In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. F. P., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0495

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. F. P., Parent.

Filed September 30, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-JV-17-787

A.F.P., Thief River Falls, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Seamus Duffy, Pennington County Attorney, Stephen R. Moeller, Assistant County
Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Denae Bayne, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges a district court order terminating paren tal rights to a
minor child. Because the record supports the district court’s determination that a statutory
ground for termination exists and termination is in the child’s best interests, we affirm.

2
FACTS
Appellant-mother challenges a district court order terminating her parental rights to
a minor child born in October 2011. Father is not a party to this appeal. 1
On September 26, 2017, Pennington County Human Services (the county) received
a report that a child with special needs was potentially in n eed of protection or services.
County Sheriff’s Deputy Melissa Larson, child protection investigator Katie Stusynski, and
county social worker Alia Cota performed a welfare check at the home. Larson described
the home as “very dirty” and “unlivable for the child,” noting that there were “piles upon
piles” of items preventing people from walking in the home. Larson noted that the child’s
play area was a “dog kennel/fenced in area covered in feces from the dog.” Larson also
saw a known drug user with an outstanding arrest warrant sleeping on the couch. Stusynski
described the house as “very dark” and “cluttered,” and was concerned about the child’s
living conditions and his safety in the home. Cota described the home as “very messy and
very dirty,” and noted that the kitchen was in “disarray” because “[t]he counters were full
of garbage” and overflowed with dirty dishes. Larson, Stusynski, and Cota were concerned
for the child’s safety and removed him from the home.
The next day, t he county filed a petit ion alleging that the child was in need of
protection or services [CHIPS]. On September 28, the district court held an emergency
protective care hearing and issued findings of fact and an order, finding that it was not in
the child’s best interest to rema in in the home due to the “risk posed to th e child’s safety

1 In January 2019, the district court transferred permanent legal and physical custody of the
child to father.

3
and security.” The district court granted the county temporary custody of the child for out-
of-home placement in foster care.
Prior to the CHIPS adjudication, the county filed a permanency petition seeking to
involuntarily terminate mother’s parental rights to the child because her custodial rights to
three other children were previously involuntarily transferred. The petition alleged that
(1) the child was in need of special care that mother was unwilling or unable to provide;
(2) the child was without proper parental care because of an emotional, mental, or physical
disability or immaturity on the part of the mother; (3) the child’s environment was
dangerous; and (4) mother previously had an involuntary custodial transfer of three other
children.
The district court held a trial on the county’s petition to terminate mother’s parental
rights, and heard testimony from Deputy Larson, Stusynski, and Cota regarding the welfare
check conducted at the home on September 26. The court also heard testimony from the
child’s foster parent, licensed psychologist Dr. Helen Achilleoudes, mother’s ex-boyfriend,
the family’s case manager , the Guardian Ad Litem (the GAL) , mother, and mother’s
personal care attendant.
The foster parent testified that she first came into contact with the child through her
work as a patient care assistant (PCA) for the child when he was four years old. She
testified that the child “needed to be assisted in all areas,” including was hing his ha nds,
using the bathroom, and participating in day-to-day activities. During her work with the
child, the foster parent became concerned about the child’s safety and well -being in
mother’s household. The foster parent observed drug paraphernali a around the house,

4
noticed the smell of marijuana in the home, saw somebody sleeping in the dog bed on the
floor in the kitchen, and saw the child eating out of the garbage. The foster parent testified
that since the child was placed in her care, he had stopped swearing, began to speak in short
sentences, began to eat “regular table food,” reached a healthier body weight, learned to sit
at the table and use utensils, began to brush his teeth and receive dental care, began bathing
regularly without fear of the bathtub, and started kindergarten.
Dr. Achilleoudes testified that she performed neuropsychological evaluations of the
child in 2016 and in 2018. The child failed to make any progress during those two years,
and regressed in certain areas . Achilleoudes testified that she expected the child to make
progress over a two -year time period, and was concerned that he had not made progress.
However, Achilleoudes testified that the child made qualitative progress under the care of
his foster pare nt, and stressed the importance of a safe, secure, stable, structured, and
organized home for the child.
Mother’s ex-boyfriend testified that he dated mother from 2015 to 2017 and lived
in the home with mother and the child. He testified that he became co ncerned about the
condition of the home and the child’s well -being, noting that there were “bed bugs,” and
“mess[es]” in the home, that “drug addicts” lived in the home and in tents in the backyard,
that the child had bad hygiene and did not ba the regularly, and he had smoked marijuana
in the home with mother.
Erin Johnson, a county child protection worker who served as the child’s case
manager, testified that the child made progress after being removed from mother’s home.
Johnson testified that she attempted to set up weekly pa renting time visits with mother .

