Tyler Halva, Appellant,
Also decided on this docket: Minn., January 20, 2021
The holding in the court’s own words
Therefore, no relief can be granted, and we conclude that the district court appropriately dismissed Halva’s claim for damages under the MGDPA.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Laura L. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. 851 N.W.2d 598
- Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs 884 N.W.2d 621
- Bahr v. CAPELLA UNIVERSITY 788 N.W.2d 76
- Jackson v. Reiling 249 N.W.2d 896
- Day Masonry v. Independent School District 347 781 N.W.2d 321
- Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc. 715 N.W.2d 452
- Burt v. Rackner, Inc. 902 N.W.2d 448
- Becker v. Mayo Foundation 737 N.W.2d 200
- Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud 813 N.W.2d 68
- In re the Welfare of J.J.P. 831 N.W.2d 260
- Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 781 N.W.2d 858
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0481
Tyler Halva,
Appellant,
vs.
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities,
Respondent.
Filed December 16, 2019
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-18-3910
Jared M. Goerlitz, Goerlitz Law, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kathryn M. Woodruff , Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.*
S Y L L A B U S
The Minnesota official records act (MORA), Minn. Stat. § 15.17 (2018), does not
create a private cause of action.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim for damages
under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-.90
(2018), after concluding that appellant already pursued an administrative action under
section 13.085. Appellant also argues that the district court erred by granting respondent’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings on appellant’s claims under the MORA after
concluding that the MORA does not provide a private cause of action. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2015, respondent Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (MnSCU)
posted a request for proposal (RFP) for a professional/technical services contract—
software for an online registration system for continuing education and customized
training. The RFP included general selection criteria upon which proposals would be
evaluated, and explained that proposals failing to address the RFP requirements may be
disregarded.
Four vendors submitted proposals, including appellant Tyler Halva. During a
WebEx video meeting, the selection committee evaluated Halva’s proposal and
electronically highlighted Halva’s proposal’s cover letter using Adobe Acrobat Reader’s
highlight function. When the document was closed on the computer, the committee’s
highlights were not saved. The committee disqualified Halva’s proposal because he failed
to provide required information.
3
In December 2015, Halva requested, pursuant to the MGDPA, that MnSCU provide
him with the names of the other vendors that submitted proposals. On February 19, 2016,
MnSCU responded to Halva’s request and stated that the contract had bee n awarded to a
vendor other than Halva. Halva then sent four additional requests for information to
MnSCU. MnSCU responded in August 2016, but, because Halva believed that MnSCU’s
response was untimely and incomplete, he filed a data-practices complaint with the Office
of Administrative Hearings (OAH) on September 20, 2016. After Halva filed the
complaint, he received additional information from Mn SCU, but ultimately, MnSCU did
not send Halva information regarding his own RFP submission, including the highlighted
copy of Halva’s cover letter, because it did not understand his request to include data on
himself.
In January 2017, an administrative-law judge (ALJ) determined that MnSCU failed
to comply with the MGDPA and ordered MnSCU to provide Halva a copy of his original
RFP submission and a copy of the highlights made to Halva’s cover letter if it had retained
a copy. MnSCU provided Halva documents in response to the ALJ’s order. But Halva
objected, claiming that the data was insufficient because he submitted his proposal on a
CD and MnSCU provided him a paper copy , and MnSCU determined that it had not
retained the highlighted copy of Halva’s cover letter. In response to Halva’s objections,
the ALJ determined that MnSCU was not obligated to provide data that was not recorded
in physical form, or required to acquire particular software to create a permanent record of
an electronic conversation or meeting.
4
In June 2018, Halva filed a complaint in district court. In count one, Halva sought
a declaratory judgment that MnSCU’s contract with the winning vendor is “void for failure
to comply with the comp etitive bidding requirements.” In count two, Halva sought to
permanently enjoin MnSCU from performing under the contract. In count three, Halva
sought to compel MnSCU’s compliance with the MORA and the MGDPA. And in count
four, Halva sought damages for MnSCU’s violation of the MGDPA.
