In the Matter of the Welfare of: S. R. L., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0519

In the Matter of the Welfare of: S. R. L., Child.

Filed December 9, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Hooten, Judge

Houston County District Court
File No. 28-JV-17-176

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant S.R.L.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Samuel D. Jandt, Houston County Attorney, Suzanne M. Bublitz, Assistant County
Attorney, Caledonia, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from the disposition order of the district court, appellant argues that
the district court erroneously adjudicated him delinquent for having unsupervised conduct
with a younger juvenile because the allegedly younger juvenile was actually one year older
than appellant and resided in the same group home where appellant had been placed by the
district court. We reverse and remand.

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FACTS
S.R.L., age 12, was charged with multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct
involving sexual assaults on each of his two younger sisters. At a pretrial hearing, within
a couple of weeks after he was charged, S.R.L. agreed to placement at the Mille Lacs
Academy, a juvenile inpatient sex offender program. S.R.L. was admitted to Mille Lacs
Academy on April 5, 2017. On January 31, 2018, S.R.L. was still making progress in his
treatment program at Mille Lacs Academy when the parties reached a re solution of the
charges. S.R.L. admitted to two separate counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
in return for t he state’s agreement that it would dismiss the other charges. Following a
psychosexual evaluation and predisposition report, the district court dismissed the other
charges brought against S.R.L., continued the case s for the admitted offenses without
adjudication, and placed S.R.L. on probation for 180 da ys. Among other probation
conditions, S.R.L. was required to remain law abiding, successfully complete the program
at Mille Lacs Academy , and was prohibited from possessing sexually explicit materials
and having “unsupervised contact with children younger than juvenile.”
On June 1, 2018, S.R.L. completed his treatment at Mille Lacs Academy and was
placed in a group foster home. In September, the state moved to extend the continuance
without adjudication for another 180 days , pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05,
subd. 4(B). The district court granted the motion and continued the matter through March
18, 2019.
When S.R.L. was 13 years old and still living at the group foster home, t he state
filed a probation violation report on January 8, 2019, alleging that S.R.L. violated two

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conditions of his probation: (1) possessing or using sexually explicit materials and (2)
having unsupervised contact with a juvenile younger than S.R.L. The report was based on
information received from S.R.L.’s group home. The owner of the group home reported
to S.R.L.’s probation agent that S.R.L. had viewed pornography on another resi dent’s
prohibited cell phone and that he had entered the bed of a low -functioning resident
approximately three to five times in the preceding months. S.R.L. denied the allegations,
and the district court set a probation revocation hearing.
At the hearing, S.R.L.’s probation agent testified regarding the facts in support of
the two pro bation violations. Regarding the second allegation, that S.R.L. had
unsupervised contact with a younger juvenile, the probation agent explained once again
what the owner had reported: “[A] lower-functioning juvenile at their home had reported
that [S.R.L.] had climbed into bed with him three to five times over the course of . . . [f]our
months.” The probation agent testified that the other resident was 14 years old and ha d
autism. The probation agent testified that in “one instance he was caught on top o f this
kid; and he, [S.R.L.] had said that he was trying to teach this kid how to get out of situations.
. . . [T]here was tickling and touching, but not sexually. Just tickling and touching.” The
owner indicated that she believed that S.R.L.’s conduct appeared to be grooming behavior.
The probation agent testified that she spoke with S.R.L. about these reports. When
she spoke with him about the second allegation, he responded, “Well, I already thought
you knew about me going into the bed with him so I didn’t think it was a big deal.” The
probation agent testified that when she told S.R.L. that she would file a probation violation,
he got upset and, for the first time, he was “defiant or disrespectful” towards her.

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The district court did not find that there was clear and convincing evidence that
S.R.L. had possessed sexually explicit materials, but found that there was clear and
convincing evidence that S.R.L. had unsupervised contact with a juvenile younger than
S.R.L.:
[G]iven the s erious nature of the charges that underlie all of
this, the charges for which you’re on probation, the fact that
you would have contact with someone younger than you
who—at least according to the proof provided here and is
convincing to me that it’s someon e who may be not
functioning at quite the level that others may be, that’s
disconcerting to say the very least.

The district court adjudicated S.R.L. delinquent and ordered that he attend
outpatient juvenile sex offender treatment. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
S.R.L. argues that there was not clear and convi ncing evidence that he violated the
condition of his probation that he ha ve no unsupervised contact with younger juveniles
because the juvenile with whom he had contact was a year older than he. The state does
not dispute that the other juvenile was older than S.R.L., but claims that notwithstanding
the other juvenile’s age, the juvenile was lower functioning and had a diagnosis of autism.
The state maintains that S.R.L. should have known that this other juvenile, because of his
lower functioning and autism, was equivalent to a younger juvenile with whom he was to
have no unsupervised contact.
District courts have broad discre tion in determining the appr opriate disposition in
juvenile delinquency cases. In re Welfare of R.V. , 702 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Minn. App.
2005). “Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a district court’s disposition will not be

