In the Matter of the Welfare of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0462

In the Matter of the Welfare of:

D. T. S.

Filed December 23, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-19-6

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant D.T.S.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Daniel McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Laura E. Iseno r, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from an adjudicati on of delinquency, appellant D.T.S. argues
that the district court abused its discretion when it adjudicated him delinquent because the

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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district court applied improper criteria and did not follow the recommendation of the parties
to stay adjudication. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
When appellant D.T.S. was 17 years old an d his girlfriend was 15 years old, they
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. At the time of the conduct, D.T.S. was
27 months older than his girlfri end. Respondent State of Mi nnesota charged D.T.S. with
third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC ) in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344,
subd. 1(b) (2016).
D.T.S. admitted the allegations and pleaded guilty to the third- degree CSC charge
in Blue Earth County. The case was transfe rred to Steele County for disposition. Before
the disposition hearing, a predisposition inve stigation was conducted. The report
recommended placing D.T.S. on probation and staying the adjudication.
During the disposition hearing, the district court heard from D.T.S., probation, and
the state. All parties recommended that the court stay adjudication.
D.T.S. argued there were mitigating factor s that supported a stay of adjudication
including that this was his first offense an d that the conduct was consensual. D.T.S.
acknowledged that he was in the wrong and stat ed that he did not “feel like this [would]
happen again.” D.T.S. also voiced irritation at being criminally charged for engaging in
consensual intercourse. D.T.S. stated th at he views consensual intercourse and
nonconsensual intercourse differently, and that he is aware of another person who engaged
in nonconsensual intercourse without facing any legal consequences.

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The district court made several inquirie s into how a stay of adjudication could
benefit D.T.S. The probation officers recommended a stay of adjudication due to D.T.S.’s
lack of criminal history, the circumstances of the case, and mental health factors. The state
recommended the stay because of the unique facts of the case, the victim’s view of the
relationship, and D.T.S.’s cooperation throughout the proceedings and examinations. The
state had concerns about D.T. S. dismissing the criminality of the conduct, but the state
submitted that probation with treatment was the best option because probation officers
would have “tight reigns on [D.T.S.]” and know right away if adjudication was necessary.
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court was not convinced that
staying the adjudication would protect the public. The court found it troubling that D.T.S.
dismissed the CSC charge as non -criminal. Because of his attitude, the court found that
D.T.S. is more likely to reoffend than an offender who recognizes the seriousness of his
offense. The court also expressed concer n about the parties’ ability to monitor and
rehabilitate D.T.S. if the court were to gran t a stay of adjudication because the court’s
juvenile jurisdiction only extends until a juvenile’s 19th birthday, which was less than five
months away for D.T.S. The court found th at five months was not long enough to
effectively monitor D.T.S. because this “kind of behavior” does not get addressed quickly,
and it takes “years of therapy and treatment” to overcome. Ultimately the court determined
that predatory-offender registration was th e best way to monitor D.T.S. past his
19th birthday. At the close of the hearing, the court found that, although there were
mitigating factors, it was in both the public interest and D.T.S.’s interest that the court enter
an adjudication.

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This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
D.T.S. argues that the district court abused its discretion when it adjudicated D.T.S.
because the court based its decision on im proper criteria and because all parties
recommended a stay of adjudication.
When facts in a petition have been admitted, a district c ourt can either adjudicate
the child delinquent or continue the case without adju dicating the child delinquent.
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. The district court may stay adjudication “[w]hen
it is in the best interests of the child to do so and not inimical to public safety and when the
child has admitted the allegati ons contained in the petition. ” Minn. Stat. § 260B.198,
subd. 7 (2016). “[A] court shall adjudicate a child delinquent or continue the case without
adjudication at the same time and in the same court order as the disposition.” In re Welfare
of J.R.Z. , 648 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to stay adjudication in
a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 245. The district court is not required to explain why an
adjudication of delinquency is the least restrictive alternative. In re Welfare of J.L.Y. ,
596 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. App. 1999), review granted (Minn. Sept. 28, 1999) and
review dismissed (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000). “Imposi ng an adjudication within the limits
prescribed by the legislature is not an abuse of discretion.” Id.
D.T.S. first argues that the district cour t failed to properly assess the prescribed
criteria for imposing a stay of ad judication. D.T.S. argues that the district court based its

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decision on an improper understanding of law enforcement’s ability to monitor D.T.S. once
on the predatory-offender registry if adjudica ted delinquent. But D.T.S. confuses the
standard for staying adjudication with the sta ndard for ordering a pa rticular disposition.
As noted above, the district court may stay ad judication “[w]hen it is in the best interests
of the child to do so and not inimical to public safety and when the child has admitted the
allegations contained in the petition.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (emphasis added).
Here, the record reflects that the district c ourt determined that concerns about reoffense
and public safety weighed against a stay of adjudication when it d ecided to adjudicate
D.T.S. The district court also considered D.T.S.’s interests. The reasons provided by the
district court are sufficient to support the ad judication because particularized findings are
not required when deciding whether to adjudicate or stay adjudication. See J.L.Y. ,
596 N.W.2d at 695. Even assuming that the district court was incorrect in its understanding
of the predatory-offender registration system, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion because th e district court appropriatel y considered public safety
concerns and the risk of reoffense when it adjudicated D.T.S. delinquent.
Second, D.T.S. argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying
D.T.S.’s request for a stay of adjudication wh en all of the parties recommended that the
district court stay adjudication. As discussed above, a district court may choose to stay
adjudication when doing so would be in the best interest of the child and a stay is not
inimical to public safety. Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7; Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05,
subd. 4(A). As the state notes, these pr ovisions are permissive, not mandatory. See In re
Welfare of S.L.J. , 782 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Minn. 2010) (“[W]e are to interpret ‘may’ as

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permissive . . . .” (citing Minn . Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2008 ))). As a result, the district
court was not required to stay adjudication simply because the parties recommended a stay.
Here, the district court found that a stay of adjudication was not supported by the
record. The court recognized th at there were “mitigating” factors, but found that the risk
of reoffense was too great. Based on these findings, the court did not act arbitrarily when
it determined that a stay of adjudication would not protect the public. See In re Welfare of
N.T.K., 619 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. App. 2000) (stating that a district court abuses its
discretion if it acts arbitrarily).
While a different court may have reached a different conclusion regarding whether
to stay adjudication, on this record, we conclu de that the district court did not abuse its
broad discretion in adjudicating D.T.S.
Affirmed.