In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. J. C., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0521

In the Matter of the Welfare of:
T. J. C., Child.

Filed November 4, 2019
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Sibley County District Court
File No. 72-JV-18-132

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David E. Schauer, Sibley County Attorney, Donald E. Lannoye, Assistant County
Attorney, Gaylord, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order certifying proceedings for adult
criminal prosecution on the charge of third- degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it applied “the wrong legal
standard” based on the “belief that the longer supervision time in the adult system is always
better for public safety.” Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
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applied the presumption of certification and considered the six public-safety factors
required by statute, we affirm.
FACTS
We presume that the facts alleged in the state’s juvenile-delinquency petition are
true.1 In June 2018, a 17- year-old female (victim) reported to police that she had been
sexually assaulted. She was camping with friends at a park in Sibley County, got heavily
intoxicated, and went to bed. The victim “woke up during the middle of the night and
[T.J.C.] was having sex with her (penetrating her with his penis).” The victim tried to push
T.J.C. off her, but she “passed out.” When she woke up later, T.J.C. was gone. The victim
later “texted [T.J.C.] and asked if he ejaculated inside her.” He replied that he “never
finished.” The victim denied having sex with T.J.C. at any other time. Later, when law
enforcement interviewed T.J.C., he “denied ever having sex with [the victim].”
The victim reported that she became pregnant and terminated the pregnancy. DNA
results of the aborted fetus excluded 99.999999996% of the population from being the
father, but could not exclude T.J.C. During a follow-up interview where police gave T.J.C.
the DNA evidence, he denied assaulting the victim or having sex with her at any
time. T.J.C. acknowledged that he was with the victim on the night she was camping.
The state filed a delinquency petition against T.J.C. and alleged one count of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d) (2016).