5
The county required mother to abstain from illegal-drug use in order to exercise parenting
time with the child . However , mother tested positive for non -prescription drugs and the
parenting-time visits stopped.
The GAL testified that she worked with the child since September 2017 , and the
amount of progress he made since being removed from his mother’s care was
“unbelievable.” The GAL testified that the child made “leaps and bounds” in speaking ,
eating, bringing his behavior under control, and learning to eat “regular food at the table.”
The child is also “no longer afraid of people,” knows “how to play,” and began to interact
with others. The GAL testified that the child began “blossoming in a way that is just
unbelievable for where we started a year ago to a child that needed to be taught how to feed
at an infant stage.” The GAL supported terminating mother’s parental rights.
Mother testified on her own behalf at trial. Mother acknowledged that the family
“struggled” with the child’s special needs , mother’s illness, fina nces, and day -to-day
activities. Mother acknowledged that three of her older children were involuntarily
removed from her care, and admitted that she struggled with drug addiction. Mother stated
that it was not safe for the child to be in her care. Mother’s PCA also testified on mother’s
behalf at trial. The PCA testified that she provided home care for mother and helped
mother with her “sores,” her medication, and her day-to-day activities.
On September 28, 2018, the district court issued an order terminating mother’s
parental rights. The district court determined that the county satisfied its burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that mother’s parental r ights should be terminated
because she failed to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent -and-child

6
relationship and was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-and-child relationship.
However, the district court did not make a finding that termination would be in the child’s
best interests. Mother appealed on the ground that the district court erred by failing to
make specific findings that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest.
This court agreed and remanded the case to the district court for best -interests findings.
See In re Welfare of Child of A.F.P., A18-1676 (Minn. App. Feb. 26, 2019) (order op.).
The district court issued an amended order on March 6, 2019 . The district court
determined that the county met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
mother’s parental rights should be terminated because she is presumed to be palpably unfit
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018), and “[t]he evidence and testimony
presented at trial does not rebut this presumption.” The court noted that mother
acknowledged during her own testimony that it was not “safe” for her to be alone with the
child. The district court concluded that the county proved mother was palpably unfit by
clear an d convincing evidence. The district court further concluded that mother
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon her by the parent and child relationship, ” and that it was in the child’s best
interests for mother’s parental rights to be terminated. The district court also made specific
best-interests findings. The court found the testimony presented by the county’s witnesses
credible, and based on that testimony concluded, “it is in [the chil d’s] best interests for
[mother’s] parental rights to be terminated.” Mother appeals.

7
D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review
The decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary with the district court. In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L ., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 -37 (Minn. 2014). As a reviewing
court, we conduct a close inquiry into the evidence but give “considerable deference” to
the district court’s termination decision. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 200 8). The district court’s decision to terminate parental rights will be
affirmed if “at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and
convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of
Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). If a statutory basis for terminating
parental rights is ruled to exist, t he “best interests of the child” are the “paramount
consideration” in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018). We
review the district court’s decision that termination is in the child’s best interests for an
abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
II. Clear and Convincing Evidenc e Supports the District Court’s
Determination that a Statutory Basis Exists to Involuntarily Terminate
Mother’s Parental Rights
“Typically, the natural parent is presumed to be fit and suitable to be entrusted with
the care of his or her child.” In re Welfare of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App.
2003). However, parental rights may be involuntarily terminated if the parent is “palpably
unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(4). A parent is pr esumed palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -and-child

8
relationship “upon a showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children
were involuntarily terminated or that the parent’s custodial rights to another child have
been involuntarily transferred.” Id. But this is a rebuttable presumption and “imposes on
a parent the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.” In
re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
This rebuttable presumption “does not shift to a parent the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it
was originally cast.” Id. (quotation omitted). Instead, “the statutory presumption shifts to
a parent a burden of production.” Id.
The evidence necessary to rebut a presumption of palpable unfitness need only
“create a genuine issue of fact.” In re Welfare of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. App.
2018). “Whether a parent’s evidence satisfies the burden of production must be determined
on a case -by-case basis.” J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 446. In determining whether a parent’s
evidence rebuts the presumption that the parent is not palpably unfit, a court should credit
and consider the evidence without weighing it against any contrary evidence. See id. If a
parent rebuts the presumption of palpable unfitness, the presumption “has no further
function at trial” and the court shall “find the existence or nonexistence of the alleged
palpable unfitness upon all the evidence exactly as if there never had been a presumption
at all.” J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246 (quotations omitted); see also J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 447
(“The burden of persuasion remains with the county to prove, by clear and c onvincing
evidence, that specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing make [the parent]
palpably unfit to be a parent.” (quotation omitted)).

