Cannon Falls Mall Inc., Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0475

Cannon Falls Mall Inc.,
Respondent,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
by and through its Commissioner of Transportation,
Appellant.

Filed December 9, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CV-18-131

Gary A. Van Cleve, Rob A. Stefonowicz, Bryan J. Huntington, Larkin Hoffman Daly &
Lindgren Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jeffery S. Thompson, William Young, Assistant
Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this inverse -condemnation action, appellant Commissioner of Transportation
(MnDOT) challenges the district court’s summary judgment in favor of respondent Cannon
Falls Mall Inc. (CFM). MnDOT argues that the district court erred by concluding that
Cannon Fall s Mall’s right to reasonably convenient and suitable access to an abutting

2
highway was taken by MnDOT’s road modifications. 1 Because there exist genuine issues
of material fact as to whether reasonably convenient and suitable access was taken by
MnDOT, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
The Cannon Falls Mall (the mall) is located in Cannon Falls and is owned by CFM.
The mall is between by County Highway 24 (CH 24), to the mall’s east, and Trunk
Highway 52 (TH 52), to its west. Until 2014, access to the mall was available off TH 52
by a stoplight-controlled intersection with CH 24 Boulevard, southwest of the property.
[NOT TO SCALE]
TH 52 N

64th Ave Path
Stoplight CH 24

CH 24 Blvd
TH 52
Stoplight
CH 24

1 MnDOT also challenges the district court’s conclusions on the valuation of the property
and contends tha t the district court should have granted its summary judgment motion.
Because we conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist on the reasonable -access
issue, we do not address MnDOT’s other arguments.
Mall

3
In 2014, MnDOT modified the mall’s access to TH 52. T he MnDOT project
resulted in the closure of the stoplight-controlled intersection that permitted access to the
mall, and replaced it with a series of four roundabouts to the south . The easternmost
roundabout now provides access to CH 24 and the mall.

[NOT TO SCALE]
TH 52 N

64th Ave Path
Removed
stoplight

TH 52
Removed stoplight

Roundabouts

In January 2018, CFM sued MnDOT, alleging MnDOT had taken the mall’s
reasonably convenient and suitable access to TH 52 by closing the stoplight-controlled
access and replacing it with the roundabout system . CFM claims that after MnDOT
removed intersections and installed roundabouts further south, a vehicle on TH 52 must
Mall
CH 24
CH 24
CH 24 Blvd

4
“travel approximately 1.5 miles farther to either the north or south, through local residential
and commercial neighborhoods, to finally reach [the mall].”
CFM requested a writ of mandamus to require the state to commence condemnation
proceedings, and it alleged that MnDOT’s road modification constituted a governmental
taking. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted CFM’s
motion and concluded that the mall lost reasonably convenient and suitable access to TH 52
because of MnDOT’s project, and that CFM suffered damages as a result. The district
court determined that a taking had occurred and ordered the state to init iate condemnation
proceedings. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows “that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. This court reviews the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court erred in applying the law. See Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock
Title, LLP, 824 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 2012). Appellate courts “view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted.” See
STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
To defeat a summary-judgment motion, the nonmoving party must show more than
a “metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn.
1997) (quotation omitted) . “[T]he nonmoving party cannot rely on denials or general
averments, but must off er specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material

5
fact for trial.” Southcross Commerce Ctr., LLP v. Tupy Props., LLC, 766 N.W.2d 704, 707
(Minn. App. 2009). “Summary judgment is a blunt instrument that should not be granted
when reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented.”
Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
The state constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed
or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.” Minn.
Const. art. I, § 13; see also U.S. Const. art. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”). “[P]roperty owners have a right to reasonably
convenient and suitable access to a public street or highway which abuts their property.”
Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Minn. 1978) (quotation omitted). This
right is “a property right in the nature of an easement.” State by Mondale v. Gannons Inc.,
145 N.W.2d 321, 329 (Minn. 1966).
A taking may occur when the state alters an abutting property owner’s access to a
roadway, even if no property was actually physically appropriated, when it damages the
property “in the constitutional sense.” Thomsen v. State by Head, 170 N.W.2d 575, 578
(Minn. 1969). “Not every denial of immediate or convenient access, however, will support
a claim for damages . . . .” Hendrickson v. State, 127 N.W.2d 165, 173 (1964). An abutting
landowner may be entitled to damages when a highway modification substantially impairs
“‘reasonably convenient access to the main thoroughfare.’” Beer v. Minn. Power & Light
Co., 400 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Hendrickson, 127 N.W.2d at 173).
Whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists is “a question of fact to be

6
determined in light of the circumstances peculiar to each case.” Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at
607.
The parties agree that the mall abuts TH 52 and that CFM has a right to reasonably
convenient and suitable access to TH 52. The question in dispute is: Do there exist genuine
issues of material fact as to whether reasonably convenient and suitable access to TH 52
was taken as a result of MnDOT’s modification?
In support of its summary judgment motion, CFM submitted an affidavit by its CEO
that states that following MnDOT’s modification, “drivers on TH 52 need to drive 3 miles
round trip: 1.5 miles to arrive at the mall, and 1.5 miles to return to TH 52” and must
“navigate side and back roads to reach it.”
MnDOT submitted an expert report opining that access to the mall changed little
after the modification. MnDOT’s expert concluded that travel time to the mall increased
by an average of only six seconds. He opined that travelers approaching the mall from the
east or west experie nced no change, and travelers approaching from the north or south
experienced very minimal change. The most significant change was for travelers leaving
the mall and heading north, which resulted in about 30 seconds added to the trip.
CFM argues, and the district court concluded, that no genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether MnDOT’s modification deprived the mall of reasonably convenient
and suitable access to TH 52. The record compels our disagreement.
The conflicting evidence in the record is sufficient to lead reasonable persons to
draw different conclusions as to whether the mall retained reasonably convenient and
suitable access to TH 52. A fact-finder may determine that the additional travel time

7
resulting from MnDOT’s change leaves the mall with reasonably convenient access.
Likewise, a fact -finder may believe the change leaves the mall without reasonably
convenient access. “Evaluation of the existence of reasonable access is a question of fact
and depends on the unique circumstances of each case, including the characteristics of the
property itself.” C & R Stacy, LLC v. C ounty of Chisago, 742 N.W.2d 447, 458 (Minn.
App. 2007); see also Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607 (stating that reasonably convenient and
suitable access is “a question of fact to be determined in light of the circumstances peculiar
to each case”).
Because genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment was improper.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.