In re the Marriage of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0506

In re the Marriage of:

Heidi Ann Kingsley, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Isaiah Thomas Kingsley,
Respondent.

Filed November 18, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-FA-15-348

Ashley M. Kuhn, O’Brien & Wolf, L.L.P., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Isaiah Thomas Kingsley, Cedar Rapids, Iowa (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant mother Heidi Ann Kingsley challe nges the district court’s decision to
appoint a parenting-time expeditor. While the district court did not abuse its discretion by
hearing respondent father Isaiah Thomas Kingsley’s motion, we conclude that the district

2
court erred by appointing a parenting-time e xpeditor because father was convicted of
domestic assault for pointing a BB gun at the head of the parents’ young child. As a result,
we reverse the district court’s order appointing a parenting-time expeditor.
FACTS
Appellant Heidi Ann Kingsley (mother) married respondent Isaiah Thomas
Kingsley (father). Mother and father had thre e children before divorcing in 2015. In the
dissolution order, the parties agreed to shared legal custody of the children, with mother as
the sole physical custodian. Father was aw arded parenting time, generally every other
weekend, two weeknight evenings, and alternating holidays.
In May 2017, the child ren reported to mother that father threatened one of them with
a BB gun. Mother called the police, and the police interviewed the children. The children
were ten, seven, and five at the time of the incident. Father was convicted after he entered
an Alford plea to domestic assault for his conduct.1 After father’s conviction, he had only
supervised parenting time with the children on a less-frequent basis than before.
In January 2019, father filed a pro se motion seeking appointment of a
parenting-time expeditor. This filing did not include any supporting affidavits or

1 An Alford plea is a type of guilty plea where a defendant may maintain their innocence
yet admit there is a strong factual basis for the plea. See State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643,
649 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “the court must be able to determin e that the defendant,
despite maintaining his innocence, agrees that evidence the [s]tate is likely to offer at trial
is sufficient to convict” ). The name of the plea comes from North Carolina v. Alford ,
400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), adopted in Minnesota in State v. Goulette ,
258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977). Following his Alford plea, father was convicted of
misdemeanor domestic assault for intending to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or
death against a family member under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242,
subdivision 1(1) (2016).

3
memoranda describing the basis for father’s request. Mother did not file any responsive
documents other than reports from the child ren’s therapists recommending supervised
contact only with father. The district court heard father’s motion.
At the motion hearing, father explained th at he wanted a parenting-time expeditor
to facilitate seeing the childre n and having phone co ntact with them. Mother opposed
father’s request, questioning whether a paren ting-time expeditor would be able to help
resolve their disputes.
Mother also described issues related to the domestic a ssault in May 2017 and its
effect on the children. Mother reported that, because of the assault, the children refuse to
talk to their father and that “[t]hey don’t feel safe” or trust him. The children started therapy
shortly after the incident. And mother sh ared letters from the children’s therapists
recommending that the children have only supervised contact, if any, with father following
the incident. Because of the way the children feel towards father, mother argued that a
parenting-time expeditor would not be able to help the family’s situ ation. Instead, she
suggested they consider a parenting consulta nt, a guardian ad litem, or assessments and
therapy.
After reviewing the parenting-time-expeditor statute with the parties on the record,
the district court agreed with father. The court found that the appointment of a
parenting-time expeditor was in the children’s best interest s. The order appointed a
specific expeditor, under Minnesota Statutes section 518.1751 (2018), and required father
to pay the cost. The parenting-time expeditor issued a decision about a month later. Mother
appeals.

4
D E C I S I O N
Mother alleges that the district court erred by appointing a parenting-time expeditor.
First, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by hearing father’s motion
when it lacked necessary supporting documents. Second, mother argues that the district
court erred by appointing a parenting-time e xpeditor because father was convicted of
domestic assault of their joint child. We review each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by hearing father’s motion when
it was not supported by affidavits or memoranda.

