A19-0516 Precedential Affirmed Processed

Jennifer S. Bild, Relator,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed January 27, 2020

The holding in the court’s own words

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision, we conclude that the facts found by the ULJ are substantially supported by the reco rd and that the ULJ adequately set forth sound reasons for determining that Bild was not as credible as Agape’s witnesses. We conclude that Bild’s actions demons trate misconduct for two reasons.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0516

Jennifer S. Bild,
Relator,

vs.

Agape Healthcare Services Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed January 27, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36931506-3

Jennifer S. Bild, Forest Lake, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Agape Healthcare Services Inc., Elk River, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Anne B. Froelich, Departme nt of Employment and Econom ic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Relator Jennifer S. Bild challenges the determination of an unemployment law judge
(ULJ) that she is ineligible for unemployment benefits be cause she was discharged for
employment misconduct. Bild argues that the ULJ made erroneous factual findings and
incorrectly determined that she engaged in employment misconduct. Because the ULJ’s
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record , and Bild’s actions
constitute employment misconduct, we affirm.
FACTS
Agape Health Services, Inc. (Agape) is an in-home health-care service provider.
Agape hired Bild in April 2018 as a part-time director of nursing (DON). As a DON, Bild
was expected to work three days per week for five hours each day, for a total of 15 hours
per week. Bild was required to perform DON work at Agape’s office, not from home. In
addition to her DON work, Bild performed part-time personal care assistant (PCA) services
for Agape. As a PCA, Bild provided in-home care to clients.
When Bild was first hired, she perfo rmed her DON duties as required for
approximately two weeks. Afte r the first two weeks, Bild es timates that sh e was in the
office “maybe five to ten out of the fifteen” hours each week. Before going in to the office,
Bild would call the office manager and ask if there was “anything there to do.” The office
manager told Bild that she needed to work her full 15 hours in the office and that she could
not work from home.

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On June 26, 2018, Bild’s husband died. Bild did not formally request time off, but
communicated with Agape that sh e was going to be absent. Due to her husband’s death,
Bild did not do any DON work in July. Agape was sympathetic to Bild’s personal issues
and waited for her to return to work.
At some point in July, Bild came into the office with PCA time sheets. The time
sheets were signed by Bild bu t not by the client, even though Agape’s standard practice
required the client’s signature on the time sh eet along with the PCA’s signature. Agape
required the client’s signature along with th e PCA’s signature to conform to state PCA
rules. Agape did not accept the time sheets and instead told Bild that she needed to get the
time sheets signed by the client before they could pay her for the time. Because Bild never
obtained client signatures on the time sheets , Agape did not pay B ild for the PCA time
reflected on those time sheets. Agape also did not pay Bild for DON hours that Bild alleged
she worked from home. But Agape did pay Bild for DON work that she did in the office
and for PCA work that was supported by time sheets with the necessary client signatures.
Bild filed a complaint with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (DLI)
alleging that Agape had not paid her for some of the hours that she had worked. DLI called
Agape and informed Agape that Bild had filed a claim for unpaid wages. Agape provided
its time sheet records, and DLI did not pursue the complaint. After receiving the call from
DLI, Agape’s president sent an email to Bild informing her that he had received a call from
DLI about the compla int, telling her that he spoke with DLI ab out her “failure to turn in
proper timecards,” and asking her to return her office keys and company property.

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On September 20, 2018, Agape sent Bild a letter about her unexcused absences.
The letter noted that Bild had continu ous absences from September 6 through
September 20, 2018, and stated that Bild had three business days to produce “just cause”
for her unexcused absences or Agape would terminate her services as a “voluntary
resignation.” Bild called Agape’s president after receiving the letter but did not provide an
explanation for her absences.
Bild applied for unemployment benefits with respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED). In her application, Bild stated that she
stopped working for Agape because Agape had not paid her for hours that she had worked.
DEED issued a determination of eligibility , concluding that Bild was eligible for
unemployment benefits after being discharged by Agape because B ild’s “dissatisfaction
with being unpaid by the employer is not employment misconduct.” Agape appealed the
determination and a ULJ conducted a de novo hearing. Bild, Agape’s president, and
Agape’s office manager testified.
In her testimony, Bild explained that she stopped coming into work because Agape
had not paid her for some of the hours that she had worked. Bild claimed that she was not
paid for DON work that she did away from the office and that she was not paid for certain
PCA work.
With regard to the DON work, both Agape’s presiden t and the office manager
testified that Bild was expected to report to the office for he r DON hours. Bild
acknowledged that she did not work the required 15 hours per week in the office, but stated
that she was working away fro m the office as a DON. The president and office manager