MnSCU moved to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. MnSCU argued that
count one failed because Halva failed to join a necessary party, the winning vendor. It
argued that count two failed because Halva sought a permanent injunction, which is a
remedy, not a cause of action. MnSCU argued that count three should be dismissed
because H alva’s action to compel compliance under the MGDPA was moot, and the
documents that Halva sought were not records within the meaning of the MORA. Lastly,
MnSCU argued that count four should be dismissed because Halva’s claim for damages
contained only legal conclusions and he made no allegations as to how MnSCU caused
him injury.
The district court granted MnSCU’s motion to dismiss counts one and two.1 The
district court also granted MnSCU’s motion to dismiss counts three and four, but only to
the extent that Halva purported to state a claim under the MGDPA. The district court
concluded that because Halva commenced his MGDPA action in the OAH, he could not
relitigate the MGDPA matters in district court. But to the extent that counts three and four
1 Halva’s appeal relates only to counts three and four.
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purported to state a claim under the MORA, the district court denied MnSCU’s motion
because the ALJ did not make a decision under the MORA, deeming it outside the
jurisdiction of the OAH.2
MnSCU then moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that th e MORA does
not create a private cause of action. On February 1, 2019, the district court granted
MnSCU’s motion, concluding: “Halva’s claim is that [ MnSCU] either did not create an
official record in the first place or that it did not preserve an official record which had been
created. The MORA does not provide a remedy, which would require [MnSCU] to go back
and create or recreate an official document.” Judgment was entered, and this appeal
followed.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss appellant’s
claim for damages under the MGDPA?
II. Did the district court err in granting respondent’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings for appellant’s claims for remedies under the MORA?
ANALYSIS
Damages under the MGDPA
The district court granted MnSCU ’s motion to dismiss Halva’s MGDPA claim
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
This court “review[s] de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for
relief. . . . [A]ccept[ing] the facts alleged in the complaint as true and constru[ing] all
2 The district court construed count four to include a claim for damages under the MORA
despite Halva claiming damages under only the MGDPA.
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reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851
N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted).
Halva argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim for damages under
the MGDPA after concluding that he could not commence an action in district court after
prevailing in the OAH. Halva claims that, under the MGDPA, an action to compel
compliance may be commenced in the OAH, and then damages may be sought in district
court. Whether the district court properly applied the MGDPA presents an issue of
statutory interpretation, which this court reviews de novo. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884
N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).
Under Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4, “[a]ctions to compel compliance [with the
MGDPA] may be brought either under [section 13.08, subdivision 4] or section 13.085.”
Section 13.085 governs administrative remedies. Thus, an action to compel compli ance
with the MGDPA may either be brought in district court or filed in the OAH. However,
section 13.085 further provides that an OAH decision regarding compliance “is not
controlling in any subsequent action brought in district court alleging the same vi olation
and seeking damages.” Minn. Stat. § 13.085, subd. 5(e). Therefore, Halva is correct; he
could file a complaint in the O AH seeking to compel MnSCU’s compliance with the
MGDPA and then file a complaint in district court seeking damages based on the same
alleged violation.
MnSCU argues that even if Halva is correct, Halva failed to sufficiently plead
damages in district court. We agree. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff cannot allege mere
“labels and conclusions.” Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010). He
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also is not entitled to recovery of damages that are “remote and speculative.” Jackson v.
Reiling, 249 N.W.2d 896, 897 (Minn. 1977). In his complaint, Halva claimed only that he
“has been injured by [ MnSCU]’s failure to provide an opportunity to participate i n a
competitive bidding process,” and alleged that he “has been aggrieved by these violations
of the MGDPA and has suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including
costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney’s fees.” These alleged damages are
conjectural.
Halva argues that this court cannot consider an alternative basis to affirm the district
court’s decision because MnSCU did not file a notice of related appeal (NORA). But a
NORA is required w hen a respondent seeks review of a district court ruling that was
adverse to respondent. Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 332 (Minn.
