In re the Marriage of: Meghan Kim Eastman, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0422

In re the Marriage of: Meghan Kim Eastman, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Todd Louis Eastman,
Appellant,

County of Becker,
Intervenor.

Filed December 2, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-FA-17-2141

Renee Ann Charon, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Timothy H. Dodd, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and John P.
Smith, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
The sole issue in this appeal is whether, after a district court has transferred
permanent physical and legal custody of a child to a relative in a juvenile-protection case,
the non -custodial parent may request modification of custody and parenting time in a
marriage-dissolution case instead of the juvenile-protection case in which the district court
previously ordered the transfer. We conclude that the district court, while presiding over
the dissolution case, properly ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the transfer-
of-custody order that was filed in the juvenile-protection case. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Meghan Kim Eastman is the biological mother of four children , who were born
between 2001 and 2013. She married Todd Louis Eastman in 2015. Todd adopted the two
oldest children in 2016. He is the biological father of the two youngest children.
In January 2017, B ecker County Human Services received reports of domestic
violence with in the family. In February 2017 , the county filed a petition for an order
declaring the children in need of protection or services . The petition was granted. In
August 2017, the county filed a petition for the termination of Todd’s parental rights to the
first child. That petition also was granted.
In August 2017 , the county also petitioned for permanency dispositions for the
second child, the third child, and the fourth child . In December 2017, after a two -day
evidentiary hearing, the district court filed a 23 -page order in which, among other things,
it transferred permanent physical and legal custody of the second child from Todd to

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Meghan. The district court ordered that any parenting time between Todd and the second
child would “be at Meghan’s discretion once [the second child]’s therapist determines that
they are ready to be able to handle parenting time ” and that it would “take place in a
supervised setting until determined differently by [the second child ]’s therapist.” The
district court also ordered that Meghan “is not to return [the second child] to the permanent
care or custody of Todd Eastman without this Court’s approval or without notice to Becker
County Human Services.” In addition, the district court stated, “The Court’s jurisdiction
in this matter is terminated and this Court File is closed.”
Meanwhile, in October 2017 , as the permanency case was pending, Meghan
petitioned for dissolution of the marriage . The dissolution case was assigned to the same
district court judge who was presiding over the juvenile-protection cases.
In the dissolution action, Todd served discovery requests on Meghan in which h e
sought, among other things, the children ’s therapy reco rds and information about the
location of the children’s residence. Meghan moved for a protective order on the grounds
that she has sole legal and physical custody of the children and that she and the children
have an order for protection that prohibits Todd from having contact with them . In
November 2018, the district court filed a two -page order granting Meghan’s motion. The
district court reasoned that Todd served his discovery requests only “for purposes of
determining parenting time ” and that “the family court has no jurisdiction to determine
parenting time ” because “the juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning permanency matters.” The order further provides that Todd “is
required to bring a motion in juvenile court to address any legal rights having to do with

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the children in this matter or to establish any parenting time with the children in this
matter.”
In March 2019, the district court reiterated its jurisdictional ruling in the dissolution
decree by stating that “the Court is without jurisdiction to issue an order affecting child
custody or parenting time with respect to the children in this proceeding.”
Todd appeals. Meghan has not filed a responsive brief or otherwise appeared in the
court of ap peals. The appeal nonetheless is submitted for a decision on the merits. See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
D E C I S I O N
Todd argues that the district court, while sitting as a family court in the marriage-
dissolution case, erred by ruling that it does not have jurisdiction to consider the issues of
custody and parenting time.
The jurisdiction of a district court presiding over a juvenile -protection proceeding
is defined in the Juvenile Court Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001-.637 (2018 & Supp. 2019).
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 1. “The juvenile court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning, ” among other things, “permanency matters under
sections 260C.503 to 260C.521 .” Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 2(2). In ruling on a
permanency petition, the juvenile court “must order one of the permanency dispositions”
authorized by statute. Minn. Stat § 260C.515, subd. 1. Among the permanency
dispositions authorized by statute is an order for the transfer of “permanent legal and
physical custody to a fit and willing relative .” Minn. Stat § 260C.515, subd. 4. Such an
order “may be modified.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.521, subd. 2. “[F]urther court hearings are

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necessary if . . . a party seeks to modify an order under section 260C.521, subdivision 2.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.519(3).
The rules of juvenile protection procedure also are relevant to the question whether
the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over a request to modify an order transferring
permanent legal and physical custody of a child to a relative. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.515,
subd. 4(2) . At the time of the district court proceedings relevant to this appeal, the
applicable rule provided that if the juvenile court transferred permanent legal and physical
custody of a child to a relative, “juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated unless specifically
retained by the court.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.07, subd. 2 (effective from Jul y 1, 2014,
to Aug. 31, 2019). But that provision did not mean that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
could not be revived. The same rule required a party seeking modification of such an order
to file a modification motion “in the court file in the county where the order was issued. ”
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.07, subd. 4 (effective from July 1, 2014 , to Aug. 31, 2019). The
rule further provided, “If the order was filed on or after August 1, 2012, the motion to
modify shall be filed in juvenile court.” Id. (emphasis added).1
This court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court ’s ruling that a
juvenile court has jurisdiction over an issue related to a juvenile -protection case. In re

1This rule recently was amended and renumbered , effective September 1, 2019 .
Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure and the
Rules of Adoption Procedure , Nos. ADM10-8040 & -8041 (Minn. May 13, 2019). The
applicable rule now provides, in pertinent part, that the juvenile court “shall order further
hearings if required by Minnesota Statutes, section 260C.519, and shall conduct any further
review as required by Minnesota Statutes, section 260C.521. ” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(b) (effective Sept. 1, 2019).

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Welfare of Child of A.H., 879 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 2016); Stern v. Stern, 839 N.W.2d
96, 99 (Minn. App. 2013).
In this case, Todd contends that the family court erred because the juvenile court
expressly stated in its December 2017 order , “The Court’s jurisdiction in this matter is
terminated and this Court File is closed.” At oral argument, Todd’s attorney asserted that
subdivision 4 of rule 42.07 would apply only if the juvenile court had expressly retained
jurisdiction upon transferring custody to Meghan. That assertion is not supported by the
plain lang uage of the then -applicable version of subdivision 4, which stated that “the
motion to modify shall be filed in juvenile court.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.07, subd. 4
(effective from July 1, 2014, to Aug. 31, 2019). There was no language in that version of
subdivision 4 indicating that subdivision 4 applied only if a juvenile court expressly
retained jurisdiction when transferring custody to a relative. Similarly, the Juvenile Court
Act provides that “further court hearings are necessary if . . . a party seeks to modify an
order under section 260C.521, subdivision 2. ” Minn. Stat. § 260C.519(3). Such “further
court hearings” presumably would occur in the juvenile court because that statute is within
the Juvenile Court Act. Consequently, u nder both the applicable statutes and the then-
applicable rule, after a juvenile court has transferred custody to a relative, the juvenile court
has exclusive jurisdiction over any subsequent request to modify custody or parenting time,
even if the juvenile court expressly terminated its jurisdiction in its prior order.
Thus, the district court in this case, while sitting as a family court in the marriage -
dissolution case, did not err by ruling that it does not have jurisdiction to consider a request

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to modify the juvenile court ’s order concerning custody and parenting time. Todd was
required to file such a motion to modify in the juvenile court.
Affirmed.