1 See In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 2008) (“For purposes of the
certification hearing, the charges against the child are presumed to be true.”).
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On the day it filed the petition, the state also moved for adult certification; T.J.C. opposed
the motion. Neither party nor the court requested a certification study.
After T.J.C. waived a formal probable -cause hearing, the district court f ound that
probable cause supported the state’s charge against T.J.C. At the certification hearing,
T.J.C. called a probation officer, who testified to various inpatient and outpatient treatment
programs for sex offenders. T.J.C. also called Maria Hipkins, a social worker and
disposition advisor for the public defender’s office, who testified about brain development
in juveniles, the research on effective programming for juvenile offenders, and available
treatment options for sex offenders. The district court also received one exhibit, a report
by Hipkins on adolescent brain development, and took judicial notice of T.J.C.’s prior
delinquency files.
The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order in March
2019, granting the state’s motion for adult certification. T.J.C. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
T.J.C. argues that the d istrict court abused its discretion because it certified him to
adult court when extended-jurisdiction juvenile prosecution (EJJ) would not risk public
safety and would provide better treatment options. The state argues that T.J.C. did not rebut
the presumption of certification that applies to his case.
“A district court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a case for
adult prosecution. Its decision will not be reversed unless [the district court’s] findings are
clearly erroneous so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of P.C.T. ,
823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). When
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determining whether a district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, we view the
record evidence in the light most favorable to the findings. See In re Custody of N.A.K. ,
649 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Minn. 2002).
Two presumptions apply to our analysis. “For purposes of certification, the juvenile
is presumed guilty of the alleged offenses.” P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 679. Second, we
presume that proceedings against a juvenile are appropriate for adult certification if the
state can prove the juvenile was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the alleged offense and a
conviction “would result in a presumptive commitment to prison” under the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (2018).
A juvenile may rebut the second presumption by “clear and convincing evidence
that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety.” Id. If the juvenile
rebuts the presumption, the district court may designate the proceeding as an EJJ
prosecution under the hearing process set out in Minn. Stat. § 260B.130, subd. 2; see also
Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 8(b). If the juvenile does not rebut the presumption, then the
district court “shall certify the proceeding” for adult court. Id., subd. 3.
Here, the parties do not dispute that the presumption of certification applies to
T.J.C.’s prosecution. He was 17 years old at the time of the alleged offense, and the pending
charge of third-degree criminal sexual conduct carries a presumptive prison sentence .
See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (2018) (providing that a conviction for third-degree sexual
conduct has a presumptive prison sentence). Thus, in response to the state’s motion to
certify, T.J.C. had the burden to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence
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that keeping the proceeding in juvenile court would serve public safety. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 3.
In determining whether retaining juvenile jurisdiction will serve public safety, the
district court must consider six factors:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;
(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child’s programming history, including the child’s
past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available
in the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4 (2018). In considering these factors, the district court must
“give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record
of delinquency than to the other factors listed.” Id.
T.J.C. argues that he “showed by clear and convincing evidence . . . that public
safety would not be at risk if EJJ was ordered” and that the district court abused its
discretion because it “wrongly assess[ed] the six public safety factors.” In its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order, the district court assessed all six of the public safety
factors, which we review in light of the arguments T.J.C. raises on appeal.
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A. Severity of the crime (greater-weight factor)
The district court found that the state charged T.J.C. with “having sex with a
physically helpless juvenile female,” which is a “very serious offense” favoring
certification. The district court found that T.J.C. had acknowledged that the victim “was
heavily intoxicated and would have been incapable of giving consent to have sex.” On
appeal, T.J.C. does not dispute the district court’s finding, but argues that “only serious
offenses . . . are even eligible for a certification motion.” This argument is unpersuasive.
The first factor recognizes that some offenses are more serious than others based on risk to
the community. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(1). The district court’s determination
that the first factor favors certification was not an abuse of discretion.
B. Culpability of the juvenile
The district court found that T.J.C. “acted alone,” “was not inf luenced or
encouraged by others, ” and therefore was “solely responsible for his behavior.” T.J.C.
does not challenge this finding. Instead, T.J.C. argues that the district court abused its
discretion because it did not consider Hipkins’s report on adolescent brain development,
which suggests that juveniles are immature and impulsive; T.J.C. appears to argue that
juveniles are less culpable than adults. Although this may raise a policy -based reason to
favor EJJ proceedings over adult certification, we agree with the district court that
Hipkins’s report does not “address the public safety factors” required by section 260B.125,
subd. 4. When the legislature has provided mandatory considerations, this court does not
modify those considerations based on public policy arguments. See LaChapelle v. Mitten,
607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. App. 2000) (stating that “[b]ecause this court is limited in its
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function to correcting errors it cannot create public policy”), review denied (Minn. May 16,
2000).
T.J.C. also argues that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to
consider that he “was intoxicated during the offense.” The district court stated that T.J.C.
is “alleged to have been using chemicals at the time of the alleged offense.” But T.J.C. cites
no caselaw establishing that intoxication is relevant to culpability. See Ganguli v. Univ. of
Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to decide an argument that
contained no legal analysis or citation). We also observe that voluntary intoxication is not
a defense for general intent crimes, such as criminal sexual conduct. See State v. Lindahl,
309 N.W.2d 763, 766 -67 (Minn. 1981) ( stating that criminal-sexual-conduct offenses
require proof of general intent and voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general-intent
crimes).
Finally, T.J.C. contends that the district court inappropriately “penalize[d]” him for
denying the criminal sexual conduct. We reject this description of the district court’s
analysis. Although the district court was required to assume the truth of the facts alleged
in the juvenile delinquency petition, the district court’s order stated T.J.C.’s denial in the
findings of fact and placed no emphasis on the denial in its analysis. Based upon this record,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the second
factor favors certification.
C. The child’s history of delinquency (greater-weight factor)
The district court found that T.J.C.’s delinquency record favored certification
because T.J.C. has “a history of involvement in the Juvenile Justice System,” including
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“six prior files,” and that T.J.C. “was on probation at the time of the alleged
offense.” T.J.C. argues that this finding was clear error because he had “no prior felony
offenses and much of his priors were not, in fact, delinquencies but, instead, were juvenile
petty offenses.”
We agree with T.J.C. that the district court clearly erred in some of its factual
findings on this factor. The definition of “[d]elinquent child” includes a child “who has
violated any state or local law,” and the definition explicitly excludes juvenile petty
offenders. Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subd. 6 (2016) (providing that the definition excludes
“juvenile offenders as described in subdivisions 16 to 18,” which includes petty offenders).
T.J.C.’s “six prior files” included two adjudications as a petty offender for
consuming liquor under the age of 21, one adjudication as a petty offender for violating a
curfew, one adjudication as a petty offender for using tobacco under the age of 18, one
delinquency adjudication for gross misdemeanor theft, and one delinquency adjudication
for disorderly conduct. The district court clearly erred in considering T.J.C.’s four petty
offenses, which are not delinquencies. See id.
T.J.C. cites In re Welfare of N.J.S. as support. 753 N.W.2d at 710 (Minn. 2008). In
N.J.S., the district court determined that the six public-safety factors supported certification
of a juvenile for adult prosecution. Id. at 706. The district court weighed the “prior record
of delinquency” factor in favor of certification although the juvenile “had no prior
delinquency petitions or adjudications”; the district court considered the juvenile’s
behavioral incidents at school. Id. On appeal, we affirmed adult certification because the
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six public-safety factors were not an “exclusive list” of factors the district court could
consider in certification. Id. at 710 n.3.
The supreme court granted review and rejected our comment about the factors as
error because “[t]here is no indication that other factors may be considered” under the
statute. Id. The supreme court reasoned that the district court could not consider the
juvenile’s school record under the third factor because the behavioral incidents were “not
the subject of any petition to the juvenile court, nor [were they] the subject of any
juvenile court adjudication.” Id. at 710. Still, the supreme court affirmed adult certification,
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion “[b]ecause only one factor, the
‘prior record of delinquency,’ weighed against certification.” Id. at 711.
N.J.S. is instructive, but must be distinguished. Unlike the juvenile in N.J.S., who
had no prior delinquency adjudications, T.J.C . had two prior delinquency adjudications.
T.J.C. contends that these prior delinquency adjudications were not felonies, but a district
court may consider prior misdemeanor-level offenses on the third factor. See In re Welfare
of K.M., 544 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn. App. 1996) (determining that one prior misdemeanor
was sufficient to support findings under the third factor). We conclude that the district
court’s error in considering T.J.C.’s four prior petty offenses does not change the outcome
of the third factor, which favors T.J.C.’s certification as an adult based on his prior
delinquency record.
D. The child’s programming history
The district court found that T.J.C. had “participated in chemical dependency
programming” but “is alleged to have been using chemicals at the time of the alleged
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offense.” T.J.C. does not challenge these factual findings, but argues that “[t]he district
court failed to properly assess that the juvenile has had no prior sexual offender
programming nor has he shown an inability or unwillingness to participate in treatment.”
T.J.C. cites no caselaw to support his claim that the fourth factor requires the
previous programming to have been related to the pending charge. To the contrary, on the
fourth factor, a district court may review diverse programming history, including
“attendance at programming events, completion of the events, and demonstrated behavioral
changes correlated with the programming,” and “behavioral problems in school.” P.C.T.,
823 N.W.2d at 683. The fourth factor specifically provides that a court should consider
“the child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming.” Minn.
Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(4). “Rejection of prior treatment efforts indicates a juvenile’s
unwillingness to submit to programming in a meaningful way. ” In re Welfare of U.S.,
612 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Minn. App. 2000).
The record supports the district court’s findings on T.J.C.’s participation in prior
programming including his rejection of chemical-dependency treatment. We conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the fourth factor in favor of
certification.
E. Adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile
justice system