9
Because mother’s custodial rights to three other children were involuntarily
transferred, the district court determined that the statutory presumption of unfitness
applied. The district court concluded that mother failed to rebut the presumption based on
the evidence and the witness testimony presented. Mother acknowledged in her own
testimony that she struggled with drug addiction and that it was not safe for the child to be
in her care. Although the statutory presumption of unfitness is “easily rebuttable,” mother
failed to rebut the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness here. R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d
at 137; see also J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 245.
The county provided clear and convincing evidence that mother was palpably unfit
to be a party to the parent -and-child relationship under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) . See J.W., 807 N.W.2 d at 447 (noting that palpable unfitness
must be established by clear and convincing evidence). Mother acknowledged that her
custodial rights to her other children were involuntary transferred. The court also
determined that mother failed to provide for the “structure and care” of this special-needs
child, that the condition of the home was of “great concern due to its dirty condition and
habitation by drug users,” and that mother testified that it was not “safe” for her to be alone
with the child. In reaching this decision, the district court made credibility determinations
regarding witness testimony. The county’s witnesses testified about the dirty and unsafe
living conditions of the home, and the foster parent and case worker testified that the child
made significant progress once he was removed from mother’s care. The court found the
testimony presented by the county’s witnesses credible, and we defer to the district court’s
opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. See In re Welfare of

10
Children of D.F ., 752 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. App. 2008) (reviewing credibility
determinations).
The record, taken as a whole, amply supports the district court’s factual findings,
and the findings support a conclusion that the county proved by clear and convincing
evidence that mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -and-child relationship
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). Accordingly, we determine that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by finding that mother is a palpably unfit parent and that
clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of her parental rights on that
ground.2
III. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Is in the Child’s Best Interests
This court will affirm a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights if “at
least one statutory ground alleged in the petition is supported by clear and convincing
evidence and termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.” In re the
Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Min n. 2008) (citation omitted). Even
if a statutory basis for termination is present, the child’s best interests are the paramount
consideration in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7; see Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2018). This analysis requires consideration of the child and

2 The district court also concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported the
termination of mother’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2018).
In light of our conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports termination of
mother’s parental rights under subdivision 1(b)(4), we need not address the other statutory
ground for termination found by the court. See In re Welfare of Children of R.W ., 678
N.W.2d at 55 & n.2 (Minn. 2004) (recognizing that only one statutory ground needs to be
proven to support termination of parental rights).

11
parent’s interests in preserving the parent -and-child relationship and of any competing
interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); see also J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d
at 905 (“Competing interests [of the child] include such things as a stable environment,
health considerations and the child’s preferences.” (quotation omitted)). We review a
district court’s best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d
at 905.
Here, the district court weighed the competing interests of the mother and child.
The court found that the mother could not provide a safe and structured en vironment for
the child, who has autism and requires special care. Mother’s failure to care for the child
led to a regression of his autism. The court found that mother allowed other individuals to
use drugs in her home, that the home contained drug paraphernalia and smelled of
marijuana, and that mother tested positive for non-prescription drugs. The court also found
that the child’s best interests were not served by living in mother’s home because the home
was dirty and he had poor hygiene and nutrition. The court found that since being removed
from mother’s home, the child had learned to bathe, eat, speak, sleep on a regular routine,
and interact with other children. The district court’s best -interests findings are supported
by the record.
In sum, because at least one statutory ground fo r termination of parental rights is
supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests,
we determine that the district court order terminating mother’s parental rights was proper.
We therefore conclude that the dis trict court did not abuse its discretion by terminating
mother’s parental rights.

12
IV. Mother Is Not Entitled to Relief on her Other Arguments
a. Mother’s Constitutional Arguments Are Forfeited
Mother argues that her constitutional rights were violated because (1) county
employees entered her home and removed the child from her care, (2) the district court
placed the child in foster care, and (3) county employees removed the child from mother’s
home and initially placed him in foster care, rather than in the care of his father. Mother
did not raise these issues to the district court and an appellate court will not consider matters
not argued to and considered by the district court. See In re Welfare of M.H., 595 N.W.2d
223, 229 (Minn. App. 1999) (noting that, “[e]ven in the context of termination of parental
rights, failure to raise constitutional issues in the district court precludes the issues from
being raised on appeal”); In re Welfare of C.L.L ., 3 10 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981)
(refusing to consider constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal from termination
of parental rights). Mother forfeited her constitutional arguments by raising them for the
first time on appeal.
b. The Record Supports the Court’s Palpable-Unfitness Determination
Mother argues that (1) the county interfered in her child-rearing decisions regarding
the child’s medical and schooling needs, and (2) the actions of the county social -service
workers deprived her of her right to parent her child. We interpret these arguments as a
challenge to the district court’s palpable-unfitness determination. While a natural parent
is presumed to be suitable to be entrusted with the care of her child, R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at
136, parental rights may be involuntarily terminated if the parent is “palpably unfit to be a
party to the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).

