State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0504

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Melvin Karnes,
Appellant.

Filed February 10, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-17-2120

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas C. Baudler, Austin City Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant John Melv in Karnes argues that his convictions for
fifth-degree assault and careless driving must be reversed and a new trial granted because
the district court erred by (1) allowing the vi ctim to testify about the underlying facts of

2
the victim’s prior convictions and (2) limiting appellant’s cross-examination of the victim
about the underlying facts of his prior convictions. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 27, 2017, the state charged Karnes with one count of fifth-degree
assault, two counts of disorderly conduct, and one count of careless driving arising out of
a road-rage incident on Septem ber 25, 2017. The victim of the road-rage incident, N.M.,
reported that Karnes cut in front of him as N.M. was slowing down at a stoplight, forcing
N.M. to slam on his breaks to avoid a collisi on. N.M. then honked his horn and threw his
hands in the air. Karnes, after unsuccessfully attempting to get N.M. to pull over, followed
N.M. to his house. Karnes exited his vehicle, approached N.M., began yelling and cursing
at him, and then punched him in the face a few times before grabbing his neck, throwing
him to the ground, and continuing to punch him. N.M.’s girlfriend, M.H., was present and
yelled at Karnes to stop. The incident ende d when M.H. and N.M. called the police and
Karnes fled before the officer arrived.
At a pretrial hearing on March 9, 2018, Karnes announced that he wished to
discharge his public defender and proceed to trial pro se. After que stioning Karnes and
reviewing his rights with him, the district c ourt granted this request and assigned Karnes
advisory counsel to assist him with the trial.
At trial, the state called three witnesses: N.M., M.H., and the officer who responded
to the 911 call and investigated the case. Before N.M. testified, Karnes informed the district
court that he wished to qu estion N.M. about N.M.’s prior convictions, which were for

3
fourth-degree assault and violat ions of a harassment restrain ing order. The state did not
object, stating that it planned to ask N.M. about the convictions on direct examination.
N.M. testified consistently with what he had reported to the police. He explained
that on September 25, 2017, at around 2:00 p.m., he was driving his truck with M.H. in the
passenger’s seat. They were coming into Au stin on Highway 218 a nd turned onto 14th
Street. As N.M. was slowing down to stop at a red light, Ka rnes suddenly came up in the
lane to his right and pulled in front of him without signaling. N.M. estimated that there was
a distance of about a car length and a half be tween him and the intersection when Karnes
made this maneuver. N.M. slam med on his brakes to avoid a collision, pressing them so
hard that his vehicle’s anti-lock braking system engaged and his seatbelt locked up. N.M.
then honked, threw his hands up in the air, and said something like, “What the h-ll?” When
the light turned green, Karnes put his hand out the window and gestured for N.M. to turn
left. N.M. testified that he was turning left anyway because that was the way to his house
but that, when he turned left, Karnes—still ahead of him at this point—pulled over, threw
open his door, and jumped out of his vehicle. N.M. had to swerve to avoid hitting him.
As N.M. continued home, he and M.H. no ticed that Karnes was following them.
When they pulled into their dr iveway, they saw Karnes stop in front of their neighbor’s
house. N.M. told M.H. to go inside. Karnes then approached N.M., yelling and appearing
angry. N.M. told Karnes something like, “Dude, you don’t really want to take this this far,”
and Karnes then swung at him, hitting him in the face. Karnes then swung again, put N.M.
in a headlock, threw him to the ground, and began punching him while N.M. shielded his
face with his arms. M.H., who was on the step s of their home, came over and yelled at

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Karnes to stop. Karnes got up and yelled at M. H. to stay out of it, calling her a “b-tch.”
N.M. asked M.H. for her phone, saying he was going to call the police. Karnes then began
pleading with them not to call the police, bu t N.M. made the call and Karnes left. N.M.
testified that he had never met Karnes before . He gave Karnes’s license-plate number to
the police officer, who located Karnes the next day.
After N.M. described the incident, the st ate asked him about his prior convictions.
N.M., who was 26 years old at the time of trial, explained that he was convicted of fourth-
degree assault when he was in high school, ba sed on an encounter with a school liaison
officer shortly after his 18th birthday. He explained that, after an argument with the liaison
officer, the liaison officer grabbed him by th e shirt and N.M. “ended up reacting and
swinging at him” and “connect [ing].” The state asked if N.M. has had any “assaultive
behavior charges” since he was 18, and N.M. replied that he has not. When the state asked
if he attributes this to anyt hing, N.M. explained that, afte r the incident with the liaison
officer, he discussed the medication that he was prescribed with his doctor and they
determined that it was causing him to “react[] in such a bad way,” and the doctor took him
off of it. He testified he is not on any me dications now. The state then asked N.M. about
his harassment restraining order violations. N. M. explained that he and M.H. have been
dating since 2008, and, after the incident with the liaison officer in or around 2010, M.H.’s
mother petitioned for a harassment restraining order (HRO) on M.H.’s behalf and was able