The district court found that “the same sex offender treatment programs available
in the Juvenile Justice System will be available to [T.J.C.], even if this matter is certified
to adult court.” T.J.C. contends this finding is clearly erroneous as “unsupported and
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contradicted by [the probation officer’s] testimony that the juvenile would not receive the
same programming in prison as he would under EJJ.”
At the certification hearing, the probation officer testified: “My understanding is
[T.J.C.] would be attending programming with other juveniles regardless if he was certified
as an adult or not,” but only if he was on probation. He also testified that “there is sex
offender programming offered in prison,” but that it is t ypically only available when an
offender nears the end of a sentence.
The r ecord supports the district court’s findings under the fifth factor. If T.J.C.
receives a stayed sentence, his programming options would be the same as other juveniles.
Any delay in T.J.C.’s access to sex-offender treatment if he is certified and committed to
prison does not make the treatment inadequate. And the fact that treatment may start earlier
in the juvenile system does not provide clear and convincing evidence that juvenile
proceedings promote public safety. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in weighing the fifth factor in favor of certification.
F. Dispositional options available for the child
The district court found that, under EJJ, T.J.C. “will only be supervised until his
21st birthday,” that T.J.C.’s own expert testified that a juvenile’s brain does not fully
develop until age 25, and that “[i]f this matter is certified, [he] can be supervised and
engage in programming beyond his 25th birthday.” T.J.C. argues that the district court
evaluated this factor “on clearly erroneous facts and faulty logic.”
There is some support for the district court’s reasoning. At the certification hearing,
Hipkins testified that it would be better for public safety if the district court kept T.J.C. in
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the juvenile system because scientific research supports that juveniles are less likely to
reoffend if they remain in the juvenile system. And the district court accurately stated
during the certification hearing that EJJ prosecution would allow supervision until age 21
(about three-and -one-half years). See Minn. Stat. § 260B.19, subd. 5(b), (c) (2018)
(providing that EJJ ends when a juvenile turns 21). Hipkins agreed in her testimony that it
was a “valid opinion” that in “some cases” juveniles need monitoring until age 25 based
on delayed brain development.
But we conclude that the district court erred in its analysis of the sixth factor because
it relied on general evidence that a juvenile’s brain continues to develop until age 25 to
support T.J.C.’s certification as an adult. Although Hipkins’s testimony suggested that
some juveniles may need supervision until age 25, no evidence supports that T.J.C. was
more or less likely to rehabilitate than the average juvenile. The district court’s reasoning
about T.J.C.’s age would generally apply to all 17 -year-old juveniles and suggest that
longer supervision always favors adult certification. Thus, the district court did not assess
T.J.C.’s “unique character istics” in its analysis of the sixth factor. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.001, subd. 2 (2018).
Despite this error, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that T.J.C. failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that juvenile
proceedings serve public safety . When the presumption of certif ication applies and the
greater-weight factors favor certification, as they do here, the mere availability of
dispositional options in the juvenile system does not provide clear and co nvincing
evidence that keeping the proceeding in juvenile court serves public safety. See Minn. Stat.
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§ 260B.125, subd. 3; P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 685; St. Louis County v. S.D.S., 610 N.W.2d
644, 650 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that available dispositional options in juvenile court
“are outweighed b y the seriousness of respondent’s alleged offenses and his prior
delinquency record”). Even if the sixth factor weighs against certification, no reversal is
required because five of six factors favor certification. See N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d at 711
(holding that no reversal was required when five of six factors supported certification).
Because the record supports the district court’s findings on at least five of the six
public-safety factors, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that T.J.C.
failed to rebut the presumption of certification with clear and convincing evidence.
Affirmed.