State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0453

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Karla Jean Winterfeld,
Appellant.

Filed December 30, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-18-1617

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jonathan D. Holets, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, appellant argues that the district court’s denial of her
motion for a downward dispositional departure constitutes an abuse of discretion. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the presumptive sentence, we
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Karla Winterfeld and the victim, F.A.R., first met when F.A.R. entered
appellant’s special education class during his eighth-grade year. Appellant sought to help
F.A.R. with his schoolwork and eventually became better acquainted with him and his
family. Appellant also allowed F.A.R. to stay at her home with he r family during some
weekdays.
F.A.R. moved permanently into appellant’s home in December 2017 , while
appellant and her husband worked to obtain their foster parent licenses. Over the following
months, appellant’s husband noticed that she spent more time with F.A.R. at night ,
becoming distant from their biological children. Through an audio recording, appellant’s
husband discovered that appellant engaged in sexual activity with F.A.R. inside their home.
Appellant’s husband reported this conduct to police. As a result, respondent State
of Minnesota charged appellant in May 2018 with one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(b) (2016). In October 2018,

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appellant entered a straight plea 1 to the sole charge, admitting that she engaged in sexual
penetration more than once with the 15-year-old victim. After this plea, the district court
ordered a presentence investigation (PSI).
Before sentencing, appellant participated in two psychosexual evaluations: one with
A.S. and L.P. of the Duluth Institute; and the other with Dr. G.H.-J. of Northland Human
Resources Consultants. Both evaluations discussed appellant’s history of being sexually
abused and prostituted as a young child. G.H.-J. concluded that appellant did not meet the
criteria for classification as a sexual predator, while A.S. and L.P. noted that appellant
blamed the victim and that her behavior exhibited signs of scheming and planning. The
parties submitted sentencing memoranda; appellant attached numerous letters in support of
her motion for a downward dispositional departure . The PSI presented the district court
with two options. First, the PSI recommended imposing the presumptive 144 -month
executed prison sentence. Alternatively, the PSI recommended g ranting a departure and
placing appellant on probation for ten years.
At appellant’s sentencing hearing, her attorneys called two witnesses, J.M. and
G.H.-J. J.M. testified first that she worked with appellant as her individual therapist from
July 2018 until sentencing. She explained that it was unusual for a person to enter group
therapy prior to sentencing, as appellant did. In J.M.’s opinion, appellant did not present a
risk to the community.

1 An individual who enters a “straight plea,” is pleading guilty without a sentencing
agreement with the state. See State v. Sanchez -Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d 324, 327 ( Minn.
2016).

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Then G.H-J testified at sentencing that he met with appe llant twice and had her
perform a battery of psychological tests. He noted that appellant showed accountability
and remorse for her offense. Both J.M. and G.H.-J. explained that female sex offenders
generally possess low recidivism rates, and specifically stated their respective beliefs that
appellant would successfully engage in the treatment recommended in the PSI and her first
psychosexual evaluation.
Following this testimony and the parties’ arguments, the district court recessed for
a short period . The district court then addressed appellant and imposed the pre sumptive
144-month prison sentence. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court improperly denied her motion for a
downward dispositional departure. Distri ct courts retain broad discretion when imposing
sentences and their sentencing decisions will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). However, the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines limit this discretion by requiring district courts to impose the
presumptive sentence “unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2 016). Only in
“rare” situations will an appellate court reverse a district court’s refusal to depart. State v.
Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
In urging this court to reverse the district court’s imposition of the presumptive
sentence, appellant asserts that she possessed particular amenability to treatment in a
probationary setting. Appellant points to (1) her role in the Duluth community, (2) the

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numerous letters of support she received, (3) the recommendations from J.M. and G.H.-J.,
and (4) the past trauma and sexual abuse she suffered as a young girl , which she sees as
unique circumstances justifying a departure.
“In weighing whether to grant a downward dispositional departure from the
presumptive sentence, a district court considers the defendant as an individual and focuses
on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for [her] and for society.” Wells v.
State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted) (emphasis omitted),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). The sentenc ing guidelines recognize a criminal
defendant’s particular amenability to probation as a mitigating factor that can support a
downward departure from the presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.7
(2016). Relevant factors that a district court can consider include a defendant’s age, prior
record, remorse, cooperation, courtroom attitude, and support from family and friends.
State v. Trog , 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 ( Minn. 1982). “[T]he district court has discretion to
impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to
probation, but it is not required to do so.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn.
App. 2009). Indeed, the presence of a mitigating factor does not obligate the district court
to place the defendant on probation or impose a shorter sentence. State v. Wall , 343
N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984).
When a district court has discretion to depart from the presumptive sentence, our
caselaw requires it to exercise that discretion by scrutinizing the reasons for and against a
departure. See, e.g., State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). But our
caselaw does not mandate that the district court make specific findings on each Trog factor

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regarding a defendant’s particular amenability to probation. Id. In fact, the district court
need not explain its reasoning for imposing the presumptive sentence . State v. Johnson ,
831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
Here, two aspects of the record reveal that the district court considered the reasons
for and against a departure. First, the district court heard testimony at sentencing from two
of appellant’s witnesses supporting a downward departure. It was free to give this
testimony whatever weight it deemed appropriate. See State v. McCoy, 631 N.W.2d 446,
452 (Minn. App. 2001) (noting that the sentencing judge makes weight and credibility
determinations).
Second, the district court’s statement to appellant at the sentencing hearing reveals
that it analyzed the reasons for and against a departure. The district court stated:
[The] Legislature tells me that the sentence in this case
should be 144 months to the Commissioner of Corrections.
You have asked that I depart from the guidelin es. The [s]tate
opposes that departure. And the guidelines tell me that I may
depart from those – that sentence, if I find substantial and
compelling reasons to do so. . . .
I will be honest. This case probably has weighed on my
mind more than any other case I have ever had. And I’ve been
a [j]udge for a long time. I have lost sleep over this. I have
thought about it consistently since the day you entered your
plea, because I knew what the presumed sentence was upon the
day of your plea. I’ve read. I have reread. And then I’ve read
again everything that’s been submitted to me in this matter.
And I’ve struggled with what the right sentence is in this case.
I’ve listened to the testimony that came before me today. I’ve
heard that you need treatment and that you have taken – and
begun treatment and that you’re taking that very seriously.
I’ve also reviewed the evidence in this case. I’ve
observed the grooming behavior, and I’ve reviewed the
multiple acts that you committed against this child. And I keep
coming back, in this case – I keep coming back to the victim.

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I keep coming back to how . . . it appears that this was a child
who didn’t have much in the way of a home life. He didn’t
have much going for him. And he came to your home and
apparently it helped. And it gave him something that he’d
probably never had in his short life, which was hope. He had
hope for a better future. And then you, by your actions,
destroyed that. And you destroyed that young man. . . .
You were his teacher, his mentor, [and] his mother.
And you raped him. And I just can’t get past that. And,
therefore, I cannot find that there are substantial and
compelling reasons to depart from the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines.

This statement shows that the district co urt reviewed the appropriate sentence for
appellant. What is more, although the district court’s statement did not list the Trog factors,
it did explain why the district court denied appellant’s departure motion. Accordingly, this
appeal does not present the “rare case” necessitating reversal of a district court’s decision
to deny a downward departure and impose the presumptive sentence. See Kindem, 313
N.W.2d at 7. In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion here.
Affirmed.