s commercial
driver’s license (CDL) because he was twice convicted of driving while impaired (DWI).
But because of commissioner error, the disqualification was delayed. Appellant challenges

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the district court’s denial of his petition to reinstate his CDL, arguing that (1) the district
court made clearly erroneous factual findings, (2) the disqualification is arbitrary and
capricious, and (3) the disqualification is unconstitutional. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jason Horsman was a com mercial truck driver. On May 10, 2006, he
pleaded guilty and was convicted of DWI. As a result, the commissioner disqualified
Horsman’s CDL for one year. On June 18, 2014, he pleaded guilty and was convicted of
a second DWI. Horsman’s CDL was again disqualified.
Starting in August 2014, Horsman participated in the ignition interlock program
(program). His standard driver’s license was conditionally reinstated, and the CDL
disqualification was erroneously lifted. Horsman successfully completed the program in
January 2015 and received notice that he “no longer ha[d] any restraints on [his] driving
privileges.”
In September 2018, the commissioner corrected Horsman’s driving record to reflect
his CDL disqualification and notified Horsman that, be cause of his second DWI
conviction, his CDL was disqualified for life effective October 8, 2018.
Horsman petitioned the district court to reinstate his CDL. After a hearing , the
district court denied reinstatement but granted Horsman’s alternative request to amend his
driving record to reflect a disqualification date of June 18, 2014. Horsman appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Minnesota law requires the commissioner to “disqualify a person from operating
commercial motor vehicles in accordance with the driver disqualifications and penalties in

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[federal regulations].” Minn. Stat. § 171.165, subd. 1 (2018). 1 For a first conviction of
driving “under the influence of alcohol as prescribed by State law,” federal regulations
mandate a one -year disqualification. 49 C.F. R § 383.51(b) (2016). For a second
conviction, the state must disqualify the driver for life, although a driver who demonstrates
successful completion of “ an app ropriate rehabilitation program” may have his CDL
reinstated after 10 years. Id. (a)(6), (b) (2016).
A person whose CDL has been disqualified may petition the district court for
reinstatement under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 (2018). In a reinstatement proceeding, the district
court conducts a trial de novo to determine whether a driver is entitled to r einstatement.
Pallas v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. App. 2010). The petitioner
has the burden of proof. Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn.
App. 2013) . Courts presume regularity and correctness in the commissioner’s
disqualification determination but may reverse a disqualification if it was arbitrary,
unreasonable, or not within the commissioner’s jurisdiction and powers. Pallas, 781
N.W.2d at 167.
On appeal, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations and will not
disturb the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Constans,
835 N.W.2d at 523. But we “review de novo the district court’ s application of t he law.”
Id.

1 The relevant portion of the disqualification statute has remained unchanged since before
Horsman’s first DWI. See Minn. Stat. § 171.165, subd. 1 (Supp. 2005).

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I. The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
Horsman challenges two factual findings. First, he contends the district court
clearly erred by finding that the delay in disqualifying his CDL was the result of a computer
error related to his participation in the program and that the commissioner, upon
discovering the mistake, “attempted to remedy it consistent with federal and state
regulations as soon as possible.” This challenge is misplaced. While Horsman correctly
observes that the record contains no evidence of a computer error ,2 it otherwise amply
supports the finding regarding the reason for the delay. Horsman’s certified driving record
notes Horsman’s second DWI conviction in June 2014 and a resulting CDL
disqualification. Reference to the disqualification is followed by a series of entries
reflecting Horsman’s participation in the program, his successful completion in January
2015 and removal of “any restraints on [his] driving privileges,” and finally a September
2018 entry noting “outstanding [r]equirements” and effectuating Horsman’s lifetime CDL
disqualification. On this record, the district court did not clearly err by finding that
Horsman’s par ticipation in the program led to the mistaken removal of his CDL
disqualification and that the commissioner discovered and promptly remedied the mistake.
Moreover, any error in the district court’s findings regarding the reason for the delay
and the prompt ness of the commissioner’s corrective action does not warrant reversal
because it did not impair his substantial rights. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61. As discussed
below, the commissioner was required to disqualify Horsman’s CDL based on his second

2 The explanation on which the district court relied comes solely from the commissioner’s
counsel’s unsworn statements at the hearing.

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DWI conviction. The reason for the commissioner’s delay in doing so has no bearing on
the validity of the disqualification.
Horsman next challenges the finding that when “he received his CDL by mistake”
in January 2015, “he kept quiet and hoped to benefit from the error.” He points to his
testimony that he “call[ed] the commercial driver’s license department and the state to
verify” and was left with “the understanding that unless [he] received another violation
that, what [he] had on [his] record, it would stay va lid.” But cross -examination revealed
this testimony to be implausible. And, even without directly contrary evidence, the district
court was not required to accept it. See Am. Bank of St. Paul v. City of Minneapolis , 802
N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that “ a fact-finder is not required to accept
uncontradicted testimony if the surrounding facts and circumstances afford reasonable
grounds for doubting its credibility” (quotation omitted)). Because we defer to the district
court’s determination that Horsman was not credible , Constans, 835 N.W.2d at 523 ,
Horsman’s argument is unavailing.
II. The commissioner’s decision to disqualify Horsman’s CDL is not arbitrary and
capricious.

A state agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if it
(1) relie[s] on factors that the legislature had not intended it to
consider, (2) fail [s] to consider an important aspect of the
problem, (3) offer[s] an explanation for the decision that runs
counter to the evidence, (4) . . . is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise, or (5) . . . reflects the agency’s will and not its
judgment.

Pallas, 781 N.W.2d at 167.