5
to obtain it over M.H.’s objection because M. H. was a juvenile. N.M. was then charged
with violating it after he and M.H. chose to meet up.1
On cross-examination, Karnes sought to delve deeper into the details of N.M.’s prior
convictions, mental condition, and medical diagnoses. He asked N.M. what medication he
was on at the time of the incident with the liaison officer, and N.M. replied that it was
Risperidone. Karnes asked if N.M. “refuse[s] to take it,” and N.M. explained that he and
his doctor agreed that his reaction to it was ba d and that he had acco rdingly been off of
medication for years. Karnes then asked what diagnosis N.M. had, and the state objected.
At a bench conference, the district cour t asked Karnes to explain how N.M.’s
diagnosis from high school was relevant to the case, and Karnes explained that N.M. had
“opened the door” to this testimony and that he wanted to call a doctor to testify about
N.M.’s mental-health condition. After some additional arguments, the district court stated
it would allow Karnes to ask N.M. what his diagnosis was but that it was “not going to give
[him] a lot of latitude” and was not going to grant a recess to subpoena a doctor, cautioning
Karnes that he was “skating on thin ice as far as relevance goes.” After further protest from
Karnes, the district court inst ructed him that he could ask N.M. what the mental-health
condition was and whether he is still prescribed anything but that nothing beyond that was
relevant.
N.M. then testified that his diagnoses in high school were “ADHD” and “ADD.”
Karnes asked if ADHD and AD D involve “violent mood-swings ,” and N.M. replied that

1 When M.H. testified, she gave the same account when Karnes cross-examined her about
it, explaining that she was against the HRO.

6
they do not but clarified that the medication he was prescribed for them had caused mood
swings, which is why he went off of it. On redirect examination, N.M. further clarified that
he had not been prescribed a ny medication since he was 18 an d that his doctor had taken
him off the medication. He has not been “under any mental health care or treatment” since
that time.
The state’s next witness was M.H., and sh e testified consistently with N.M.’s
account of the September 25 events. She testified that when they pulled into their driveway,
she exited the truck and walked towards their house but only made it to the front steps
before turning back to see Ka rnes and N.M. on the ground, with Karnes on top of N.M.,
punching him. She testified that N.M. had not been aggressive towards Karnes, Karnes was
the only person yelling, and she never saw N.M. throw any punches.
The final witness was the po lice officer who investigated the case. The officer
testified about responding to N.M. and M.H.’s call, and th e state introduced the audio
recordings of his interviews with them into evidence. Th e state also introduced the
photographs that the officer took of N.M.’s injuries, his house and yard, and the portion of
the lawn where the punching incident occurred. The officer then testif ied that he located
Karnes in a Walmart parking lot the next day, and the state introduced an audio recording
of the officer and Karnes discussing the incident . In it, the officer as ks Karnes to tell his
side of the story. Karnes says that he was driving along when N.M. came “racing up”
behind him shaking his fists. Karnes says that he got out of his vehicle when N.M. pulled
up at a house and that he approached N.M. in “a polite nice manner,” asking him what was
going on. Karnes says that N.M. then became “irate” and came at him and that he, Karnes,

7
felt threatened. Karnes says that they started “kind of fighti ng” and that, at one point, he
did fling N.M. to the ground, but N.M. got right up. Karnes states that he was never yelling
or getting aggressive and that he does not know N.M.
Karnes chose not to testify and did not ca ll any witnesses. The jury deliberated for
less than an hour before returning guilty verdicts on all counts. At sentencing, the district
court set aside Karnes’s conviction for count II (disorderly conduct—brawling or fighting),
imposed no sentence for count III (disorderly conduct—offensive/abusive/noisy/obscene),
and sentenced Karnes to a 90-day stayed sentence on counts I and IV (fifth-degree assault
and careless driving) and placed him on probation for one year.
Karnes now appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Karnes argues that errors regarding the admission of testimony about N.M.’s prior
convictions requires reversal and a new tria l. He makes a two-part challenge to the
testimony, arguing that (1) the district court committed reversible error by allowing the
state to elicit testimony about the underlying facts of N.M.’s prior convictions and (2) the
district court “compounded that error” by no t allowing full cross-ex amination into the
underlying facts. We address both arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not commit revers ible error by allowi ng the victim to
testify about the facts underlying his prior convictions.