Mother first challenges the district court’ s decision to allow a hearing on father’s
motion absent a supporting affidavit or memora ndum. Procedural rulings are within the
district court’s discretion and are review ed for an abuse of that discretion.
Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 24, 2001). Minnesota Rule of General Practice 303.02(a) requires all motions
be supported by affidavits relevant to the motion. And rule 303.03(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) states that
a motion shall not be heard unless the mova nt files appropriate documents, including
“[r]elevant affidavits and exhibits” and “[a] ny memorandum of law the party intends to
submit.” If the movant fails to file documents required under this ru le, the district court
may cancel the hearing. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(b) (emphasis added).
Here, father filed a pro se motion reques ting that the district court appoint a
parenting-time expeditor, but did not include any supporting memoranda or affidavits. And
the district court decided to hear father’s motion despite the lack of supporting documents.
This falls squarely within the court’s discretion—while it may have cancelled the hearing,

5
it was not required to do so. Id. We discern no abuse of discretion here.
Still, mother argues that failure to file supporting documents resulted in her not
knowing the basis on which father sought re lief. But mother did no t file any pleadings
opposing the motion. See Id. (noting that “[i]f responsi ve documents are not properly
served and filed, the court may deem the initial motion unopposed and may issue an order
without a hearing”). Nor did she file a reque st for more information. And mother and
father spoke before the hearing and tried to reach a resolution but were unable to do so.
Because the rule is permissive, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in hearing the motion without supporting documents.
II. The district court erred by appointi ng a parenting-time expeditor because
father was convicted of domestic assault of the parties’ child.

Even if the district court properly heard father’s motion, mother contends that it was
error to appoint a parenting-time expeditor because father was convicted of domestic
assault of the parties’ child. 2 A party may not be required to submit to a parenting-time
expeditor if the district court determines there is probable cause that “a child of the parties

2 Mother also argues that the district court e rred in two other ways. First, according to
mother, the district court erred by appointing a parenting-time expeditor because the parties
are unable to afford it. A party may not be required to work with a parenting-time expeditor
if the party cannot pay for th e expeditor unless the other pa rty agrees to pay for the
expeditor. Minn. Stat. § 518.1751, subds. 1a(3), 2a. Because father agreed to pay for the
expeditor and the district court ordered him to do so, this argument fails.
Second, mother contends th at the district court erred by granting the parenting-time
expeditor authority to make decisions incons istent with the existing parenting-time order
without mutual consent of the parties. Beca use we reverse the district court’s order on
other grounds, we do not reach the merits of this argument but note that Minnesota Statutes
section 518.1751, subdivision 3(c), requires a pa renting-time expeditor’s decisions to be
consistent with the existing parenting-time order unless the partie s mutually agree to
expand that authority.

6
has been physically abused or threatened with physical abuse by the other party.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.1751, subd. 1a(2). And while a district court’s decision to appoint a
parenting-time expeditor is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Nolte v. Mehrens ,
648 N.W.2d 727, 731-32 (M inn. App. 2002), its compliance with the statutory
requirements governing the appointment of a parenting-time expeditor is a question of law,
reviewed de novo. Braith, 632 N.W.2d at 724.
The central issue before us is not whether probable cause exists that the child was
abused or threated with abuse by father. He re, it is clear that father was convicted of
domestic assault of one of the parties’ childr en. Rather, the question is whether mother
adequately raised this issue in response to father’s motion.
We acknowledge that mother did not poin t to the statute precluding appointment
when raising the domestic as sault issue at the hearing regarding the parenting-time
expeditor. But we assess mother’s argument here in light of the fact that father failed to
file any supporting documents to give mother notice of the arguments he intended to make.
In response to father’s general motion, we view her general assertions about the domestic
assault to be sufficient to raise the issue before the district court and preserve this issue for
appeal.
Several times in the hearing, the parties and the district court discussed the domestic
assault. Mother’s counsel stated, “this case involved, I think, a domestic assault. I think it
was a BB gun. And there was an Alford plea.” The district court reviewed the family’s
related court files in the hearing and acknowledged the criminal file, stating, “I see there’s
a criminal matter, and there’s a sentencing order in that one.” And the district court judge

7
presiding over the motion hearing was the same judge that presided over father’s criminal
matter. Mother’s counsel even referenced the criminal case and commented to the judge,
“[y]ou know what the background is.” This suggests that the district court judge had
knowledge of the domestic assault conviction and that the parties expected him to consider
that knowledge when assessing the motion.
Because of the repeated discussion of the criminal matter in the motion hearing, we
conclude that mother sufficiently raised this i ssue with the district court. And the statute
is clear: a district court may not appoint a parenting-time expeditor if a child of the parties
has been abused or threated with abuse by the other party. Minn. Stat. § 518.1751,
subd. 1a(2). As a result, the district court should have viewed father’s domestic assault
conviction as barring the appointment of a paren ting-time expeditor. Because the district
court failed to do this and appointed an expeditor, the district court erred. We reverse the
appointment.
Reversed and remanded.