Brian J. Henel, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0431

Brian J. Henel,
Respondent,

vs.

Rosario Salas,
Appellant,

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation,
Defendant.

Filed February 10, 2020
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-15219

Beau D. McGraw, McGraw Law Firm, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Eric Bond Anunobi, Eric Bond Law Office, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, Columbus, Ohio (defendant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order for allocation of equity after a court
trial in a partit ion-by-sale action regarding a house purchased by the parties. Appellant
argues that the district court erred in three findings of fact and in not allocating to her (1) the
total mortgage and utility payments; (2) more than half of the remaining equity; and (3) half
of the $8,000 federal tax credit respondent received. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Rosario Salas and respondent Brian J. Henel started livin g together
romantically in 2005. The parties and their young son lived in a three-bedroom apartment
with Salas’s mother and three younger siblings . The parties purchased a three -bedroom
house in Minneapolis in May 2009. The house was listed at a pproximately $85,000, and
the couple financed $76,948 after receiving a $10,000 grant from the Greater Metropolitan
Housing Corporation, which required them to stay in the house for five years. The monthly
mortgage payment on the house started at $801.40 and increased increm entally to
$1,018.43 as of the date of trial. Salas’s family lived with the parties in the house.
At trial, Henel testified that he worked on the house before anyone moved in. Henel
stated that he painted the house, installed new toilets and insulation, and fixed a couple of
windows, incurring approximately $5,200 in out-of-pocket expenses. Around this time,
Henel also received an $8,000 federal homeowner’s tax credit that he kept for himself.

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The parties ended their romantic relationship in December 2009 but continued to
live together until July 2010. Salas offered to move out with her family, but Henel testified
that he moved out so their son could stay with his mother in a nice home.
The parties did not have any financial agreement when Henel moved out. Salas
took over all the mortgage and utility payments for the house and paid approximately
$87,400 in mortgage payments over the past eight years. She also painted the house,
installed new flooring, handled a city-required lead abatement, and replaced the locks, roof,
and boiler; all of which cost her approximately $28,500. Salas’s family continued to live
with her. Her mother contributed by providing child care, and some of her siblings assisted
by paying certain utility bills.
On March 27, 2017, Henel brought this lawsuit seeking partition by sale. The
parties agreed that a partition is impossible and asked the district court to allocate the equity
between the parties. After a court trial in September 2018, the district court ordered a home
appraisal and allocat ed equity using the formula of “[c]urrent market value minus
$62,283.53 (current mortgage balance) minus $11,871.03 (amount of principal reduction
[Salas] paid for) minus $28,500 equals divisible equity. One half of the divisible equity is
awarded to Henel.” Salas appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous or prejudicial to
Salas.

Salas argues that the district court erred when it found that (1) Henel made
improvements to the house; (2) Salas’s family moved in after the parties moved in; and

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(3) the parties agreed that Salas’s family could stay with them for one year. We address
each issue in turn.
We will not reverse a district court’s finding s of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. Anderson v. Anderson , 560 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Minn. App . 1997), review
dismissed (Minn. May 28, 1997). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if we are “left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” LaPoint v. Family
Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Appellate
courts give great deference to the district court’s findings of fact because the district court
can hear the witnesses’ testimony and assess their credibility. Id.
A. Henel’s repairs
The district court found that, “ [p]rior to moving in, Henel painted the house,
installed new toilets and insulation, and put in new windows.” Henel’s trial testimony
directly supports this finding.
Salas argues that this is clear error because Henel did not provide any receipts and
Salas disputed in her testimony that Henel did the work. But when cross-examined and
asked if Henel accurately testified “that he did the work prior to moving in, ” Salas
responded, “Yes.” Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, see id.,
the testimony supports the district court’s finding. Further, we defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. Id.
B. When Salas’s family moved in
Salas next challenges the district court’s finding that Salas’s family moved in after
the parties. But even if we assume without deciding error, Salas cannot show prejudice.

