State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0452

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lawrence Frank Herron,
Appellant.

Filed February 18, 2020
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-17-4779

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In this direct appeal from his judgment of conviction of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a

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presumptive sentence and denying his motion for a dispositional departure because he is
particularly amenable to probation. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Lawrence Frank Herron’s conviction arises from an altercation the night
of May 23, 2017, between him and his significant other at the time, victim T.A. While the
two were arguing, T.A. attempted to end their relationship and leave their residence with
her child. Appellant prevented her from leaving and physically assaulted her for more than
an hour, putting his arm against her throat, hitting her repeatedly, and grabbing her by her
hair and pulling her to the ground. Appellant then told T.A. she needed to get in the shower
with him so he could calm down. Fearing appellant’s continued assault, T.A. believed she
had no choice but to get in the shower with him. Appellant proceeded to sexually assault
T.A. in the shower. T.A. had sent text messages to her mother for help and ultimately left
the residence when her parents arrived. She disclosed the sexual assault to her mother
immediately and to a nurse who examined her later that day. The nurse noted many bruises
on T.A.’s arms, breasts, and inner thighs.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant in an amended complaint with
third-degree criminal sexual conduct ( count I), two counts of f elony domestic assault
(counts II and III), domestic assault by strangulation (count IV), and false i mprisonment
(count V).

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Appellant entered an Alford plea1 on the third -degree criminal -sexual-conduct
charge (count I). He did not dispute that he and T.A. had intercourse, but he maint ained
that he thought at the time that it was consensual. In exchange for his guilty plea, the state
dropped the remaining charges and waived its motion for an upward durational departure.
The state would instead seek a presumptive sentence, and appellant would be able to argue
for a downward dispositi onal or durational departure. The district cou rt accepted
appellant’s plea.
Before sentencing, appellant filed a motion for a downward dispositional departure.
At his sentencing hearing in De cember 2018, T.A. gave a victim -impact statement, and
appellant also testified. The state asked for a 48-month presumptive sentence. The district
court denied appellant’s motion and sentenced appellant to 48 months in prison. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that he was particularly amenable to probation and that the district
court improperly focused on his Alford plea in finding that he did not take responsibility
for his actions. We disagree.
We give “grea t discretion” to a district court ’s sentencing decision. See State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). A district court abuses

1 In an Alford plea, a defendant maintains his claim of innocence, but agrees that the state
has sufficient evidence for a jury to find him guilty and wishes to accept the state’s plea
offer. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167-68 (1970); see
also State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977) (recognizing Alford pleas in
Minnesota).

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that discretion “when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted).
A district court must impose a presumptive sentence unless there are substantial and
compelling circumstances warranting a downward dispositional departure. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1. Su ch circumstances include when t he defendant is “particularly
amenable” to probation and to treatment. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Particular amenability is based on offender-related factors, including “the defendant’s age,
his prior record, his remo rse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support
of friends and/or family.” Id.; see also State v. Chaklos , 528 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn.
1995). A district court need not address every Trog factor in considering a dispositional
departure. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 252, 254 (Minn. App. 2011).
Even if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, a district court need not
depart, State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009), and it need not provide
reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence, State v. Johnson , 831 N.W.2d 917, 925
(Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). As long as the district court
“carefully evaluated all the testimony an d information presente d” before imposing a
presumptive sentence, we must affirm. Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court credited appellant’s young age and support from his family
and employer. It also considered his remorse, including his apology at the end of his
sentencing-hearing testimony , which his trial attorney prompted, that “I’m truly and
honestly sorry for what has happened. I just want you to know that I do realize that it was

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wrong.” The district court w eighed the evidence aga inst appellant’s statements of what
occurred and stated that “factually speaking, I have a problem with exactly what it is that
you’re sorry for.” We give great deference to the district court’s credibility determinations.
See State v. Dickerson , 4 81 N.W .2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992). T he district court then
considered what would serve justice in the case and described it as a “close call.” It
ultimately denied the departure, concluding that “[e]ven though you’re amenable, and I
believe there’s a record of that, I’m not going to use my discretion to depart.” The record
shows that the district court carefully considered the circumstances for and against
departure before making this determination.
Appellant nonetheless claims that the district court improperly focused on his failure
to take responsibility for his actions, including by entering an Alford plea. He argues that
if his plea could have foreclosed the possibility of the district court granting a departure, it
should have informed him of this.
Appellant’s argument ignores the record regarding how the district court reached its
decision and what factors it considered . T he district court did not focus exclusively on
appellant’s Alford plea. It discussed his Alford plea, presentence-investigation report, and
psychosexual evaluation , each of which appellant challenged. In response, t he district
court instead focused on the evidence about T.A.’s physical condition after the offense and
whether it supported appellant’s version of what happened. It also considered appellant’s
statements at the sentencing hearing. Rather than relying solely on appellant’s Alford plea,
the record shows that t he district court carefully evaluated all of the testimony and
information before it. See State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985). This

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is not the “rare case” in which we w ill reverse a presumptive sentence. See Johnson, 831
N.W.2d at 925 (quotation omitted) . The district court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing an executed sentence of 48 months.
Affirmed.