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acknowledged that Bild had completed some client intake hours as DON away from the
office, but clarified that intake work requires her to report to the office beforehand. The
office manager also testified that Bild’s D ON hours were recorded by logging into the
computer system at the office and that Bild had been given a computer password for this
purpose. The office manager explained that Agape downloaded the computer login times
to create the payroll. The office manager furthe r testified that Bild had been paid for her
DON hours logged through the computer since she started in April. Agape did not pay
Bild for her DON work-at-home hours. Bild disputed Agape’s claim that she had recorded
her DON hours on the office computer. Bild testified that she did not have a password and
never logged into her computer at the office . Bild also testified that she had submitted
hand-written time sheets for DON hours in the past.
In addition to addressing the DON hours, both Agape’s witnesses and Bild testified
about Bild’s alleged PCA hours. Agape’s offi ce manager testified th at Bild brought in a
number of time sheets that were not signed by the client and wa nted to be paid for them.
She further testified that Agape cannot acc ept unsigned time sheets because the state
requires the client’s signature on each time sheet to show that the client received care from
the PCA. The office manager stated that because the time sheets were never signed by the
client, Bild was not paid for the time included on those time sheets.
Agape’s president also tes tified about Bild’s work as a PCA for Agape. The
president explained that Bild claimed to be providing PCA services to a person (T.K.) who
lived in Bild’s home, but T.K. informed Agape that Bild never provided any PCA services
to her. Bild acknowledged that T.K. lived in her home, but denied doing PCA work for

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T.K. and denied submitting any time sheets for work for T.K. Bild further testified that the
time sheets she submitted were for PCA services that she provided to a man who lived in
White Bear Lake. Agape’s president testified that the White Bear Lake man was actually
a client of Bild’s late husband, not a client of Bild’s, and that it was her husband who did
PCA work for the man.
In a written order, the ULJ found that Bild was not doing her DON job as required
and was refusing to come to work unless Agape paid her for hours that she did not work.
Where there was conflicting testimony, the ULJ determined that Agape’s witnesses were
more credible than Bild. Based on the ULJ’s factual findings, the ULJ concluded that Bild
was discharged because of employment misconduct, and, therefore, Bild was ineligible for
unemployment benefits under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (2018). Bild requested
reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed the initial decision with a modification.
Bild appeals.
D E C I S I O N
In her pro se brief, Bild challenges the ULJ’s determination that she is ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Bild argues that (1 ) the ULJ’s factual findings are unsupported
by the record and (2) her actions do not constitute misconduct. We address each argument
in turn.
I. The ULJ’s factual findings are substantially supported by the record.

Bild disputes multiple factual findings made by the ULJ. We review a ULJ’s
findings of fact “in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision and will rely on findings
that are substantially sup ported by the record.” Fay v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev. ,