13
Minnesota courts recognize the fundamental right of parents to enjoy the custody and
companionship of their children, but parental rights are not absolute and should not be
enforced to the detriment of the child ’s welfare and happiness. In re Welfare of
Rosenbloom, 266 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn. 1978); In re P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn.
App. 2003). The fundamental right of parents to enjoy the custody and companionship of
their children is subject to the state’s compelling interest in protecting children from abuse
and neglect. P.T., 657 N.W.2d at 589. The district court determined that the state met its
burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother was palpably unfit
to be a party to the parent-and-child relationship and that termination of her parental rights
was in the child’s best interest. As discussed earli er, t he record supports the court’s
decision.
c. The County Was Not Required to Reunify the Family
Mother argues that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the
family.3 The petition alleged that mother was palpably unfit to be a party to th e parent-
and-child relationship because her custodial rights to three other children were
involuntarily transferred. Accordingly, the county was not required to provide reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. See In re Welfare of D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d at 250 (“[U]pon
a district court’s determination that a person’s parental rights to another child previously
have been terminated involuntarily, reasonable efforts for rehabilitation and reunification
are not required.”); see also Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(2) (2018).

3 And, in any event, father has custody of the child and is raising him.

14
d. The Foster Care Sibling Bill of Rights Does Not Apply
Mother argues that the county failed to preserve the relationship between the child
and his siblings. Siblings placed in foster care have the right to be placed together in foster
care homes, when possible and when it is in the best interest of each sibling, in order to
sustain family relationships. Minn. Stat. § 260C.008, subd. 1 (2018). Here, while the child
has at least three older siblings, none of those siblings were living in mother’s home when
he was placed in foster care . This section was established for “the benefit of siblings in
foster care.” Id., subd. 2. Because the child did not have other siblings living in foster care
when he was removed from the home, this section is inapplicable.
e. Mother Has Not Demonstrated Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mother claims that her attorney was ineffective. An aggrieved party must establish
that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686,
693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). Under Strickland, mother bears the bu rden of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
Mother failed to establish either prong here. Mother did not identify any particular
instances of misconduct, nor did she cite to relevant caselaw or explain how the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different absent her attorney’s alleged errors.

15
f. Mother Has Not Demonstrated Malevolence or Bias
Mother argues that (1) there was “a very clear theme of malevolence throughout the
actions and reports in this case,” and (2) the judge was biased against her. Mother does not
cite to any caselaw in support of th ese arguments, and the record as a whole does not
support her claims . To the contrary, the record shows that the court considered the
testimony of t he witnesses carefully, reviewed all of the evidence presented, and
determined that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of her parental rights.
While mother is dissatisfied with the adverse rulings against her, Minnesota law is clear
that adverse rulings do not constitute an affirmative showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Olson
v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986).
g. We Defer to the District Court’s Credibility Determinations
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that mother used drugs in her
home, allowed other people to use drugs in her home in front of the child, and allowed
drug-users to sleep in her home. Multiple witnesses testified that mother abused drugs and
allowed drug-use in her home, and mother tested positive for using non-prescription drugs.
The district court found these witnesses credible, and we defer to the court’s opportunity
to observe witnesses and assess their credibility. See In re Welfare of Children of D.F .,
752 N.W.2d at 94.
Mother also argu es that the district court’s factual findings are based on
“misunderstandings,” and she offers alternative explanations for the evidence presented.
A careful review of the entire evidentiary record supports the district court’s factual
findings, and the f actual findings support the court’s legal conclusions. This court’s role

16
on appeal is not to reweigh the evidence and question the district court’s credibility
determinations. And while we conduct a close inquiry into the evidence, we also give
“considerable deference” to the district court’s termination decision. In re Welfare of
Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. The record supports the district court’s termination
decision.
h. Mother’s Unsupported Arguments Are Forfeited
Mother argues that she is entitled to reversal of the district court’s order because
(1) the district court violated her habeas corpus rights, (2) the county withheld evidence,
(3) the court reviewed evidence from mother’s previous court filings, (4) the county failed
to demonstrate “egregious harm,” and (5) mother is the child’s biological parent. Mother
failed to adequately support these arguments with citation to relevant caselaw or to the
record. We therefore determine that mother waived these issues by failing to present any
argument or cite to supporting authority. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn.
App. 2007) (“A party who inadequately briefs an argument waives that argument.”).
Affirmed.