Andrew Bearden Williams, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0434

Andrew Bearden Williams, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 28, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Cook County District Court
File No. 16-CR-13-136

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Molly C. Hicken, Cook County Attorney, Grand Marais, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief following an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he filed his petition within two years
of discovering his claims. Because the record supports the district court’s finding that
appellant’s petition was untimely because he filed his petition more than two years after he
objectively knew or should have known of his underlying claims, we affirm.
FACTS
In May 2013, appellant Andrew Bearden Williams was charged with two counts of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct,
and one count of solicitation of a minor. Respondent State of Minnesota later amended the
complaint to add another count of third -degree criminal sexu al conduct involving a
different minor victim. Attorney J.L. represented appellant against these charges . In
January 2014, the p arties reached a plea agreement, which provided that appellant would
plead guilty to one count of third -degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of fifth -
degree criminal sexual conduct in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. The
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15 plea petition appellant signed included language related to mandatory
conditional release periods for “most sex offenses.” The petition also read: “In this case,
the period of conditional release is ___ years.” The parties contemplated a 36-month prison
sentence, stayed for seven years with conditions of probation. Conditional release was not
mentioned at appellant’s plea hearing.

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The presentence investigation report filed before appellant’s sentencing hearing
included an attached sentencing worksheet with the following language : “Conditional
Release Statutes Apply if Prison Sentence is Executed: 10 Years.” The district court
accordingly sentenced appellant to 36 months in prison, but stayed execution for seven
years and imposed conditions of probation. The warrant of commitment did not mention
a conditional release period.
After appellant violated his probation, the parties appeared for a hearing in October
2014, where attorney G.W. represented appellant . Appellant admitted to violating his
probation, and the district court issued an amended warrant of commitment , which stated:
“Commit to Commissioner of Corrections at the MN Correctional Facility – St. Cloud for
36 months. Sentence is stayed for 7 years. Conditional release after confinement has been
set at 10 years.” G.W. continued to represent appellant throughout several probation
proceedings. After finding two additional probation violations following contested
violation hearings in March and May 20 15, the district court executed appellant’s stayed
36-month sentence at a June 8, 2015 disposition hearing. The district court told appellant
on the record, “[i]t’s a harsh wake -up call, but I hope it will be a wake -up call, because
you’re going to remain on conditional release for a period of up to ten years based upon
the original sentence and the presumptive sentence in this case.” The amended warrant of
commitment again included language about the ten-year conditional release period.
On December 14, 2017, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting
that he was entitled to plea withdrawal based on an unconstitutional guilty plea and
ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s petition included an affidavit from the state

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appellate public defender who represented him at a Department of Corrections revocation
hearing in October 2016. The state appellate public defender averred that she had “advised
[appellant] that he [might] have a valid claim that his guilty plea was not valid b ecause of
his attorney’s failure to advise him of conditional release before he entered his guilty plea.”
In July 2018 , appellant and his two former attorneys testified at an evidentiary
hearing. Following the hearing, the district court issued a written order denying appellant’s
petition, concluding that, while appellant’s claims were not frivolous, it was not in the
interests of justice to grant them. The district court held that appellant learned about his
underlying claims sometime before the June 8, 2015 disposition hearing, rendering his
petition untimely under the interests -of-justice exception to the postconviction relief
statute. On appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that his
petition was untimely.
D E C I S I O N
A district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Henderson v. State, 906 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Minn. 2018). This decision
will not be reversed “unless the [district] court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, based its ruling on an error of law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Swaney v. State , 882 N.W.2d 207, 214 ( Minn. 2016). “We review the
postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of f act for clear error.”
Griffin v. State, 883 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 2016).
An individual convicted of a crime who claims that his or her constitutional rights
have been violated may file a petition for postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

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1 (2016). To be timely, a postconviction petition must be filed within two years after “the
entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed” or “an appellate
court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal,” whichever is later. Id., subd. 4(a) (2016).
Notwithstanding this two-year statute of limitations, a petition may be heard if “the
petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is
in the interests of justice.” Id., subd. 4(b)(5) (2016). “The interests-of-justice exception is
available only in rare and exceptional situations.” Hooper v. State, 888 N.W.2d 138, 142
(Minn. 2016). Postconviction p etitions brought under the interests -of-justice exception
must be filed within two years of the date the “claim arises.” Min n. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(c) (2016).
Appellant does not dispute that his postconviction petition was filed more than two
years after the district court entered judgment in April 2014. Instead, appellant argues that
his petition meets the interests-of-justice exception because it involves nonfrivolous claims
and he brought the petition within two years of discovering these claims in October 2016.
We first consider whether appellant filed his petition i n compliance with the time
requirements of subdivision 4(c). See Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Minn. 2012)
(explaining that courts should consider whether a petitioner has complied with the two-
year time limit under subdivision 4(c) before determ ining whether the petitioner has
satisfied an exce ption under subdivision 4(b)) . A “claim arises” under the interests -of-
justice exception when the petitioner objectively “knew or should have known” that the