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Horsman first contends his CDL disqualification is arbitrary and capricious because
the commissioner failed to articulate a sufficient reason for the delay in issuing the
disqualification. We disagree. It is the disqualification itself, not the delay, that is the
decision at issue. And the delay has no bearing on the validity of the d isqualification,
which is mandated by Minn. Stat. § 171.165, subd. 1, and 49 C.F.R § 383.51(b). Even if
we accept Horsman’s argument that a state’s failure to timely disqualify a driver constitutes
substantial noncompliance with federal regulations, see 49 C.F.R. § 384.231(c) (2016)
(requiring state to “disqualify a driver as expeditiously a s possible”), the consequence is
not impairment of the state’s authority to issue the disqualification . Rather, the potential
consequences are reduction in federal f unding to the state, 49 C.F.R. §§ 384.401 -.402
(2016), or decertification of the state’s CDL program, 49 C.F.R. § 384.405 (2016). Indeed,
since state and federal law plainly require lifetime disqualification of a driver’s CDL after
a second DWI conviction, it would have been arbitrary and capricious for the commissioner
not to have disqualified Horsman’s CDL simply because of the delay.
Horsman next argues that his disqualification is arbitrary and capricious because his
2014 conviction of having an alcoho l concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
driving is not a conviction of driving “under the influence of alcohol as prescribed by State
law.” 49 C.F.R § 383.51(b). We are not persuaded. Minnesota law plainly indicates that
all violations of Mi nn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2018), constitute driving “under the
influence” or “while impaired.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.03, subd. 20 (defining “prior
impaired driving conviction” as including “a prior conviction under . . . section 169A.20
(driving while impaired)”), .54, subd. 1 (referring to conviction under “section 169A.20”

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as “driving while impaired”) (2018). A DWI conviction based on alcohol concentration,
under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) , is therefore a conviction of driving “under the
influence of alcohol as prescribed by State law.” Disqualifying Horsman’s CDL based on
that conviction is not arbitrary and capricious.
III. Horsman’s CDL disqualification is not unconstitutional.
Horsman asserts several constitutional arguments, again focusing on the
commissioner’s delay in issuing the disqualification rather than the disqualification itself.
We review de novo the interpretation and application of the federal and state constitutions
to established facts. Riehm v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 745 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Minn. App.
2008), review denied (Minn. May 20, 2008).
Horsman first contends the disqualification of his CDL several years after his
second DWI conviction violated his right to due process under the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 1. But
he acknowledges that reversal is warranted for a claimed due -process violation only upon
a showing of prejudice. “ An appellant cannot assert a procedural due -process claim
without first establishing that he has suffered a direct and personal harm resulting from the
alleged denial of his constitutional rights.” Riehm, 745 N.W.2d at 877 (quotation omitted).
Horsman has not demonstrated any such harm from the commissioner’s del ay in issuing
the mandatory disqualification of his CDL.
Rather, as the district court observed, Horsman “had the benefit of his CDL during
a period where he should have not had his CDL.” See id. at 877-78 (observing that a driver
who retains his license during revocation proceedings does not suffer prejudice from

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delay). And because the district court amended Horsman’s driving record to reflect that
the lifetime disqualification began upon his second DWI conviction, rather than the date
the commissioner discovered and remedied its mistake, the delay did not impair Horsman’s
ability to rehabilitate and seek reinstatement after ten years.3 Nor was Horsman prejudiced,
as he claims, by forgoing employment or educational opportunities in the four years
between his second DWI conviction and CDL disqualification. The record supports the
district court’s findings that Horsman could continue his employment in a comparable non-
driving position and that Horsman knew his CDL would be revoked after his second DWI
and he “kept quiet and hoped to benefit from the error.” Because Horsman has not
demonstrated any prejudice from the commissioner’s delay in issuing his mandatory CDL
disqualification, his due-process claim fails.
Horsman also argues that his disqualification is unconstitutional because the
“relationship between the Federal regulations and Minn. Stat. § 171.165 [is] vague” with
respect to which convictions require disqualification. This argument is likew ise
unavailing. The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to criminal statutes, requiring that “a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage

3 Horsman cites numerous foreign cases for the proposition that substantial delay itself
indicates prejudice. Those cases are inapposite because they involve personal driver’s
licenses, not CDLs, see Terraciano v. Pennsylvania, 753 A.2d 233 (Penn. 2000); Davis v.
S. C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 800 S.E.2d 493 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017); Wilson v. S. C. Dep’t
of Motor Vehicles, 796 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017), or involve delayed imposition of
a temporary CDL disqualification, not a lifetime disqualification, Jobe v. La. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 94 So. 3d 217 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2012) (dissenting opinion noting that CDL
disqualification is mandatory upon DWI conviction).

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arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 568 (Minn.
App. 2006) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). Even assuming the
doctrine applies to Minn. Stat. § 171.165, which is a civil statut e,4 our foregoing analysis
demonstrates that Minnesota law define s with sufficient definiteness which convictions
result in disqualification under Minn. Stat. § 171.165. Accordingly, Horsman’s vagueness
challenge fails.
Finally, Horsman contends his disqualification is unconstitutional because the delay
in issuing the disqualification violates his right “to obtain justice . . . promptly.” Minn.
Const. art. I, § 8. This contention ignores established caselaw, which indicates that article
I, section 8, is not an independent basis for relief. See State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863,
873 (Minn. 2015) ; Hoeft v. Hennepin C ounty, 754 N.W.2d 717, 726 (Minn. App. 2008).
Horsman has not demonstrated that his right to prompt justice warrants relieving him of
his mandatory CDL disqualification.
Affirmed.

4 “For purposes of a vagueness analysis, ‘quasi-criminal’ statutes are tantamount to
criminal ones.” Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 568. Horsman does not contend that Minn. Stat.
§ 171.165 is quasi -criminal, and it is readily distinguishable from the harassment -
restraining-order statute held to be so in Dunham.