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disturbed.” In re Welfare of J.A .J., 545 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Minn. App. 1996). A district
court abuses its discretion if its disposition is arbitrary or based on clearly erroneous factual
findings. In re Welfare of S.J.T., 736 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 24, 2007); J.A.J., 545 N.W.2d at 414. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if
there is no reasonable evidence to support it or if the appellate court “is left with the definite
and firm convi ction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Rhoads , 813 N.W.2d 88 0, 885
(Minn. 2012).
“Adjudicating a child for an offense after initially granting a continuance without
adjudication is a probation revocation and must be accomplished pursuant to Rule 15.07.”
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(E). To revoke probation in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, district courts are not required to follow the steps provided in State v. Austin,
295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). 1 Instead, district court s must follow the rules of
juvenile delinquency procedure. R.V., 702 N.W.2d at 302–04. Before a district court may
adjudicate a juvenile delinquent who was previously granted a continuance without
adjudication, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile violated the
terms of a disposition order. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.07, subd. 4(D); see also R.V., 702
N.W.2d at 303. “[A]s a matter of fundamental fairness, the district court must also ensure
that the conditions that the probationer is alleged to h ave violated were actually imposed
and that the juvenile had notice that violation of the conditions of probation could result in

1 In State v. Austin, t he Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that, before probation can be
revoked in an adult criminal case, the district court must designate the specific conditions
that were violated, find the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and find that the need
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. 295 N.W.2d at 250.

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revocation.” R.V., 702 N.W.2d at 303; see also State v. Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d 74, 79 –80
(Minn. 2004) (reversing revocation of adult probationer’s probation because the condition
alleged to have been violated was not imposed by district court).
While the Austin factors are not required for probation violations in juvenile
delinquency cases, the first factor —that the district cou rt must identify the specific
conditions violated —is analogous to the requirement to provide notice . See R.V. , 702
N.W.2d at 303 ( “To find a violation of the terms of the disposition order by clear and
convincing evidence, the district court must necessarily identify the specific conditions that
the probationer violated, as Austin requires.”).
Here, S.R.L.’s disposition order prohibited him from having “unsupervised contact
with children younger than juvenile.” The district court found that S.R.L. entered the bed
of another resident of his group home on multiple occasions and concluded that he had
violated this term of his disposition order. But, testimony at the revocation hearing
revealed that the other juvenile is actually older than S.R.L. and was 14 years old when the
contact occurred . T he probation condition specifically states that S.R.L. may not have
“unsupervised contact with children younger than the juvenile.” (Emphasis added).
Because the other juvenile was older than S.R.L., t he district court ’s factual finding is
clearly erroneous.
The sta te argues that S.R.L. violated probation because “he engaged in bad
behaviors that were a threat to public safety and to the safety of other residents in his group
home.” The state contends that the district court need not interpret the t erms of S.R.L.’s
disposition order literally, but may “expand” the meaning of “younger” to include those

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who are developmentally delayed. The state pro vides no caselaw to support these
assertions.
Contrary to the state’s argument , caselaw provides that probation conditions must
reasonably explain what conduct is prohibited. “In imposing a probationary sentence, if
noncriminal conduct could result in revocation, the district court should advise the
defendant so that the defendant can be reasonably able to tell what lawful acts are
prohibited.” Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d at 80 (quotation omitted). Because S.R.L.’s probation
condition states that he should have no unsupervised conta ct with juveniles younger than
S.R.L., and the district court never explained to S.R.L. that this term could be expanded to
include older juveniles with disabilities or developmental delays, t he conditions of
probation imposed by the district court never put S.R.L. on notice that there were
circumstances where having contact with a juvenile older than S.R.L. would violate his
probation.
Although the district court placed S.R.L. in a group home with other juveniles, there
is nothing in the record indicatin g that the district court considered how many other
juveniles were in the home or their ages, the degree of supervision provided to the juveniles
in the home, or whether incidental or perhaps unavoidable contact with younger juveniles
in the group home wou ld constitute a violation. There is also nothing in the record that
indicates that the district court , S.R.L.’s probation officer, or anyone else advised S.R.L.
as to how he was to maneuver in a group home full of juveniles, perhaps even younger than
S.R.L., with varying degrees of supervision without violat ing the condition of no contact
with younger juveniles.

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The specific condition that the district court claims was violated was that S.R.L. had
unsupervised contact with a juvenile younger than he. In order to support such a violation,
the district court must find by clear and convincing evidence that S.R.L. had unsupervised
contract with a younger juvenile. B ecause S.R.L. did not have unsupervised contact with
a younger juvenile, as the other juvenile was older than S.R.L., the district court’s finding
that S.R.L. violated his probation is not supported by the record.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court ’s adjudication of delinquency because
S.R.L. did not violate the specific probation condition relied upon by the district court.
Because the juvenile’s continuance without adjudication has expired, the petition against
S.R.L. must be dismissed. The district court had already continued the matter for one
additional 180-day continuance. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(B) (providing
that the district court may continue a case without adjudication for 180 days with one
additional continuance of 180 days). A district court loses jurisdiction after the initial stay
and one additional c ontinuance of 180 days expires. See In re C.S.N. , 917 N.W.2d 427,
434 (Minn. App. 2018) (reversing and remanding when the district court lost jurisdiction
to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent after failing to continue without adjudication for an
additional 180 days). Therefore, we remand with directions to dismiss the petition against
S.R.L.
Reversed and remanded.