Karnes concedes that he did not object at trial to the evidence on the underlying
facts of N.M.’s convictions. Because the appellant did not object, the plain-error standard
of review applies. See State v. Vasquez , 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (M inn. 2018). Under this

8
standard, an appellant must show that “(1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and
(3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799,
804 (Minn. 2016). If these three prongs ar e satisfied, the appellate court may then
determine “whether it should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the
judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998).
We note as an initial matter that neither pa rty argues that N.M.’s prior convictions
should have been excluded in their entirety. When Karnes informed the district court and
the state that he intended to question N.M. ab out the convictions, the state responded that
it would ask N.M. about these convictions during direct examination.
A. There was no plain error.
“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is typically established if the error
contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782,
787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
As a general rule, “when a witness is the defendant in a criminal proceeding, cross-
examination as to the witness’s prior convictions may ordinarily extend only to the fact of
conviction, the nature of the offense, and the identity of the defendant.” State v. Griese ,
565 N.W.2d 419, 426 (M inn. 1997) (emphasis added). This is because, “[i]n such cases,
there is a unique possibility of prejudice: to allow broad inquiry into the facts underlying a
prior conviction might confuse the issues befo re the jury or have a chilling effect on the
accused’s right to testify in his own defense.” Id.
When the witness is not a criminal defendant, there are different concerns regarding
the admission of the witness’s prior convictions. As explaine d by the supreme court in

9
State v. Lanz-Terry: “When evaluating whether to admit a prior conviction of the defendant
or a defense witness, the major concern is to protect the defendant from unfair prejudice.”
535 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn. 1995). “In contrast, when evaluating whether to admit a prior
conviction of a prosecution witn ess, the major concerns are to protect the witness from
being harassed and unduly emba rrassed, the jury from being confused and misled, and
everyone involved (court, jury, parties) from having to endure an unnecessarily prolonged
trial.” Id. Accordingly, the district court has “wide latitude to impose reasonable limits” on
any inquiry into facts underlyi ng a witness’s prior convictions. Id. And, even when the
witness is the criminal defendant, the rule against admitting the underlying facts “is not an
iron-clad rule,” and admission “must be left largely to the discretion of the [district] court.”
State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W. 2d 425, 436 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Here, the state questioned N.M. about his prior convictions on direct examination—
after Karnes had asserted that he intended to do the same on cross-examination—and asked
N.M. to explain the facts underlying the conv ictions. Karnes did not object. On appeal,
Karnes analogizes this case to ca ses where the facts underlying the defendant’s prior
convictions were admitted. He argues that such cases, like Valtierra, highlight “one type
of risk” from delving into facts underlying a conviction: “that particularly disturbing facts
underlying a [defendant’s prio r] conviction might inappropri ately influence the jury and
make it more likely for the jury to convict.” But this case, he says, highlights the “opposite”
concern: that the explanation of the facts underlying a conviction might paint the witness
in “an extremely favorable light.”

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But the concern when a witness’s convictions are at issue is not that the factual
details will paint the witness in a favorable light and thereby prejudice the defendant (here,
apparently, by dispelling any assumptions that the jury might have made about N.M. if they
only heard the nature of his offenses); the co ncern is with “protect [ing] the witness from
being harassed and unduly emba rrassed, the jury from being confused and misled, and
everyone involved (court, jury, parties) from having to endure an unnecessarily prolonged
trial.” Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 639. Given these different concerns, and that any inquiry
into the facts of a prior conviction is largely discretionary with the district court, we discern
no error—let alone a plain error—here.
B. No substantial rights were affected.
Even if Karnes could show an error and that the error was clear, he would still have
to show that the error “affected [his] substantial rights.” Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804. “With
respect to the substantial-rights requireme nt, [the defendant] bears the burden of
establishing that there is a reasonable likeli hood that the absence of the error would have
had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted). The court’s analysis under this prong “is the equivalent of a
harmless error analysis.” State v. Matthews , 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011). “In
evaluating the reasonable likelihood that the erroneously admitted evidence significantly
affected the verdict, this court must consider the persuasiveness of that evidence . . . [and]
the manner in which the evidence was presented.” State v. Jackson, 764 N.W.2d 612, 620
(Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. July 22, 2009).

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Karnes argues that the error affected his substantial rights because the credibility of
the witnesses was crucial in this case. He a sserts that, if the jury had not heard N.M.’s
explanations of his prior convictions, and had merely heard that N.M. had prior convictions
for an assault and HRO violations, “the outcome may well have been different.” It appears
his argument is that, had the jurors not he ard about the facts underlying N.M.’s prior
convictions, they would have been more inclined to believe that N.M. was the aggressor.
A significant problem with Karnes’s argum ent, though, is that he essentially
contends that the jury was prevented from drawing an inference that the Minnesota Rules
of Evidence are designed to prohibit. Rule 404 prohibits evidence of “another crime,
wrong, or act” to “prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). While c ouching his argument on appeal in terms of
N.M.’s general credibility (citing Minn. R. Evid. 609), at trial, Karnes stated that he wanted
to ask N.M. about the conviction to “show . . . that he’s an angry man.” That the state
effectively countered this narrative by having N.M. explain the underlying facts of his high
school offenses did not affect Karnes’s substantial rights because Karnes never had a right
to offer the convictions as character evidence in the first place.
Even if this problem with Karnes’s argument were set aside, he has not shown that
the testimony about the facts underlying N.M .’s convictions signif icantly affected the
verdict. Here, two eye witnesses testified about the road-rage incident. They both testified
consistently with their reports to the investigating officer on the day of the incident. They
gave clear, consistent answers to cross-exam ination questions from Karnes, even though
the questions were often compound and confusing. Photographs that the officer took on the