2010). Here, although MnSCU argued to the district court that Halva failed to adequately
allege damages, the district court did not decide that issue. Thus, there is no ruling adverse
to MnSCU on that issue, and a NORA was not required. Further, in reviewing an order
dismissing a claim under rule 12.02, the only issue before this court is whether the
pleadings are adequate, and this court will affirm a dismissal “if it is clear that no relief can
be granted under any set of facts that can be proved consistent with the allegations.” Nelson
v. Productive Alts., Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Minn. 2006). Halva failed to sufficiently
plead damages in his complaint. Therefore, no relief can be granted, and we conclude that
the district court appropriately dismissed Halva’s claim for damages under the MGDPA.
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Remedies under the MORA
The district court granted MnSCU’s motion f or judgment on the pleadings,
dismissing Halva’s claims for compliance and damages under the MORA. This court
reviews a district court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings “to determine
whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Burt v. Rackner, Inc.,
902 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). In doing so, this court accepts the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Id. Whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief
is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.
Interpretation of the MORA is an issue of statutory interpretation, which this court
reviews de novo. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624; see also Becker v. Mayo Found.,
737 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Minn. 2007) (stating that whether a statute creates a private cause
of action is a question of statutory interpretation). The goal of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). In
interpreting a statute, courts give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings.
Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012). This court reads a statute
as a whole and gives effect to all of its provisions. See In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d
260, 264 (Minn. 2013).
Halva claims that Mn SCU violated the MORA , and that he may bring an action
against MnSCU for that violation because, as an unsuccessful bidder, he may bring a claim
against an entity that violated a statute in awarding a public contract. In count three of his
complaint, Halva asserted that the MORA requires that official activity be recorded and
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that a “public- bidding procedure such as [ MnSCU’s] RFP is official activity.” Halva
claimed that by failing to create official records, MnSCU violated the MORA. Halva
sought an order compelling the production of the public data or a declaration that MnSCU
violated the MORA. In count four, Halva asserted that he was “aggrieved by [ MnSCU’s]
violations of the MGDPA and has suffered damages.” The district court stated that when
the case began it “might” have been characterized as a bid-letting case, but counts three
and four are “stand-alone claim[s].” The dist rict court determined that the MORA “says
nothing about creating a cause of action f or damages or a vehicle for any of the other
requested relief Halva seeks.”
A statute gives rise to a private cause of action only if “the language of the statute
is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” Becker , 737 N.W.2d at 207.
Courts are reluctant to recognize a cause of action under a statute when one does not clearly
exist. Krueger v. Zeman Constr. Co., 781 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Minn. 2010). Courts are
equally reluctant to imply a cause of action when a statute explicitly provides for an
alternative remedy. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 207. Here, there is no indication, based upon
a review of the plain statutory language of section 15.17, that the legislature intended to
create a pri vate cause of action. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 13.08 (recognizing a private cause of
action for violation of the MGDPA).
The MORA provides that public officers “shall make and preserve all records
necessary to a full and accurate knowledge of their official activities.” Minn. Stat. § 15.17,
subd. 1. Each agency must also “carefully protect and preserve government records from
deterioration, mutilation, loss, or destruction.” Id., subd. 2. Additionally, every custodian
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of government records is required to deliver to a successor in office all government records.
Id., subd. 3. Finally, the MORA provides access to all records containing government data,
pursuant to section 13.03 of the MGDPA, and section 138.17 for archived government
records. Id., subd. 4. Section 13.08 of the MGDPA provides a cause of action for any
violation of any provision of the chapter, which would include section 13.03. Minn. Stat.
§ 13.08. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that the MORA does not
provide for a separate private cause of action and did not err in granting MnSCU judgment
on the pleadings, dismissing counts three and four of Halva’s complaint.
D E C I S I O N
Because Halva did not adequately plead damages, the district court did not err in
granting MnSCU’s motion to dismiss Halva’s claim for damages under the MGDPA. And
because the MORA does not create a private cause of action, the district court did not err
in granting MnSCU’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for Halva’s claims under the
MORA.
Affirmed.