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claim existed. Sanchez v. State , 816 N.W.2d 55 0, 558 -60 ( Minn. 2012).1 “A
postconviction court’ s determination of when a petitioner knew or should have known
about his or her claim is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” Bolstad, 878
N.W.2d at 497.
The district court found that appellant knew or should have known of his underlying
claims before the June 8, 2015 disposition hearing because attorney G.W. testified that he
advised appellant about conditional release before his second probation-violation hearing
in 2015. The district court credited the attorney’s testimony that he informed appellant
about the nature of conditional release, including its ten-year duration in appellant’s case.
In making this finding, the court rejected appellant’s contrary testimony . We do no t
second-guess that credibility determination. See Miles v. State , 840 N.W.2d 195, 201
(Minn. 2013) (“The postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness
credibility and so we defer to the court’s credibility determinations.”).
The record from the evidentiary hearing supports the district court’s finding. At the
hearing, G.W. testified that he remembered appellant’s case better than others . He also
testified that he spoke with appella nt by telephone and informed him of what conditional
release entailed after his paralegal reported that appellant had questions about the meaning
of conditional release and supervised release. In his testimony, G.W. recalled that he
described conditional release to appellant as a form of extended probation, where appellant

1 The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the invitation to adopt a subjective,
actual knowledge standard for assessing when a “claim arises” for the two-year limitations
period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). See, e.g., Bolstad v. State, 878 N.W.2d 493, 497
(Minn. 2016); Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Minn. 2013).

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could be revoked if he violated any conditional release terms, such as using drugs and
alcohol, or procuring new criminal charges. G.W. accurately described conditional release
to appellant. See State ex rel Duncan v. R oy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 272 n.1 (Minn. 2016)
(“Functionally, conditional release is identical to supervised release.”); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 244.05, subd. 3(2) (2014) (stating that if an inmate violates the conditions of their
supervised release, the commiss ioner may revoke that release). 2 This information about
conditional release was sufficient to provide objective notice to appellant of his
postconviction claims.
In urging the opposite conclusion, appellant asserts that G.W. failed to “adequately
notify” him that he had a viable claim for plea withdrawal. It is true that G.W. did not
explicitly inform appellant that he had a potential basis to withdraw his guilty plea.
However, based on his attorney’s description of conditional release and its ten -year
duration in appellant’s case, appellant knew or should have known that he could be subject
to additional prison time beyond the 36 months in the plea agreement if he violated any
conditional release terms. In turn, this advice furnished appellant with a basis to challenge
the validity of his guilty plea and the adequacy of his trial attorney’s representation.
Therefore, the district court’s finding that appellant objectively knew or should have known
of his claim sometime before the June 8, 2015 hearing is not clearly erroneous.
The fact that appellant subjectively did not receive legal advice to challenge his plea
until October 2016 does not hamper the district court’s finding. Rather, the record shows

2 The 2014 version of the statute was in effect when G.W. advised appellant about
conditional release.

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that, under the objective standard for analyzing when a “claim arises” under Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(c), appellant’s claim arose when he and his attorney spoke about
conditional release, which occurred sometime before the June 8, 2015 disposition hearing.
Appellant filed his petition on December 14, 2017. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that appellant’s petition was untimely.
Even if appellant’s assertion that G.W. failed to provide adequate advice of the
conditional release period was correct, his claims nonetheless arose when the district court
executed his sentence on June 8, 2015. “A claim under [the interests-of-justice exception]
arises on the date of an event that establishes a right to relief in the interests of justice.”
Bee Yang v. State, 805 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Aug. 7,
2012). When the district court executed appellant’s 36 -month sentence, it informed him
on the record that he would be subject to a ten-year conditional release period. Any injury
or prejudice to appellant resulting from the imposition of the allegedly unknown
conditional release term would have occurred on this date. Thus, appellant’s
postconviction claims arose when the district court directly informed him that he was
subject to the conditional release period on June 8, 2015. See id. (holding that petitioner’s
interests-of-justice claim arose on the date when the district court revoked his probation
and imposed a longer conditional release ter m than he had been promised at sentencing).
Appellant’s petition was filed two years beyond the June 8, 2015 hearing, rendering it
untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c).
Affirmed.