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day of the incident showed N.M.’s injuries and the imprint in the grass on his lawn where
Karnes threw him down. It wa s N.M. who called the police, and Karnes, after pleading
with him not to call, fled before the officer arrived. The jurors also heard Karnes’s audio-
recorded statement to the officer, where he claimed that N.M. was the aggressor but also
admitted to driving to and getting out of his vehicle at N.M.’s house.
In light of the substantial evidence agains t him, and given that the error he alleges
relates to the witness’s conduct from eight years prior that had no connection to Karnes,
Karnes has not shown that the absence of the alleged error in admitting the challenged
testimony would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.
II. The district court did not commit revers ible error by limiting appellant’s cross-
examination of the victim about the victim’s prior convictions.

Karnes also argues that, once the facts underlying N.M.’s prior convictions had been
admitted, the district court erred by prohibiting Karnes from “fully cross-examining” N.M.
about those facts.
“[T]he scope of cross-examination regarding prior convictions must be left largely
to the discretion of the [district] c ourt depending upon the circumstances.” Valtierra, 718
N.W.2d at 436 (quotation omitted). “Based on co ncerns about such things as harassment,
decision making on an improper basis, confusion of the issues, and cross-examination that
is repetitive or only marginally relevant, the [district] court possesses wide latitude to
impose reasonable limits on cross-examination of a prosecution witness.” Lanz-Terry, 535
N.W.2d at 639. Moreover, “the extent to wh ich extraneous matters are permitted into a
criminal case, either to show the existence or nonexistence of a material fact or to affect

13
the credibility of a witness as to such fact, rests largely in the discretion of the [district]
court.” Id. at 641.
Karnes argues that the state “opened the door” to the facts underlying N.M.’s prior
convictions and then tried to “shut it” when Karnes cross-examined N.M. on those facts.
“Opening the door” occurs when one party, by introducing certain material, creates a right
for the opposing party to respond with otherwise inadmissible material. State v. Guzman,
892 N.W.2d 801, 814 (Minn. 20 17). “The opening-the-door doctrine is essentially one of
fairness and common sense, ba sed on the proposition that on e party should not have an
unfair advantage and that the factfinder shou ld not be presented with a misleading or
distorted representation of reality.” Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d at 436 (quotation omitted).
It is unclear what cross-examination questions Karnes believes he should have been
allowed to ask N.M. After Karnes asked N.M. what medication he was on at the time of
the incident with the liaison officer, and whether he “refuse[s] to take” medication, Karnes
asked him what diagnosis he had and the st ate objected. Following a bench conference,
where Karnes requested that he be allowed to call a medical doctor to testify about N.M.’s
mental health, the district court instructed Karnes that he could ask N.M. (1) what the
mental-health condition was and (2) whether he is still prescribed anything but that nothing
beyond that was relevant. N.M. then testified that his diagnoses in high school were ADHD
and ADD, that these do not cause violent mood swings, that he has not been prescribed any
medications since he was 18, and that he has not been receiving any mental-health care or
treatment since then.

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On appeal, Karnes essentially suggests th at, had he been allowed to ask more
questions, he could have woven together a picture of N.M. that made him look more prone
to assaultive behavior. He supports this pr oposition with “evidence” entirely outside the
record, including online information about the properties of Risperidone, Register of
Actions records with the conditions of N.M .’s probation, and information about the
requirements of a specific program included in those probation conditions. We decline to
consider any of this “evidence ,” though, as “[t]he record on appeal consists of the
documents filed in the district court, the offered exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings, if any.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 8; see also Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d
354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (explaining that an appellate court “generally will not decide issues
that were not raised before the district court”).
The district court had broad discretion to limit extraneous details about N.M.’s prior
convictions. Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 641. The convictions were from eight years prior
and had little to no probative value. Even though the state did “o pen the door” to some
discussion of the underlying facts, this did not give Karnes the unfettered ability to explore
N.M.’s mental-health history, which could have confused the issues, invited decision-
making on an improper basis, and had marginal relevance, at most. See id. at 639. The
district court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by limiting the scope of Karnes’s
cross-examination.
Affirmed.