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“[W]e do not reverse unless there is error causing harm to the appealing party. In other
words, error without prejudice is not ground for reversal.” Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542,
546 (Minn. 1949) (quotation omitted). Nothing in the district court’s award suggests that
this finding impacted its allocation of equity. Salas was not prejudiced by this finding.
C. The parties’ agreement about how long Salas’s family would liv e with
them

Finally, Salas contends that the district court clear ly erred by finding that “[a]fter
moving in, Henel and Salas agreed that Salas’s family could move into the house and live
with them for one year.” Salas argues that this fact is shown to be erroneous by Henel’s
testimony that the parties did not have a written agreement and his testimony that he did
not ask the family to leave after a year. But Henel did testify that Salas and Henel agreed
that Salas’s family could live with them for one year. Again, we defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations.
Salas also argues that “[t]his greatly prejudiced” her but does not explain how. The
district court does not mention the agreement in its conclusions of law or allocation order.
Salas cannot establish clear error or prejudice in any of the district court’s challenged
findings.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the equity of the
house.

Salas argues that the district court should have allocated to her (1) the total mortgage
and utility payments; (2) more than half of the remaining equity; and (3) half of the $8,000
federal tax credit Henel received. We address each issue in turn.

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“In Minnesota, an action for partition of real estate is statutory and the court is
guided by the principles of equity in its decisions.” Anderson, 560 N.W.2d at 730; see also
Minn. Stat. §§ 558.01-.32 (2018). “A district court has broad discretion when fashioning
an equitable remedy.” State ex rel Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass ’n v. Nicollet Cty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 799 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn. App. 2011). Appellate courts review equitable
determinations for an abuse of discretion. City of North Oaks v. Sarpal , 797 N.W.2d 18,
23 (Minn. 2011). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
error of law or is against the facts in the record. Id.
A. Mortgage and utility payments
Salas argues that she is entitled to all payments made toward utilities as well as the
portions of her mortgage payments that covered the interest, insurance, and taxes. We are
not persuaded.
The district court determined that “Salas should be credited with the reduction in
the principal of the mortgage, but not the interest she paid. The interest payments can be
viewed as the price she paid in lieu of rent to provide a place for her family to live.”
Salas cites Kauffman v. Eckhardt , in which the Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that, in a partition, the district court must consider the interests in the property of all parties,
whether those interests “consist of liens, taxes paid, advances , or improvements made.”
263 N.W. 610, 611 (Minn. 1935) . Here, the district court did consider the interest and
taxes Salas paid with her benefit of living in the house and determined that they offset each
other. Salas also cites Kirsch v. Scandia Am. Bank to argue that interest must be credited
to the party that paid it in allocating the property. 199 N.W. 881 (Minn. 1924). However,

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Kirsch involved partition after one tenant in common redeemed a foreclosed property. Id.
at 881-82. Kirsch is not controlling. The district court here considered the non-principle
mortgage payments to be rent payments for her family. Moreover, divisions of equity need
not be equal to be equitable. See Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. App. 2005)
(addressing equitable division of marital assets).
B. Remaining divisible equity

Salas also contends that she is entitled to more than half of the remaining eq uity in
the property because Henel abandoned her and left her with the financial commitment that
they entered into together. Salas argues that Henel “falls short of the equitable principle of
‘clean hands.’” This assertion is not supported by the testimo ny of the witnesses. Both
parties testified that they split amicably, and they both were looking for a new place to live
before Henel decided on an apartment. Salas’s argument fails.
C. The $8,000 federal tax credit

Salas’s final argument is that the district court abused its discretion by not dividing
the $8,000 federal tax credit that Henel received because of the partition in kind and
because Henel never paid her brother when he helped paint half of the kitchen wa ll. But,
as previously mentioned, equity allocations do not need to be equal to be equitable. See
Sirek, 693 N.W.2d at 900. Further, it appears that the district court already accounted for
this tax credit. The district court did not credit Henel for his $5,200 in repairs in its order,
apparently to balance out the $8,000 tax credit. This decision falls within the discretion of
the district court.
Affirmed.