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860 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted). We also defer to the ULJ’s
credibility determinations when they ar e supported by substantial evidence. See
Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc. , 726 N.W.2d 525, 532-33 (Minn. App. 2007).
When the credibility of a witness has a “significant effect on the outcome of a decision, the
unemployment law judg e must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting that
testimony.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2018).
Here, the ULJ determined th at Bild was not doing her DON job, was refusing to
come to work unless Agape paid her for hours she di d not work, and made a baseless
complaint that she was not paid. These findings are supported by the testimony of Agape’s
witnesses that Bild stopped coming into the office to do her DON work as required and
that Agape paid Bild for her DON work ba sed on the hours that she was logged into
Agape’s computer system. The ULJ’s findings are also consistent w ith Bild’s testimony
that she stopped coming into work and only came into the office “five to ten out of the
fifteen” hours per week.
The ULJ also found that Bild submitted unsigned time sheets and did not complete
PCA hours that she alleged she completed. These findings are also supported by the record.
Agape’s office manager and president both testified that Bild failed to submit signed PCA
time sheets after being told that the time sheets needed to be signed by the client. And a
person who Bild claimed was her PCA client, T.K., informed Agape in writing that Bild
never provided any PCA services for her.
Bild contests these findings, arguing that (1) she never received a password for the
computer to complete DON h ours; (2) she was allowed to work at home as a DON; and

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(3) she was not paid for her PCA work. In essence, she argues that the ULJ erred by
rejecting her version of even ts and by determining that Ag ape’s witnesses were more
credible.
We defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations on these matters because the ULJ
provided sound reason s for finding Agape’s witnesses more credible than Bild. See
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. App. 2006) (concluding that
credibility determinations are the “exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed
on appeal”); Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a (a) (stating that the ULJ “must set out the
reason for crediting or discrediting” testimony). The ULJ determined that the testimony of
Agape’s president and office manager was “more credible than Bild’s testimony, because
it is a more convincing and likely explanation of events, they corroborate each other, and
Bild has nothing to support her allegations.”
In her brief, Bild also ap pears to ask this court to make new credibility
determinations and to adopt new findings of fact, but that is not our role. Skarhus,
721 N.W.2d at 345. Our role is to determ ine whether the ULJ adequately explained the
reasons for her credibility determinations a nd to determine whether the ULJ’s factual
findings are supported by the record. Id. at 344 (stating that appellate courts “will not
disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence substantially sustains them”).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision, we conclude that
the facts found by the ULJ are substantially supported by the reco rd and that the ULJ
adequately set forth sound reasons for determining that Bild was not as credible as Agape’s
witnesses.

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II. Bild’s actions constitute employment misconduct.
We turn next to whether Bild was discharged because of employment misconduct,
making her ineligible for unemployment benefits. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1).
We review a ULJ’s determination that an applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits
de novo. Fay, 860 N.W.2d at 387.
Employment misconduct is intentional, negl igent, or indifferent conduct “that is a
serious violation of the standards of behavi or the employer has the right to reasonably
expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (Supp. 2019).1 The Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that “[a]s a genera l rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s
reasonable policies and requests amount s to disqualifying misconduct.”
Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp. , 644 N.W.2d 801, 80 4 (Minn. 2002); see also
Cunningham v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc. , 809 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. App. 2011)
(indicating that “[a]n employee’s refusal to abide by the employer’s reasonable policies
ordinarily constitutes employment misconduct.”).
We conclude that Bild’s actions demons trate misconduct for two reasons. First,
Bild failed to report to work. Agape has a right to reasonably expect Bild to report to the
office as DON and Bild admits that she failed to report to the office for the required fifteen
hours per week after the first two weeks of her employment. Second, Bild did not submit

1 The version of Minn. Stat. §268.095, subd. 6(a) that was in effect at the time of the ULJ’s
decision was amended in 2019 to remove “a substantial lack of concern for the
employment” from the definition of employment misconduct. Neither the ULJ’s analysis
nor our analysis relies on the “substantial lack of concern” language that was removed from
the statute.

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her hours worked in the manner required by Agape. For DON hours, Bild failed to use the
required computer system. For PCA work, Bild submitted time sheets without the required
client signatures. It is reasonable for Agap e to expect Bild to submit client-signed time
sheets for any work she did as a PCA to ensure that the patient is getting the care that the
employee claims was provided and to ensure that Agape is in compliance with state rules
for PCA services. See Minn. R. 9505.2175, subp. 7(H)(9 ) (2017). Collectively, these
actions are a “serious violation of the standa rds of behavior the employer has the right to
reasonably expect.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a).
Because Bild engaged in employment misconduct, and was discharged on that basis,
Bild is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1).
Affirmed.